

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DEBRECENIENSIS  
SERIES HISTORICA LXVI.

---

A Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézete Kiadványai

Főszerkesztő / Editor-in-Chief:  
ATTILA BÁRÁNY



ACTA UNIVERSITATIS  
DEBRECENIENSIS  
SERIES HISTORICA LXVI.

# TÖRTÉNETI TANULMÁNYOK

## XXII.

A Debreceni Egyetem Történeti Intézetének kiadványa /  
Published by the Institute of History, University of Debrecen

SZERKESZTETTE / EDITED BY:  
ATTILA BÁRÁNY and CSABA LÉVAI

Debreceni Egyetem, Debrecen  
2014

A DEBRECENI EGYETEM TÖRTÉNELMI INTÉZETE KIADÁSA

*Nemzetközi szerkesztőbizottság / Editorial Board*

Barta János (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Forisek Péter (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Gheorghe Gorun (Partium Egyetem, Nagyvárad)  
Kónya Péter (Prešovská Univerzita, Prešov)  
Manfred Jatzlauk (Universität Rostock, Rostock)  
Orosz István (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Pál Judit (Babes-Bolyai Egyetem, Kolozsvár-Cluj)  
Papp Imre (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Papp Klára (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Püski Levente (Debreceni Egyetem)  
Rüsz-Fogarasi Enikő (Babes-Bolyai Egyetem, Kolozsvár-Cluj)  
Sipos Gábor (Református Egyházkerületi Levéltár, Kolozsvár-Cluj)

*Lektorálták /Peer-reviewed by:*

a Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézet oktatói illetve anonim lektorok /

*Technikai szerkesztő / Lay-out:*

LOVAS ANETT CSILLA

*A kötet kiadását támogatta / Supported by:*

a Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézete,  
a Debreceni Egyetem, Történelmi és Néprajzi Doktori Iskola

ISSN 1217-4602 Történelmi Tanulmányok  
ISSN 0418-4556 Acta Univ. Debr. Ser. Hist.

© Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézete

© Szerzők / Authors

Nyomta a Kapitális Kft., Debrecen  
Felelős vezető: Kapusi József



## Tartalom / Foreword

<i>Foreword</i> .....	8
ORSOLYA TÓTH	
The Roman Saturnalia and the Survival of its Traditions Among Christians.....	10
LÁSZLÓ PÓSÁN	
Der Deutsche Ritterorden in der europäischen Politik im ersten Drittel des 13. Jahrhunderts (1211–1230).....	22
ATTILA BÁRÁNY	
La Hongrie et la guerre de Bretagne (1488-1493).....	38
ATTILA GYÖRKÖS	
Diplomatie ou espionnage? La France et le conflit Habsbourg-Hongrie en 1506.....	66
ÁDÁM NOVÁK	
The Seal Usage of János Perényi (†1458), Master of the Treasury.....	78
ISTVÁN PETROVICS	
Capystranus: An anonymous English epic poem printed in London in 1515.....	98
KATALIN SCHREK	
Anglo-Russian Mechanisms for Crisis Management in the First Period of the Greek Cause (1821 – 1826).....	142
FERENC VELKEY	
„Jouer à la Talleyrand? István Széchenyi lors du tournant de mars 1848.....	160
GYÖRGY MIRU	
Ideas and languages in Hungarian politics during the period of Dualism.....	186
JÁNOS MAZSU	
Right Way or Dead End: What Kind of Turning Point is the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867?.....	204
BALÁZS VENKOVITS	
A Changing Experience of Transport, Travel, and Mobility: The Transatlantic Crossing to the United States in 19 <sup>th</sup> -century Hungarian Travel Writing.....	222
ISTVÁN KORNÉL VIDA	
“His Second Beau Ideal of Statesman?”: The Invocation of Thomas Jefferson in Abraham Lincoln’s Political Career.....	240

GÁBOR SZABÓ-ZSOLDOS	
Differing Interpretations of the South African War in Hungary . . . . .	254
ZSOLT SZILÁGYI	
The Perception of a Market Town in the Great Plain. The Representations of Kecskemét between 1880 and 1940 . . . . .	266
RÓBERT BARTA	
Churchill’s Ideas on United Europe After World War II . . . . .	282
PÉTER DEBRECENI	
Horthy’s Meeting with Hitler in Kiel in August of 1938 from a Polish perspective . . . . .	300
ERZSÉBET MOLNÁR D.	
Transcarpathia and the <i>Malenkiy Robot</i> . . . . .	326
NATÁLIA VÁRADI	
Documents Related to the Revolution of 1956 from Transcarpathian Archives . . . . .	340
ДМИТРИЙ ДЬЯКОВ	
Враждебная территория. Воронежский поход 2-й венгерской армии . . . . .	362
List of authors . . . . .	382

## *Foreword*

We have long been planning to have a foreign language issue of the periodical of the Institute of History, the University of Debrecen, *Történeti Tanulmányok – Acta Universitatis Debreceniensis Series Historica*. The editors intended to come forward with a kind of a special issue with articles in foreign languages in order to have ourselves introduced to the non-Hungarian public and make our researches accessible to foreign readers.

The issue covers a large part of the research fields of the members of the departments within the Institute of History, ranging from medieval to modern periods. It is not only designed to give an overview of the work of our colleagues in the Institute, but it also has an opportunity for younger scholars, mainly PhD-students of our Doctoral School. We were pleased to include articles from former doctoral students – one for instance from another higher education institution in Transcarpathia –, and we also aimed at introducing the works of colleagues whom we are working with, either from other departments of our university, or, another Hungarian university, or, from a Russian university.

The articles will hopefully present an outline of the investigations in the Institute of History in Debrecen.

The Editors





## Orsolya Tóth

### The Roman Saturnalia and the Survival of its Traditions Among Christians<sup>1</sup>

Saturnalia was originally counted as one of the sowing festivals, since planting the winter seeds finished in the middle of December, the feast itself was held on 17 and lasted for only one day, meanwhile, in the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C. it was certainly a seven-day long holiday (from December 17 to 23) as Novius, the Atellana poet gives evidence of it in one of his lines: “*olim exspectata veniunt septem Saturnalia*”.<sup>2</sup> At certain times, for instance under the reign of Augustus, the length of the festival was limited to three days. Consualia, the festival of Consus – the god of harvest – was two days prior to Saturnalia, and Opalia, the feast of Ops – the goddess of rich and plentiful crop – was held on 19. These celebrations repeated similarly at the time of the summer harvest (Consualia was on August 21, Vulcanalia-Opis Opifera’s feast was on August 23, Opiconsivia was on 25).<sup>3</sup>

The most detailed description of Saturnalia’s origins and traditions can be found at Macrobius, the Roman author from Late Antiquity.<sup>4</sup> We know from him that Accius, the tragedy writer traced Saturnalia back to the Greek Cronia festival, while Varro had the opinion that the first celebration of this kind had been held at the time of the dictator Titus Larcus, who bore his office in 501 or 498 B.C.<sup>5</sup> Under his leadership the Saturn temple was consecrated, although the construction of it had been ordered by Tarquinius Superbus. According to another tradition, the first Saturnalia was organised during the reign of Tullus Hostilius, regarding the traditional date between 672 and 641 B.C., as the above mentioned temple was actually consecrated by this king to Saturn as a votive gift for his victories over the Albans and the Sabines. Relative to the *consecratio* of the Saturn temple other possible dates are also known: according to one

1 This study was prepared with the support of Hungarian National Foundation for Scientific Research (OTKA), grant no. 104789K, and the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

2 Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, 1.10.3.

3 In connection with the order and significance of the celebrations mentioned above see Th. Köves-Zulauf, *Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe*. [Introduction to the History of Roman Religion and Mythology] Budapest, 1995. 75–80.

4 Macr. *Sat.* 1.7.18–37.

5 Titus Larcus consul in 501 or 498 B.C. bore the title of dictator in one of the two years mentioned, however, there is a diversity of opinions relating to which year.

view, it was built by the senate's order, under the control of Lucius Furius, a military tribune with consular power, possibly around 390 B.C.,<sup>6</sup> but Livy<sup>7</sup> and Dionysius of Halicarnassus<sup>8</sup> dated the dedication of the temple to 497, to the year of A. Sempronius and M. Minucius' consulship. The treasury took place in this temple, according to the idea that during the earthly reign of Saturn the crime of theft was unknown, as people did not have private wealth, their possessions belonged to the public property. The great honour of Saturn is well demonstrated by the expression the Romans used for his feast: *festum omnium deorum principis*<sup>9</sup>.

By examining the question of the feast's origins Macrobius concluded that the roots of Saturnalia would go back to the ancient, pre-historic times. He talked about four possible theories of the origin: according to the first one, Ianus,<sup>10</sup> the Italian ruler founded the feast to the honour of Saturn, or it was founded by the companions of Hercules, who were left in Italia, because they thought Saturn would protect them from their hostile neighbours. The third option is that the Pelasgians, who immigrated into Latium, established the feast, or maybe Saturnalia was the adoption of the above mentioned Greek Cronia feast. Besides these four versions the

---

6 Between 444 and 367 B.C. consular tasks were carried out by military tribunes with consular power. There are three military tribunes named Lucius Furius known from this period who took this office all together twelve times from 432 to 370 and one of them probably had the responsibility to restore the temple after the Gallic invasion in 390. Cf. *Macrobius, Saturnalia 1-2*. Ed., transl. R. Kaster. Cambridge, Massachusetts – London, 2011. n. 118.

7 2.21.1.

8 6.1.4. Here the author mentions the year of Postumius Cominius' consulship as a possible date that can be put between 501 and 493. About the construction and history of the Saturn temple see in greater detail: L. Richardson, Jr., *The Approach to the Temple of Saturn in Rome*. = *American Journal of Archeology*, 84, 1980. 51–62.

9 *Macr. Sat.* 1.7.13, in translation of R. Kaster (see n. 6): “celebration of the foremost of the gods”.

10 About the figure and appearance of Ianus in Roman mythology, literature and art a thorough description is given by the Roscher's mythological lexicon in its entry ‘Ianus’ that can be used well up to the present (W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie*. Leipzig, 1890–1894. II. 1. 15–55); the deity's role played in Roman religion is clarified from the aspect of topography, through the buildings and monuments connected to him: L. A. Holland, *Janus and the Bridge*. Roma, 1961; recently the issue has been examined together with its survival by V. Gasperoni Panella – M. G. Cittadini Fulvi, *Dal mondo antico al Cristianesimo sulle tracce di Giano*. Perugia, 2008. To Macrobius' Ianus and Saturn interpretation, furthermore to the origins of Saturnalia see E. Syska, *Studien zur Theologie des Macrobius*. Stuttgart, 1993. 4–95.

author is aware of the existence of one more theory that is related to the secret nature of the deity, but he does not give an account of it. He does not commit himself explicitly to any of the listed versions, however, he explains the first theory in more details than the others and it can be reckoned the most coherent one.

The first version, the euhemeristic approach combines the figures of Saturn and Janus closely. According to that, neither Janus nor Saturn was originally a deity, but a human being. In the ancient times Janus reigned in the area that later became Italia, and only after his death he started to be worshipped as god for his deeds. Janus shared his power with a certain Camese who was replaced by Saturn in power after some time. Saturn arrived at the coast of Italia by ship and Janus received him with hospitality, furthermore, he learnt from him how to farm and make the lands fertile and gave this knowledge to his people. Saturn's Italian reign finished with his disappearance and after this event he started to get worshipped as god. Although in connection with Saturn it is not stated that he was human, the description of Macrobius makes us think of it unambiguously: *aram deinde cum sacris tamquam deo condidit; observari igitur eum iussit maiestate religionis*.<sup>11</sup> If he talked about a deity he would not have to emphasize that an altar had been set up for him, *as though for a god*, and it would not have to be commanded that people worshipped him, which could be also natural in case of a deity. In this respect the author must have relied on the Virgilian tradition as well, since some texts of the *Aeneid*'s 7th and 8th books mention Janus and Saturn as *vir* (man),<sup>12</sup> and Servius also calls attention to this word's significance.

Protarchus of Tralles<sup>13</sup> is the earliest known writer who mentions Janus as a human being and at around the beginning of our era this story occurs at several authors. In another version of this account Janus is of Greek origin and moved to Italia with his wife, Camese or in other places Camesene and with his two children.<sup>14</sup> Virgil also must have known the

11 *Sat.* 1.7.24. ("he established an altar, as though for a god, and sacred rites that he called the "Saturnalia"", transl. R. Kaster)

12 Virgil, *Aeneid* 7.177–182, 8.356.

13 About Protarchus not much information is known, actually we can only be certain that he wrote about the geography and history of ancient Italia and he must have lived in the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C. or before as Hyginus mentions him as a source.

14 According to this version he came from Perhaibia in Thessalia, cf. Plutarch, *Roman Questions* 22; Athenaeus, 15.692; John Lydus, *On the Months* 4.2. According to the first version Janus is a native, his co-regent, Camese is probably a man, in the other variant he

two types of tradition as he refers to Janus among the ancestors of Latinus besides Italus, Sabinus and Saturn<sup>15</sup> (and if we accept the commentary of Servius relating here, then he also comes from the Aborigines), while the Arcadian Euander<sup>16</sup> calls him *Ianus pater*,<sup>17</sup> so he also counts him among his ancestors, which can support his Greek origin. Macrobius was definitely aware of the Greek relations' possibility since he mentions Antevorta and Postvorta as Janus' companions, and it is a matter of common knowledge that they were the sisters or supporters of Euander's mother, Carmenta,<sup>18</sup> moreover, Servius' commentary also reports about this in details.<sup>19</sup>

---

is an immigrant stranger and the other character in the story is a woman. It is certain that Camese and Camesene – even a man or a woman (although G. Radke, *Götter Altitaliens*. Münster, 1965. 77 deduced convincingly that the name Camese grammatically cannot be taken by men) – are the same person. Regarding the personality even Macrobius could have been uncertain as he talks about this person quite laconically. Not much is known only that they shared power with Janus in a way that this person ruled over the land that was named after him Camesene and Janus governed the city that took the name Janiculum. (The cult of the heroes generally has an urban feature, cf. A. Brelich, *Gli eroi Greci*. Roma, 1958. 313.) According to the Greek version Janus arrived in Italia by ship and as he found the native people uncivilized he taught them how to farm and gave them political institutions. The latter version assigns Janus with the deeds of creating civilization that had been attributed to Saturn previously. The example is not unique: in the mythology of different nations the first rulers are often recognised as culture heroes creating civilization traced back into mythical times. The general feature of these heroes is that they gain or create different cultural benefits for people for the first time (acquiring fire, spreading cultivated plants, producing tools). They teach people certain crafts, arts, introduce rites and celebrations, and in general they play an intermediary role between people and the transcendental powers. Janus does not belong to the type of heroes who as a demiurge interferes with organising the world and he himself is the creator of nature's order like Prometheus or the Sumerian Enki and Enlil – although the figures of the demiurge, the culture hero and the progenitor are often so closely correlated that it is impossible to separate these phenomena –, but to a type appearing on a more developed level of myths, which lay the foundations of society and civilization establishing the conditions for a higher standard of life.

15 *Aen.* 7.177–182.

16 Euander is the son of Carmenta or Carmentis and Mercurius, cf. Verg. *Aen.* 8.138; 8.335–6; Ovid, *Fasti* 1.461; Plut. *Rom. Quest.* 56.

17 *Aen.* 8.357.

18 Ov. *Fasti* 1.633–36; Servius, *ad Aen.* 8.336; it should be noted, however, that both authors use the name Porrima for Antevorta, and Postverta instead of Postvorta.

19 Serv. *ad Aen.* 7.180; 8.357. Although Servius does not claim that Italian rulers were to be worshipped as deities but that certain kings took the names of different gods.

Before Saturn's arrival Ianus and his people had a *ferus* (wild) and *rudis* (uncouth) lifestyle,<sup>20</sup> namely it shows the irregularities and incompleteness of the Origins. This ancient world is ruled by chaos that does not recognise the divine, the human and the natural laws so the gifts of Saturn become creations like miracles that cannot be reckoned as the deeds of an average human. According to Macrobius the changes caused by Saturn's appearance are also commemorated on the temple's tympanum by Tritons being carved there that are blowing horns, and these Tritons' tails submerge under the surface and are hidden from humans' eyes. This representation expresses that from the time of Saturn the history of mankind is clear, so to say talkative while prior to that it was obscure and unknown. Through his activities chaos becomes an organised world, the microcosmic imitation of the macrocosmic creation is realised. The archaic man's mentality is reflected in this account who attributes every significant and conscious deed to an archetype and who can see his acts' verity be justified by repeating this archetype. Similarly, the act of the world's creation is reproduced by the foundation of cities. Here Ianus and Saturn found neighbouring cities that they name Ianiculum and Saturnia after themselves and they reign together sharing power. This detail of the story can be partly connected to the institution of dual kingship also existing among the Italian nations and partly supposes the knowledge of deeply rooted Indo-European traditions.<sup>21</sup> The descendants dedicated months next to each other to Saturn and Ianus to express their relation, namely December and January, setting the spatial neighbourhood into an aspect of time.

Parallel to the disappearance of Saturn we can also mention the mysterious vanishing of Romulus who was worshipped as a deity by the name of Quirinus after this event: the city founder, the lawmaker cannot die in ordinary circumstances and it is also doubtful whether these heroes

20 *Sat.* 1.7.21.

21 The heroes creating civilization do not often act alone but they have a helper in their duties and it is most often their brother (e.g. Prometheus and Epimetheus, Castor and Pollux or Romulus and Remus), or their friend (e.g. Gilgames and Enkidu). In most cases this companion is able to give effective help but there are also examples when in contrast with the hero he appears as an evil or comic anti-hero who only tries to imitate the other or intentionally acts against him. His asocial behaviour that manifests itself mainly in the constant wrong-doing, intrigue and the profanation of the sacraments foreshadows the figure of a jester appearing later on festive carnivals like Saturnalia. Electing the festive or mock king personifying Saturn was part of Saturnalia's traditions. The *rex Saturnaliorum* (or *Saturnalicus princeps*) could order anything to his subjects and everybody had to obey him. Cf. e.g. Tacitus, *Annals* 13.15; Lucian, *Saturnalia* 2; 4.

would die at all, by all means their existence leaves a mark both in space and time.

The reign of Saturn placed in mythical time is the Golden Age. The happiness of the Golden Age is caused by peace, abundance and the equality between people. This latter, namely that there are no masters and servants, furthermore, that everybody is equally entitled to liberty, can refer to the harmonic state of the first times after order had evolved. The identification of Saturn with abundance is not only obvious because people learn how to farm from him but because he is called *Sterculius*,<sup>22</sup> and his wife is said to be *Ops*<sup>23</sup> who had been mentioned above to be the goddess of fertility, sowing and plentiful harvest and who had her feast as part of the Saturnalia festivals which was also the day of Ops Opifera's temple's foundation. Goddess Ops had great honour and it is well demonstrated by considering her to be Rome's secret patron god by many people. Macrobius, who also touches upon this topic in his work, estimates this possibility the most probable as well.<sup>24</sup>

According to the story of origin connected to the Pelasgians, this nation was dispelled from their land and as they did not know where to go, they asked for advice from the oracle in Dodona. The prophecy led them to the land of Latium where they conquered the island in the Cutilian lake,<sup>25</sup> but the same prophecy contained the following command as well: καὶ κεφαλὰς Ἄϊδη, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ πέμπετε φῶτα (“Send heads to Hades and a man to the father!”). Because of this order a small shrine was erected to Dis and an altar to Saturn, to the father whose feast got the name Saturnalia. For a long time human heads were sacrificed to the former and men to the latter deity.<sup>26</sup> The habit of bloody sacrifices was

22 Macr. *Sat.* 1.7.25.

23 Macr. *Sat.* 1.10.20.

24 *Sat.* 3.9.4.

25 Cf. Seneca, *Natural Questions*, 3.25.8.

26 The sacrifice of humans by the Pelasgians warns that the feast of Saturn was not only a happy celebration. A type of tradition is known that at certain periods of time and at certain places the mock king of Saturnalia became the sacrifice on the altar of the god. The documents reporting Saint Dasius' martyrdom give examples for this and it turns out that the Saturn cult had a dark side even in the 300's A.D. in the popular tradition. Dasius was one of the Roman soldiers stationed at Durostorum who was selected by a draw as the king of Saturnalia by his companions. He could have practised his power for thirty days in this position as the earthly counterpart of Saturn then he should have killed himself on the deity's altar. Dasius was not willing to play the role of a pagan deity and to take part in unchristian feasts so he was sentenced to death. (About the story and its interpretation see J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*. New York, 1925. [copyright 1922])

finally left behind because of the influence of Hercules who suggested that they should give human images created with beautiful art to Dis instead of the human heads and that they should not worship Saturn's altar by sacrificing men but by lighting candles as the word 'φῶτα' in the prophecy does not only mean 'man' but 'light' as well. The tradition that people give each other candles as gifts at Saturnalia could evolve from this. The habit of giving presents became an important part of the feast and this tradition was so strong all through Antiquity that even Christians adapted it and up to the present it has been the most representative feature of Christmas. It was generally wide-spread that at the time of Saturnalia the clients brought presents to their masters but a lot of nobles led by their avidity wanted expensive gifts so Publicius, a plebeian tribune ordered that wealthy people can only receive candles as gifts.<sup>27</sup> This is the other possible explanation to the question why people gave candles to each other. At the same time the candle symbolizes its function to lead us from darkness to the light, from ignorance to the level of knowledge. Saturnalia was also the festival of light<sup>28</sup> and this meaning is naturally attached to the fact that its time coincided with the winter solstice when light starts to overcome darkness following the longest night of the year.

Previously another theory of origin had been mentioned which states that Saturnalia was established to follow the Greek Cronia festival. According to Accius' verses this was celebrated in almost all parts of Greece and at these times both city dwellers and country people prepared rich meals and invited their servants.<sup>29</sup> The tradition of changing roles between masters and servants came to Rome from this habit.

---

584–586). The practice of ritual sacrifice of humans was not unknown to the Romans, all through their history it was used several times until its forbidding in 97 B.C., cf. Livy 22.57.6; Plut. *Marcellus* 3.4; *Rom. Quest.* 83. For a special kind of human sacrifice, the *devotio* cf. Livy 8.9–10; Macr. *Sat.* 3.9–13.

27 Cf. Varro, *On the Latin Language* 5.64.

28 The earliest feast of the kind is known from Babylonia. The annual festival that lasted for seven days commemorated the consecration of Ningirsu's temple around 2nd millennium B.C. Herodotus (2.62) reports a feast from Sais in Egypt when candles were lit up during the night. The feast was held in honour of Neith, the patron goddess of the city who arrived home after the creation of the world gloriously with her son, Re who had overcome his enemies. For further examples see P. Bourboulis, *Ancient Festivals of „Saturnalia” Type*. Thessalonike, 1964.

29 Macr. *Sat.* 1.7.36–37.



Macrobius speaks about identifying Saturn with *Khronos*: he is time, the time that had not existed before him.<sup>30</sup> Cronus or Saturn, who swallows then throws his children up, is the symbol of time that consumes and then recreates everything.<sup>31</sup>

On the feast of Saturn, according to Greek rite, the Romans sacrificed at the altar in front of Senaculum<sup>32</sup> with uncovered head. They acted just like Hercules and the Pelasgians, then, the cult statue was brought out of the temple. During the year this statue was kept tight. The woollen rope was untied only in December, during the feast. Macrobius states with reference to Apollodorus that tying and later untying Saturn in the 10th month of the Roman year symbolizes the fetus becomes viable in the uterus by the 10th month and the gentle ties of nature keep it until it is born. Consequently the undoing of Saturn's woollen ties stand for birth as the symbol of creation.

The feast organised in the honour of Saturn and the connecting sacrifice mean the new realization of the Golden Age. Successors were to symbolize perfect harmony of their age. Saturnalia was the period of peace and harmony and it was a sin to start wars or carry out prosecution.<sup>33</sup>

The final day of the festive period, December 23 was the day of Sigillaria. Clay figures were offered to Dis and Saturn on this day and people gave each other tiny presents. As of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, two days after Saturnalia, the festival of Sol Invictus – the Invincible Sun – was held.<sup>34</sup> It was the peak of the feast cycle symbolizing the new creation and Christians chose this day to be the birthday of Jesus.<sup>35</sup>

The origin of the Christian year's feasts root back to the Resurrection of Christ. This Resurrection was the beginning and the end of the Christians' holy year's cycle. The other festive from the 4<sup>th</sup> century was connected to the birth of Jesus. By the end of the 6<sup>th</sup> century the Christian calendar

---

30 Macr. *Sat.* 1.8.6–7;10.

31 Cf. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.64.

32 Senaculum was – probably outside – the meeting place for senators.

33 Cf. Macr. *Sat.* 1.10.1;5.

34 About the cult of Sol Invictus see G. H. Halsberghe, *The Cult of Sol Invictus*. Leiden, 1972; S. E. Hijmans, *The Sun Which Did Not Rise in the East.* = *BaBesch*, 71, 1996. 115–150; recently about the roots of the cult: László Takács, *A Sol Invictus-kultusz Nero-kori gyökerei.* [The Roots of the Cult of Sol Invictus in the Neronian Age] In: Orsolya Tóth (ed.), *Hereditas Litteraria Totius Graeco-Latinitatis* II. (Agatha XXVIII) Debrecen, 2014. 316–323.

35 In connection with this see S. Hijmans, *Sol Invictus, the Winter Solstice, and the Origins of Christmas.* = *Mouseion*, 47/3, 2003. 277–298.

had mainly been filled with new feasts, whereas some old Roman feasts still existed. During the 350s besides their own feasts, noble Christians kept the ancient Roman ones as well, without any objections. It can partly be explained with the fact that the rites of the traditional Roman calendar still ruled the flow of everyday life and ensured order. Many Christians, who had important state or public offices, convinced themselves easily that keeping these feasts do not have religious importance, since their sacred nature had faded away so much that Christian spirit would not be harmed.<sup>36</sup> During these so-called pagan feasts many of the Christian believers flocked to circuses and theatres not only in Rome but in other cities as well to see plays and other events. Even though everybody was aware of the original meaning of these spare-time activities, only some thought about the sin of idolatry. Celebrating January 1 can be mentioned as a further example. It used to be the public feast of the inauguration of new consuls and it was the time of personal rites, like expressing best wishes, making resolutions, praying for the lucky new year and last but not least revelry. As it was not regulated by imperial legislation, non-believers could celebrate according to their own customs. They were joined by their Christian peers, not worrying about the possible heathen nature of the event.<sup>37</sup> Tertullian complains that the pagans were much more consistent in this matter than the Christians, as they did not participate in any Christian feast to avoid being taken for believers: *Iudaeis dies suos festos exprobrat spiritus sanctus. Sabbata, inquit, vestra et numenias et ceremonias odit anima mea. Nobis, quibus sabbata extranea sunt et numenias et feriae a deo aliquando dilectae, Saturnalia et Ianuariae et Brumae et Matronales frequentantur; munera commeant et strenae, consonant lusus, convivia constrepunt. O melior fides nationum in suam sectam, quae nullam sollemnitatem Christianorum sibi vindicat! Non dominicum diem, non pentecosten, etiamsi nossent, nobiscum communicassent; timerent enim, ne Christiani viderentur.*<sup>38</sup> He considers the opportunist Christians pagans who are unable to realize their sin and worship their own feasts.

36 Cf. R. A. Markus, *The End of Ancient Christianity*. Cambridge, 1990. 97–107.

37 Cf. *Ib.* 101, 104.

38 *On Idolatry*, 14.6–7. (“The Holy Spirit upbraids the Jews with their holy-days. ‘Your Sabbaths, and new moons, and ceremonies,’ says He, ‘My soul hates’. By us, to whom Sabbaths are strange, and the new moons and festivals formerly beloved by God, the Saturnalia and New-year’s and Midwinter’s festivals and Matronalia are frequented – presents come and go – New-year’s gifts – games join their noise – banquets join their din! Oh better fidelity of the nations to their own sect, which claims no solemnity of the Christians for itself! Not the Lord’s day, not Pentecost, even they had known

Church Fathers like St. Augustine believed that Christians can voice their faith towards the Church by distancing themselves from the pagans and their feasts.<sup>39</sup> A tool could be the exact clarification of the Christian holidays. At the same time the extirpation of the traditional Roman feasts – as the examples mentioned above demonstrated – was not easy at all. Creating Christian context to the pagan feast could mean a possible solution. This was the fate of Saturnalia as well. Macrobius' particular mentality mixed with several traditions gradually dissolved in the celebrations connected to the birth of Christ: not only its ideals but the connecting customs as well (e.g. candle lighting, giving presents, festive meals, donations to the poor) became elements of the new feast, the traditions of Christmas – although in different interpretation.

St. Leo the Great in one of his Christmas preaches compared the birth of the Saviour to the regeneration of light: *hanc adorandam in caelo et in terra nativitatem, nullus nobis dies magis quam hodiernus insinuat, et nova etiam in elementis luce radiante, totam sensibus nostris mirabilis sacramenti ingerit claritatem.*<sup>40</sup> The birth of Christ marks a new era literally and figuratively as well. He represents the new beginning. He is the light born at the darkest hour so as to illuminate the world. Christ is *rex* creating new world order, bringing salvation to mankind in the dark. Celebrating his birth also symbolizes the birth of Christianity. As pope Leo words it: *...et dum salvatoris nostri adoramus ortum, invenimur nos*

---

them, would they have shared with us; for they would fear lest they should seem to be Christians.” Source of translation: <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.iv.iv.xiv.html>)

39 Augustine, *Sermo* 198.2 (*De Calendis Ianuariis, contra paganos*): *Si non credis quod credunt Gentes, non speras quod sperant Gentes, non amas quod amant Gentes; congregaris de Gentibus, segregaris, hoc est separaris de Gentibus. Nec te terreat commixtio corporalis in tanta separatione mentis. Quid enim tam separatum, quam ut credant illi daemones deos, credas tu qui unus et verus est Deus? Sperent illi inania saeculi, speres tu aeternam vitam cum Christo? Ament illi mundum, ames tu artificem mundi? Qui ergo aliud credit, aliud sperat, aliud amat, vita probet, factis ostendat. Acturus es celebrationem strenarum, sicut paganus, lusurus alea, et inebriaturus te: quomodo aliud credis, aliud speras, aliud amas? Quomodo libera fronte cantas: “Salva nos, Domine Deus noster; et congrega nos de Gentibus”? Segregaris enim de Gentibus, mixtus corpore Gentibus, dissimili vita. Et quanta sit ista segregatio, videte, si modo facitis, si modo probatis.*

40 Sancti Leonis Magni *Tractatus* 26.1. (“This Nativity which is to be adored in heaven and on earth is suggested to us by no day more than this when, with the early light still shedding its rays on nature, there is borne in upon our senses the brightness of this wondrous mystery.” Source of translation: <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf212.ii.v.xiv.html>)

*nostrum celebrare principium. Generatio enim Christi origo est populi christiani, et natalis capitis natalis est corporis.*<sup>41</sup> Christian Christmas, slowly decolouring the traditions of pagan Saturnalia, preaches peace, solidarity towards those in need and mutual respect. Even though it kept some features of the secular celebration, the greatest benefit of the Christian interpretation of the ancient Roman feast is the highlight on benevolence, reconciliation with one another, because these things serve as the key to development and they are essential for the survival of our civilization.

---

41 Ib. 26.2. (“...and in adoring the birth of our Saviour, we find we are celebrating the commencement of our own life. For the birth of Christ is the source of life for Christian folk, and the birthday of the Head is the birthday of the body.” Source of translation: <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf212.ii.v.xiv.html>)



László Pószán

## Der Deutsche Ritterorden in der europäischen Politik im ersten Drittel des 13. Jahrhunderts (1211–1230)<sup>1</sup>

Neben den auf sich genommenen Kämpfen gegen die Kumanen wandte sich die Aufmerksamkeit des Deutschen Ordens in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 13. Jahrhunderts in erster Linie der Levante-Region zu.<sup>2</sup> In diese Konzeption fügte sich auch die Frage der Besitztümer im Burzenland, und es ist auch kein Zufall, daß der Hochmeister Hermann von Salza gleich nach seinem Amtsantritt (1209) die Besitzungen des Deutschen Ordens an den Anmarschwegen der Kreuzzüge nacheinander besichtigte, und im Zuge dessen, im April 1212 der Orden auch weitere Schenkungen erhielt von Leon II., König von Kilikien,<sup>3</sup> der als Halbbruder (*confrater*) selbst in den Deutschen Orden eintrat.<sup>4</sup> In dem zweiten Jahrzehnt des 13. Jahrhunderts hat der Orden mit einer planmäßigen Besitzerweiterung im Heiligen Land angefangen. Im Jahre 1215 kaufte zum Beispiel Hermann von Salza von der Witwe des mit dem vierten Kreuzzug nach Palästina gekommenen Konrads von Schwarzenberg ein Haus für 400 Mark Silber

1 Der Artikel wird von der unterstützten Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften – Universität Debrecen „Lendület“ Forschungsgruppe „Ungarn im mittelalterlichen Europa“.

2 Über den Deutschen Orden in Siebenbürgen vgl. J. Laszlovszky and Z. Soós, Historical Monuments of the Teutonic Order in Transylvania. In: Zs. Hunyadi and J. Laszlovszky (Hgg.), *The Crusades and the Military Orders. Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity*. Central European University Budapest, 2001 (CEU Mediaevalia, 1) 319–336.; Zs. Hunyadi, The Teutonic Order in Burzenland (1211–1225): recent reconsiderations. In: H. Houben e K. Toomaspoeg (Hgg.), *L'Ordine Teutonico tra Mediterraneo e Baltico incontri e scontri tra religioni, popoli e culture*. Ed. Mario Congedo. Galatina, 2008. 151–162.; H. Zimmermann, *Der Deutsche Orden in Burzenland. Eine diplomatische Untersuchung*, Köln – Weimar – Wien, 2000. (Studia Transsylvania, 26); H. Zimmermann, Der Deutsche Ritterorden in Siebenbürgen. In: J. Fleckenstein und M. Hellmann (Hgg.), *Die geistliche Ritterorden Europas*. Sigmaringen, 1980 (Vorträge und Forschungen, 26) 261–298; Sz. Kovács, A Német Lovagrend és a kunok közötti fegyveres hódítás és térítés. In: L. Balogh – L. Keller (Eds.), *Fegyveres Nomádok, nomád fegyverek*, Budapest, 2004. (Magyar Östörténeti Könyvtár, 21) 139–150.; L. Pószán, *A Német Lovagrend története a 13. században*. Debrecen, 1996. 21–43.; A. A. Rusu, Die Frage der vom Deutschen Orden im Südosten Siebenbürgens erreichten Burgen. = *Castrum Bene*, 5, 1996. 165–172.

3 Wilbrand in Itinerarium Terrae Sanctae. In: *Peregrinatores medii aevi quattuor*. Ed. J. C. M. Laurent. Leipzig, 1873. I. Cap. XXIV. [= Wilbrand]

4 *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonicici*. Hg. E. Strehlke. Berlin, 1916. [= Tabulae] Nr. 46.

in Akkon.<sup>5</sup> Neben den Vermehrung der Besitzungen im Heiligen Land strebten die Ritter auch in Europa den Erwerb weiterer Donationen an. Zum Beispiel wurde um 1210 das Ordenshaus des Deutschen Ritterordens in Metz eröffnet.<sup>6</sup> Im Orden selbst hat sich die Tradition festgesetzt, daß der erste Besitz in Thüringen erworben worden sei.<sup>7</sup> Außerhalb von Thüringen und Sachsen verfügte dagegen der Orden 1212 bereits über eigenes Balleien im Elsaß und Burgund.<sup>8</sup> Dank der Unterstützung durch die Staufer hatten die Ritter auf Zypern, die strategisch wichtigen Insel zwischen Europa und Palästina ebenfalls Besitzungen, und in der Urkunde von Papst Innozenz III. vom 27. Juni 1209 ist ja eindeutig die Rede von den zyprischen Gütern des Deutschen Ordens,<sup>9</sup> und 1212 ist der Hochmeister Hermann von Salza nicht aus reinem Zufall aus Armenien angereist.<sup>10</sup>

Die sichtbare Verstärkung der Positionen des Deutschen Ritterordens im Heiligen Land setzte ein, als Hochmeister Hermann von Salza als einer der wichtigsten inneren Ratgeber Friedrichs II. eine große Rolle in der Steuerung der großen europäischen Politik erhielt. Der Hochmeister soll wahrscheinlich 1216 in Nürnberg, in einer Hofversammlung zum ersten Male in der Umgebung des Herrschers aufgetreten sein, wo dem deutschen Ritterorden verschiedene Schenkungen zu teil wurden.<sup>11</sup> In Nürnberg war Hermann von Salza noch nicht als königlicher Rat, sondern als Hochmeister des Ritterordens anwesend, der nach der Hofversammlung ins Heilige Land zurückkehrte. 1217 taucht er wieder an Zypern auf, wo er Teilnehmer an dem Kreuzzug des ungarischen Königs Andreas II. anwarb. In Limassol traf er Hugo I., den König von Zypern, der die früheren Schenkungen König Amalrichs II. an den Orden bestätigt hatte, und der dem Hochmeister 200 Scheffel Getreide, 200 Maß Wein und 400 Scheffel Gerste aus dem Einkommen des königlichen

---

5 H. E. Mayer, *Die Seigneurie de Joscelyn und der Deutsche Orden*. In: *Die geistliche Ritterorden Europas*, 190.

6 R. Schmidt, *Die Deutschordenskommenden Trier und Beckingen 1242-1794*. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 9) Marburg, 1979. 10.

7 K. Militzer, *Die Entstehung der Deutschordensballeien im Deutschen Reich*. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 16) Marburg, 1981. 193.

8 D. Zimmerling, *Der Deutsche Ritterorden*. Düsseldorf – Wien – New York, 1988. 67.

9 W. Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und die Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*. = *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist.-Kl., 1966. 253.

10 Wilbrand I. Cap. XXIV.

11 E. Horst, *Friedrich II. der Staufer. Kaiser – Feldherr – Dichter*. München, 1990. 69–70.

Besitzes in Lefkara überließ.<sup>12</sup> In der Levanteregion ahm die politische, diplomatische und wirtschaftliche Aktivität des Deutschen Ritterordens im wesentlichen mit dieser Periode ihren Anfang. Am 24. Juni 1217 zum Beispiel stattete Friedrich II auf Sizilien den Deutschen Ritterorden mit Rechten aus, über die Templer und Johanniter verfügten.<sup>13</sup> Das hing mit der Bestrebung Hermanns von Salza zusammen, die Gleichberechtigung des Deutschen Ritterordens mit den beiden älteren Ritterorden, sowie die gleiche Rechtsstellung herbeizuführen.

Es ist vorstellbar, daß die Herausbildung des Gegensatzes zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und dem Ungarnkönig Andreas II. in Zusammenhang mit fünften Kreuzzug stand, wo die Zusammenarbeit mehrerer Könige und Herzöge (die Könige Andreas II. aus Ungarn, Jean de Brienne aus Jerusalem, Hugo I. von Zypern) ernste Probleme aufbrachte. Die aus den früheren Kreuzzügen bereits bekannten Beschwerlichkeiten haben sich erneut vervielfacht, und die Durchführung ernsthafter Aktionen vereitelt. Der Ungarnkönig Andreas kehrte mit anderen Herren zusammen nach einem Vierteljahr in sein Land zurück.<sup>14</sup> Da eine erfolgreiche Durchführung der Kreuzzüge das Ansehen des Deutschen Ritterordens bedeutend erhöht hätte, war es kein Wunder, daß Hermann von Salza, gegenüber Andreas II. die militärische Aktionen befürwortete. Vielleicht spielte auch dieser Meinungsunterschied eine Rolle darin, daß der ungarische König sich 1218 nach der Heimkehr vom Heiligen Lande des Deutschen Ritterordens nicht einmal gedachte.<sup>15</sup> Die noch dagebliebenen, in ihrer Mehrzahl deutsche Kreuzzügler griften unter der Führung des österreichischen Herzogs zusammen mit den Kreuzrittern aus den Diözesen Köln, Trier und Bremen unter dem Oberbefehl Wilhelms, Grafen von Holland und Georgs, Grafen von Wied, im Spätfrühling 1218 Ägyptern an.<sup>16</sup> Der Deutsche Ritterorden geriet vorher in Palästina noch nicht in den Mittelpunkt der Interesse, jetzt aber, 1218, erweckte seine

12 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und die Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 255–258.

13 Zum Deutschen Orden in Sizilien und in Italien siehe z.B. H. Houben, *Die Staufer und die Ausbreitung des Deutschen Ordens in Apulien*. = *Historische Zeitschrift*, 277, 2003. 1. 61–85; K. Forstreuter, *Der Deutsche Orden am Mittelmeer*. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 2) Bonn, 1967. 110–134.; K. Toomaspoeg, „Confratres, procuratores, negociorum gestores et factores eorum.“ *Storia dei „familiaris“ dei Cavalieri Teutonici in Sicilia*. = *Sacra Militia*, 1, 2000. 151–165.; D. Zimmerling, *Der Deutsche Ritterorden*, 49.

14 W. Zöllner, *A keresztés háborúk története*. Budapest, 1980. 161.

15 I. Fejér, *A német és templomos lovagok Haralyban*. Eger, 1894. 15.

16 Zöllner, *A keresztés háborúk története*, 161.



militärische Leistung vor Damietta unter Hermann von Salza eine große Aufmerksamkeit. Von da an vermochte der Ritterorden seine besitze in Syrien und Palästina augensichtlich zu vergrößern.<sup>17</sup> 1219 zum Beispiel schenkte der österreichische Herzog Leopold dem Orden 6000 Mark Silber, der auch mit Hilfe dieser Summe einen planmäßigen Grundkauf in der Gegend von Akkon und Tripolis in Angriff nahm, und bedeutende Besitztümer erwarb.<sup>18</sup> 1220 zum Beispiel hat er für 7500 Mark Silber und 5250 byzantinischen Solidus ein riesiges, zusammenhängendes Besitzkonglomerat, das als *Seigneurie de Joscelin* bekannte Territorium gekauft. Ende Mai 1220 wurde der Kauf durch den Herrscher zu Jerusalem bestätigt. Dafür hatte der Deutsche Ritterorden 500 Mark Silber an die Schatzkammer zu bezahlen. Vermutlich haben die Deutschen Ritter aus dem Grunde eine so große Summe in den Erwerb des Grundbesitzes investiert, weil sie es für gewinnbringend hielten, andererseits wollten sie mit dem einheitlichen Grundkomplex ihre Positionen im Heiligen Land stärken. Nach Hans Eberhard Mayer wollte der Deutsche Ritterorden auf diesen mehr oder weniger zusammenhängenden Besitz basierend ein autonomes Herrschaftsgebiet in Palästina aufbauen.<sup>19</sup> Die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Templerorden trug ebenfalls zur Stärkung der Positionen des deutschen Ritterordens in Palästina bei. 1218 haben zum Beispiel die deutschen Ritter den Tempelherren beim Bau ihrer Burg Chateau Pélérin südlich von Akkon geholfen.<sup>20</sup>

Der sehenswürdige „Anlauf“ des deutschen Ritterordens im Osten hing eng mit den deutschen Fürsten zusammen, insbesondere mit dem 1215 zum König gekrönten Friedrich II., der über das Privileg vom 24. Juni 1217 hinaus 1219 den Deutschordensrittern gestattet hatte, ihren Handel in der Stadt Palermo oder auf dem Gebiet der sizilianischen Königreichs zollfrei abwickeln.<sup>21</sup> Wir können daraus schließen, daß der Deutsche Orden zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits selbst Handel betrieb und über eigene Schiffe verfügte. Eine spätere, im Januar 12301 ausgestellte Urkunde erwähnt zum Beispiel ein Schiff des Ordens, das auf dem Wege nach Akkon war.<sup>22</sup>

---

17 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 259.

18 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 256–259.

19 Mayer, Die Seigneurie de Joscelin, 191.

20 F. Gies, The Knights Templars: Soldiers, Diplomats, Bankers. In: F. Gies, *The Knight in History*. New York, 1984. 116.

21 *Codex diplomaticus Ordinis Sanctae Mariae Theutonicorum*. Tom. I. Hg. J. H. Hennes [= CDO I.] Mainz, 1845. Nr. 36.

22 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 256.

Nach dem große Anerkennung einbringenden Unternehmen gegen Damietta taucht Hermann von Salza als vertrauter Ratgeber und Diplomat in der engeren Umgebung des jungen Königs Friedrich auf. Vor der Kaiserkrönung leitete er die Verhandlungsdelegation Friedrich in Rom. nach den erfolgreichen Verhandlungen wurde Friedrich II. am 22. November 1220 in Rom zum Kaiser gekrönt.<sup>23</sup> Er kam als Kandidat der Kurie auf den Thron, bald fing er aber an, seinen eigenen Weg zu gehen und setzte die Politik seines Vaters, Heinrich VI. fort. Sein versprechen über die Frage Siziliens, da sehr zur Zeit Innozenz III. gegeben hatte (nämlich, daß er das normannische Erbe nicht an das Reich bindet) hielt er nicht, mit Papst Honorius III. spitzten sich die Gegensätze trotzdem nicht zu. Dafür haben nicht zuletzt die kompromißbereiten Politiker der beiden Lager, der Erzbischof von Capua und der Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens, Hermann von Salza gesorgt.<sup>24</sup> Es darf auch nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, daß die Lage Friedrichs noch bei weitem nicht am stabilsten war. Wegen seiner diplomatischen und politischen Fähigkeiten erfreute sich Hochmeister Hermann nicht nur am kaiserlichen, sondern auch am päpstlichen Hof großen Ansehens und Anerkennung. Teils diesem, teils aber dem mehr oder weniger friedlich zu nennenden Verhältnis zwischen Friedrich II. und Honorius III. war es zu verdanken, daß Honorius III. am 15. Dezember 1220, ähnlich den Tempelherren und Johanniten, auch dem Deutschen Ritterorden verboten hat, lehensartige Besitzschenkungen von Laien anzunehmen.<sup>25</sup> Der Heilige Stuhl hatte den Tempelorden bereits 1139, dem Johanniten 1192 die Entgegennahme lehensartiger Schenkungen verboten.<sup>26</sup> Den 9. Januar 1221 gewährte der Papst auch dem Deutschen Ritterorden an die kirchlichen Rechte und Privilegien, über denen die beiden älteren großen Ritterorden verfügten.<sup>27</sup> Die deutschen Ritter wurden damit mit den großen Orden des Heiligen Landes gleichberechtigt. Zwei Monate später dagegen, den 10. April 1221 setzte der Kaiser die Brüder und Halbbrüder des Deutschen Ordens unter seinen speziellen Schutz (*fratres et confratres ipsius sub nostra*

23 Horst, Friedrich II. der Staufer, 115.; H. Houben, *Kaiser Friedrich II. (1194-1250). Herrscher, Mensch und Mythos*. Stuttgart, 2008. 38–39.

24 Zöllner, A keresztes háborúk története 167–168; E. Rotter, *Friedrich II. von Hohenstaufen*, München, 2004. 55–68.

25 Mayer, Die Seigneurie de Joscelyn, 197.

26 *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter. Vorarbeiten zum Oriens pontificus I.* (Abh. d. Göttinger Akad. d. Wiss., philol.-hist. Klasse, 3, Folge 77. Göttingen, 1972. [= Papsturkunden] Nr. 3. 223.

27 Zimmerling, Der Deutsche Ritterorden, 49.

*speciali protectione et defensione recepimus*).<sup>28</sup> Es ist vorstellbar, daß diese Urkunden mittelbar mit dem sich verschlimmernden Streit Andreas II und der Deutsche Orden im Zusammenhang standen.

Vom Anfang der 1220er Jahre an, erhielten die Ritter immer mehr Schenkungen in Deutschland. 1220 zum Beispiel von Konrad, Bischof von Speyer ein Hospital, von Wilhelm, Graf von Jülich je ein Ordenshaus in Siersdorf und in Niedeggen, in Bergstein dagegen erhielten sie eine Burg. Adolf, Graf von Berg schenkte dem Orden einen Meierhof in Dieren, sein Nachkomme, Dietrich, gab ihnen dann 1220 im Mündungsgebiet des Rheins einen Besitz. Die Zeugenliste der Begründungsurkunde des Biesener Ordenshauses bezeugt eindeutig, welche Anerkennung sich der Deutsche Ritterorden in Deutschland nach dem fünften Kreuzzug erworben hat. Unter den Zeugen der Urkunde waren auch die Erzbischöfe von Mainz und Trier, die Bischöfe von Metz und Bamberg, Heinrich, Herzog von Brabant, Ludwig, Herzog von Bayern, Ludwig, Landgraf von Thüringen, die Grafen Heinrich von Sayn und Gerhard von Are.<sup>29</sup> Im Dezember 1221 erhielt der Deutsche Orden in Luxemburg Besitzen.<sup>30</sup> Die Landkomtureien (Balleie), die größeren Verwaltungseinheiten des Ordens fingen an, sich herauszubilden. Neben den elsäbisch-burgundischen und thüringisch-sächsischen Balleien waren auch die böhmisch-mährische, die lotharingische, die westfälische Landeskomtureien sowie die von Koblenz, Bozen, Armenien, Sizilien, Apulien, Griechenland (Morea) Lombardei, Spanien, und Frankreich in Herausbildung begriffen.<sup>31</sup>

Neben der Unterstützung von Seiten der Landesherren des Reiches hörte auch die kaiserliche Unterstützung nicht auf. Hermann von Salza erreichte, daß sich zur Vertretung des Deutschen Ritterordens ständig zwei Brüder am kaiserlichen Hofe hatten aufhalten dürfen, Friedrich II. dagegen beauftragte Berthold von Tannenrode, einen Bruder des Ordens, mit der Verwaltung des Elsaß.<sup>32</sup> In der ersten Hälfte der 1220er Jahre wurden die ehrgeizigen Pläne Hermanns von Salza und des Deutschen Ordens offensichtlich: die Schaffung einer selbständigen Territorialmacht in Siebenbürgen, militärisches vorrücken der Donau entlang in der Richtung zum Lateinischen Kaisertum, die Herausbildung eines

---

28 CDO I. Nr. 54.

29 H. Neu, *Das Rheinland und der Deutsche Orden* (Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens. Studien zum Deutschtum im Osten. H. 5) Köln–Wien, 1969, 11–13.

30 Schmidt, *Deutschordenskommenden*, 11.

31 K. Militzer, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*. Stuttgart, 2005. 32–62.

32 Horst, *Friedrich II. der Staufer*, 116.

zusammenhängenden Besitzstandes im Heiligen Lande, und zu an diesem die Schaffung einer entsprechenden materiell-politischen Hintergrundes und Unterstützung in Europa.

Der alte und kränkelnde Papst Honorius III. spornte den Kaiser Friedrich II. zu einem möglichst baldigen Kreuzzug an, es war aber mit den Innenaffären des Reiches beschäftigt. Hermann von Salza organisierte sogar zwei persönliche Treffen zwischen dem Papst und dem kaiser, wobei es um einen künftigen Kreuzzug ging: 1222 in Veroli, und 1223 in Ferentino.<sup>33</sup> Ein Kreuzzug des den Deutschen Ritterorden unterstützenden Kaiser sin das Heilige Land hätte die Positionen des Ordens im Mediterraneum erheblich stärken können. Zum Krezzugs unternehmen gab die Frage von der neuen Ehe des Kaisers einen unmittelbaren Anstoß. Im Juni 1222 starb Kaiserin Constance in der Stadt Catanien. Hermann von Salza setzte sich sofort zu die Planung der Eheschließung Friedrichs II. mit der Erbin von Jerusalem, Isabella de Brienne, wodurch der Kaiser als König von Jerusalem den Deutschen Ritterorden noch effektiver im Heiligen Land hätte unterstützen können. Im Frühling 1223 wurde in Ferentino der Ehevertrag unterschrieben und die Besprechung des künftigen Kreuzzuges vollzogen. An dem feierlichen Zeremoniell nahm außer Papst Honorius III., den Hochmeistern der Templer- und Johanniterorden, Jean de Brienne, König von Jerusalem und Ralph, Patriarch jerusalems auch Hermann von Salza teil.<sup>34</sup> Friedrich II. war sich darüber ein Klaren, daß er trotz seiner mit der Erbin zu schließenden Ehe sein Heer brauchen wird, um seinen Königstitel zu Jerusalem anerkennen zu lassen, und daß er einen Kreuzzug nach Osten führen muß. Vor dem Unternehmen im Heiligen Land aber hatte er die problematischen Fragen in Europa zu klären.

Im 1223 entbrannte ein ernster Streit zwischen dem norddeutschen Hochadel und dem im Baltikum zur Großmacht aufgestiegenen Dänemark. Der Kaiser sandte seinen besten Diplomaten, Hermann von Salza, in den Norden, dem Konflikt zu beseitigen und die dänische Macht zurückzudrängen, da das Reich 1214 gezwungen war, bedeutende Küstenbebieite an Dänemark abzutreten, unter anderem einen so wichtigen Hafen, wie Lübeck.<sup>35</sup> Der Konflikt eskalierte am 7. Mai 1223, als Heinrich,

33 Horst, Friedrich II. der Staufer, 116.

34 R. Payne, *Die Kreuzzüge. Zweihundert Kampf um des heilige Grab 1096-1270*. Zürich-Köln, 1986. 483.

35 W. Froese, *Geschichte der Ostsee. Völker und Staaten am Baltischen Meer*. Gernsbach, 2002. 123.

Graf von Schwerin den Dänenkönig Waldemar II. gefangen nahm, um die Rückgabe der von den Dänen besetzten Gebiete zu erzwingen. Im September 1223 in Nordhausen kam es durch die Vermittlungen Hermanns von Salza zu einem Abkommen, demzufolge Graf Heinrich den König Waldemar freiläßt, wenn er im Gegenzug diejenige Besitztümern den norddeutschen Fürsten und Hochadligen zurückgibt, die nach 1214 unter die Oberhoheit Dänemarks geraten waren. Die Vereinbarung trug notwendigerweise die Möglichkeit eines künftigen Konfliktes zwischen dem Reich und Dänemark in sich, die durch das am 12. März 1224 in Catanien herausgegebene Manifest Friedrichs II. noch wahrscheinlicher gemacht wurde. Der Kaiser erklärte nämlich, daß das Reich die Völker von Livland, Estland, Sengallen, Samland und Preussen unter seinen Schutz nehme, obwohl diese Gebiete damals noch als dänische Interessensphäre galten. Die kaiserliche Urkunde kündigte an, daß sich das Reich künftig auch im Norden aktivisieren werde. Am 4. Juli 1224 gelang es Hermann von Salza in Dannenberg zu erreichen, daß Waldemar II. sich zu der Teilnahme an einem Kreuzzug ins Heilige Land verpflichtete, außerdem wurde ein Abkommen getroffen, daß die Bistümer Lübeck, Schwein und Ratzenburg an das Reichskirche zurückzugeben werden, Holstein dagegen nur als Reichslehen in dänischen Händen bleibt. Im Herbst 1224 aber lehnte Dänemark die Umsetzung des Dannenberger Vertrag ab. Deswegen entbrannte ein kleinerer Streit zwischen dem norddeutschen Hochadel und Waldemar II. Erst im November 1225 wurde der Vertrag geschlossen, durch den Deutschland einen Zugang zur Ostsee erwerb.<sup>36</sup> Hermann von Salza, der sich über den nördlich-nordöstlichen Plänen des Kaisers vollkommen im Klaren und mit ihnen vermutlich weitgehend einverstanden war, suchte genaue Informationen über die Verhältnisse im baltischen Raum zu gewinnen. Vermeintlich hat er 1223-1224, während seines Thüringen- und Sachsenaufenthaltes nähere Informationen über die Preussen, die preußische Mission und die Kämpfe gegen die Preußen erhalten. Das im November 1225 abgeschlossene deutsch-dänische Vertrag war für den Deutschen Orden auch deshalb so wichtig, weil gerade um diese Zeit, vor dem Frühherbst 1225, der Orden von Andreas II., König von Ungarn, mit Waffengewalt aus dem Siebenbürgen (Burzenland) vertrieben wurde. Trotz der Niederlage wurde des Ansehen des Hochmeisters des Deutschen Ordens durch den mit König Waldemar abgeschlossenen Vertrag gestärkt, aber noch mehr dadurch, daß im

---

36 C. Krollmann, *Politische Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen*. Königsberg, 1932. 5-6.

November des Jahres die Eheschließung zwischen Friedrich II. und Isabella de Brienne vollzogen wurde. Der Kaiser nahm den Titel „König von Jerusalem“ an, und erklärte seinen Anspruch auf den Thron des Königtums im Heiligen Lande. Unter der Leitung der Grafen Bernhard Gentile von Nardo und Stephan von Cetrone und des Bischofs von Melf sandte er 300 Ritter nach Palästina, damit sie in seinem Namen die Huldigung der dortigen Baronen als seiner Vasallen entgegennahmen.<sup>37</sup> Die Sendung Hermanns von Salza erzielte nicht nur die Lösung des dänischen Konflikts, sie stand in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang mit der Frage des Erwerbs der Jerusalemer Krone: Friedrich beauftragte den Hochmeister mit der Organisation seines Kreuzzuges, dessen Verkündung in Deutschland und der Anwerbung des Heeres.<sup>38</sup>

Walther Hubatsch meint, der siebenbürgische Mißerfolg und die sich stärkenden Positionen des Kaisers im Mediterraneo bestätigten Hermann von Salza in seiner Überzeugung, die Kraft des Deutschen Ritterordens auf das heilige Land zu konzentrieren und die Möglichkeiten des Vorwärtkommens hier zu suchen.<sup>39</sup> In Zusammenhang mit dieser Bestrebung ließ er den Kauf der Seigneurie de Joscelyn vom Papst, später aber auch von Friedrich II. und auch der Frau des Kaisers bestätigen. Im Januar 1226 hat der Kaiser die Besitzungen des Deutschen Ordens in Palästina von allen Verpflichtungen und Diensten entbunden.<sup>40</sup> Die starken Pläne und Absichten des Ordens wurden nicht einmal durch die Boten Konrads, des Herzogs von Masovien abgeändert, als sie beim Besuch des Hochmeisters als Gegenleistung für die Hilfe gegen die heidnischen Preußen das Gebiet von Kulmerland den Rittern angeboten hatten.<sup>41</sup> Hermann von Salza wollte den Orden nicht wieder in eine ähnliche Lage geraten lassen, wie in Siebenbürgen.<sup>42</sup> Er wollte das eventuelle Unternehmen gegen die Preußen gründlich vorbereiten, und dazu suchte er die Unterstützung der kaiserlichen Macht zu erringen. Im März 1226 erließ Friedrich II. in Rimini die sog. Goldene Bulle von Rimini, die im wesentlichen die politische Unterstützung des Reiches für den Fall einer möglichen preußischen Aktion des Deutschen Ordens formulierte und

37 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 260.

38 O. Engels, *Die Staufer*. Stuttgart–Berlin–Köln, 1972. 146.

39 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 260–261.

40 Mayer, *Die Seigneurie de Joscelyn*, 195–197.

41 *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*. Politische Abteilung Bd. I. Heft 1. Hg. R. Philippi, C. P. Woelky, Königsberg, 1882. [= PUB I.1.] Nr. 56.

42 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 260–261.

den Rittern weitreichende Privilegien verlieh.<sup>43</sup> Die Bulle artikulierte Privilegien in Bezug auf die preußischen Gebiete, die im Januar desselben Jahres im Zusammenhang mit den Besitzen des Ordens im Heiligen Land bereits verliehen worden sind.<sup>44</sup> Friedrich II. befreite in Palästina den Ritterorden praktisch von jeglicher Verpflichtung, und laut dem „alternativen Programm“, das in der Bulle von Rimini ausgedrückt wird, deklarierte er im Prinzip dasselbe auch in Bezug auf Preußen. Als eine weitere Manifestation der kaiserlichen Gunst durfte der Orden an sein Schildwappen (schwarzes Kreuz im weißen Feld) auch den Adler, das Wappentier der Staufer aufnehmen.<sup>45</sup> Hermann von Salza behandelte die Frage der preußischen Mission auch nach dem Erlaß der Bulle von Rimini behutsam. Er konzentrierte sich auf die Vorbereitung des Kreuzzuges des Kaisers und in engem Zusammenhang damit auf die Stärkung der Positionen des Deutschen Ordens in Mediterraneo. Mit dem Angebot Konrads, des Herzog von Masovien und der sich darauf beziehenden Reichsgarantien, artikuliert in der Bulle von Rimini der preußischen Angelegenheit schlechthin, rechnete er nur als einer zweiten Alternative, für den Fall daß sich das erste Ziel nicht dem Plan gemäß verwirklichen lassen sollte.<sup>46</sup> Das primäre Ziel, die Stärkung der Stellung des Ordens im Heiligen Land schien aber zu diesem Zweitpunkt noch ungefährdet zu sein. Kennzeichnend für den Ausbauder territorial-autonomen Macht des Deutsche Ordens ist, daß der als *dominus* auftraten, sogar Lehen verliehen haben. Im Juli 1226 wurde J. de Amigdala Vasall der Ritter und erhielt auch einen Burgbesitz. Nach dem Jaffaer Vertrag Friedrichs II. mit dem Sultan (18. Februar 1229) – im Sinne dessen Jerusalem wieder in christliche Hände geriet – setzte sich der Deutsche Orden an den Bau seines Hauptordenshauses, seiner Klosterfestung, einer der wichtigsten Burgen im Heiligen Land: Montfort.<sup>47</sup>

Die nordöstliche Interessensphäre des Reiches vor Augen haltend – vermeintlich auf den Rat Heinrichs von Salza – ließ Friedrich II. im Mai 1226 auch für den Schwertbrüdern in Livland eine Urkunde ausstellen, in der er die Besitzungen des livlandische Ritterorden bestätigte. Unter den

---

43 PUB I.1. Nr. 56.

44 Mayer, Die Seigneurie de Joscelin, 200.

45 Horst, Friedrich II. der Staufer 128–129.

46 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypren, 261.

47 Mayer, Die Seigneurie de Joscelin, 209–210.

Zeugen war auch der Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens.<sup>48</sup> Trotzdem kam der baltische Raum in den Plänen des Deutschen Ordens noch nicht vor. Die zahlmäßige Verteilung der für ihn ausgestellten Urkunden bezeugt es deutlich: drei der im Jahre 1226 an den Orden gerichteten Urkunden beziehen sich auf das Heilige Land und nur eine auf Preußen.<sup>49</sup> In Januar 1226 stellte der Kaiser die Besitzungen des Deutschen Ordens in Königtum Jerusalem unter seinen Schutz. Unter den Zeugen sind bedeutende Würdenträger anzutreffen, wie die Barone Balian von Sidon, und Gawein von Zypern oder der Bischof von Akkon.<sup>50</sup> Da Friedrich II. zu dieser Zeit noch nicht zum König von Jerusalem gekrönt wurde, stellte auch Isabella, die rechtmäßige Erbin Jerusalems, einen Privilegienbrief des gleichen Inhalts aus. Unter den Zeugen finden wir wiederum den Baron Gawein.<sup>51</sup> Im Juli 1226 stellte der Kaiser eine weitere Privilegiumsurkunde für den Deutschen Ritterorden aus, in der er den Grundkauf des Ordens von 30. Mai 1220 bestätigte, den Hermann von Salza in der Gegend von Toron von einem gewissen Otto von Henneberg gekauft hatte.<sup>52</sup> Aus dem Vergleich des sich auf Preußen beziehenden Bulle mit den anderen sich auf den Deutschen Orden beziehenden Urkunden aus dem Jahre 1226 geht hervor, wo die Schwerpunkte des kaiserlichen, und zu engem Zusammenhang damit der ritterordentlichen Politik lagen.<sup>53</sup>

Neben den Hauptzielen im Mediterraneum ließ jedoch weder Friedrich II. noch sein oberster Ratgeber und Vertrauter Hermann von Salza die Nordinteressen des Reiches aus den Augen. Der Bulle von Rimini folgten Schritte des Hochmeisters des Deutschen Ordens im Interesse der Sicherung der Voraussetzungen für den Meerestransport zu den preußischen und baltischen Gebieten hin. Er erkannte die Wichtigkeit des Lübecker Hafens und versuchte es gegen die Machtbestrebungen nicht nur der dänischen, sondern auch der deutschen Fürsten zu schützen, so verlieh der Kaiser auf sein Fürbitten den Rang und die Privilegien einer Reichsstadt, das so von dem Einfluß der Welfischen Herzogsfamilie

---

48 *Liv- Esth- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch*. Bd. I. Hg. F. G. Bunge, Reval–Riga, 1852 [= LUB I.], Nr. 90.

49 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 262.

50 Tabulae Nr. 58; *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis Mariae Theutonicorum 1198-1525*. Pars II: *Regesta Privilegiorum*. Bearb. E. Joachim, Hg. W. Hubatsch. Göttingen, 1950 [= Regesta] Nr. 30.

51 Tabulae Nr. 59; Regesta Nr. 31.

52 Tabulae Nr. 60.

53 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 263.



befreit wurde.<sup>54</sup> 1226 reiste Hermann von Salza wieder nach Deutschland, um das nötige Heer zum Kreuzzug des Kaisers ins Heilige Land zu organisieren. Es gelang ihm etwa 700 Adelige, Ritter und Vornehme, unter ihnen auch den Herzog von Limburg und den Landgrafen von Thüringen für den Plan des Kreuzzuges zu gewinnen.<sup>55</sup> In den nördlichen Gebieten des Reiches wurde die Lage wieder Unsicher: der Dänenkönig Waldemar II. brach den früheren Vertrag und versuchte die Großmachtposition Dänemarks in Nordraum wiederherzustellen. Am 22. Juli 1227 erlitt er aber von den norddeutschen Fürsten bei Bornhövend eine vernichtende Niederlage.<sup>56</sup> Erst nach der Regelung der Fragen der europäischen Großpolitik, bzw. der Festigung der Reichspositionen fasste Friedrich II. einen Kreuzzug in Heilige Land und den Erwerb der Königswürde von Jerusalem ins Auge. Im September 1227 lief die kaiserliche Flotte aus dem Hafen von Brindisi aus.<sup>57</sup>

Zu den Vorbereitung des Kreuzzuges gehörte auch das Erwerben der aus der Sicht des Nachschubs, der Versorgung des Heeres einen wichtigen Stützpunkt bildenden Insel Zypern unerlässlich hinzu. Die Lage wurde von den inneren zyprischen Streitigkeiten erleichtert, in deren Zuge sich die mit der Herrschaft des statt des 11jährigen Königs Heinrich I. regierenden Philipps de Ibelin unzufriedenen Vornehmen an Friedrich II. wandten, und den Kaiser zum Regentem aufforderten.<sup>58</sup> Das schnelle Wachstum der kaiserliche Macht, ihre großzügige räumliche Ausbreitung erfüllte den an die Stelle Honorius III. tretenden neuen Papst Gregor IX., der den politischen Richtlinien Innozenz III. folgen wollte, mit Sorge. Seiner Beurteilung nach habe Friedrich II. den Anfang des Kreuzzuges zu lange aufgeschoben und sabotiert, deshalb exkommunizierte er ihn.<sup>59</sup> Den 25. April 1228 wurde Friedrich ein Sohn geboren, Konrad, der der rechtmäßige Erbe Jerusalems wurde.<sup>60</sup> Aus politischer Sicht war dies deshalb von großer Bedeutung, weil Kaiserin Isabella, durch die Friedrich den Rechtstitel für seine Ansprüche auf die Krone Jerusalems

---

54 Krollmann, Politische Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 8.; Maschke, *Der Deutsche Ordensstaat. Gestalten seiner großen Meister*. Hamburg, 1936. 34.

55 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 263.

56 Über die Schlacht siehe F. Rörig, *Die Schlacht bei Bornhövend 1227*. Lübeck, 1927.

57 Engels, *Die Staufer*, 146.

58 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 264.

59 Horst, *Friedrich II. der Staufer*, 136.

60 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 264.

gefunden hatte, kurz nach der Geburt starb.<sup>61</sup> Der Kaiser erreichte Zypern am 28. Juni 1228. Philipp de Ibelin, die Machtverhältnisse erkennend, unterwarf sich, und Friedrich verpflichtete ihn mit seinen Anhängern zur Teilnahme auf eigenen Kosten an dem Kreuzzug ins Heilige Land. Auf Zypern ernannte er fünf Barone zu Mitgliedern des mit der Regierung beauftragten Regentenrates. Bei der Regelung der Angelegenheiten der Insel mußte der Kaiser die Hilfe seines Ratgebers Hermann von Salza, der mit dem bedeutenden Teil der Militärkräfte bereits in Akkon auf die Ankunft des Friedrichs II. wartete, entbehren.<sup>62</sup> Der Kaiser erreichte, in erster Linie durch Geschichte Diplomatie und nicht mit Kriegsmanövern, daß die Kreuzritter 1229 in Jerusalem haben einziehen können.<sup>63</sup> Noch am 18. März desselben Jahres wurde Friedrich II. zum König Jerusalems gekrönt. Die Krönungsrede hielt Hermann von Salza.<sup>64</sup>

Mit der Erfolg Friedrichs II. im Heiligen Lande konnte auch der Deutsche Orden seine Positionen stärken, vieler Schenkungen wurde er teilhaftig. Er erhielt die Zolleinkünfte von Akkon, ein Hospital, zwei städtische Häuser und drei Herrenhöfe in Jerusalem, drei größere Ländereien in Sidon, einen Weinberg und eine Mühle in Antiochien und daneben die Burg Toron. Zusammen mit Monfort stellten auch die beiden Burgen teile der von Akkon bis zum deren Lauf des Jordans reichenden Befestigungskette dar. Die herausragende Bedeutung Hermanns von Salza in der Umgebung des Kaisers wird dadurch signalisiert, daß Friedrich II. dem Hochmeister den militärischen Oberbefehl über des Heer der Kreuzfahrer anvertraute.<sup>65</sup>

Das Fernsein des Kaiser sin Palästina ausnützend brachten dei Truppen des Papstes in Campanien ein. Als Friedrich vom Angriff Kenntnis nahm, brach er seinen Aufenthalt im Heiligen Lande ab und schiffte sich von Hermann von Salza Begleitet am 1. Mai 1229 in Akkon ein.<sup>66</sup> Für kurze Zeit hielt er in Tyros, wo er den Deutschen Orden mit einem weiteren Haus begüterte, dann fuhr er nach Zypern, nach Limassol. Er nahm den Eid von den fünf Regenten der Insel ab, daß sie den Rückkehr des von Ibelin und seiner Parteianhänger nicht zulassen.<sup>67</sup> Während des

61 Horst, Friedrich II. der Staufer 120.

62 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 267–268.

63 J. Gergely, *A pápaság története*. Budapest, 1982. 127.

64 Payne, Die Kreuzzüge, 499.

65 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 269–270.

66 L. Pósán, *Németország a középkorban*. Debrecen, 2003. 146–147.

67 Hubatsch, Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern, 270–271.

zweiten Zypern-Aufenthalt des Kaisers wurden dem Deutsche Orden bedeutende Schenkungen auf der Insel zuteil: Anfang Juni 1229 überließ Heinrich I., König von Zypern den Rittern die Burg Chadovie mit den ihr angehörenden Dörfern, Äckern und Wäldern, in Nicosia beschenkte er den Orden mit einem Haus.<sup>68</sup>

Kaum verließ Friedrich II. die Insel von Zypern, als der Aufstand Ibeliner ausbrach und große Erfolge erreichte. Gleichzeitig mit den inneren Kämpfen erhob die Mutterkönigin, sich auf ihren Großvater Amalrich beziehend, Anspruch auf die Krone des Königtum Jerusalems. Die ostmediterrane Macht des Kaisers schien ins Schwanken geraten zu sein.<sup>69</sup> Die Schläge an der Positionen der Staufer betrafen auch den mit der Dynastie in enger Verbindung stehenden Deutschen Orden unangenehm. Die Johanniter nutzten die Gelegenheit, um zu versuchen, die deutsche Ritter unter sich zu ordnen. Dafür machten sie Propaganda beim Heiligen Stuhl, was auch nicht ohne Wirkung bleibt. Am 17. August 1229 forderte Gregor IX. den Patriarch von Jerusalem auf, gegen den Deutschen Orden, der die Oberhoheit des Johanniterordens nicht annahm, aufzutreten.<sup>70</sup> Der Deutsche Ritterorden, vorher von der Kurie stark unterstützt, fiel jetzt 1229 in Rom fast völlig in Ungnade. Hermann von Salza konnte seine Hoffnung auf die Besserung der Lage des Deutschen Ordens nur auf die Versöhnung des Papstes mit dem Kaiser setzen. Die Sommerverhandlungen des Jahres 1229 endeten wegen des Widerstands des Papstes der Reihe nach ohne Erfolg. Erst im Herbst zeigte Gregor IX. Bereitschaft zur Verständigung, als Friedrich II., auf Hermanns von Salza Rat einen Teil seiner Soldaten entließ. Dank den diplomatischen Anstrengungen der Hochmeisters hat Gregor IX. am 19. Oktober 1229 eine Urkunde in Zusammenhang mit dem umrissenen Frieden zwischen dem Papst und dem Kaiser ausstellen lassen, in der er – im Gegensatz zu seinem Standpunkt im Sommer – die Unverletzlichkeit der Besitzungen und Gütern, sowie die Privilegien und den rechtlichen Status des Deutschen Ordens garantierte.<sup>71</sup>

Das Schwanken der kaiserlichen Macht im Levanterraum zwang Hochmeister Hermann von Salza zur Überlegung der künftigen Möglichkeiten des Deutschen Ordens und der Chancen der Ostpolitik.

---

68 Tabulae Nr. 71.

69 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypem*, 272–273.

70 *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Jean de Jérusalem* II. Ed. J. Delaville le Roulx. Paris, 1899. Nr. 1944.

71 *Die Urkunden des Deutschordens Zentralarchives zu Wien*. Hg. G. Pettenberg. Prag–Leipzig, 1887. Nr. 126.

Walther Hubatsch meint, daß der Orden sich nach dem Erreichen der päpstlichen Garantie seiner soweit errungenen Besitzungen und Schenkungen im Heiligen Land und in Mediterraneo ernsthafter mit der Frage der preußischen Mission und den sich in den nördlichen polnisch-preußischen Gebieten eröffnenden neuen Möglichkeiten zu beschäftigen begonnen habe. Zu dieser Zeit erscheinen die ersten Ritter des Ordens an der Weichsel.<sup>72</sup> Im Gegensatz dazu meint Erich Caspar, der Deutsche Orden habe ursprünglich bereits den Kampf gegen die Preußen als seine Hauptaufgabe betrachtet, und das Unternehmen Friedrichs II. im Heiligen Lande habe nur die Verwirklichung dieser verzögert.<sup>73</sup> Der polnische Historiker Tymieniecki vertritt auch einen ähnlichen Standpunkt.<sup>74</sup> Die Quellen jedoch untermauern unseres Erachtens eher die Meinung von Hubatsch. Nach 1230 vermehren sich die an den Deutschen Orden verliehenen päpstlichen Privilegien wieder, und parallel dazu erfolgt eine vorsichtige Lockerung der engen Verbindung zwischen dem Orden und dem Staufischen Haus. Nachdem zum Beispiel Friedrich II. im Sommer 1230 in Anagni mit dem Papst Frieden geschlossen und seine Lage in Süditalien verfestigt hatte, wollte er seine Oberhoheit über Zypern wiederherstellen. An dem gegen die Insel geführten sog. „Lombardischen Krieg“ (1231-1233) beteiligte sich der Deutsche Ritterorden nicht mehr.<sup>75</sup> Er hat den Schwerpunkt seiner Tätigkeit auf das nordöstliche Randgebiet Europas verlagert. Indem er die Aufgabe der Mission gegen die Heiden auf sich lud, stellte er das gute Verhältnis zum Heiligen Stuhl wieder her, konnte aber seine Positionen auch am kaiserlichen Hofe bewahren. Unterstützt von den beiden Großmächten der Epoche nahm der Deutsche Orden ab 1230 die Bekehrung der preußischen Gebiete in Angriff.

---

72 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 274–275.

73 E. Caspar, *Hermann von Salza und die Gründung des Deutschordensstaates in Preußen*. Tübingen, 1924. 70.

74 K. Tymieniecki, *Misja Polska w Prusiech i sprowadzenie Krzyżaków*. Toruń, 1935. 41.

75 Hubatsch, *Der Deutsche Orden und den Reichslehnschaft über Cypern*, 277–280.



**Attila Bárány**

## **La Hongrie et la guerre de Bretagne (1488-1493)<sup>1</sup>**

En effectuant des recherches sur les relations de la Hongrie avec les puissances de l'Europe de l'ouest – la France et l'Angleterre – à la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle, j'ai découvert un pan de l'histoire relativement peu connu : la lutte que se livrèrent durant plusieurs décennies les Valois, les Tudor et les Habsbourg pour la succession du duché de Bretagne. L'acquisition de la Bretagne aurait eu une influence considérable sur la place qu'ils occupaient l'échiquier des grandes puissances européennes pour les Pays-Bas des Habsbourg gouvernés par Maximilien, roi des Romains, la France des Valois et l'Angleterre où les Tudor venaient de conquérir le pouvoir en 1485. Certes, la Hongrie ne prit pas une part active dans le conflit, mais d'une manière indirecte, le changement de dynastie qui suivit la mort du roi Mathias Corvin fut étroitement lié aux intérêts momentanés des parties qui combattaient sur la lointaine terre bretonne.

Au cours de mes recherches sur les relations franco-anglaises, je me suis souvent aperçu que mes études ne devaient pas porter exclusivement sur la « grande politique » et qu'il fallait dénicher tous les lieux où des relations avaient existé ou *avaient pu exister* : non seulement les relations directes, mais aussi les relations *indirectes* au delà de la diplomatie. Dans ma présente étude, j'aimerais montrer que dans la diplomatie européenne extraordinairement complexe de la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle et du début du XVI<sup>e</sup>, dans l'imbroglio des ligues et des guerres d'Italie, il n'y eut pas que les relations diplomatiques traditionnelles, directes qui eurent de l'importance, mais aussi les contacts indirects. Tel est le conflit breton du début des années 1490 où les relations des intéressés avec le Royaume de Hongrie pesèrent de tout leur poids. De son côté, la direction politique hongroise, survolant les dynasties, veilla régulièrement à ses intérêts : et prit part « en tant qu'élément extérieur » au conflit des grandes puissances et suivit une orientation pragmatique, récurrente.

A la fin des années 1480, le conflit breton remodela la constellation des puissances européennes. L'échiquier politique de l'Europe occidentale fut déterminé fondamentalement par l'opposition entre, d'un côté, la dynastie des York en Angleterre et les ducs de Bourgogne et de

---

1 La réalisation de ce travail a été soutenue par le projet Lendület: *Hungary in Medieval Europe Research Group* / LP2014-13/2014. (Académie hongroise des sciences – Université de Debrecen)

l'autre, les Valois et les Lancastre anglais. Dans cet axe, François II, duc de Bretagne (1458-1488) prit le parti d'Edouard IV (1461-1483) et du duc de Bourgogne, Charles le Téméraire pour se protéger des aspirations territoriales du Valois, Louis XI (1461-1483). Le duc François prit même part à une campagne militaire anglo-bourguignonne contre la France dans les années 1470<sup>2</sup>. Entre temps, avec la mort de Charles le Téméraire, l'héritage bourguignon tomba dans le giron des Habsbourg, mais la dynastie des York poursuivit l'orientation bourguignonne et conclut une alliance avec Maximilien, le nouveau duc<sup>3</sup>.

Comme François II, duc de Bretagne, n'avait qu'une héritière, Anne, les Valois nourrissaient le dessein que le nouveau souverain français, Charles VIII, épousât Anne de Bretagne, avec pour conséquence que le duché indépendant qui jouissait d'une quasi complète autonomie et qui n'était même pas lié à la France par un serment de vassalité, se retrouva complètement sous l'autorité de la couronne. Le nouveau souverain anglais, Henri VII Tudor (1485-1509) qui avait pris la place des York sur le trône grâce au soutien des Valois, renforça à plusieurs reprises son alliance avec les Valois après son accession au trône, poursuivant en cela l'héritage des Lancastre<sup>4</sup>. Toutefois, quelques années après le début du règne des Tudor, il devint urgent de décider quel parti l'Angleterre allait prendre dans la question de l'appartenance du duché de Bretagne. Au début, quand Charles VIII envahit la Bretagne en 1487-1488, Henri Tudor souhaita intervenir comme intermédiaire, puis rester neutre le plus longtemps possible pour rester fidèle aux Valois qui l'avaient fait monter sur le trône, tout en ménageant ses relations avec Maximilien de Habsbourg<sup>5</sup>.

Jusqu'en 1487, les Habsbourg continuèrent à soutenir les prétendants au trône de la Maison des York contre les Tudor, si bien qu'Henri Tudor se retrouva tout naturellement adversaire des Habsbourg. L'Angleterre mit sous embargo le commerce flamand, puis s'allia aux insurgés hollandais,

---

2 Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae*. I-XX. London, 1704-35.; I-X. The Hague, 1739-45. [= Rymer, *Foedera*] XII. 95-97.

3 Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 95-97.

4 1486, 1488.: John M. Currin, *Persuasions to Peace: The Luxembourg-Marigny-Gaguin Embassy and the State of Anglo-French Relations, 1489-90*. = *English Historical Review*, 113, 1998, 882-904. tout spécialement 883.; Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 281-82., 344-45., 347.

5 Ralph A. Griffiths – Roger S. Thomas, *Hogyan lett naggyá a Tudor-dinasztia?* [Comment la dynastie Tudor est passé à grande puissance?] Debrecen, 2007. 149.

surtout flamands, contre Maximilien, avec le soutien de la France<sup>6</sup>. Toutefois, à partir de 1487-1488, voyant que l'agression et les aspirations territoriales françaises augmentaient, il devint pragmatique et poursuivit l'orientation des York qui avait fait ses preuves, c'est-à-dire l'orientation Bourgogne-Habsbourg<sup>7</sup>. Henri VII se rapprocha de plus en plus de Maximilien et souhaita renouveler les accords signés sous le règne des York<sup>8</sup>. Maximilien, puis son fils Philippe le Beau, s'allièrent aux Anglais, bien que la belle-mère du prince, Marguerite d'York, veuve de Charles le Téméraire continuât à soutenir la dynastie des York, « la Rose Blanche » depuis sa cour de Malines<sup>9</sup>. Maximilien se réjouit aussi de cet accord avec les Tudor car il redoutait lui aussi une alliance franco-anglaise, vu qu'il savait qu'Henri était arrivé sur le trône grâce aux Français. Cet accord avec les Anglais lui permettait d'espérer récupérer avec leur aide une partie de l'héritage bourguignon tombé aux mains des Français<sup>10</sup>. En 1487, Maximilien avait essuyé un échec dans une attaque militaire contre la France et n'avait pu apporter un soutien en Bretagne, ni renforcer les positions du duc François. Jusqu'aux Flamands qui s'étaient révoltés dans le dos du prince Habsbourg, si bien qu'il était devenu évident pour lui qu'il ne pourrait pas récupérer seul l'héritage de Charles le Téméraire et qu'il avait besoin d'appuis ; en revanche, il était hors de question de soutenir les révoltés du parti des York, d'où un rapprochement naturel avec l'Angleterre.

Cette politique double avait du mal à réussir, vu qu'aussi bien la diplomatie des Valois que celle des Habsbourg considérait l'Angleterre comme le fléau de la balance dans la situation d'équilibre en formation. La position d'Henri Tudor était de première importance pour la diplomatie française<sup>11</sup>. Pour l'Angleterre, la solution acceptable aurait été

6 John M. Currin, *English international relations 1485–1509: Continuities amidst Change*. In: Susan Doran – Glenn Richardson (eds.): *Tudor England and its Neighbours*. Basingstoke, 2005. 14–43. ici 14.; András Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő esztendő (1490–1491) [Deux années mémorable] = Történelmi Szemle*, 33, 1991. 1–54. ici 14.

7 Avec Maximilien: 1487: Public Record Office / The National Archives, Kew, Surrey, Grande-Bretagne [= PRO] Exchequer [= E] 30/591., 592., 1489: E 30/594, 595.

8 Roger Lockyer – Andrew Thrush, *Henry VII*. Harlow, 1997. (Seminar Studies in History) 76.

9 Christine Weightman, *Margaret of York, Duchess of Burgundy, 1446-1503*. Gloucester, 1989. 150–52.

10 Weightman, Margaret of York, 156., 161.

11 Eugène de Certian (ed.), *Chronique rimée de Guillaume Ledoyen, notaire a Laval a XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*. = *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 13, 1852, 361–93. tout spécialement



que le status quo demeurât, que la Bretagne restât indépendante et ne fût pas annexée par les Français ; or, les Tudor auraient aimé continuer à pouvoir compter sur le soutien des Français, vu que peu de temps auparavant les Habsbourg aidaient encore financièrement des rebelles au règne des Tudor. Le grand dilemme était de savoir jusqu'à quand le roi d'Angleterre pourrait temporiser afin de choisir son camp le plus tard possible. Fondamentalement, il souhaitait la paix puisque les rebelles favorables aux York étaient toujours prêts à se battre en Irlande et aux Pays-Bas : c'est pourquoi, il avait équipé la flotte en 1486 pour parer à toute éventualité<sup>12</sup>. En même temps, comme Henri n'était pas certain que Maximilien n'aidât plus les partisans des York, il ne voulait pas s'éloigner totalement des Valois<sup>13</sup>. Les armistices conclus avec les deux parties ne duraient que jusqu'au 17 janvier 1487 pour le premier et 2 février pour le second, mais comme la France et Maximilien étaient en conflit en Bretagne, Henri décida de ne prolonger aucun des deux. Tout d'abord, en mars 1488, il décida de renforcer l'amitié qui le liait au roi de France – ou plus exactement, de maintenir sa neutralité dans le conflit breton<sup>14</sup>. Toutefois, plus tard, Henri VII eut de plus en plus peur de l'hégémonie française et préféra s'allier aux Habsbourg, dans l'espoir que le roi de Germanie pourrait l'aider contre les Valois<sup>15</sup>. Le prix de cette alliance était qu'Henri s'engageât aux côtés de Maximilien sur le front français des Habsbourg, en Bretagne. En effet, Henri était de plus en plus inquiet à cause des victoires françaises en Bretagne et était angoissé à l'idée que si les ports bretons tombaient aux mains des Français, le roi de France pourrait du même coup débarquer sur le sol anglais<sup>16</sup>. En passant sous la coupe française, la Bretagne aurait pu servir de tremplin idéal pour une éventuelle invasion menée par les Français et les partisans des York contre l'Angleterre : Henri le savait bien puisque lui-même s'était emparé du trône de cette façon. En juillet 1488, le duc de Bretagne fut défait par les Valois à la bataille de Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier

---

373.; Lockyer – Thrush, Henry VII, 76.

12 *Materials relating to the reign of Henry VII*. Ed. William Campbell. Vol. I-II. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, Rolls Series [= RS], 183) London, 1873-77. [= Materials Henry VII] I. 145-152.

13 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 281.; 320-21.

14 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 337.

15 Négociations: 1488: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 338.; 352.; traité: Dordrecht, 14 février 1489: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 359-61.; 397-400.

16 Lockyer – Thrush, Henry VII, 77.

et il dut prêter serment de vassalité. On pouvait craindre que Charles VIII épousât l'héritière, Anne de Bretagne et par la-même plaçât le duché sous la couronne. Aussi, Henri Tudor n'avait-il pas d'autre alternative que de s'allier complètement avec Maximilien<sup>17</sup>. Cependant, leur relation ne fut jamais stable. Quand Maximilien prit parti pour la Bretagne, l'Angleterre aurait dû enfin choisir son camp pour protéger le duché à moitié autonome de l'annexion française<sup>18</sup>. Finalement, Henri Tudor se décida à intervenir militairement pour défendre la Bretagne. L'Angleterre espérait que Maximilien soutiendrait l'intervention anglaise en Bretagne depuis l'Artois et la Picardie<sup>19</sup>. L'annexion totale du duché par la France aurait dérangé les intérêts commerciaux maritimes de l'Angleterre<sup>20</sup>. D'où les négociations avec les Rois catholiques en 1488 et 1489. En 1489, fut signé le premier « grand » accord anglo-espagnol à Medina del Campo<sup>21</sup>.

A la mort de François II, (septembre 1488), Maximilien, le partenaire stratégique d'Henri, voulut épouser son héritière, Anne de Bretagne, tout comme les Valois. Maximilien avait besoin de l'alliance des Tudor contre les Français car il aspirait à la reconquête de l'Artois, de la Franche-Comté et de la Bourgogne – territoires auxquels il avait renoncé lors du traité d'Arras en 1482<sup>22</sup>. De leur côté, les Habsbourg devaient venir à

17 Traité: 1486 : Rymer, Foedera, XII. 303., 1487: Foedera, XII. 320.; une réception d'une ambassade des Habsbourg : 1488 : Rymer, Foedera, XII. 338.

18 Anglo-Habsbourg négociations: mars – décembre 1488: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 338.; 352.

19 J. M. Currin, Henry VII and the Treaty of Redon (1489): Plantagenet Ambitions and Early Tudor Foreign Policy. = *History*, 81, 1996. 343–58. [= Currin, Redon] ici 356. Maximilien envoya des troupes : 1488 : Lockyer – Thrush, Henry VII, 77.

20 M. C. V. Alexander, *The first of the Tudors: a Study of Henry VII and his Reign*. Totowa, N.J., 1980. 90–104.; Lockyer – Thrush, Henry VII, 68., 82–84.; P. S. Crowson, *Tudor Foreign Policy*. London, 1973. 47–66.; S. B. Chrimes, *Henry VII*. London, 1972. (English Monarchs Series) 280–82.

21 Négociations: 10 mars 1488: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 336. Voici l'engagement de Prince Arthur et Catherine d'Aragon est sur l'ordre du jour. *Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain preserved in the Archives of Simancas and elsewhere*. Ed. G. A. Bergenroth – Pascual de Gayangos. I-III/1., Supplement I-II. 1485-1526. London, 1862-73. [= CSP Spain] I. n. 21.; Rymer, Foedera, XII. 353.; 28 mars 1489: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 417–24.; renouvellement : 1490: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 411.; 1491: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 460.; 1492: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 517., 523.; CSP Spain I. n. 34.; Currin, Redon, 351–54.; Currin, Persuasions, 883., 887.

22 *Lettres inédits de Maximilien, duc d'Autriche, roi des Romaines at Empereur sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*. Ed. Louis Prosper M. Gachard. I-II. Bruxelles, 1851-52. [= Lettres inédits de Maximilien. Pays-Bas] II. n. 89.

bout de la résistance flamande<sup>23</sup>. Le mouvement de protestation dirigé par les villes de Gand, Bruges et Ypres était soutenu depuis longtemps par la France<sup>24</sup>. Un autre facteur ayant pu influencer la décision de Maximilien : il avait un grand besoin de céréales pour ses combats aux Pays-Bas et en Bourgogne. Les sources anglaises précisent même qu'il dut souvent importer des céréales d'Angleterre<sup>25</sup>.

L'engagement militaire effectif de l'Angleterre se faisait toujours attendre. Henri VII s'était contenté de négocier avec Maximilien en mars 1488 à Calais<sup>26</sup>. Le signe de l'engagement des Tudor fut l'accord commercial signé avec Anne de Bretagne fin 1488<sup>27</sup>. Puis en mars 1489, fut signé l'accord de Redon, suivi de la consolidation de l'alliance avec Maximilien qui précéda l'envoi de troupes anglaises en Bretagne<sup>28</sup>. A l'Assemblée impériale de Francfort, Maximilien demanda de l'aide pour la guerre entamée aux côtés des Anglais contre la France<sup>29</sup>.

Toutefois, en pleine campagne militaire, l'alliance avec Maximilien tomba à l'eau, quand en juillet 1489, ce dernier fit marche arrière et signa une paix séparée avec les Français à Francfort<sup>30</sup>. Le traité de paix de Francfort aurait pu pousser le roi de Hongrie à s'allier à l'adversaire de Maximilien, l'Angleterre des Tudor. En effet, le souverain anglais aurait dû se réconcilier avec ses alliés continentaux, entre autres avec la

23 Lettres inédits de Maximilien. Pays-Bas, II. n. 89.

24 J. M. Currin, «To Traffic with War»? Henry VII and the French Campaign of 1492. In: David Grummitt (ed.), *The English Experience in France, c.1450–1558: War, Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange*. Aldershot, 2002. 106–31. ici 113.

25 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 475.

26 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 338

27 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 348.

28 J. M. Currin, To play at peace. Henry VII, War Against France, and the Chieragato-Flores Mediation of 1490. = *Albion*, 31, 1999. 2/Summer: 207–237. ici 209. Traité: Dordrecht, 14 février 1489: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 359–61.; 397–400.

29 *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*. Mittlere Reihe. *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I.* [1486-1505] Bd. 1-8. Bearb. Heinz Angermeier – Ernst Bock – Heinz Gollwitzer – Dietmar Heil – Reinhard Seyboth. Göttingen, 1989-2008. Bd. 4. Reichsversammlungen 1491-1493. Bearb. Reinhard Seyboth. Göttingen, 2008. [= DRTA] III/1. n. 239.; Péter E. Kovács, Miksa magyarországi hadjárata [La campagne de Maximilien en Hongrie]. = *Történelmi Szemle*, 37, 1995. 1. 35–49. ici 37.

30 Jenő Horváth, Mátyás király nyugati diplomáciája [La diplomatie de l'Europe occidentale de Matthias]. In: *Mátyás király. Emlékkönyv születésének ötszázéves fordulójára*. I-II. Ed. Imre Lukinich. Budapest, 1940. I. 71–94. ici 92.; Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 14.

Hongrie<sup>31</sup>. Après la „trahison” de Maximilien, Henri choisit à nouveau la cause française et prit position contre le roi de Germanie et après l’été 1489, il se retrouva donc dans le camp politique où Mathias avait l’intention d’entrer. La situation politique était pressante parce que le roi d’Angleterre craignait que ses troupes ne fussent attaquées dans le dos par les Habsbourg en Bretagne depuis les Pays-Bas ; de plus, Maximilien pouvait abattre son vieux-nouvel atout, à savoir, accueillir les York.

Pour la politique anglaise, les alliés continentaux „extérieurs”, comme la Hongrie, se retrouvèrent valorisés. Les Tudor auraient toujours aimé s’appuyer sur les alliés d’antan de Charles le Téméraire. Mathias, opposant de Maximilien et tuteur en partie de l’ancienne ligue Bourgogne–Naples aurait été parfait dans ce rôle d’allié „extérieur”. Henri VII engagea des négociations avec le roi de Hongrie. Le 26 février 1488, il adressa une missive à un certain Robert de Champlayn qui avait lutté contre les Turcs en Hongrie<sup>32</sup>. Peu de temps auparavant ou peut-être juste à ce moment là, Champlayn avait effectué une mission diplomatique en Hongrie lorsque dans le courant de 1487, Jan Filipec, évêque de Várad, était ambassadeur de Hongrie en France. Henri VII jugea important d’entrer en contacts avec la Hongrie, en tant qu’allié potentiel contre les Habsbourg<sup>33</sup>. En juin 1487, Henri exhorta son ambassadeur en France, Sir John Kendall, à entamer des négociations avec un représentant de Mathias à Laval<sup>34</sup>. Le roi de France reçut les ambassadeurs hongrois et anglais ensemble à Angers<sup>35</sup>. Filipec fut ambassadeur en France jusqu’à fin novembre 1487<sup>36</sup>. Kendall, lui aussi, défendit les intérêts de son souverain, Henri VII, et attendit de nouvelles instructions de Westminster au sujet de négociations avec l’ambassadeur hongrois : il se rendit chez le roi de

---

31 Chrimes, Henry VII, 280.

32 PRO Chancery: Patent Rolls: C 66/567 m 4.; Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Ashmole 1114. f. 84–85: Combattu dans l’armée de Mathias, 1479: Bodleian Library MS Ashmole 1114. f. 78–79.

33 26 février 1488: *Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the PRO* [1232-1509]. I-LII. London, 1891-1916. [= CPR Henry VII] Part I. 188.

34 15 août 1487: *Calendar to the English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*. Ed. Rawdon Brown. I-III. 1202-1526. London, 1864-69. [= CSP Venice] I. n. 522.

35 Antonín Kalous, „Itinerář Jana Filipce (1431–1509) [L’itinéraire de Jan Filipec]. = *Sborník prací historických XXII. Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, Facultas philosophica, Historica*, 34, 2008. 17–43. ici 28–29.

36 Kalous, Itinerář Jana Filipce, 29.

France avec l'évêque de Várad<sup>37</sup>. En vertu du nouvel ordre arrivé de *son souverain*, roi d'Angleterre, il resta en France<sup>38</sup>. Jusqu'en janvier 1488, Henri VII reçut des informations sur la situation des affaires et demanda à son ambassadeur, Kendall, de poursuivre des négociations au sujet de démarches entre l'Angleterre et la Hongrie.

Nous avons des sources faisant état qu'en 1488, Mathias envoya un émissaire à Henri VII Tudor pour le féliciter de son couronnement ; hélas, aucun document concret lié à cette mission n'a été conservé<sup>39</sup>. On peut seulement supposer qu'il le félicitait aussi pour sa victoire remportée peu de temps auparavant à la bataille de Stoke (1487) contre les rebelles partisans des York. Mathias ne fut pas ébranlé par le changement de dynastie en Angleterre, – lui qui avait déjà des contacts précédemment avec l'Angleterre – et il n'avait pas l'intention de les arrêter avec l'arrivée sur le trône d'Henri Tudor, descendant de la branche Lancastre. Le souverain Tudor conclut un accord commercial avec Florence et l'Ordre des Chevaliers Allemands en sachant qu'il y avait Mathias qui aurait pu devenir le gérant de cette ligue anti-Habsbourg<sup>40</sup>. Tant que Mathias vécut, un accord avec la Hongrie était toujours à l'ordre du jour. Henri VII améliora aussi ses relations avec Milan<sup>41</sup>. Nous savons que cela était en harmonie avec l'approche hongroise : en effet, depuis le 25 novembre 1487, János Corvin était l'époux de la duchesse milanaise Bianca Maria Sforza. Le notaire de Laval, Guillaume Ledoyen, évoque que

---

37 Ibid.

38 4 janvier 1488: CSP Venice, I. n. 526.

39 « [...] ad regem variis ex regionibus oratores destinati [...] Pannonii »: [Bernard André / Bernardi Andreae Tholosatis] De vita atque gestis Henrici Septimi / Historia regis Henrici Septimi, a Bernardo Andrea Tholosate conscripta: necnon alia quaedam ad eundem regem spectantia] In: Memorials of King Henry VII. Ed. James Gairdner. London, 1858. (RS, 10) 47.

40 Florence: 15 avril / 1 mai 1490: PRO 30/604.; Rymer, Foedera, XII. 374.; 378., 380., 389., 441. Por Alliance portugais a également convenu: août 1489: PRO 30/597.; 1696. L'Ordre de la Jarretière est donnée au roi du Portugal: Rymer, Foedera, XII. 448.; Alliance danoise est signé: 20 janvier 1490: PRO E 30/1098.; John M. Currin, 'Pro Expensis Ambassadorum': Diplomacy and Financial Administration in the Reign of Henry VII. = *English Historical Review*, 108, 1993. 589–609. tout spécialement 601.; J. D. Mackie: *The Earlier Tudors, 1485–1558*. Oxford, 1952. 102., 223.; Florence: 15 avril/1 mai 1490: PRO 30/604.; *Deputy Keeper of the Public Records*. [= DKPR] *Forty-fifth report*. London, 1885. 339.

41 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 429.; CSP Milan – *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts in the Archives and Collections of Milan 1385-1618*. I. Ed. A. B. Hinds. London, 1912. [= CSP Milan] I. n. 250.; CSP Venice, I. n. 554.

l'ambassadeur milanais était aussi présent aux pourparlers de 1487 entre Filipec, Kendall et le roi de France<sup>42</sup>. En novembre 1489, le duc de Milan engagea des négociations au sujet d'une affaire de contrat de mariage avec la Maison Tudor<sup>43</sup>. En février 1490, il signèrent même l'accord<sup>44</sup>. Cependant, à l'époque, les parties savaient que leur allié commun, le roi de Hongrie, vivait. En juin 1490, sans doute après avoir appris la mort de Mathias, le duc Gian Galeazzo envoya des ambassadeurs porteurs de lettres *simultanément* en Hongrie et en Angleterre par le biais de son conseiller principal, Bartolomeo Chalco<sup>45</sup>.

Le *volte face* de Maximilien à Francfort signifiait que la Hongrie et la libération des provinces autrichiennes de l'occupation hongroise constituaient la priorité politique pour lui<sup>46</sup>. Le roi des Romains souhaitait du „calme” et trouver un accord avec la France car il était de plus en plus préoccupé par la Hongrie et la question de l'héritage hongrois<sup>47</sup>. De son côté, Mathias avait lui aussi besoin d'un allié, pouvant constituer un contrepoids dans le dos de Maximilien. Pour l'Angleterre, la relation avec Mathias revêtait d'autant plus d'importance qu'elle ne pouvait plus guère compter sur l'Espagne, empêtrée de plus en plus dans le siège de Grenade qui durait depuis 1482, contre l'alliance Valois-Habsbourg<sup>48</sup>.

L'Angleterre dut trouver impérativement des alliés après avoir fait la lumière sur une nouvelle conjuration en décembre 1489. Au printemps 1490, les Français envoyèrent plusieurs spadassins pour occire Henri Tudor<sup>49</sup>. Quant à Maximilien, il continuait à jouer son double jeu en garantissant son soutien au roi d'Angleterre en septembre 1489, sans être gêné par le fait que quelques semaines plus tôt, il avait signé un accord avec les Français à Francfort<sup>50</sup>. Le roi d'Angleterre crut tout même que l'accord conclu avec les Valois n'était pas dirigé contre l'Angleterre et

42 Certian (ed.), *Chronique rimée de Guillaume Ledoyen, notaire à Laval a XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 371.

43 CSP Milan, I. nos. 251–52.

44 CSP Venice, I. n. 559.; renouvellement: octobre 1490: Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 430.; Mackie, *Tudors*, 103.

45 7 juin 1490: CSP Milan, I. n. 256.

46 Lockyer – Thrush, *Henry VII*, 79.

47 Hermann Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit*. I-V. München, 1971-86. I. 220–24.

48 Currin, *Persuasions*, 890.

49 Ian Arthurson, *The Perkin Warbeck Conspiracy, 1491–1499*. Stroud, 1994. 37.; Currin, *English international relations*, 30.

50 Woking: Currin, *To play*, 211.; Mackie, *Tudors*, 110.

en septembre 1489, il l'inscrivit comme allié dans la ratification du traité espagnol<sup>51</sup>.

Le ciel continua à s'assombrir sur Henri VII lorsque les Français projetèrent d'envoyer des troupes en Irlande – en guise de contre-attaque en pleine guerre de Bretagne – pour aider le comte Warwick, partisan des York<sup>52</sup>. On envisagea aussi l'hypothèse de voir Maximilien, dégagé de l'alliance anglo-bretonne, combattre aux côtés des Français en Bretagne : ce qui poussa Anne de Bretagne à réclamer une nouvelle aide à Henri en mai 1490. En effet, entre temps, l'effectif des troupes ayant débarqué en 1489 avait fondu<sup>53</sup>. Par ailleurs, les Bretons n'avaient pas totalement confiance dans les 1500 mercenaires allemands envoyés début 1489 dans le cadre de l'alliance anglo-Habsbourg<sup>54</sup>. Henri VII envoya de nouvelles troupes en Bretagne en janvier 1490 et commença des opérations militaires au printemps<sup>55</sup>.

Parallèlement, le souverain anglais essaya de dissuader Maximilien de se rapprocher des Français. En mars 1490, il lui promit l'ordre de la Jarretièrre s'il revenait dans la ligue<sup>56</sup>. Dans le même temps, il envoya 3000 hommes en renfort en Bretagne en février 1490 : geste dont il se serait évidemment passé s'il avait été sûr de Maximilien. En effet, il croyait encore en ce temps-là que ses alliés garantissaient les intérêts anglais dans le dos de Maximilien face à ce dernier<sup>57</sup>. Ce n'est pas par hasard que précisément en février 1490 Maximilien envoya un ambassadeur permanent en Angleterre, le dénommé Pierre Puissant, qui occupa le poste d'ambassadeur résident jusqu'en octobre 1492<sup>58</sup>. Maximilien le dépêcha certainement muni d'une réponse positive, si bien qu'en mars

51 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 411–19.; CSP Spain, I. nos. 53., 54.

52 Desmond Seward, *The Last White Rose: The Secret Wars of the Tudors*. London, 2011. 53., 58.

53 *State Papers published under the authority of his Majesty's Commission: King Henry the Eighth*. I-XI. London, 1831-52. VI. 1–18.

54 J. M. Currin, 'The King's Army into the Partes of Bretagne': Henry VII and the Breton Wars, 1489–1491. = *War in History* 7, 2000. 4/Nov: 379–412. 394.

55 Currin, King's Army, 383.; 390–91.

56 Currin, To play, 222.

57 Charles Giry-DeLoison, Henry VII et la Bretagne: aspects politiques et diplomatiques. In Jean Kerhervé (ed.): *1491 La Bretagne, terre d'Europe*. Brest, 1992. 227–39. tout spécialement 236.; Currin, To play, 230.; Lockyer – Thrush, Henry VII, 81.

58 Currin, Traffic, 115.; PRO Exchequer of Receipt: Warrants for Issues E 404/81/1.; PRO Exchequer of Receipt: Jornalia Rolls, Tellers' Rolls, Certificate Books, Declaration Books and Accounts of Receipts and Issues. E 405/78 rot. 42.; Arthurson, Warbeck, 79.

1490, Henri pouvait être sûr des Habsbourg, vu qu'il avait des alliés dans le dos de Maximilien : en effet Mathias vivait encore.

Cependant l'opération militaire anglaise se solda par un échec. On pouvait craindre qu'après avoir soumis la Bretagne, Charles VIII pourrait exécuter le projet qu'il avait à cœur depuis longtemps : s'emparer de Naples et diminuer ainsi les chances de l'Angleterre d'apparaître sur la scène politique comme une nouvelle puissance. Toutefois, à partir de l'automne 1489 – tandis que Maximilien faisait croire au roi d'Angleterre que son alliance avec la France n'était pas dirigée contre lui –, les liens entre les Habsbourg et les Valois devinrent de plus étroits.

On ne peut pas dire que la situation politique en Hongrie n'ait pas eu d'effets sur la guerre de Bretagne qui touchait l'Angleterre, l'Empire, la France et l'Espagne. Je dirai même qu'elle a eu un grand impact à certains égards. Certes, d'une manière indirecte, si l'on considère que Maximilien quitta le champ de bataille occidental après avril 1490 à cause de la mort du roi Mathias et de sa succession sur le trône de Hongrie qui réduisirent à néant les espoirs des Anglais ; ou encore quand le roi des Romains qui ne se trouvait justement pas en Hongrie ne put pas se dissocier, ni dissocier la guerre qui avait lieu en France de la situation politique hongroise : en 1491, après avoir appris la chute de Fehérvár, il rappela une partie de ses troupes qu'il avait envoyées en Bretagne et en Bourgogne<sup>59</sup>. Péter E. Kovács considéra que toute la campagne militaire hongroise avait été marquée du sceau de la « tactique de la guerre éclair » parce que le roi des Romains était occupé sur plusieurs fronts, notamment en Bretagne<sup>60</sup>. (De plus, très longtemps il ne montra pas le moindre signe de se retirer de l'un d'eux) András Kubinyi souligna aussi que le but était de s'emparer du trône de Hongrie par une attaque « à la hussarde »<sup>61</sup>. Lorsque Maximilien quitta la Hongrie fin 1490 et se retrouva fin décembre à Wiener Neustadt, la diplomatie anglaise se mit à espérer et la française à craindre que le roi des Romains allait reprendre ses manoeuvres militaires en Bretagne. Le conflit entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet de la Bretagne eut une telle

59 Tibor Neumann, *Békekötés Pozsonyban – Országgyűlés Budán. A Jagelló-Habsburg kapcsolatok egy fejezete 1490-1492*, 1. [Traité de paix à Bratislava – Parlement à Buda. Le chapitre de Jagellon-Habsbourg Relations] = *Századok*, 44, 2010. 335–372. [= Neumann, *Jagelló-Habsburg I.*] I. 361. Sur la récupération de Fehérvár: László Solymosi, *Kőszeg 1490. évi feladása*. [La reddition de Kőszeg en 1490] = *Vasi szemle*, 37, 1983. 94–101. 96.

60 E. Kovács, Miksa, 44.; Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő*, 26.; Wiesflecker, Maximilian, I. 281.

61 Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő*, 30.



influence sur Ulászló/Vladislas II qu'il entama des négociations en vue d'une alliance avec le roi de France, ennemi principal de Maximilien, et qu'ils signèrent même un accord le 14 juillet<sup>62</sup>. Un autre fait qui put avoir une influence – quelque étrange que ça puisse paraître à première vue – sur la guerre qui se déroulait sur la lointaine terre bretonne : l'accord conclu par Vladislas avec les mercenaires tchèques<sup>63</sup> de Mathias qui lui permit de se renforcer au détriment de Maximilien sur le champ de bataille hongrois et d'augmenter les chances anglaises car ces derniers pouvaient espérer que le roi des Romains n'allait pas continuer à se laisser absorber par le combat pour la couronne hongroise. Après la signature de la paix de Presbourg, ses opposants hongrois invoquèrent le départ pour la France de Maximilien pour revendiquer l'Autriche<sup>64</sup>. Les Anglais et les Français étaient parfaitement au courant de la campagne militaire de Maximilien en Hongrie et ce n'est pas par hasard que fut écrit le « Journal de voyage du roy Maximilien en Hongrie »<sup>65</sup>.

Un peu plus tôt, dans le cadre de son alliance avec les Tudor, Maximilien avait souhaité épouser Anne de Bretagne et il avait envoyé un émissaire en mars 1490 pour conclure un mariage *per procuram*. Cependant, continuant son double jeu, il s'appêtait à envoyer un ambassadeur en France le 15 mars 1490 pour renforcer son alliance avec les Valois<sup>66</sup>. Toutefois, il se produisit un événement début avril 1490 qui le fit changer d'avis et, finalement, il décida de renoncer à son mariage breton

---

62 *Documents concernant l'Histoire de la Hongrie conservés aux Archives Nationales*. Paris, 1956. Inventaire n. 943, 1–2. : György Székely, A rendek válaszüton. A dinasztiaaváltás harcai 1490-92-ben [Les ordres à la croisée des routes. Les guerres d'un changement de dynastie en 1490-1492; orig.: = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 116, 2003. 2: 427–456.] In. *Népek, rendek, dinasztiaák. Tanulmányok Közép- és Kelet-Európa hadtörténetéből*. Budapest, 2010. 102–132. ici 116.

63 Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 35.

64 *Magyar Diplomáciai Emlékek Mátyás király korából, 1458-90*. [Monuments de l'histoire diplomatique hongroise de l'époque du roi Matthias] Ed. Iván Nagy – Albert Nyáry. I-IV. (Magyar Történelmi Emlékek. 4. osztály: Diplomáciai emlékek) Budapest, 1875-78. [= MDE] IV. n. 180.; Tibor Neumann, Békekötés Pozsonyban – Országgyűlés Budán. A Jagelló-Habsburg kapcsolatok egy fejezete 1490-1492, 2. [Traité de paix à Presbourg – Parlement à Buda. Le chapitre de Jagellon – Habsbourg Relations] = *Századok*, 145, 2011. 2: 293–347. [= Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg II.] 301.

65 *Beiträge zur Geschichte Ungarns unter der Regierung der Könige Wladislaus II. und Ludwig II. 1490–1526*. Mitgeteilt von Friedrich Firnhaber. [*Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen*, 2, 1849. 3–4: 1–171.] Wien, 1849. [= Firnhaber, Beiträge] n. XLVII.

66 CSP Venice, I. n. 563.; Mackie, Tudors, 110.

et de rompre son alliance avec l'Angleterre. Ce pouvait être l'annonce de la mort de Mathias à partir de laquelle le roi des Romains se soucia de la succession du trône de Hongrie ; or, s'il voulait „espérer” quelque chose en Hongrie, il devait garantir ses arrières. La France pouvait s'engager à calmer ou simplement à ne pas remonter les nobles flamands contre lui, ainsi qu'à ne pas attaquer les territoires bourguignons contestés, aussi longtemps qu'il aspirerait à la couronne hongroise<sup>67</sup>. Maximilien rentra en toute hâte en Europe centrale<sup>68</sup>. L'ambassadeur papal déclara qu'il était déjà loin et était préoccupé par les affaires hongroises<sup>69</sup>. Le 19 avril, Maximilien adressa un appel aux nobles hongrois depuis Innsbruck : « le pays revient à l'empereur et à ses descendants »<sup>70</sup>. Dès le mois de mai, ses troupes étaient aux portes de Vasvár.<sup>71</sup> Le 21 mai, il somma les provinces de Styrie, Carinthie et Carniole de s'emparer de la Hongrie par les armes<sup>72</sup>. Le 7 juin, les émissaires de l'empereur transmettaient ses exigences au Champ de Rákos, puis, avant le départ de troupes de Vladislav/Ulászóló (fin juin), puis son élection comme roi, il rassembla une armée et partit à l'assaut des domaines autrichiens aux mains des Hongrois. Dès le mois d'août, il était aux portes de Vienne et il s'empara de la ville à la fin du mois<sup>73</sup>. Il était prêt à prendre « la couronne de Hongrie par la force ». Il envahit une partie des territoires de la Basse-Autriche conquis par Mathias<sup>74</sup>. Toutefois, en septembre, il s'arrêta net et demanda de l'aide aux princes de l'empire<sup>75</sup>. Fort du soutien des troupes impériales, le roi des Romains s'empara alors de Székesfehérvár en novembre<sup>76</sup>. Cependant, à partir de ce moment-là, il se trouva dans une impasse, vu que Vladislav avait été couronné. En l'absence de Maximilien, à l'Ouest

67 Wiesflecker, Maximilian, I. 278–308.

68 Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*. I-IV. Philadelphia, 1976-84. III. 409.; Heinrich Ulmann, *Kaiser Maximilian I.* I-II. Stuttgart 1891. 85ff.

69 25 août 1490: CSP Venice, I. n. 592.

70 Firnhaber, Beiträge, n. II.; Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 16.; E. Kovács, Miksa, 36.

71 Firnhaber, Beiträge, n. IV.

72 Székely, Rendek, 124.

73 Maximilien au Conseil des Pays-Bas: Enns, 14 juillet 1490: Lettres inédits de Maximilien. Pays-Bas, II. n. 99.; Firnhaber, Beiträge, n. XIII.; E. Kovács, Miksa, 40.; Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 19.

74 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 339.; E. Kovács, Miksa, 41.

75 *Frankfurts Reichs-correspondenz* nebst andern verwandten Aktenstücken von 1376-1549. I-II. Hrsg. Johann Janssen. Freiburg, 1863-72. [= Janssen, Frankfurter Reichs-correspondenz] II. n. 682.

76 Firnhaber, Beiträge, n. XXXII.; Székely, Rendek, 124.

aussi, ses affaires prenaient un mauvais tournant. Dès le mois d'août, il envisagea de retourner aux Pays-Bas<sup>77</sup>, mais en novembre, il n'avait plus d'argent et ne pouvait ravitailler ses troupes que par des rapines. Bien qu'il fût installé en Slavonie et en Transdanubie, il fut contraint de quitter le pays<sup>78</sup>.

Avec la mort de Mathias, Maximilien sembla écarté du conflit breton, ce dont se réjouissait la diplomatie française. La mort du souverain hongrois força aussi Henri VII à revoir sa politique : en effet, il ne pouvait plus compter sur un soutien des Tudor dans le dos de Maximilien, son allié infidèle. Il fallait „trouver” autre chose et il fut obligé de circonvier encore une fois Maximilien quand il devint évident qu'il ne pourrait plus s'allier avec le roi de Hongrie : une dernière fois, il fit encore un geste vers les Habsbourg et aurait été prêt à réintégrer Maximilien aux côtés de l'Angleterre. D'où la proposition étrange qu'il fit aux émissaires Habsbourg à Londres pour Pâques 1490, les 11 et 12 avril, dans laquelle il essayait d'attirer une nouvelle fois Maximilien dans son camp<sup>79</sup>. Chronologiquement, ça tient: la « nouvelle sensationnelle » de la mort de Mathias (6 avril) put parvenir de Vienne en Angleterre en 5 ou 6 jours – sans doute après être parvenue en 1 jour ou 2 dans les villes rhénanes et hollandaises, et de là, en 1 jour ou 2 en Angleterre. En plus, les intéressés pouvaient être au courant depuis longtemps de l'état de santé du roi hongrois et pouvaient savoir qu'il était gravement malade depuis janvier 1489. Vers la fin de l'année, le bruit avait couru que la maladie avait encore progressé et en mars, son état s'était aggravé à une vitesse fulgurante. Tous les hommes politiques européens s'attendaient au décès imminent de Mathias<sup>80</sup>. Le 4 avril, jour des Rameaux, il fut frappé d'apoplexie : ce qui veut dire qu'avant le 6, toutes les cours européennes

---

77 *Magyarország történelmi kronológiája*. [La chronologie historique de la Hongrie] Ed. Kálmán Benda – László Solymosi. I-IV. Budapest, 1983. I. 318–19.; Wilhelm Busch, *England unter den Tudors. I. König Heinrich VII.* Stuttgart, 1892. 60. Maximilien au Conseil de Mons (Bergen): 17 août 1490: Lettres inédits de Maximilien. Pays-Bas, II. n. 101.

78 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 339., Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 31–32., E. Kovács, Miksa, 42–44.

79 Henri VII aux ambassadeurs des Habsbourg, Lodovico Bruno, Pierre Puissant, Herman Young: PRO Exchequer Treasury of Receipt, Miscellaneous Books, E 36/124. p. 63.; PRO Exchequer of Receipt: Jornalia Rolls, Tellers' Rolls, Certificate Books, Declaration Books and Accounts of Receipts and Issues E 405/77. m. 1.; Currin, To play, 233.

80 Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 6.

savaient que Mathias Corvin allait achever sa vie sur terre. Evidemment, Henri VII se dit que maintenant que Maximilien était préoccupé par la couronne hongroise, il ne devait pas être négligeable pour lui que les Anglais n'encouragent pas les Flamands à la révolte. Maximilien a pu aussi se dire que l'Angleterre pourrait signer rapidement la paix avec les Français ce qui permettrait aux Valois de reconquérir par les armes les territoires bourguignons contestés des Habsbourg. C'est précisément pour cette raison qu'après le début avril, au printemps 1490, le souverain Tudor répéta plusieurs fois sa proposition à Maximilien qui cependant était déjà tourné vers la Hongrie<sup>81</sup>. Toutefois, en automne, quand il ne fit plus aucun doute qu'il ne pourrait pas s'emparer de Buda et de la couronne hongroise, il sembla qu'il y avait une chance que Maximilien noue à nouveau de bonnes relations avec l'Angleterre, car il commençait à se dégager du traité de Francfort signé avec les Français, vu que ceux-ci l'avaient trahi<sup>82</sup>. Henri eut raison car, dès le mois de mai, alors que Maximilien s'appropriait à lancer une campagne militaire pour s'emparer de la couronne de Hongrie, il envoya une délégation à Londres pour tâter le terrain<sup>83</sup>. Dès juin, l'ambassadeur milanais rapporta que Maximilien aimerait que l'affaire hongroise s'arrange pour qu'il puisse se consacrer de tout son cœur à attaquer les Français<sup>84</sup>. Début août, l'ambassadeur vénitien parla d'un nouvel accord secret entre Henri et Maximilien<sup>85</sup>. En réalité, dans le traité de Woking, Henri Tudor réussit à « attirer de nouveau » Maximilien dans son camp ; mieux, Maximilien épousa Anne de Bretagne *per procuram*<sup>86</sup>. Fin 1490, les négociations des émissaires de Maximilien avec Vladislas à Magyaróvár<sup>87</sup> firent espérer au roi d'Angleterre que le roi des Romains allait signer la paix avec la Hongrie et qu'il pourrait consacrer toutes ses forces au conflit breton.

81 Rymer, Foedera, XII: 392–94., Jean Molinet, *Chroniques*. Ed. J. A. Buchon. I-IV. Paris, 1828. (Collection des Chroniques Nationales Françaises) IV. 95–122.

82 CSP Venice, I. nos. 574., 575.; À Rennes en août, les ambassadeurs des Habsbourg déposèrent des plaintes « contra falsas Francorum litteras pro defensione honoris Romanorum regis »: *Négociations diplomatiques entre la France et l'Autriche durant les trente premières années du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* publiées par André Joseph Ghislain Le Gay. I-II. Paris, 1845. I. n. 1.

83 22 mai : PRO E 30/601.; Rymer, Foedera, XII. 393.; 397–400.; Mackie, Tudors, 103.

84 CSP Milan, I. n. 439.

85 CSP Venice, I. n. 590.

86 Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 15.

87 Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 15.

En réalité, Maximilien jouait un double jeu parce qu'entre temps – une fois qu'il n'avait plus à craindre Mathias – il renforça son alliance avec le roi de France ; en juillet il envoya une délégation à Tours, entama des pourparlers avec le souverain Valois et était déjà prêt à épouser la fille de Charles VIII, Marguerite, au lieu d'Anne de Bretagne<sup>88</sup>. Finalement, à la fin de l'année, il choisit quand même le parti anglais après s'être aperçu que Charles VIII voulait tout, notamment épouser lui-même Anne de Bretagne, et ne rien lui laisser.

Cependant, les négociations avec la Hongrie avaient atteint le point mort, vu que Maximilien n'était pas décidé à modérer ses prétentions, alors qu'il avait du mal à payer ses troupes, maintenues en garnison, qu'il avait dû retirer du front occidental, comme il n'en avait pas en Hongrie. Le roi de France profita de l'impuissance des Anglais qui attendaient Maximilien et de l'incapacité du roi des Romains pour s'emparer des points stratégiques bretons et assiéger Rennes au début de l'année 1491.

En 1491, devant le Parlement de Nuremberg, Maximilien plaça la Bretagne au centre des négociations et essaya d'obtenir de l'argent par tous les moyens, mais il n'était pas disposé à renoncer à la Hongrie<sup>89</sup>. Le 28 juillet, l'Assemblée de l'Empire vota la levée d'une armée de 8000 hommes que le roi voulait utiliser surtout contre la France. Toutefois, dans la pratique, il ne reçut pas cette armée<sup>90</sup>. Le Parlement de Nuremberg exhorta Maximilien à ne pas s'impliquer sur deux fronts et à signer un traité de paix au moins avec Vladislas<sup>91</sup>. Pressé de tous côtés – précisément à cause de la guerre de Bretagne – Maximilien fut obligé de revoir sa position au sujet de la couronne hongroise, à savoir qu'elle lui revenait à lui seul et que Vladislas devait y renoncer. Son objectif n'était plus d'occuper la Hongrie, mais d'obtenir des garanties sur la succession du trône de Hongrie en signant une paix avantageuse<sup>92</sup>. Connaissant les difficultés de Maximilien, Vladislas s'efforça lui aussi d'arracher un accord favorable en projetant d'attaquer l'Autriche en son absence : ce qui prouve que les opérations militaires en Bretagne ont eu une influence sur la politique hongroise. Charles VIII renforça son attaque contre

---

88 Traité: Montils-lez-Tours: Currin, *Persuasions*, 894., 900. Ulmann, Maximilian, I. 324–25.; CSP Venice, I. n. 585., 590.

89 Firnhaber, *Beiträge*, n. LXIV.

90 E. Kovács, Miksa, 48., Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő*, 37.

91 Susanne Wolf, *Die Doppelregierung Kaiser Friedrichs III. und König Maximilians (1486-1493)*. Köln, 2005. 264.

92 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 342.

Rennes au moment où Vladislas envisageait une campagne militaire en Autriche. Maximilien devait donc aussi surveiller l'Autriche, si bien que les Anglais le supplièrent en vain d'intervenir en Bretagne avec toutes ses forces. En juillet 1491, Vladislas envoya ses mercenaires tchèques en Basse-Autriche<sup>93</sup> et il était évident que si l'Autriche était menacée, le roi des Romains n'allait pas combattre les Français. La situation de Maximilien était d'autant plus difficile que l'Autriche n'appartenait toujours pas complètement aux Habsbourg ; en effet, de nombreux châteaux-forts étaient aux mains des Hongrois. Le bruit courut même que fin juin, Maximilien allait quitter Nuremberg pour se rendre sur le terrain des opérations militaires pour le protéger de l'attaque hongroise prévue. Bien que cela s'avérât faux, le roi des Romains „était attristé” par la présence des troupes hongroises aux portes de Vienne et leur percée en Haute-Autriche<sup>94</sup>. En août, Maximilien se rendit en personne sur cette zone d'occupation et il leva une armée à Ulm<sup>95</sup>. Dans ces conditions, les Tudor eurent beau le relancer, Maximilien ne retourna pas à l'Ouest et, en l'absence de forces germaniques, le roi de France put faire ce qu'il voulait en Bretagne. Rennes tomba et Anne de Bretagne délaissée, qui n'avait été épousée que *per procuram* par Maximilien, fut conduite à l'autel par Charles VIII. Peu de temps après, le pape Innocent VIII annula le mariage contracté avec Maximilien et reconnut comme véritable celui contracté avec Charles. Les Anglais ne purent remporter aucun succès militaire et durant l'année 1491, Henri perdit la Bretagne et les plans de Woking tombèrent à l'eau<sup>96</sup>.

En 1491, ni Henri, ni Maximilien ne purent empêcher que Charles VIII épousât l'héritière du trône de Bretagne et annexât le duché à la monarchie des Valois. En réponse, ils déclarèrent qu'ils enverraient une armée contre la France. Maximilien renforça son alliance avec

---

93 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 346.

94 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 351., 353–54.

95 *A Magyar tud. akadémia Történelmi bizottságának oklevél-másolatai*, ismerteti Óváry Lipót. [Copies des chartes de la Commission historique de l'Académie hongroise des sciences] I. füz. A Mohácsi vész előtti okiratok kivonatai. Bp., 1890. I. n. 663.

96 Woking : PRO E 30/606., 599., 600.; Rymer, Foedera, XII. 397–402.; *Österreichische Staatsverträge*. England. Bd 1: 1526-1748. Hrsg. Alfred F. Pribram. Innsbruck, 1907. I. n. 5.; 17 septembre 1490 : *Tudor Royal Proclamations*. I-III. Vol. I. The Early Tudors 1485-1553. Eds. Paul L. Hughes – James F. Larkin. New Haven and London, 1964-69. I. n. 23. Il a proclamé nuire à leur alliance est ferme. 1490: CPR Henry VII. Part I. 352.; Windsor, 17 novembre 1490 : L'Ordre de la Jarretière est donné. Molinet, Chroniques, IV. 115–18.; Wiesflecker, Maximilian, I. 295–95.

l'Angleterre<sup>97</sup>, puis Henri commença à lever une armée. En janvier 1492, à Innsbruck, le roi des Romains décida d'obtenir réparation par les armes<sup>98</sup>. Maximilien commença à préparer une opération militaire contre Charles VIII<sup>99</sup>. Au printemps 1492, le roi de Germanie invita les princes à une rencontre personnelle à Strasbourg et Francfort, puis fin mai, début juin, lors d'une réunion à Augsbourg, il décida de convoquer l'Assemblée de l'empire au début de l'automne, en septembre, à Coblenche pour que les princes donnent leur bénédiction à la levée d'impôts pour une invasion<sup>100</sup>. Il appela toute la nation allemande à châtier le « roi de France félon ». <sup>101</sup> D'avril à juillet 1492, Maximilien se préoccupa de la levée d'une armée impériale : les princes formaient les rangs en vue d'une guerre de grande envergure contre la France. Toutefois, sans le soutien militaire d'Henri Tudor, l'opération ne pouvait pas commencer. Le roi des Romains promit à Henri de soutenir les opérations militaires anglaises avec une armée de 10 à 12 000 hommes<sup>102</sup>. De plus, en juin 1492, les Espagnols aussi s'engagèrent à envoyer de nouvelles troupes en Bretagne pour soutenir les forces anglaises contre les Français<sup>103</sup>. Le gouvernement impérial était au courant de tout ça<sup>104</sup>. Charles VIII lui s'attendait à une attaque de Maximilien par la Champagne et la Bourgogne<sup>105</sup>. En fait, Maximilien donna des instructions pour des renforts soient envoyés à la frontière du Hainault et du Luxembourg<sup>106</sup>. Henri VII avait besoin de plus en plus d'alliés, outre Maximilien, contre la France ; en effet, Charles VIII avait accueilli à sa cour en mars 1492 Perkin Warbeck et l'avait reconnu comme prétendant au trône d'Angleterre. En outre, John Taylor, le rebelle York

---

97 PRO E 30/599., 30/605/1., 30/608.

98 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 93.; Wolff, Doppelregierung, 272–73.

99 Plans de guerre: avril 1492 : DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. n. 696.; Currin, Traffic, 106–107., 113.

100 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 94.

101 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 95., n. 697.; Wiesflecker, Maximilian, I. 334–35.; Wolff, Doppelregierung, 274–76.

102 Gladys Temperley, *Henry VII*. Boston, 1914. 103. ; James Gairdner, *Henry the Seventh*. New York, 1889. 85.

103 Rymer, Foedera, XII. 462–63., Currin, English international relations, 21.; CSP Venice, I. n. 613.; DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 94.

104 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. n. 734.

105 Currin, Traffic, 120–21.

106 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. n. 722.

organisait la résistance à Paris avec de l'argent français<sup>107</sup>. (Il est aussi exact qu'il ne pouvait pas être persuadé que Maximilien, jouant double jeu, ne soutenait pas en coulisses le prétendant au trône. Warbeck était en correspondance épistolaire avec la belle-mère de Maximilien, Marguerite d'York, et il trouva refuge à sa cour de Malines en 1493. D'ailleurs, Maximilien et Marguerite avaient des relations avec le roi d'Écosse qui soutenait Warbeck<sup>108</sup>.)

D'après une lettre de l'évêque de Sion adressée à Charles VIII, le roi de Hongrie envoya des troupes tchèques et hongroises, ainsi que de l'argent, au camp strasbourgeois de Maximilien en juin et juillet 1492 : « Les grands d'Allemagne garantissent un grand nombre d'hommes au roi des Romains, tandis que le roi tchèque et hongrois lui envoie de l'argent »<sup>109</sup>. On peut se demander comment Vladislav II put se trouver dans la situation de soutenir Maximilien dès 1492, et en plus avec de l'argent?

L'événement fondamental pour la politique étrangère hongroise est le traité de paix Habsbourg-Jagellon de 1491. À la lumière de l'accord du 7 novembre, on peut imaginer que Vladislav souhaita renforcer ses relations avec les Habsbourg en apportant un soutien à Maximilien. Toutefois, une campagne aussi lointaine tout au bout de la France, à plusieurs milliers de kilomètres de la Hongrie et de la Bohême aurait coûté beaucoup d'énergie au roi, sans parler du fait qu'après la mort de Mathias, il ne regorgeait pas d'argent. Début 1492, le roi de Hongrie s'exprimait ainsi : « le pays a vaincu ses ennemis, avant tout Maximilien, souverain du Saint-Empire romain », mais malgré la paix, nos relations « avec l'ennemi défait »

107 Anthony Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses. Military Activity and English Society, 1452-97*. London, 1981. 109.

108 Arthurson, Warbeck, 79., 80., 87., 89.

109 « Le roy Romain fait son assemblée de l'Empire d'autrepart et la grant ligne des Allemens luy baillent ung grant nombre de gens, le roy de Boheme, aussi le roy de Hongrie luy fournissent argent. » [Traduction par Attila Györkös. Je suis reconnaissant pour son aide.] BNF MS Français 15541. Harlay 311. Recueil de lettres, pour la plupart originales, et autres pièces, relatives à l'histoire de France, principalement sous les règnes de Charles IX, Henri III, Henri IV et Louis XIII. (1477-1657). Documents relatifs principalement aux affaires diplomatiques, militaires et maritimes. Il Règnes de Charles VIII et Louis XII (1487-1500). Le folio en question : Lettre d'évêque de Sion [Jost von Silenen, évêque de Grenoble après], au Roy Charles VIII a qui il mande des nouvelles des conspirations d'Allemagne contre luy, f. 159.; Il ya un autre document de la même, des nouvelles de l'Empire : Nouvelles d'Allemagne. f. 140. [<http://archiveset-manuscrits.bnf.fr/ead.html?id=FRBNFEAD000045942> – 2 mars 2014] Currin, Traffic, 114. 25. j.



sont très tendues<sup>110</sup>. Il est exact qu'à l'Assemblée nationale de 1492, le thème principal fut « le traité à signer avec l'empereur Frédéric et le roi Maximilien »<sup>111</sup>. Dans ces conditions, une campagne militaire paraît bien très surprenante, quel que soit l'effectif engagé, même s'il s'agit d'un soutien symbolique. En outre, début 1492, le roi Vladislav venait juste de se débarrasser du prince polonais Jean Albert qui avait des visées sur la Hongrie, puis était occupé par l'Assemblée nationale de Buda, si bien qu'il ne ratifia le traité de paix de Presbourg que le 7 mars. De plus, au printemps et en été 1492, les Turcs lancèrent plusieurs attaques contre les châteaux de Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Jajca (Jajce) et Szabács (Šabac), avant de faire une incursion à Szörény (Turnu-Severin)<sup>112</sup>. Le commandant du pays, Paul Kinizsi libéra d'abord les châteaux assiégés, puis tailla en pièces ce qui restait de l'Armée noire en septembre. Le gros des troupes était pris par le combats en été ; aussi est-il difficile d'imaginer une aide aux Habsbourg durant l'année 1492. Prudemment, on peut dire qu'en 1492, Vladislav s'associa tout au moins *sur les principes* à une coalition Tudor-Habsbourg. Il semble probable que le traité de paix de Presbourg eut une influence sur les relations franco-anglaises : le roi des Romains qui était en guerre contre la France se retrouva libéré du fardeau que constituait le conflit hongrois et il put consacrer toute ses forces au front occidental.

Un rassemblement de toutes les forces de l'Empire sembla nécessaire vu que Maximilien voulait en découdre à tout prix avec Charles VIII. En août et septembre 1492, ce dernier renforça la protection des frontières à l'est et fit entasser des armes par exemple à Troyes.<sup>113</sup> Il s'attendait à une attaque des « Allemands et de leurs alliés » en Champagne ou en Bourgogne<sup>114</sup>. Parmi les ennemis potentiels, il était aussi fait référence

---

110 Buda, 2 février 1492 : Archives nationales de Hongrie, Archives nationales, Collection des chartes [= DL] 39 325.

111 Buda, 3 avril 1492 : DL 37 673.

112 Kubinyi, Két sorsdöntő, 39.

113 *Lettres de Charles VIII, roi de France*, par P. Pélicier. I-IV. Paris, 1898. III. 294.

114 « [...] tant a puissance de gens de guerre sur les costes de la mer de Normandie, Bretagne, Picardie et autres lieux [...]. pour ce que nous avons n'a gueres esté et sommes chacun jour advertiz et certiffiez que nosdicts ennemys, tant Angloys, Alemans que autres leurs complices, ou plus grant nombre de gens de guerre qu'ilz ont peu finer, se sont approchez sur les frontieres de nostredict royaume de costé de Picardie, Bourgogne, Champaigne et autres pais, tous prestz á marcher sur nous et destruire nostre peuple [...]. »: Étampes, Charles VIII, lettre à Reims, 3 août 1492: Pélicier, *Lettres Charles VIII*, III. 292.

aux alliés, mais seulement en général : « nosdict ennemys, tant Angloys, Alemans que autres leurs complices ». Parmi ces alliés, les autres sources françaises ne nomment pas le roi tchèque et hongrois. Le souverain Valois s'attendait à des attaques des troupes impériales venant de plusieurs côtés : de Picardie, de Champagne et de Bourgogne. Dans le rassemblement guerrier, les sources nomment les ducs de Bavière, le margrave de Brandebourg, mais elles mentionnent aussi « la participation d'autres ». Les sources françaises rapportent aussi que l'empereur a déjà convoqué un rassemblement de troupes le 3 août près de la frontière, à Metz, pour lancer de là une offensive. Une autre lettre rapporte que des troupes d'autres princes peuvent se trouver dans l'armée impériale « les grands d'Allemagne donnent beaucoup d'hommes à Maximilien »<sup>115</sup>.

En été 1492, Maximilien se préparait sérieusement à la guerre, vu que sa délégation envoyée à la mi-juillet à Charles VIII était revenue bredouille<sup>116</sup>. Toutefois, nous ne considérons pas comme probable la présence de forces auxiliaires de Jagellon dans l'armée de Maximilien. Celui-ci aurait entamé les hostilités même sans le débarquement très attendu des Anglais. Il présenta même des plans d'expansion concrets devant le conseil de la cour<sup>117</sup>. Le choix de Metz comme lieu de réunion du duché de Lorraine et le rassemblement des troupes constituaient déjà en eux-mêmes un *casus belli*<sup>118</sup>. Plusieurs princes électeurs se joignirent au rassemblement<sup>119</sup>. Un rapport d'un ambassadeur milanais nous apprend qu'en septembre, l'armée du roi des Romains était alignée à la frontière bourguignonne. D'autres alliés, comme le prince Albert de Saxe, envoyèrent des troupes contre les Français<sup>120</sup>. En septembre, à l'Assemblée de Coblenz, Maximilien demanda de l'aide aux princes – parmi lesquels devait se trouver en théorie Vladislav, roi tchèque et hongrois-pour la guerre contre la France<sup>121</sup>. Déjà, auparavant, en alléguant l'alliance anglaise et la possibilité d'une guerre victorieuse, Maximilien avait tenté de mettre la pression sur les princes de l'empire

115 « [...] roy d'Angleterre s'est allyé avec le roy des Romains et autres ses adherans pour grever noz bon villes, pais et subgetz, et invahir nostredict royaume en plusieurs et divers lieux ». Charles VIII, 12 mars 1492. Pélicier, *Lettres Charles VIII*, III. 248., Il ya une autre lettre avec un contenu similaire : 9 mai 1492. *Ibid.* 265.

116 Currin, *Traffic*, 127.

117 10 mai 1492 : DRTA *Mittlere Reihe IV/1*. n. 715.

118 DRTA *Mittlere Reihe IV/1*. n. 747., 758.

119 DRTA *Mittlere Reihe IV/1*. 102., n. 763., 824., 827.

120 CSP Milan, I. n. 463.; DRTA *Mittlere Reihe IV/1*. n. 962., 963.

121 Wiesflecker, *Maximilian*, I. 76.

pour qu'ils soutiennent ses aspirations expansionnistes sur la Champagne et la Bourgogne<sup>122</sup>. A l'Assemblée de Coblençe, les princes électeurs envoyèrent eux-mêmes un émissaire au roi d'Angleterre et invitèrent les représentants d'Henri à d'autres négociations en décembre à l'assemblée impériale de Francfort<sup>123</sup>. Henri VII lui-même avait besoin de l'aide de l'empire. Dès février 1492, il avait écrit aux princes électeurs de l'empire pour qu'ils soutiennent Maximilien contre le roi de France félon et il leur avait demandé une aide militaire<sup>124</sup>. En automne, il envoya même un ambassadeur aux princes de l'empire, à proprement parler aux princes électeurs – et donc aussi au roi tchèque Vladislav – pour qu'ils appuient l'opération préparée par le roi des Romains contre la France, aussi bien matériellement que militairement<sup>125</sup>. On a conservé le discours de l'ambassadeur anglais, Franciscus de Puys, adressé aux princes, dans lequel il fustige le roi de France coupable d'avoir semé la discorde dans l'Empire et d'avoir dérobé l'épouse *per procuram* de Maximilien, acte par lequel il avait causé un préjudice gigantesque à tous les princes et nobles. Il accusait aussi le souverain Valois d'avoir poussé le roi anglais Richard III à faire assassiner ses cousins, fils d'Edouard IV, dans la Tour. Il s'adressait aussi aux « rois et princes alliés de l'Empire » en les exhortant à se joindre à l'opération. Tout cela concernait aussi Vladislav, non seulement en tant que roi tchèque, mais aussi comme roi de Hongrie et allié<sup>126</sup>. Vladislav en tant qu'électeur devait être au courant de tout ce qui se passait dans l'empire et son propre intérêt le poussait à tout savoir des manoeuvres politiques de Maximilien. György Székely et András

122 Lettres inédites de Maximilien. Pays-Bas, II. n. 89.

123 Janssen, Frankfurter Reichs-correspondenz, II. n. 710. L'empereur et l'Assemblée du Reichstag a envoyé une autre ambassade au roi d'Angleterre : 8 Octobre 1492. Ibid.; DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 106. n. 829.

124 « Heinricus...meminit...Electores caeteros Imperii Principes, promisso auxilio, in bellum contra Gallos extimulavit »: *Volumen rerum Germanicarum novem sive de pace imperii publica* etc. Libri V. Ed. Johann Philipp Datt. Ulm, 1698. 502–04.

125 DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. n. 828.

126 « [...] iniuriam et ignominiam suae Majestati et Sacro Romano Imperio, et omnibus Regibus et Principibus eis confoederatis et alligatis...sed etiam Sacri Romani Imperii omniumque eius Principum caeterorumque Regum et Principum eis confoederatorum cedet et remanebit [...] iniurias illatas tam ipsi quam Sacro Romano Imperio et omnibus eis confoederatis, amicis et subditis [...] »: Legatio Anglicana. Henrici VII Angliae Regis ad Maximilianum Regem Romanorum & Imperij Ordines, in Comitibus Confluentiae habitis Anno MCCCCXCII. Legatio. In: *Germanicarum rerum Scriptores aliquot Insignes*. Ed. Marquard Freher. I-III. Frankfurt – Hannover, 1611-37. [1717] III. 42–46. 45.

Kubinyi montrent que le chancelier Filipec qui se rendit en personne à la frontière bretonne en 1487 en tant que délégué était parfaitement au courant des relations en Europe de l'Ouest<sup>127</sup>. On ne peut croire que Vladislav ait apporté une aide militaire, mais l'acte politique d'entrer dans le conflit français avait désigné sa place. Il est aussi exact qu'une défaite de Maximilien en France ne l'aurait pas attristé.

En tout cas, le Reichstag répondit à la demande d'Henri et vota une contribution de 94 000 Florins pour la campagne française ; 16 000 Florins furent prélevés en automne et le roi des Romains emporta cette somme en octobre pour sa campagne<sup>128</sup>. Nous ne savons pas s'il y avait des troupes de Jagellon dans l'armée de Maximilien quand elle partit véritablement en campagne, en harmonie avec l'attaque anglaise d'octobre et le siège de Boulogne. On ne peut exclure la présence de mercenaires tchèques *indépendants* du roi dans les rangs de Maximilien. Il est également possible que les sources françaises se soient trompées, bien qu'elles parlent séparément du roi de Bohême et de Hongrie. Henri débarqua en Bretagne en octobre, confiant dans l'aide de Maximilien, mais alors que le siège de Boulogne venait à bout des forces anglaises fin octobre, le roi des Romains ne commença sa percée en Bourgogne et en Franche-Comté qu'en novembre. Maximilien envoya du renfort aux Anglais pour le siège de Boulogne sous la forme de 4000 fantassins et 2000 cavaliers. En chemin, ils prirent Arras, mais le temps qu'ils s'échauffent, Henri VII était obligé de signer la paix d'Étapes avec les Français<sup>129</sup>. L'Angleterre s'aperçut qu'elle devait chercher des alliés dans toute l'Europe. En novembre, Maximilien arrêta à son tour toute opération militaire<sup>130</sup>. En décembre 1492, les princes de l'empire et l'empereur lui-même cessèrent leur soutien à Maximilien dans sa guerre contre la France. Maximilien lui-même fit marche arrière. Charles VIII réussit donc à désarmer Maximilien dont la campagne militaire n'aura pas duré plus de quelques semaines. « En récompense », au traité de Senlis de 1493, on lui remit l'Artois et la Franche-Comté<sup>131</sup>. Selon les historiens français, Charles VIII signa les traités de paix d'Étapes et Senlis pour neutraliser

127 Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő*, 25.; Székely, *Rendek*, 106.

128 Currin, *Traffic*, 127.

129 Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 497.; Currin, *Traffic*, 115., 128.; DRTA *Mittlere Reihe* IV/1. 109., n. 964.

130 CSP Milan, I. n. 464.

131 Chrimes, *Henry VII*, 282.; Weightman, *Margaret of York*, 167.; Wiesflecker, *Maximilian*, I. 318–44.; Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő*, 50.

les puissances occidentales et ainsi avoir les mains libres pour se lancer dans la guerre d'Italie prévue en 1494. A Étapes, Charles VIII s'engagea à verser 745 000 *livres*. La paix était chère. Le Charolais et Noyon furent aussi cédés aux Habsbourg<sup>132</sup>. L'élaboration des traités de paix français était suivie de près en Hongrie, comme l'atteste Bonfini : « « l'alliance a été rejoint par le roi des îles de la Grande-Bretagne et le reste des princes de l'Occident »<sup>133</sup>. L'Angleterre perdit la Bretagne et toute chance de contracter un mariage avec la duchesse Anne, mais Charles VIII fit le serment de ne pas soutenir les opposants des Tudor<sup>134</sup>. Henri Tudor ne perdit pas beaucoup car malgré l'échec, ses relations avec les Habsbourg s'étaient renforcées et, chose encore plus importante, il avait créé un nouveau front fort – contre les Valois – avec les Rois catholiques<sup>135</sup>.

On peut tout de même se demander pourquoi la question du soutien de Vladislas a pu apparaître dans la lettre de l'évêque de Sion ? La clé de l'énigme peut être l'engagement pris par Vladislas dans le traité de paix de Presbourg de verser une indemnité de guerre de 100 000 Florins à Maximilien<sup>136</sup>. Comme l'évêque de Sion parle au présent de cette aide, il est certain qu'elle n'était pas encore arrivée à ce moment-là. Il est probable qu'il s'agit de la promesse de Vladislas, de l'*argent* attendu par Maximilien qui va arriver ou qui peut arriver un jour. Tibor Neumann rappelle qu'après le traité de paix de Presbourg, on fit courir le bruit dans la propagande impériale qu'outre l'indemnité de 100 000 Florins, le souverain hongrois s'était engagé à livrer une troupe auxiliaire considérable – de 18 000 hommes selon un rapport de janvier. En cas de retard dans le versement de quelque échéance, le roi des Romains aurait reçu l'autorisation de saisir des marchandises de commerçants hongrois<sup>137</sup>.

L'hypothèse d'une participation hongroise se réduit d'autant plus qu'en juin, le roi de Germanie avait entamé des négociations sur un éventuel soutien contre les Turcs en réponse au siège de Belgrade

132 Didier Le Fur, *Charles VIII*. Paris, 2006. 231-240, tout spécialement 232 et 234-235. (Je suis reconnaissant pour l'aide de Attila Györkös.)

133 Antonius de Bonifinis, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades*. Ed. I. Fögel – B. Iványi – L. Juhász. I-IV. Lipsiae-Budapestini, 1936-41. Decas V, Lib. III. (p. 236).

134 Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 508.

135 Traité avec Maximilian: 1493: Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 544.

136 En deux ans: Art. XXII. DL 37 205.; DL 46 173.; Firnhaber, *Beiträge*, nos. LXIX–LXXI.; Neumann, *Jagelló-Habsburg I.*, 366.; Székely, *Rendek*, 124.

137 Neumann, *Jagelló-Habsburg II.* 294., 340.

commencé en mars. Au conseil de la cour de Maximilien, on envisageait une aide contre les Turcs de 10 000 hommes et 120 000 Florins.<sup>138</sup> On peut imaginer que le roi de Germanie avait mis à l'ordre du jour la question de l'aide à apporter à la Hongrie parce que Vladislas avait montré son intention, du moins dans le principe de prendre part à la campagne contre le roi de France. En accord avec Tibor Neuman, je dirai que l'indemnité de guerre ne constituait pas un lourd fardeau pour le pays<sup>139</sup>. Moi-même je vois que l'obligation de paiement n'était pas assez rigoureuse pour que Maximilien entreprenne de l'arracher par la force au bout de quelques mois. Vladislas ne se sentit pas obligé de s'en acquitter; d'ailleurs, il n'était guère possible qu'il puisse payer une somme pareille. En revanche, il était possible que Maximilien rappelle au roi de Hongrie son éventuel engagement de principe au moment des préparatifs de la guerre contre la France au printemps puisque ses émissaires se trouvaient encore à Buda le 18 mars<sup>140</sup>. On sait encore qu'en juin, les parties allemande et hongroise se rencontrèrent et se remirent les chartes à Hainbourg en vertu du traité de paix. Il est certain que ce jour-là Vladislas donna 3000 Florins à Maximilien, certes, en remboursement de dette<sup>141</sup>. Il n'est pas non plus impossible d'imaginer que la garde des châteaux autrichiens aux mains des Hongrois remis à Maximilien – les mercenaires tchèques en avaient pris possession vu qu'ils n'avaient pas reçu leurs soldes – soit passée du côté Habsbourg et plusieurs d'entre eux se mirent à son service, éventuellement pour sa campagne contre la France. Une partie des mercenaires de l'Armée Noire défaite passèrent aussi au service des Autrichiens. Neumann rapporte qu'en outre le souverain hongrois envoya en octobre à Maximilien toutes sortes de marchandises d'une valeur de 2400 Florins hongrois<sup>142</sup>. Le roi des Romains souhaitait consacrer cette somme au paiement de ses mercenaires. Les années suivantes arrivèrent certaines indemnités, par exemple sous la forme de boeufs, mais leur montant total ne suffisait pas à la levée d'une armée importante. L'indemnité totale, elle, ne fut jamais payée.

---

138 Augsburg, 31 mai 1492 : DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. 97–98. n. 708. La déclaration des ordres impériaux dans l'affaire de l'aide. DRTA Mittlere Reihe IV/1. no. 717.

139 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg I., 370.

140 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg II., 318., 320.

141 Archives nationales de Hongrie, Archives nationales, Collection photographique de Charters [= DF] 287 376.; Firnhaber, Beiträge, n. CIV.

142 Neumann, Jagelló-Habsburg, I. 341.

Vladislas lui aussi prit part au traité de paix d'Étaples clôturant la guerre parmi les garants<sup>143</sup>. En ce qui concerne la paix franco-Habsbourg, la Hongrie et la Bohême figurent comme alliés aux côtés de l'Angleterre et de la France<sup>144</sup>. Et en 1495, au traité de paix de Verceil entre la France et Milan, la Hongrie figure à nouveau comme allié des Valois – aux côtés de l'Angleterre<sup>145</sup>. Nous savons aussi que durant les années suivantes, il y eut une tentative de croisade soutenue par la France contre les Turcs, suite à leurs irruptions en Croatie<sup>146</sup>. Après les premiers coups d'ailes, la diplomatie Jagellon hongroise sort vraiment de son isolement et son engagement dans la guerre de Bretagne aura eu au moins ce mérite. La Hongrie existe à nouveau, même si le grand Corvin est mort, et on peut compter avec elle en Europe. Finalement, les relations entre Vladislas et Maximilien n'étaient pas mauvaises, puisqu'après la ratification du traité de paix de Presbourg par l'Assemblée nationale en 1492, en juin 1493, le roi pardonna « à tous les regnicoles et à leurs familles qui s'étaient joints à l'empereur et au roi Maximilien contre leur roi et leur pays »<sup>147</sup>. Dès qu'il eut signé le traité de paix de Senlis avec les Valois, Maximilien se tourna vers la Hongrie et proposa sa fille, Marguerite, comme épouse à Vladislas<sup>148</sup>. Même si l'information de l'évêque de Sion est fautive et si effectivement la question d'un soutien des Jagellon au roi de Germanie n'a pas pu se poser, elle devait quand même avoir un fondement. Ce fut une des premières démarches autonomes de la diplomatie Jagellon,

143 En 1492, la Hongrie a également classé parmi les alliés du roi de France.: « [...] in praesenti tractatu pacis et amicitiae comprehenduntur alligati et confoederati utriusque partis subsequenter nominati pro parte Christianissimi regis Franciae, Sacra Majestas Imperialis, um Electoribus Imperii, reges [...] Ungariae et Bohemiae ». Rymer, *Foedera*, XII. 505.; PRO E 30/616, 30/609., 30/610.; *The Reign of Henry VII from contemporary sources*. Vol. I-II. Ed. A. F. Pollard. London, 1913. III. 19.

144 Molinet, *Chronique*, IV. 377.

145 *Regesta Imperii*: XIII. *Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs III. (1440–1493) nach Archiven und Bibliotheken geordnet*. Bd. I-XXVII. Hrsg. J. F. Böhmer. neu hg. H. P. Koller – J. Heinig – A. Niederstätter. Wien, 1982-2010.; XIV. *Ausgewählte Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Maximilian I. (1486/1493-1519)*. Bd. 1, 1 – 4, 2. [1486-1504] Hrsg. Hermann Wiesflecker – Manfred Hollegger – Angelika Schuh – Christa Beer – Inge Friedhuber. Köln, 1990-2004. [<http://www.regesta-imperii.de/>] XIV,1,2. n. 3580.

146 Le rapport de l'envoyé du pape, Anthoine Fabregues de Senj/Zengg. Molinet, *Chronique*, IV 406–08.; RI XIV,1, 2. n. 2764.

147 DL 94 289.

148 Adorján Divéky, Ujabb elmélet az 1494. évi lőcsei fejedelmi kongresszusról [Une théorie récente sur le congrès des monarques en 1494 à Levoča]. = *Századok*, 54, 1920. 4-6: 371–379. ici 375.

démarches indépendantes de l'affaire de la succession du trône, de Béatrice d'Aragon et des Jagellon polonais : dans le but de renforcer sa position de prince électeur à l'intérieur de l'empire, le roi tchèque et hongrois fit une offre ayant valeur de geste et souhaita consolider sa relation avec Maximilien. En cela, il fut capable d'éviter Frédéric III qui vivait encore et il entra dans la politique active de l'Empire.

Ces découvertes nuancent les relations de la Hongrie des époques Mathias et Jagellon avec l'Europe de l'ouest. Un lien indirect unissait la Hongrie et les puissances d'Europe de l'ouest. Les deux royaumes eurent un rôle politique parallèle dans le conflit breton. La guerre touchant l'Angleterre, l'Empire, la France et l'Espagne eut une influence sur la situation politique hongroise. Le fait qu'ils étaient impliqués sur plusieurs fronts, notamment en Bretagne, marqua la campagne militaire des Habsbourg en Hongrie. C'est précisément à cause de la guerre bretonne que Maximilien fut obligé de revoir sa position initiale sur la couronne hongroise. Le front occidental le força à renoncer à occuper la Hongrie et à se contenter de recevoir des garanties sur la succession du trône de Hongrie en signant une paix favorable. Même si ce n'est qu'indirectement, mais la Bretagne contribua à la paix de Presbourg.





**Attila Györkös\***

## **Diplomatie ou espionnage? La France et le conflit Habsbourg-Hongrie en 1506**

Lorsqu'en 1502 Vladislas II, roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, épousa Anne de Foix, cousine de la reine de France, les maisons des Jagellon et des Valois semblaient être alliées et les contacts diplomatiques ou personnels entre les pays concernés furent plus animés que jamais. Même si les détails et les conséquences de ce rapprochement dynastique sont bien traités dans les historiographies française ou hongroise<sup>1</sup>, un de ses épisodes, à savoir celui des ambassades françaises de l'année 1506 travaillant en Europe centrale, restait mal connu.

Dans notre étude, nous voulons comparer et commenter deux narrations contemporaines, en l'occurrence la chronique de Jean d'Autun et les mémoires du Vénitien Marino Sanuto, sur l'histoire des délégations de Louis XII envoyées respectivement en Autriche et en Hongrie. Nous essayons de démontrer que les diplomates français, qui avaient des tâches représentatives, fonctionnaient également comme agents de renseignement pour découvrir les capacités militaires de l'empereur Maximilien et Vladislas II, qui étaient alors en conflit.

---

\* La réalisation de ce travail a été soutenue par le projet Lendület: *Hungary in Medieval Europe Research Group* / LP2014-13/2014

1 Dobosy, Tibor, *Pierre Choque, Anna magyar királyné francia kisézője*, [Pierre Choque, compagnon français d'Anne, reine de Hongrie] Budapest, 1940. ; Fögel, József, *II. Ulászló udvartartása*, [La cour de Vladislas II] Budapest, 1913. ; Kropf, Lajos, Anna királyné, II. Ulászló neje, [Reine Anne, épouse de Vladislas II] *Századok*, 29 (1895: 1). 689-709. ; Wenzel, Gusztáv, II. Ulászló magyar és cseh király házassága, 1501-1506, [La vie familiale de Vladislas II, roi de Hongrie et de Bohême] *Századok*, 11 (1877) 630-641 ; 727-757 ; 816-840. ; Brown, Cynthia Jane, *The Queen's Library. Image Making at the Court of Anne of Brittany (1477-1514)*, Oxford, 2011. ; Discours des cérémonies du mariage d'Anne de Foix... Ed. et comm. par Le Roux de Lincy, Antoine, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 22 (1861) 156-185, 422-439. ; Lartigaut, Jean, Un Français du Midi à la cour de Bude au temps de Vladislas II, *Bulletin de la Société des Etudes du Lot*, 105 (janvier-mars 1984) 14-22.

Lorsque, après 1500, Louis XII désira stabiliser ses positions dans le duché de Milan récemment conquis, ce descendant des Visconti dut se tourner vers Maximilien qui, en tant qu'empereur (plus précisément roi des Romains à l'époque), possédait le droit d'investiture séculière sur la Lombardie. Par l'intermédiaire de trois traités, respectivement conclus en 1501 (Trente), en 1504 (Blois)<sup>2</sup> et un an plus tard à Hagenau, le roi de France s'engagea à payer 100 mille francs pour le Milanais et proposa sa fille, Claude, à Charles de Habsbourg (le futur Charles Quint) en acceptant que leurs héritiers reçoivent la souveraineté sur le duché.

Pourtant, suite à la proposition des États généraux de Tours en mai 1506, Louis XII se décida à fiancer sa fille à François d'Angoulême (futur François I<sup>er</sup>)<sup>3</sup>. Ce changement avait certainement pour but d'assurer le pouvoir de la maison des Valois sur le trône de la France, mais bouleversa brusquement le *status quo* établi au cours des années précédentes.

Louis lança donc une campagne diplomatique pour faire accepter sa décision aux grands pouvoirs européens. Il envoya ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre,<sup>4</sup> auprès de Maximilien<sup>5</sup>, et – comme on le verra plus tard – à la cour de Hongrie. Il voulait apaiser le mécontentement de Ferdinand d'Aragon en lui donnant comme épouse Germaine de Foix (elle-même cousine de la reine de Hongrie), et en soutenant ses prétentions castillannes contre son beau-fils, Philippe le Beau de Habsbourg<sup>6</sup>.

Convaincre Maximilien était le devoir le plus difficile. L'histoire de cette mission française envoyée à la cour des Habsbourg est détaillée dans la *Chronique de Louis XII*, écrite par Jean d'Autun.

Les ambassadeurs devaient non seulement transmettre au roi des Romains les termes de la décision de Tours, mais ils avaient également la tâche quasi impossible de gagner l'investiture impériale pour le duché

---

2 Autrand, Françoise – Bély, Lucien – Contamine, Philippe – Lentz, Thierry, *Histoire de la diplomatie française*, Paris, 2007. t. I. 165.

3 Quilliet, Bernard, *Louis XII*, Paris, 1986. 314-333.

4 Le Fur, Didier, *Louis XII. Un autre César*, Paris, 2001. 187-188. Cf. également: Eichel-Lojkine, Patricia – Vissière, Laurent (éds.), *Claude de Seyssel: Les louenges du Roy XII (1508)*, Genève, 2009. 15-16 et 95. note 8.

5 *Chroniques de Louis XII par Jean d'Autun*, Ed. Maulde la Clavière, René, Paris 1891. t. IV. 51-61. [ci-après simplement *Chroniques de Louis XII...*].

6 Guicciardini, Francesco, *Histoire d'Italie*, Paris, 1996. lib. VII, cap. II., 492.; et Baumgartner, Frederic J., *Louis XII*, Paris, 1996. 190-191.

lombard à Claude de France et à ses héritiers.<sup>7</sup> Les dirigeants de la mission étaient des personnages aptes à ce devoir difficile. Le premier fut François Rochechouart, sénéchal de Toulouse<sup>8</sup>, qui sera deux ans plus tard gouverneur général de Gênes<sup>9</sup>. Le second, Antoine du Prat (1463-1535), fut maître des requêtes de l'hôtel du roi et devait également devenir par la suite président du Parlement de Paris et chancelier de François I<sup>er</sup><sup>10</sup>. Même si selon Marino Sanuto le chef de délégation était Accurse Mainier, cette mention ne peut être qu'une erreur, puisque Mainier se trouvait durant cette même période en Hongrie, comme on le verra plus bas<sup>11</sup>.

#### LES VICISSITUDES DES AMBASSADEURS ET L'INTERPRÉTATION FRANÇAISE DE LA GUERRE

Le voyage mouvementé de l'ambassade montre bien quel est le sort d'une délégation qui va dans un pays non amical et doit transmettre des informations déplaisantes. Selon le chroniqueur français, Rochechouart et ses compagnons prirent leur route le 25 mai 1506, après avoir averti Maximilien de leur arrivée<sup>12</sup>. Ils empruntèrent l'itinéraire Tours-Orléans-Troyes-Bar-le-Duc-Nancy-Strasbourg-Stuttgart-Ulm-Regensburg-Linz. La cour impériale se trouvant alors quelque part en Carinthie, ils auraient dû continuer immédiatement leur route, mais Rochechouart apparemment fatigué se reposa quelques jours à Linz (où il a rédigé une lettre à Anne de Foix, reine de Hongrie)<sup>13</sup>. Privés d'informations pendant une semaine, les Français durent eux-mêmes prendre contact avec l'empereur, qui leur ordonna d'aller à Eisenerz, en Styrie. Lors de leur arrivée dans la ville le 1<sup>er</sup> août, une lettre leur apprend que Maximilien se trouve à Graz. Lorsque, quatre jours plus tard, ils gagnèrent le chef-lieu du Land, l'empereur était

---

7 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 59-60.

8 Moreri, Louis, *Le grand dictionnaire historique ou le mélange curieux de l'histoire sacrée et profane...*, Paris, 1732. t. V. 536.

9 Le Fur, *Louis XII*, 209.

10 Archevêque de Sens à partir de 1525, cardinal en 1528. *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. Biographical Dictionary (1523-1534)* [En ligne] <http://www2.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios1527-ii.htm#Prat> [25 novembre 2014]

11 « di oratori vanno, uno al re di romani, videlicet domino Acurzio, fo qui horator, e l'altro al re di Hongaria... » Le 22 juin 1506. Dans : *I diarii di Marino Sanuto*, per cura di Berchet, Guglielmo, Venezia, 1881. (ci-après simplement *Sanuto*) t. VI. 357.

12 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 52-53.

13 *Lettre inédite de l'ambassadeur François de Rochechouart à la reine de Hongrie et de Bohême*, éd. par Saint Saud, Arlot de, Paris, 1896.

déjà parti et ne les informa que deux semaines plus tard sur le lieu de son séjour. Finalement, après six autres jours, la rencontre tant désirée eut lieu à Leoben.

Si nous acceptons donc les dates données par Jean d'Autun, les ambassadeurs de Louis XII durent voyager trois mois entier pour être accueillis par Maximilien le 25 août. Le chroniqueur essaya de trouver des explications à ce comportement temporisateur du Habsbourg : « ... [le] *Roy des Rommains, lequel faisoit toutes ses dissimulations et esloing de parler ausditz ambassadeurs, affin qu'il n'allassent par devers luy et qu'ilz n'eussent veue et cognoissance de l'armée, qu'il avoit tant pouvre et desordonnée que a iceulx François ne l'eust voulu monstrer pour chose du monde; car ses gens estoyent a peu de nombre et nudz comme Arabbes.* »<sup>14</sup>

La peur de Maximilien était compréhensive dans la perspective d'un futur conflit Valois-Habsbourg, mais il était également tout naturel que les ambassadeurs aient été, pour leur part, particulièrement intéressés par l'état de l'armée impériale. Leur opinion plutôt méprisante était bien contrebalancée par la représentation de l'armée de son ennemi : « *les Hongres, qui plus puissans de beaucoup estoyent que luy; car estans lesditz ambassadeurs a Lins, iceulx Hongres, jucques a une lieue pres du camp du Roy des Rommains, brullerent trente et cinq villaiges de ses pays, sans ce qu'il leur donnast ung seul allarme* »<sup>15</sup>. Cette histoire relate certainement les razzias des troupes d'István Hédervári autour de Vienne<sup>16</sup>.

Concernant les raisons de la guerre, d'Autun avait des informations imprécises, mais il a quand-même réussi à saisir l'essentiel du conflit: c'est l'avenir du trône de Hongrie qui était en question. En mai 1506, un héraut français alla auprès de l'empereur pour lui annoncer l'arrivée de l'ambassade de Louis XII, et « *en tant qu'il arriva en Ongrye, ou trouva ledit roy des Rommains en camp, faisant la guerre a ung conte du pays, nommé le conte Estephe, pour ce qu'il vouloit avoir la fille du roy de Hongrie, que le roy des Rommains vouloit avoir pour le filz du roy de Castille.* »<sup>17</sup>

---

14 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 54-55.

15 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 55.

16 Bánlaky, József, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme*, [L'histoire militaire de la nation hongroise], Budapest, 1928. t. XII. ch. 12. [En ligne] <http://mek.oszk.hu/09400/09477/html/0012/907.html> [24 octobre 2014.]

17 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 52.

En réalité, ce « *conte Estephe* », à savoir Etienne de Szapolyai, comte de Szepes (auj. la région de Spiš en Slovaquie) et palatin de Hongrie, trouva la mort sept ans plus tôt, en 1499<sup>18</sup>. Par contre, son fils Jean (le futur roi de Hongrie entre 1526-1541), également comte de Szepes<sup>19</sup>, voulait réellement épouser la fille de Vladislas. Anne (qui était à l'époque l'unique héritière de la maison royale) était pourtant engagée dès sa naissance de 1503 à Ferdinand de Habsbourg, fils de Philippe le Beau, roi de Castille. Jean, très populaire parmi la noblesse hongroise, essaya de réaliser sa volonté lors de la Diète du février 1505. Bien qu'il y essayât un refus, lui et ses partisans réussirent en octobre à forcer Vladislas à accepter les « décisions de Rákos », qui stipulaient qu'après la mort du roi, son successeur devait être élu de la « nation hongroise »<sup>20</sup>.

La vie politique du pays fut bouleversée. En mars 1506, le roi aveuli a manqué à ses promesses en acceptant une future succession habsbourgeoise, mais après un nouveau retournement politique, en juin, il fut contraint par le parti de Szapolyai à soutenir la guerre contre Maximilien.

Malgré tous les propos flatteurs de d'Autun sur la puissance de l'armée hongroise, la guerre ne fut pas une réussite. Les troupes impériales ont saccagé et occupé les territoires frontaliers, le Burgenland (auj. en Autriche), les alentours de Pozsony (auj. Bratislava, en Slovaquie) et de Sopron. Même si ces attaques furent suivies par des frappes similaires des Hongrois autour de Vienne, Vladislas dut solliciter la paix pour finir cette guerre non désirée<sup>21</sup>.

Jean d'Autun nous informe sur les négociations. Selon lui, Maximilien envoya un chevalier au camp militaire des Hongrois, mais « *la commune gent* » (la petite et moyenne noblesse) accusa l'empereur de vouloir occuper – malgré ses déclarations de paix – le royaume, et tua l'ambassadeur. Lorsque la nouvelle de la cruauté hongroise arriva à Vienne, la foule de la cité voulut se venger sur la délégation de Vladislas.

18 Kulcsár, Péter, *A Jagelló-kor*, [L'époque des Jagellon] Budapest, 1981. 96.

19 D'ailleurs, dans les documents de Maximilien Jean Szapolyai fut toujours appelé « fils du comte Etienne ». C'était certainement la raison de la faute du chroniqueur. Cf. Szabó, Dezső, *Küzdelmeink a nemzeti királyságért, 1505-1526*, [Nos luttes pour la monarchie nationale] Budapest, 1917. 90. note 1.

20 Fraknoi, Vilmos, *Küzdelem a nemzeti királyságért 1505-ben*, [Lutte pour la monarchie nationale en 1505] *Századok*, 52 (1918) 142-160. Ici : 144-145. ; et également : Engel, Pál – Kristó, Gyula – Kubinyi, András, *Magyarország története 1301-1526*, [Histoire de Hongrie] Budapest, 2002. 351.

21 Kulcsár, *A Jagelló-kor*, 105.

Les prélats et les magnats hongrois<sup>22</sup> ne purent sauver leur vie que grâce à l'intervention de Maximilien<sup>23</sup>.

Ajoutons que ces informations du chroniqueur français n'ont laissé aucune trace dans les autres documents connus.

Le 19 juillet la paix fut conclue. Selon l'interprétation de Jean d'Autun : « *les Hongres luy [à Maximilien] baillèrent deux mille beufz et troyz mille aulnes de drap pour nourrir et vestir ses gens, qui bon besoing en avoyent, lesqueulx il disoit vouloir mener avecques luy a Romme pour se faire la couronner empereur.* »<sup>24</sup>

Ainsi, continuant son discours sur la pauvreté des gens du Habsbourg, Jean d'Autun nous fait apparemment alimenter et vêtir l'armée impériale par le roi de Hongrie. Certes, selon d'autres sources, Vladislas devait payer 20 000 florins d'or d'indemnité, mais le Jagellon ayant toujours des soucis d'argent, il est fort possible qu'il s'acquittait de ses dettes en nature. Pourtant, en octobre 1507, la moitié de la somme n'était pas encore versée à Maximilien<sup>25</sup>.

Il nous faut noter également, que ni le roi des Romains ni son armée n'ont jamais fait ce voyage à Rome. Lorsqu'en 1508, il demanda son passage à travers les territoires de la Seigneurie de Saint-Marc pour se faire couronner par le pape, la République le lui a résolument interdit, s'ajoutant ainsi à la conclusion de la Ligue de Cambrai. Déçu, Maximilien devait se proclamer empereur « élu des Romains » avec l'autorisation du pape Jules II<sup>26</sup>.

Pour revenir à l'histoire de la délégation française en Autriche, leur accueil impérial était protocolaire mais leur mission fut infructueuse. Se présentant les 25 et 26 août à la cour de Maximilien, Antoine du Prat a finalement réussi à transmettre le message de son roi. Ses propos furent clairs : suivant les conseils de ses Etats, Louis XII donnera la main de sa fille Claude à François d'Angoulême et non à Charles de Habsbourg, pourtant il continue à demander l'investiture impériale pour le Milanais à sa fille et à ses descendants, et en compensation, il versera à Maximilien

---

22 Sur la composition de l'ambassade hongroise à Vienne v. Tóth-Szabó, Pál, *Szatmári György prímás 1457-1524*, [György Szatmári, primat de Hongrie] Budapest, 1906. 65.

23 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 52.

24 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 56.

25 Tóth-Szabó, *Szatmári György*, 65. et note 94.

26 Pósan, László, *Németország a középkorban*. [L'Allemagne au Moyen Age] Debrecen, 2003. 374.

100 mille francs<sup>27</sup>. La réponse ne fut pas à la hauteur des espérances de la délégation: l'empereur déclara qu'une telle affaire devait être examinée par les princes-électeurs. Le programme officiel des envoyés français a donc été achevé en deux brefs jours.

Dans sa chronologie un peu confuse, d'Autun raconte que la délégation passa encore deux semaines en territoire autrichien : ils accompagnèrent l'empereur à Villach pour chasser. Rochechouart y a reçu un merveilleux cor de cerf de 42 livres de poids, puis les ambassadeurs passèrent la frontière vénitienne vers Trente pour rentrer en passant par Milan (où ce cadeau cynégétique fut offert au gouverneur de la ville, Charles d'Amboise).

#### L'ACTIVITÉ DES AMBASSADEURS FRANÇAIS ENVOYÉS EN HONGRIE

Nous savons très peu de choses sur les objectifs de la mission diplomatique française en Hongrie, puisque les documents français ou hongrois sont muets sur le sujet. Selon Marino Sanuto, leur tâche était l'amélioration des relations entre les Habsbourg et les Jagellon<sup>28</sup>. Le fait que Louis XII s'intéressait fortement à ces contacts nous est également connu par la lettre d'Alvise Mocenigo, ambassadeur de la Seigneurie en France qui, le 29 juin, demanda des informations à sa ville natale concernant l'affaire<sup>29</sup>. Pourtant, le roi n'était pas du tout neutre: lorsqu'il reçut des nouvelles sur une des défaites de Maximilien, il se montra joyeux<sup>30</sup>.

Vladislas ayant une épouse française, il fut traité par Louis XII comme un allié naturel sur l'échiquier européen. Il avait même connaissance de la nouvelle grossesse de la reine Anne (v. plus bas), ainsi les ambassadeurs français avaient-ils des devoirs protocolaires, à savoir transmettre les félicitations du roi et être présents à la naissance de l'héritier espéré. La continuité du règne de la dynastie des Jagellon en Bohême et en Hongrie était très importante pour les Valois, puisque cette lignée pouvait constituer le contrepoids souhaité face à Maximilien.

---

27 *Chroniques de Louis XII...* 57-59.

28 « e l'altro orator manda in Hongaria per adatar quel re col re di romani ». Tours, le 22 juin 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 357.

29 « per comunicarli li sumarii di Elemania et Hongaria ». Tours, le 29 juin 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 361.

30 « Item, che essendo col re, soa majestà disse aver nova di una gran rota ebbe Maximiano da'hongari, e tutti mostrò alegra ». Rapport de Mocenigo, le 01 août 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 385.



La naissance d'un enfant mâle en Hongrie aurait pu également empêcher l'arrivée au pouvoir des Habsbourg en Europe centrale.

Et finalement, comme nous l'avons démontré dans un travail commun écrit avec Attila Bárány, les ambassadeurs devaient aussi mener des négociations sur le sort de Richard de la Pole, prétendant yorkiste qui se cachait alors à Buda devant la fureur de Henri VII d'Angleterre<sup>31</sup>.

Cette délégation française, commandée par Accurse Manier, est arrivée auprès de Vladislas par la voie Milan-Venise – la route choisie par Rochechouart n'était pas assurée à cause de la guerre. Nous n'avons pas beaucoup de détails sur leur présence en Hongrie, mais ils étaient certainement présents à l'enterrement de la reine Anne (morte peu après son accouchement)<sup>32</sup>. Leur retour est encore moins documenté. Dans une lettre de Maximilien, datée du 14 septembre de Celje (auj. en Slovénie), l'empereur écrit au roi anglais, Henri VII, sur les ambassadeurs français venant de Hongrie : « *Significamus praeterea serenitate vestrae nos diligenter fecisse inquisitionem de oratoribus Gallicis qui ad Hungariam per Venetias profecti fuerunt, et habemus compertum eos ad Regem Hungariae pervenisse et cum magno luctu fuisse per eos ploratum propter obitum reginae.* »<sup>33</sup>

Si nous acceptons la datation de la chronique d'Autun, le 26 août l'empereur était encore à Leoben, puis il passa par Villach, apparemment en faisant un détour par Celje. Il nous semble que c'est dans cette petite ville slovène que les deux délégations françaises, celle de Rochechouart et de Manier, se rencontrèrent. Un autre document paraît contredire cet itinéraire: dans une lettre du 6 septembre, écrite à Buda, le secrétaire de l'ambassade vénitien Beneti informe la Seigneurie que Manier demande une galère dans le port de Senj (auj. en Croatie), puisqu'il ne veut pas passer par les territoires impériaux<sup>34</sup>. Mais finalement, comme on l'a vu,

31 Bárány, Attila – Györkös, Attila, A Fehér Rózsa Magyarországon. Egy angol trónkövetelő viszontagságai és a Jagelló-kori diplomácia, [La Rose Blanche en Hongrie. Les vicissitudes d'un prétendant anglais et la diplomatie des Jagellon] *Századok*, 146 (2012 :2) 416-442.

32 « Di li exequii fati a la raina, dove erano li oratori, tra li quali domino Accursio, orator dil re di Franza. » Rapport du secrétaire vénitien Gian Francesco di Beneti. Buda, le 04 septembre 1506. *Sanuto*... t. VI. 410-411.

33 Dans : *Letters and Papers illustrative of the Reigns of Richard III and Henry VII*, ed. by Gairdner, James. Vols. I-II. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. Rolls Series 24) London, 1861-1863. Vol. I. 303-304.

34 « Item scrive esso secretario, come domino Accursio, e l'altro, oratori francesi, stati li dal re di Hongaria, per le cosse dil re de romani, qualli si trovano a le exequie di la

il a choisi la voie terrestre. Peut-être, après la paix austro-hongroise, il se sentait plus en sécurité. C'est toujours un rapport vénitien qui nous relate que le 6 octobre, Manier et les autres français sont déjà à Gorizia (auj. en Italie) pour gagner Venise où ils veulent partager des informations importantes avec la Seigneurie<sup>35</sup>.

Cinq jours plus tard, Manier s'est présenté devant le Conseil des Dix pour faire un rapport de sa mission. Il raconta que son devoir était d'assurer les négociations entre le roi des Romains et celui de Hongrie, et de transmettre les vœux de Louis XII pour la naissance de l'héritier du Jagellon. En réalité, comme on l'avait vu, il manqua les deux occasions. Lorsqu'il est arrivé en Hongrie, au début de septembre, la paix a été déjà faite, et la reine Anne était déjà morte.

Manier ajouta encore que, pendant la guerre, les Hongrois ont brûlé plus de deux cents villes autrichiennes, et leur armée était déjà devant Vienne lorsque la paix fut conclue<sup>36</sup>. Il a déclaré également que l'armée de Maximilien qu'il avait vue à Gorizia se trouvait dans un état pitoyable: les soldats étaient « déchaussés et pauvres »<sup>37</sup>.

Nous ne devons pas nous étonner de la loquacité de Manier devant le Conseil des Dix. Il avait été l'ambassadeur de France à Venise durant la période de 1499-1503, et avait participé à l'élaboration de l'alliance franco-hongroise-vénitienne de la même période<sup>38</sup>, donc c'était un diplomate bien établi dans les milieux vénitiens avec les connaissances nécessaires sur la région de l'Europe-centrale.

rezina, pregavano la Signoria li volesse mandar una galia a Segna, a condurli et passarli di qua, perchè hanno dubito di vegnir per terra di le zente dil re di romani, che sono sul camino dieno far ». Buda, le 06 septembre 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 420.

35 « Come a Goricia erano zonti li oratori francesi stati in Hongaria, videlicet domino Acursio e l'altro, qualli dicono vegnir a Venetia, et haver cosse di gran importantia di conferir con la Signoria ». Udine, le 06 octobre 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 438.

36 « Prima domino Acursio disse, che erano stati in Hongaria, con commission di tratar pace col re di romani e quel re, et alegrarsi con la raina dil fiol nato. Et in itinere trovano la raina esse morta, et la pace fata, conveneno mutar proposito; et che hongari non stima l'imperador, et li ha brusato 200 ville, et fino nel borgo di Viena, quando si trattava acordo ». Venise, le 11 octobre 1506. *Sanuto...* t. VI. 445.

37 « Poi che a Goricia à visto le zente dil re di romani discalze e povere ». *Sanuto...* t. VI. 445.

38 V. : Györkös, Attila, II. Ulászló házassága és a francia diplomácia, [Le mariage de Vladislas II et la diplomatie française] *Acta Academiae Agriensis Nova Series Tom. XXXIX. Sectio Historiae*, Eger, 2012. 89-102.

La relation de Jean d'Autun sur la mission de Rochechouart en Autriche et les documents vénitiens sur l'ambassade de Manier en Hongrie sont tellement parallèles que nous pouvons en tirer une conclusion: en plus de leurs tâches diplomatiques, les deux délégations devaient se renseigner sur l'état des forces militaires des Habsbourg et des Hongrois. Il semble en outre que ces informations étaient également importantes pour la République vénitienne.

Nous avons déjà présenté les intérêts français: dans la perspective d'un futur conflit Valois-Habsbourg, Louis XII voulait naturellement connaître les capacités de son ennemi tout comme celles de son allié. Venise était également curieuse de la force réelle d'une armée impériale qui, pour gagner Rome, aurait dû nécessairement passer sa *terra ferma*.

Nous ne savons pourtant pas pourquoi ces rapports français sur le pouvoir de Vladislas étaient si exagérés. Manier a peut-être été dupé ou mal informé à Buda, mais Rochechouart devait connaître la vraie situation: ce sont les Hongrois qui furent battus et demandèrent la paix. Est-ce que les ambassadeurs disaient ce que leurs audiences vénitienne ou française voulaient entendre? Nous ne le saurons jamais.

## CONCLUSION

A partir de 1500, les relations diplomatiques franco-hongroises devinrent régulières mais furent toujours marquées par les questions politiques à l'ordre du jour dans les États concernés. En 1506, Louis XII voulait connaître les capacités militaires et les intentions des Habsbourg ou des Jagellon d'Europe centrale. Cette tendance continuera dans les premières décennies du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, par exemple lors de la guerre de la Ligue de Cambrai en 1510<sup>39</sup>, ou neuf ans plus tard, quand François I<sup>er</sup> essaya de gagner à son rêve impérial le jeune Louis II (qui, en tant que roi de Bohême, était prince-électeur). Dans les années 1522-1523, Antonio

---

39 E. Kovács Péter, Magyar-francia diplomáciai kapcsolatok a 16. század elején, [Relations diplomatiques franco-hongroises au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle] dans : *Redite ad cor. Tanulmányok Sahin-Tóth Péter emlékére*, szerk. : Krász Lilla – Oborni Teréz, Budapest, 2008. 171-186. ; Fraknói Vilmos, Magyarország és a cambrai liga, 1509-1511, [La Hongrie et la Ligue de Cambrai] *Századok*, 16 (1882) 177-201, 366-387, 705-727, 793-811. et Lakatos Bálint, Haag, Mrakes, Cuspinianus és Helianus. A német és francia követek tárgyalásai a magyar elittel az 1510-es tatai országgyűlés idején, [Haag, Mrakes, Cuspinianus et Helianus. Les négociations des ambassadeurs allemands et français lors de la Diète de Tata en 1510] *Komárom-Esztergom megyei múzeumok közleményei*, 17 (2011) 223-238.

Rincón, ambassadeur du roi de France, chercha auprès des magnats hongrois un appui contre Ferdinand d'Autriche<sup>40</sup>. Mais, après la bataille de Mohács en 1526, la Hongrie se décompose. Une nouvelle politique orientale débutera-t'elle en France<sup>41</sup>? La question mérite un autre travail.

---

40 Bourilly, Louis, Les diplomates de François I<sup>er</sup> : Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de François I<sup>er</sup> (1522–1541), *Revue Historique*, 113 (1913) 64–83, 268–308.

41 Garnier, Edith, *L'Alliance impie : François I<sup>er</sup> et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles Quint*, Paris, 2008. Györkös Attila, Mohács és a török-francia szövetség, avagy a «Nyugat áruulásának» mítosza, [Mohács et l'alliance franco-turque ou le mythe de la « trahison de l'Occident »] dans : *A magyar emlékezhelyek kutatásának elméleti és módszertani alapjai*, szerk. : S. Varga Pál – Száraz Orsolya – Takács Miklós, (Loci memoriae Hungaricae II.) Debrecen, 2013. 339-351.



**Ádám Novák**

## **The Seal Usage of János Perényi (†1458), Master of the Treasury<sup>1</sup>**

I have been studying János Perényi's career since 2009. In the essays I have published since then I covered the outline of his career, his relation to royal power and to the magnates and his position within the national council.<sup>2</sup> In my papers which are about to be published I examined the beginning of his political career, the history of his family's possessions and the use of their residence<sup>3</sup> Besides the conclusions of the literature, these studies are based mainly on already published diplomas and on the sources I have collected. In my present paper I intend to summarize the results of the sources collection I have carried out in the course of my studies abroad and during my professional practices.<sup>4</sup> Conducting a research in the National Archive of Hungarian National Archive<sup>5</sup> and also in the archives of the free royal cities of Upper-Hungary I collected

1 The article is supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences–University of Debrecen “Lendület” Research Group “Hungary in Medieval Europe”.

2 Ádám Novák, Johannes de Peren Magister Tavernicorum Regalium. In: *Keresztény szellemben a tudomány útján: III. Kárpát-medencei Keresztény Tudományos Diákköri Konferencia válogatott tanulmányai*. Ed. Gábor Kozma. Szeged, 2011. 103–114.; Idem, Adalékok egy 15. századi tárnokmester tevékenységéhez. In: *Hallgatói Műhelytanulmányok I. Debreceni Egyetem Bölcsészettudományi Kar Történelmi Intézet*. Eds. Róbert Barta – Róbert Kerepeszki – Ákos Szendrei. Debrecen, 2012. 24–29.; Idem, Levelek Budáról. Az országnagyok levelei a városoknak V. László halála után. In: *Micae Mediaevales III. Fiatal történészek dolgozatai a középkori Magyarországról és Európáról*. Eds. Judit Gál – Bence Péterfi – András Vadas – Károly Kranzieritz. Budapest, 2013. 153–166.; Idem, A sasember fiai. Egy főúri család és famíliája Luxemburgi Zsigmond kíséretében. In: *„Causa unionis causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris.” Tanulmányok a Konstanzi zsinat 600. évfordulója alkalmából*. Eds. Attila Bárány – László Pósn. Debrecen, 2014. 385–400.

3 Ádám Novák, Egy felső-magyarországi bárói család birtoklástörténete 1465-ig. A terebesi Perényiek. = *Agrártörténeti szemle* (under publication).; Idem, Rezidencia-választás kérdése a Perényi családban – Csorbakő szerepe. In: *DOSZ Tavasz Szél 2014 Konferenciakötet* (under publication).

4 Prešovská Univerzita Filozofická Fakulta Inštitút histórie 2011/2012. Prešov, Slovakia. Erasmus LLP.; Archív mesta Košice 2013. 01. 03.–31. 08. Košice, Slovakia. Campus Hungary traineeship.

5 Hereinafter: MNL OL

the charters issued or confirmed by János Perényi.<sup>6</sup> I used the database of the MNL OL DL–DF<sup>7</sup> as the basis of my investigation. Since I was predominantly interested in the seals attached to the charters, the inspection of the diplomas and letters kept abroad was inevitable. I photographed all these seals or had them photographed.

As a result of my research I created a database which contains the charters issued or confirmed by János Perényi, and also the seals attached to these charters. I publish these information in a summarizing table at my former paper.<sup>8</sup> My work could not have been completed without listing polysigillic diplomas and were issued between 1439 and 1457. My studies written about the building of this database together with the conclusions I have drawn from it will be available to the public soon.<sup>9</sup>

Based on the above mentioned database and also on my previous research I try to find out whether the seal usage of Perényi reflected his relation to national politics and the role he played in it and his party affiliations. For my investigation I also use the results of the works on the functioning and seal usage of medieval judicial offices, the results of already published itineraries and discourses on political history.

---

6 Štátny archív v Prešove, Pobočka Prešov (ŠaP PP); Štátny archív v Prešove, Pobočka Bardejov (ŠaP PB); Štátny archív v Bratislave Pobočka Trnava (ŠaB PT); Archív mesta Košíc (AmK); Archív hlavného mesta SR Bratislavy (AhmB).

7 Database of Archival Documents of Medieval Hungary. Made by the National Archive of Hungarian National Archive used by the digitization of the archival guides for the Collection of the era Pre-Mohács, which was made between 1874 and 2009. Ed. György Rác. Online publication [Medieval Charters – hereinafter: DL] – Collection of Photocopies [hereinafter: DF] 5.1]. 2010. [<http://mol.arcanum.hu/dldf>].

8 Ádám Novák, 15. századi pecséthasználat id. Perényi János tárnokmester pecsétjeinek tükrében. In. *VIII. Szegedi Medieviztika Doktorandusz Konferencia tanulmánykötete* (under publication).

9 Ádám Novák, Sokpecsétes oklevelek 1439 és 1457 között – egy kutatási terv és első eredményeinek bemutatása. In. *A Középkorral Foglalkozó Doktoranduszok Konferenciája 2014. 06. 05–06. ELTE Tanulmánykötete* (under publication); Idem, Seals of Noblemen in the Fifteenth Century. In. *Műveltség és társadalmi szerepek: arisztokraták Magyarországon és Európában. Learning, Intellect and Social Roles: Aristocrats in Hungary and Europe*. Eds. Attila Bárány – István Orosz – Klára Papp – Bálint Vinkler. Debrecen, 2014. (*Speculum Historiae Debreceniense* 18. A Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézete Kiadványai) 59–72.

The works written on the office of the Master of the Treasury or on the judicial court headed by the Master of the Treasury do not discuss the seal usage of this office holder.<sup>10</sup> In his work written on the diploma issuing activity of the Master of the Treasury, Imre Szentpétery does not touch upon the types of seals used for the confirmation of charters.<sup>11</sup> The comprehensive work of Bernát L. Kumorovitz does not discuss this topic exhaustively either.<sup>12</sup> Neither can we draw a relevant and unambiguous conclusion based on seal indices or publications about seals. Sigillographic research has left this topic undiscovered.<sup>13</sup> On the one hand the frequency of the Master of the Treasury's diploma issue was somewhere between that of other judicial offices and court offices, which I will explain later in detail.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand most of the charters issued by the Masters of the Treasury, together with the seals, are not kept in the MNL OL DL but in the archives of such towns which were annexed from Hungary after the

10 Elemér Boreczky, *A királyi tárnokmester hivatala 1405-ig*. Budapest, 1904.; Imre Szentpétery Jn., „A tárnoki ítélőszék kialakulása”, = *Századok*, 68, 1934. 510–590.

11 Imre Szentpétery, *Magyar oklevéltan*. Budapest, 1995. 226–227.

12 Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz, *A magyar pecséthasználat története a középkorban. Der Gebrauch von Siegeln in Ungarn im Mittelalter*. (second, expanded and revised edition). Budapest, 1993.

13 Older publications: Károly Wagner, *Collectanea genealogico-historica illustrium Hungariae familiarum, quae jam interciderunt. Decas I. Ex ms potissimum eruit, et scutis gentilitiis auxit Carolus Wagner*. Budaë, 1778. 129–134.; György Pray, *Syntagma historicum de Sigillis regum et reginarum Hungariae pluribusque aliis. Opus postumum cum XVI. tabulis aeri incis.* Budaë, 1805.; Indexes: Béla Czobor, *Magyarország világi és egyházi hatóságai kiadott pecséteinek jegyzéke*. Pest, 1872.; *A Magyar Királyi Országos Levéltár Diplomatikai Osztályában őrzött pecsétek mutatója*. Ed. Dezső Csánki. Budapest, 1889. ; Publications: András Hegedűs – Pál Lővei – Imre Takács – Tünde Wehli, *Megpecsételt történelem: középkori pecsétek Esztergomból*. Ed. András Hegedűs. Esztergom, 2000.; Kumorovitz, *Pecséthasználat*, 1993. 136–146.; Attila Sunkó, *Pecsétyűjtemény V szekció* (MNL OL segédletei 23. 2006); Exhibitions: *Művészet Zsigmond király korában 1387–1437. II. Katalógus*. Eds. László Beke – Ernő Ernő – Tünde Wehli. Budapest, 1987.; *Művészet I. Lajos király korában 1342–1382*. Eds. Ernő Marosi – Melinda Tóth – Lívia Varga. Budapest, 1982.; Zsuzsanna Bándi, *A Magyar Országos Levéltár Mátyás-kori pecsétkiállításának katalógusa* (1990. április 6–október 6.). = *Levéltári Közlemények*, 62, 1991. 57–150; Idem, *A Magyar Országos Levéltár Jagelló-kori pecsétkiállításának katalógusa* (1991. szeptember 20–1992. június 30.) = *Levéltári Közlemények*, 64, 1993. 107–142.

14 This problem arises during the archontological examines too. Erik Fügedi, *A 15. századi magyar arisztokrácia mobilitása. Történeti statisztikai kötetek*. Budapest, 1970. 19.



First World War. Since then these sources can only be studied on black and white microfilms, but the seals are not visible on these.<sup>15</sup> Therefore it cannot be expected for some time to come to any conclusions covering a longer period in history. I do not intend to provide a complementation with my present paper as I do not have enough available sources to do so. Therefore I am compelled to define the outline of the Master of the Treasury's seal usage based on the already known sigillographic works.

The number of establishments issuing diplomas grew proportionally with the development of medieval Hungarian literacy.<sup>16</sup> For the court judicatures the royal seal usage always served as a model. Owing to the diversity of issued diplomas, the establishments with chancelleries introduced the smaller seal by the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, then the middle seal as well and according to the literature, there were even non-royal counter seals.<sup>17</sup> The workload of the Lord Chief Justice necessitated the use of several seals already in the first third of the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Before that only the great seal of the Lord Chief Justice and his seal ring had been in use. The Lord Chief Justice definitely had a smaller seal as well after 1332, but presumably even earlier, after 1328. In the judicial process the so-called "prothonotary seal" of Deputy Lord Chief Justice and that of the Lord Chief Justice were used as well. We also need to add the seals used by the fine collectors to the just mentioned five seals.<sup>18</sup> The seal usage of the Lord Chief Justice did not become any simpler during the reign of King Sigismund either. However, the larger amount of charters makes the investigation of the Lord Chief Justice's seal usage easier. Therefore it is possible for the researcher to determine with great certainty which seal was used for the different types of charters, and by whom and when the different seals were used.<sup>19</sup>

The duties of the Master of the Treasury separated from that of the royal treasurer in the reign of the Anjou monarchs and according to historical research, until 1405 his office became the court of appeal for

---

15 We do not know any seal from János Rozgonyi Master of Treasury, because The MNL OL do not keep any charters from him.

16 Szentpétery, *Oklevéltan*, 213.

17 Kumorovitz, *Pecséhasználat*, 76.

18 Iván Bertényi, *Az országbírói intézmény története a XIV. században*. Budapest, 1976. 216–218.

19 For the seal usage of the Lord Chief Justice see Norbert C. Tóth, *Rozgonyi Simon országbírósa (1409–1414)*. In: „*Fons, skepsis, lex.*” *Ünnepi tanulmányok a 70 esztendősk Makk Ferenc tiszteletére*. Eds. Tibor Almási – Éva Révész – György Szabados. Szeged, 2010. 49–75.

the burgesses of towns.<sup>20</sup> After that the office became separated from the royal court and operated in the town of Buda.<sup>21</sup> In 1456 a statute of the Mastery of the Treasury was issued in which the common law of the procedure of the Mastery of the Treasury's bench was recorded in written form.<sup>22</sup> Therefore the office of the Master of the Treasury and his bench only provided a legal forum for the burgesses of the towns. Research on population and social history revealed that the number of town burgesses was infinitesimal compared to that of the nobility, and they kept themselves somewhat distanced both from national politics and also from any quarrel with the nobility.<sup>23</sup> As a consequence the Master of the Treasury, compared to the office of the Lord Chief Justice or that of the Palatine, conducted very few affairs between the foundation of the office and the reign of King Matthias. For example János Rozgonyi, Master of the Treasury between 1435 and 1438, issued only 12 charters, while more than 400 diplomas can be associated with Lord Chief Justice István Bátori (1435-40).<sup>24</sup> Therefore in case of the office of the Master of the Treasury we cannot talk about the mass issue of diplomas.

The majority of the charters issued by the Master of the Treasury were so called missives addressed to the towns under his judicial jurisdiction. The court of the Master of the Treasury was summoned increasingly frequently after the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The missives were sent out by the Master of the Treasury on the demand of the king, the governor or the burgesses.<sup>25</sup> These were confirmed with the seal of the Master of the Treasury. The sentences of the Master of the Treasury's bench were recorded in the letters of sentence and issued in privileged form.<sup>26</sup> To meet the formal requirements these were affixed with a bull. According to the investigations of Imre Szentpétery Jn., the letters of sentence were mainly issued by the Master of the Treasury himself.<sup>27</sup> This is the reason why it was not characteristic of this office, as opposed to the office of the

20 Boreczky, Tánokmesteri hivatal.

21 Szentpétery, Oklevéltan, 226.

22 Szentpétery, Tárnoki hivatal, 549.

23 Szentpétery, Tárnoki hivatal, 536. Cf. András Kubinyi, A magyarországi városok országrendiségének kérdéséhez: különös tekintettel az 1458–1526 közti időre. = *Tanulmányok Budapest múltjából* 1979, no. 21. 7–48.

24 According to the MNL OL DL–DF.

25 Szentpétery, Tárnoki hivatal, 517.

26 Szentpétery, Oklevéltan, 227.

27 The vice Master of Treasury leed rarely judicial jurisdiction in the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century . Cf. Szentpétery, Tárnoki hivatal, 528. The office of the Master of the

Palatine and the Lord Chief Justice, that the deputy of the Master of the Treasury would seal a charter with his own seal or with a seal left behind by the Master of the Treasury. The Master of the Treasury issued other missives in his own name as well, usually at the requests of the burgesses. In these patents the Master of the Treasury warned the public that only he and the king could sit in judgement on the towns.<sup>28</sup> Therefore charters issued under the jurisdiction of the mastery of the treasury could only be issued by the holder of this office. Without coming to a false conclusion we can state that the operation of the office of the Master of the Treasury did not require the use of different seals in judicial procedures.

Apart from being an office holder, the Master of the Treasury was also a great landlord; therefore he often issued charters in private matters. Most of these are receipts, missives, the authenticity of which is only secondary. The diplomas he issued in his own name in private matters which also implicate legal consequences are rarely authentic when issued exclusively with his own seal. This is why contemporaries tried to have these transcribed at a place of authentication and have it confirmed with an authentic seal.<sup>29</sup> However, we only have information about one private seal used by a Master of the Treasury.<sup>30</sup> Besides no seal has been revealed which can be personally associated with János Perényi and not with his office, and which he would have used simultaneously with his official seal as Master of the Treasury. Naturally we cannot state that such seal did not exist, but its non-existence seems to be proven by the charters he issued on private matters since the seal of the Master of the Treasury appears on these diplomas as well. Consequently we cannot and do not have to distinguish his private seal from his official one. This statement is confirmed by the fact that in case of the polysigillic diplomas Perényi, as opposed to for example Palatine László Garai, Lord Chief Justice László Pálóci and Miklós Újlaki, *Banus Machoviensis*, used the same seals which can be seen on the charters he issued on his official and private matters.<sup>31</sup>

---

Treasury do not have independent chancellery. That is why the Master of the Treasury confirmed the letters of sentence with his own seal. Cf. Szentpétery, *Tárnoki hivatal*, 530.

28 Szentpétery, *Oklevéltan*. 141.

29 Szentpétery, *Oklevéltan*. 242.

30 „Official” seal Kusalyi György Jakch Master of Treasury’s was published by Tamás Emödi, „A kusalyi Jakcsok származása és címeres emlékei”, = *Turul* 69, 1996, No. 3–4, 57–66. 60. „Privat” seal: *Megpecsételt történelem*, 2000. 112.

31 Novák, *Seals of Noblemen*.

Based on the sphragistical collection of Bernát L. Kumorovitz and the investigations of researchers following in his footsteps we know when a given person in the Middle Ages in general and also in the Kingdom of Hungary had a new seal made for himself. We know of one case of provable theft in the history of the Hungarian kings' double seals, namely when Louis I's seal was stolen from the chancellor's tent during the king's campaign against Bosnia in 1363, because of which the king had a new seal made. To avoid any misuse the king recalled all privileges to the chancellery which had been issued with the first seal and by adding a confirming clause to these documents they were issued again with the new double seal.<sup>32</sup> Offices or private persons could have new seals made not only in case of theft but also when the seal was lost or damaged.<sup>33</sup> In such cases the new seal became the authentic one and the old seal was not accepted any more.<sup>34</sup> In royal seal usage a new seal was made when the monarch assumed a new title. The best example for this is King Sigismund who used three double seals and six "secret seals" during his reign above his seal ring and "middle seal". The reason for having new seals made was that Sigismund obtained first the title of Czech elector, then the title of King of Germany and finally the title of Holy Roman Emperor.<sup>35</sup> Similarly to literacy, the seal usage of secular lords took the royal court as an example.<sup>36</sup> In other words, when an eminent secular person obtained a new office or gained a new title from the monarch, he tried to express this in his seal as well.<sup>37</sup>

32 Iván Bertényi, Pecsétan. In. *A történelem segédtudományai*. Ed. Ivány Bertényi. Budapest, 2006. 249.

33 King Ulászló II renewed the smaller seal of chapter of Eger in 1511. László Solymosi, *Levelesített káptalanok: Eger és Csázma pecsétjei a középkorban*. In. „*Fons, skepsis, lex.*”, 391–402. 395.

34 King Mátyás gave a modified seal to the chapter of Eger after than he amnesty its. Solymosi, *Levelesített*, 393.

35 Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz, *A specialis praesentia regia pecséthasználata Zsigmond korában*. In. *Emlékkönyv Domanovszky Sándor születése hatvanadik fordulójának ünnepére*. Budapest, 1937. 422–439.; *Művészet Zsigmond király korában*, 13–26. Recently Tamás Körmenyi, *Zsigmond király hatalmi reprezentációja*. Paper at the conference: „*Causa unionis causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris.*” *Konferencia a Konstanzi zsinat 600. évfordulója alkalmából*. November 6, 2014.

36 Kumorovitz, *Pecséthasználat*, 59.; Tamás Körmenyi, *A magyarországi nemzeti címerek kialakulásának kérdéséhez*. = *Századok*, 143, 2009. no. 2. 391–426. 392.

37 For example: János Hunyadi, or László Pálóci and László Garai. Novák, *Seals of Noblemen*.

## THE KNOWN SEALS OF JÁNOS PERÉNYI

During his life Perényi issued 64 charters, including the ones issued by himself and also the ones he issued together with other dignitaries.<sup>38</sup> Besides he sealed 3 other diplomas with his seal<sup>39</sup> and his name appears as compurgator on 2 further contracts.<sup>40</sup> From the charters to which his seal was attached 55 original ones have remained. Out of these only 33 contain identifiable seals, fragments or imprints. The types of the documents vary; there are private and official charters, missives, and polysigillic contracts, agreements and letters.<sup>41</sup> Based on my research I can state that János Perényi used at least four seals during his life. Except his first seal all the other ones appear on his missives, receipts, agreements and on polysigillic diplomas. The use of the different seals cannot be categorized according to the place of issue either. It seems so that apart from the obvious chronological order no other reason can be found for the method of his seal usage. The exact dates when the different seals appeared and the period in which they were used are the following:

- Seal No. 1<sup>42</sup> – with the circumscription János Perényi: January 31, 1424
- Seal No. 2<sup>43</sup> - with the circumscription János Perényi: July 18, 1436 and from June 29, 1440 until February 2, 1443
- Seal No. 3<sup>44</sup> – with the circumscription János Perényi, Master of the Treasury: March 15, 1439 then from December 30, 1446 until April 20, 1451, and finally, between March 19, 1456 and February 28, 1458
- Seal No. 4<sup>45</sup> – with the circumscription János Perényi, Master of the Treasury: from March 5, 1452 until September 24, 1454

We know his first seal from 1424 when he signed his charter as János, son of Imre Perényi and this is also the first recorded charter from

38 Novák, 15. századi pecséthasználat. Table.

39 MNL OL DF 289 006.; DF 289 009.; and DF 270 275.

40 MNL OL DL 13 827.; DF 235 587.

41 Cf. Novák, 15. századi pecséthasználat. Table.

42 Intact imprint: 31 January 1424 MNL OL DL 11 470.

43 Intact imprint: 18 July 1436 MNL OL DL 12 937.

44 Intact imprint: 20 April 1451 MNL OL DL 70 241.

45 Intact imprint: 20 September, 1452: MNL OL DL 70 900.

him.<sup>46</sup> He probably had his own seal made based on the seals of his family members,<sup>47</sup> namely his father, Imre Perényi, secret chancellor (1405-18),<sup>48</sup> his uncle, Miklós Perényi, *Banus Zewriniensis* (1390-91)<sup>49</sup> and his cousin, Miklós Perényi, Lord Marshal (1420-28).<sup>50</sup> Following the death of his father in 1418 and his cousin in 1428, János became the oldest male member of the Perényi family's branch of Terebes.<sup>51</sup> After his brother died in 1437 he became the only male member of full age<sup>52</sup> and from this date we encounter his name more often in the sources. In 1431 he was given the title of the Master of the Stewards and in 1435 he became *ispán* (lord lieutenant) of Zemplén county.<sup>53</sup> It is possible that he had his second seal made on account of getting these positions. The first copy of this second seal dates back to 18 July 1436.<sup>54</sup> On the first two seals only his name appears<sup>55</sup> and could be considered as his private seals, but as it will be revealed later he used his official seals as the Master of the Treasury on polysigillic diplomas and also on charters related to his private affairs. Following the death of King Sigismund he got a place in the council of King Albert as Master of the Treasury and he is mentioned as the holder of this title on 8. September 1438.<sup>56</sup> He must have had his third seal made at that time since its circumscription contains his new title as well. On 15 March 1439 he issued a letter of sentence with this new seal and this is also the first of this kind of document which remained to posterity.<sup>57</sup>

---

46 MNL OL DL 11470.

47 János Perényi as same as his ancestry used his family's coat of arm at his seals. The description of the coat of arm see: András, Komáromy, „Heraldikai és Sphraistikai adalékok a „Harmincpecsétés oklevél 1511-ből” című értekezéshez. (3. közlemény)”, = *Turul* 5, 1887, No. 3. 135.

48 MNL OL DL 75 406.

49 MNL OL DL 8837.

50 MNL OL DL 39 284. See: *Művészet Zsigmond király korában*, 466. and MNL OL DL 39 287.

51 Engel Pál, Magyarország világi archontológiája: 1301–1457. In: *Magyar középkori adattár (CD-ROM)*. Budapest, 2001. Cf. Novák, A sasember fiai. 397.

52 Ebd.

53 Engel, Achontológia.

54 MNL OL DL 12 937.

55 1. seal: IOHANNES DE PEREN cf. MNL OL DL 11 470. 2. seal: S.johannis. de.perin.

56 Gr. József Teleki, *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon. X–XII. Okmánytár*. Pest, 1853–1857. X. 6. sz.

57 MNL OL DF 239 718.

So far the formula seems to be quite simple: as a descendent of a baronial family and later as a great landowner and court dignitary he needed a seal. We do not know what happened to his first seal later; he could have lost it, it could have become unfit for use or he might even have felt that it was not worthy of his title any more. Later this seal did not appear at all. We know that the barons did not represent their court titles on their seals and Perényi followed the same tradition. The title of the Master of the Treasury was, however, a judicial title of nationwide importance, and therefore it was expectable that the holder of such title should include it in his seal. Therefore in this case having a new seal made can be an acceptable act.

#### THE SEAL USAGE OF PERÉNYI DURING THE CIVIL WAR

We experience the first incomprehensible change in his method of seal usage after the death of King Albert. At that time the sources referred to Perényi as the Master of the Treasury and his prestige was unshaken since he was the member of the legation sent to the Polish king, Vladislaus/Ulászló III in order to invite him to the Hungarian throne.<sup>58</sup> On 9 March 1440 he presumably used his second seal already,<sup>59</sup> but definitely did so on 29 June 1440 and on 17 July 1440.<sup>60</sup> All of these diplomas are polysigillic and we would think that, similarly to other judges of national importance, he did not use his official seal but his private one to confirm these kinds of documents. However, other charters issued later prove that this was not the reason for changing his seal.<sup>61</sup> What could have been in the background of this change? Is it possible that he could not use his official seal in the absence of a lawful king?

For the latter question we must give a negative answer. When the seals of the diplomas issued on 30 May 1439,<sup>62</sup> on 17 September 1439<sup>63</sup> and on 29 June 1440<sup>64</sup> are compared to each other, it becomes obvious,

---

58 MNL OL DF 289 005.

59 MNL OL DF 289 004.

60 MNL OL DF 289 006.

61 See MNL OL DF 287 198.; DF 270 334.

62 MNL OL DF 258 081. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) AUR, 1439. V. 30.

63 MNL OL DL 39 290.

64 MNL OL DF 289 006. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie dok. perg. nr. (AGADW) 5575. The photos made from black-and-white photocopies, which were ordered by Pál Engel. I could use them thanks to Pál Lővei.

that the Palatine, Lőrinc Hédervári, and László Pálóci, Lord Marshal used the same seal in case of all three diplomas, while László Garai, ban of Macsó and Matkó Tallóci, ban of Slavonia also used the same seal in case of the latter two diplomas. Unfortunately Perényi sealed only the diploma issued on 29 June 1440, but perhaps the diplomas mentioned above will serve with enough proof. We will be able to state this with more confidence when the copies of the three polysigillic diplomas which have not been investigated so far will arrive from Warsaw.<sup>65</sup> But if this was not the reason, than how the change in Perényi's seal usage can be explained?

We know that Perényi used his second seal on 27 March 1442 and on 2 February 1443 as well, although he called himself Master of the Treasury.<sup>66</sup> However, it is not certain at all that he was acknowledged as such in the court of King Ulászló. According to the work of Pál Engel written on Hungarian archontology, János Perényi held this office first between 8 September 1438 and 2 February 1442. He was followed by János Ország between 4 April 1443 and 18 February 1444 but he was referred to as formal Master of the Treasury on 23 May. The list of dignitaries written on 22 February 1444 recorded a vacancy and from 30 June 1445 Perényi held the title until 1458.<sup>67</sup> In his archontology Imre Szentpéteri Jn. calls Perényi King László V's Master of the Treasury between 1441 and 1444. Szentpétery considered Ország – although Mihály Ország and not János Ország – as King Ulászló's Master of the Treasury, but unfortunately he does not quote his sources in his work.<sup>68</sup> Still it seems to justify him that Engel, based on charters issued by King Ulászló and on a grant given in front of the cathedral chapter of Buda, refers to Ország as the holder of this office. And the reference he made to Perényi is a charter issued by Perényi himself.<sup>69</sup>

Hereinafter we should not think about party affiliations but should simply follow the facts. Perényi was not among the great dignitaries of the country in 1441 at Márványkő or at Szombathely<sup>70</sup> and until 1445 he

65 MNL OL DF 289 005. AGADW 5574.; DF 289 004. AGADW 5572.; DF 289 127. AGADW 5573.

66 MNL OL DF 213 069. and DL 13 705.

67 Engel, *Achontológia Tárnokmesterek*.

68 Szentpétery Jn. *Tárnoki hivatal* 1934. 525.

69 Cf. Engel, *Achontológia Tárnokmesterek*.

70 Engel, *Achontológia Főrendek* 1441A–B and MNL OL DF 287 161–2.



is not mentioned in any polysigillic diploma.<sup>71</sup> At the end of 1441 he did not appear on either side at the siege of Kassa (Košice)<sup>72</sup> and in 1443 his office was held by János Ország. Based on all this we can conclude that he did not get any position in the government of King Ulászló and was not in the king's favour. Although he kept on referring to himself as Master of the Treasury without using the "formal" word, he did not confirm his charters with his official seal. Authenticity can provide an answer to his seal usage. At that time Perényi was not Master of the Treasury of King Ulászló, who possessed real, although incomplete power, therefore Perényi could not use his third seal, or rather it would not have been authentic. He considered it safer to use his former, second seal which had been accepted by everyone during the reign of King Sigismund. Unfortunately we do not have any analogies from the judges of nationwide importance. Lőrinc Hédervári continued to hold his office as Palatine. István Bátori was removed from the office of Lord Chief Justice at the beginning of 1440<sup>73</sup> and the seal of György Rozgonyi is not known from this period. Miklós Újlaki, ban of Macsó and later the woiwode of Transylvania did not change his seal either, although the latter he remained loyal to King Ulászló.<sup>74</sup> László Garai, ban of Macsó, who rebelled against Ulászló also used a seal with the abbreviation of the title of his office.<sup>75</sup> Therefore the seal usage of János Perényi was quite unique. Although we do not know his motives for doing so, we suspect that there was consistence and consciousness in it.

In April, 1444 Perényi was present at the diet where the decrees of Ulászló were accepted.<sup>76</sup> In the diplomas ratifying the decrees Perényi is not referred to with any title, only with the word "senior" to differentiate him from his kinsman, János, son of Péter Perényi. However, the battle of Varna brought changes in domestic politics. In December, 1444 the Palatine, Lőrinc Hédervári addressed a letter to Perényi calling upon him to make peace with Simon Pálóci, against whom he waged a private

---

71 Cf. Novák, Sokpecsétes.

72 József Tutkó, *Szabad királyi Kassa városának történelmi évkönyve*. Kassa, 1861. 34–35.; Pál Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon*. Budapest, 1917. 187–188.

73 Engel, Achontológia.

74 Novák, Seals of Noblemen.

75 MNL OL DL 13 677.

76 MNL OL DL 13 827.

war, but the Palatine does not call him Master of the Treasury.<sup>77</sup> The conflict was resolved in the diet held in May, 1445<sup>78</sup> where the assembled dignitaries already called him the Master of the Treasury.<sup>79</sup> His title is also present in the diploma signed at Szina on 8 July which brought an end to the civil war.<sup>80</sup> Unfortunately the confirming seal of this diploma completely wore off. On 30 December 1446 he attended to a matter as the Master of the Treasury and in this case he used his third seal.<sup>81</sup> We should not look for the reason for this change in the content or character of this charter, since on 13 February 1448 he also used the same seal as a landlord.<sup>82</sup> The real reason is the consolidation of domestic politics and this can also be proven with an analogy. As I have already pointed out in a previous essay, many of the great dignitaries changed their seals at the turn of 1444 and 1445.<sup>83</sup> Therefore Perényi was not the only one who intended to show this change in domestic politics and his own personal influence even in his seal usage. It also needs to be mentioned that he did not destroy his previous seals.

#### THE SECOND OFFICIAL SEAL OF PERÉNYI

When reading the study of Pál Lövei on the polysigillic diploma issued on 5 March 1452 in Vienna we can witness an interesting phenomenon.<sup>84</sup> Apart from being one of the five diplomas which contain the seals of governor János Hunyadi and that of the national council,<sup>85</sup> this diploma is also the first one which was sealed with the fourth seal of János Perényi,

---

77 *A zichi és vásonkeői gróf Zichy-család idősb ágának okmánytára. Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vasonkeő.* Eds. Imre Nagy – Iván Nagy – Dezső Véghely. Pest, 1872–1931. IX. 90–91. (no. 89.)

78 Nándor Knauz, *Az országos tanács és országgyűlések története: 1445–1452.* Pest, 1859. 24.

79 MNL OL DL 13 846.

80 MNL OL DF 270 275.

81 MNL OL DF 228 693.

82 MNL OL DL 66 917.

83 Novák, *Seals of Noblemen.*

84 Pál Lövei, („...jelen levelünket ...szokott pecsétjeinkkel meg is erősítettük ...”) - Sokpecsétetes oklevelek megpecsételési folyamata. In. *„A feledés árja alól új földeket hódítok vissza”: Írások Timár Árpád tiszteletére.* Eds. István Bardoly – László Jurecskó – György Sümegi. Budapest, 2009. 109–117. 112.

85 Cf. Imre Szentpétery, Hédervári Imre 1447-iki felmentő levele. = *Turul*, 20, 1902. no. 4. 153–165. 161–162.

Master of the Treasury. He certainly used this seal until 24 September 1454.<sup>86</sup> It would seem so that he only renewed his seal but on a charter issued on 19 March 1456 his third seal can be found again.<sup>87</sup> He did not use the fourth seal any more to certify charters, his third seal appears on even the last charter he issued.<sup>88</sup> Why did he change his seal another time and why did he decide to use his original official seal in 1456 at latest?

Hereinafter we will look at the role Perényi played in national politics after 1445. In that year he was not chosen to be a member of the legation sent to Frederick, King of Germany on 11 May.<sup>89</sup> Although he was present at the confirmation of the diploma issued at Szina mentioned above, he did not seal any of the invitations to the diet which were signed on 17 June at Zsámbék.<sup>90</sup> He was not on the diet too, when it elected to the Governor János Hunyadi.<sup>91</sup> Because of the great number of participants the diet took place at Rákos and was attended by the representatives of several towns.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, not a single charter survived which would have been issued by Perényi, Master of the Treasury, although the towns' representatives would have gone to see their judge as it was customary.<sup>93</sup> At the beginning of January, 1447 the national council sent another delegation to Frederick while Perényi issued a diploma at Terebes.<sup>94</sup> Unsurprisingly we do not find his name among those who signed the armistice agreement on 1 June 1447.<sup>95</sup> His name appears again on a charter of nationwide importance on 13 September 1447 when the dignitaries of the country removed Imre Hédervári from his office.<sup>96</sup> During the spring of 1447 Perényi kept signing his charters on his own estate<sup>97</sup> while the other dignitaries resided mainly in Buda.<sup>98</sup> He did not take

---

86 MNL OL DF 279 651.

87 MNL OL DF 255 752.

88 MNL OL DL 44 858.

89 Knauz, Országos tanács, 27.

90 MNL OL DF 240 862.; DF 250 106.

91 He did not belong to the national council. Cf. Engel, *Achontológia Főrendek* 1445A.

92 Knauz, Országos tanács, 40–41.

93 Cf. Boreczky, *Tánokmesteri hivatal* 1904.

94 Knauz, Országos tanács, 56–57. and MNL OL DF 228 693.

95 MNL OL DF 287 192.

96 Szentpétery, *Hédervári Imre*, 155.

97 MNL OL DL 66 917.; DF 228 708.; DF 213 190.; DL 31 575.; DL 31 576.;

98 Knauz, Országos tanács 1895. 79–81.

part in the battle of Rigómező either<sup>99</sup> and while the dignitaries were all staying in Buda in 1449<sup>100</sup> he issued a diploma in Terebes.<sup>101</sup>

It clearly appears so that one of the greatest landholders of the country and also the Master of the Treasury was not a regular and determining member of the national council and did not reside in the company of Hunyadi either. He mainly fought against the Czechs who were plundering his estates. The defeat at Rigómező (Kosovo Polje) resulted in changes in national politics. János Hunyadi's reputation as the whip of Turks was somewhat shaken and according to the literature, this made Hunyadi think over his politics.<sup>102</sup> He was forced to sign an armistice agreement with Jan Jiskra, the leader of the Czech mercenaries;<sup>103</sup> he left Buda to meet Jiskra on 12 March 1450.<sup>104</sup> János Perényi, who sealed a diploma in Buda at the end of February,<sup>105</sup> must have been in Hunyadi's escort since his name and seal appears on the armistice agreement signed on 28 March at Mezőkövesd.<sup>106</sup> At the beginning of 1451 he resided in Buda together with the other dignitaries,<sup>107</sup> then wrote a letter from Terebes on Hunyadi's orders to the towns of Upper-Hungary.<sup>108</sup> According to the available sources, in 1452 we often find him in the company of Hunyadi and the dignitaries. On 5 March he took part in the negotiations with the Austrian estates in Vienna,<sup>109</sup> in April he issued a charter in Buda<sup>110</sup> and on 24 August he confirmed the peace treaty with Jiskra on Hunyadi's behalf.<sup>111</sup> Reading the text of this treaty it becomes obvious that Perényi and his three associates, namely Vince, bishop of Vác, Rajnald Rozgonyi and László Pálóci were also responsible for keeping the peace. After

99 Engel, *Achontológia Főrendek* 1448A.

100 Knauz, *Országos tanács*, 87–90.

101 MNL OL DF 213 215.

102 Tamás Pálosfalvi, A pozsonyi vár elfoglalása 1450-ben. In. *Analecta Mediaevalia II. Várak, templomok, ispotályok. Tanulmányos a magyar középkorról*. Ed. Tibor Neumann. Piliscsaba, 2004. 197–219. 198.

103 Pálosfalvi, *Pozsonyi vár*, 203.

104 Pál Engel, Hunyadi János kormányzó itineráriuma, 1446–1452. = *Századok*, 118, 1984. no. 5. 974–997. 984.

105 MNL OL DF 240 052.

106 Engel, *Achontológia Főrendek* 1450A.

107 MNL OL DL 70 900.

108 MNL OL DF 213 344.

109 Lővei, „...jelen levelünket”, 112.

110 MNL OL DF 240 148.

111 MNL OL DF 235 587.

signing the peace treaty he returned to his estate at Füzér<sup>112</sup> and probably after he got news about the handing over of László V<sup>113</sup> he joined Hunyadi at Buda in the second half of September.<sup>114</sup> Neither of them were among the members of the legation which was sent to bring home László V from Vienna,<sup>115</sup> but in December he and Hunyadi welcomed the king together.<sup>116</sup> The diet at Pozsony (Bratislava) settled the questions of land ownership and as a result of this Perényi got a new grant, the castle of Jolsva (Jelšava) from László V.<sup>117</sup>

Based on the above mentioned information we can conclude that from the end of 1449 or from the beginning of 1450 Perényi played an increasingly important role in the politics of Governor János Hunyadi. Apart from being able to take part in the decision making of the council of the dignitaries, he attended the negotiations in Vienna and was a dependable ally of Hunyadi against Jiskra in the north-eastern part of the country. His increasing influence in politics must have led Perényi to promulgate this in his seal as well.

Although Hunyadi resigned from his office as governor at the end of 1452, he gained the title of chief captain and in reality all power concentrated in his hands. As a consequence he started to isolate from the influential dignitaries in 1453. In this year Dénes Szécsi, Miklós Újlaki, László Garai and László Pálóci signed a cooperation agreement which was clearly aimed against Hunyadi.<sup>118</sup> Perényi did not join this cooperation and we do not know about any charters issued by him in 1453. In 1454 he sealed several charters in Buda for which he used his fourth seal<sup>119</sup> and held a meeting in Terebes in November regarding the defence against the plundering mercenaries.<sup>120</sup> We do not know about any sealed charters which he would have issued in 1455 and we do not encounter his name

---

112 MNL OL DF 242 414.

113 László V was handed by Frigyes to Cillei on September 4. See: Antal Áldásy, A magyar országgyűlés követtsége V. Lászlóhoz 1452 október havában. = *Századok*, 44, 1910. no. 7. 554–562. 554.

114 MNL OL DL 70 900. Cf. Engel, *Itinerárium*, 986.

115 Áldásy, *Követtség* 1910. 555.

116 MNL OL DF 242 420. Cf. Engel, *Itinerárium*, 986.

117 MNL OL DL 14 627–8.

118 MNL OL DF 287 204.

119 MNL OL DL 106 096.; DL 14 784.; DF 279 651.

120 MNL OL DL 31 664.

in diets, or in any legation, campaign or agreement. His next charter was issued in 1456 and in this case he used his third seal again.<sup>121</sup>

Presumably he returned to the use of his previously seal in 1455 or at the beginning of 1456. Yet again, the reason for this change was probably his political manoeuvring. He had his fourth seal made to express that he was a trusted man of Governor János Hunyadi and one of his greatest supporters against the Czechs in the north-eastern part of the country. However, the return of László V and the evolving political alliances against Hunyadi made him realize that he took a stand on the wrong side. It must have been an attempt on Perényi's part to find a way out of this situation when he tried to get closer to László V, which was rewarded by a new royal grant to all of his estates.<sup>122</sup> From March 1456 he started to take part in national politics again, mainly by organizing the military operations against the plundering mercenaries.<sup>123</sup> He used his third seal to confirm his charters which he signed as King László's Master of the Treasury and later called himself captain of the upper parts as well.<sup>124</sup> Acting as such, Perényi, united with Jiskra, fought against Mihály Szilágyi, the brother-in-law of János Hunyadi and later signed a peace treaty with Szilágyi on 8 September 1457 at Kassa (Košice).<sup>125</sup> Following the king's death in the same year he was in council with the dignitaries in Buda from 29 November at latest until 6 December.<sup>126</sup> He was in charge of the north-eastern part of the country until the new king was chosen at the diet.<sup>127</sup>

The question might arise whether János Perényi considered the representation of his political engagement really so important that he emphasized it on his seals as well. It is well-known fact that royal seal usage was an important means of propaganda.<sup>128</sup> The seal of a magnate did not only serve the purpose of advertising his pedigree and title but it also represented his power. Perényi also used the marble tombstone which was

---

121 MNL OL DF 255 752.

122 MNL OL DL 14 909.

123 MNL OL DF 270 319.; DF 213 596.; DF 213 600.; DF 213 611.; DF 213 649.; DF 213 651.; DF 213 654.;

124 Ibid.

125 MNL OL DF 213 674.

126 MNL OL DF 228 791.; DF 213 680.; DF 270 334.; DF 203 229.; DF 250 248.

127 Novák, *Levelek*, 159.

128 Körmendi, *Zsigmond király*.

probably ordered by him<sup>129</sup> to demonstrate his power. The unusually long and very telling circumscription of the tombstone immortalized his title of Master of the Stewards he held during the reign of King Sigismund and the title of Master of the Treasury given to him by King Albert. Besides the symbol of the Order of the Dragon and the symbol of the Aragonese Order of the Jar, i.e. of Annunciation Lilies and the Vase also appears on the tombstone together with the symbol of the Lancaster-House, the Collar of SS. This way red marble tombstone, which was made for all eternity, has a crowded effect but it contains everything a baron can be proud of.<sup>130</sup> Everything, except that János Perényi also used to be László V's Master of the Treasury and captain of the upper parts. Naturally in the reign of King Matthias it was not too favourable to refer to these offices. This might as well be a coincidence but can also be a momentum of conscious baronial representation.

#### SUMMARY

In my study in concentrated only on János Perényi's seal usage. I would not state that his political engagement and his relation with the dignitaries can only be described based on this. A more comprehensive source analysis is required to make such statements. Not only the charters issued by him but also the letters written about him and even the ones written to him contain information on the topic. Unfortunately the coherent correspondence of that branch of the Perényi family whose members became Palatines did not survive; therefore we rarely come across letters written to him, although his own correspondence with the towns was quite lively. With extensive source criticism and by finding as many references as possible the itinerary of János Perényi will also be possible to be made which will serve as the "spine" of his activity.

Nevertheless, this sigillographic research can point out the deficiencies of our historiography: namely that we need to conduct a more intensive, deeper research on 15<sup>th</sup> century secular seal usage. In the absence of analogies I can only make comparisons based on my own research. Nevertheless, I sincerely hope that my seemingly week demonstration

129 Pál Lövei, „*Posuit hoc monumentum pro aeterna memoria*” – *Bevezető fejezetek a középkori Magyarország síremlékeinek katalógusához. Akadémiai doktori disszertáció.* Budapest, 2009. 83. According to Lövei János Perényi ordered his own tomb with his brother's one. But the epigraph was made later.

130 Pál Engel – Pál Lövei – Livia Varga, Zsigmond-kori bárói síremlékeinkről. = *Ars Hungarica*, 11, 1983. no. 1. 37–38.

ÁDÁM NOVÁK

will stand its ground even after the information on the available seals is processed. As a humble contribution I wish to foster this by collecting and publishing the polysigillic diplomas issued between 1439 and 1457. By means of this it will become easier to prepare the seal indices of other dignitaries. For instance it would be worth investigating the seal usage of another dignitary who held his office for a similarly long period. The seal usage of a Lord Chief Justice or a Palatine is perhaps too versatile for this but the sigillographic research of a voivode of Transylvania or that of another dignitary of nationwide importance would be more expedient.





## István Petrovics

### Capysranus: An anonymous English epic poem printed in London in 1515<sup>1</sup>

The above mentioned and below published English epic poem's original title is unknown. Hungarian scholars have known about its existence only since 1937, when Éva Róna, a literary historian, researcher of the Hungarian-English relations published her article about this metric romance in the *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok* [English Philological Studies] the most important journal of Hungarian English Studies, founded by László Országh. After a reaffirming and careful scan of the literature of the English Studies we can clearly conclude that Éva Róna's study, *Hungary in a Medieval Poem. "Capysranus", a Metrical Romance* reported first on the literary work in question.<sup>2</sup>

The later Hungarian research - probably because of the political change after the Second World War - seemingly forgot the 'Capysranus'. The ice broke in 1986 when *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, an English language journal founded in 1959 published the 'Capysranus' text alongside a study.<sup>3</sup> The reasons behind this were the 600<sup>th</sup> birthday of John of Capistrano and the 530<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the victory of Nándorfehérvár, and most of all that not long before 1986 the literary- and cultural historian

1 A Hungarian version of the article, without the textual edition of the Capysranus poem was published In: Peregrin Kálmán – László Veszprémy (eds.), *Európa védelmében. Kapisztrán Szent János és a nándorfehérvári diadal emlékezete* [In the defence of Europe. John of Capistrano and the remembrance of the triumph of Nándorfehérvár]. Budapest, 2013. 126-134.

2 Éva Róna, *Hungary in a Medieval Poem. „Capysranus”, a Metrical Romance.* = *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok* [Second series] 3, 1937. 60-70. Unaltered text re-issued: Brahmer, Miechisław-Helsztyński – Stanisław-Krzyżanowsky, Julian (eds.), *Studies in Language and Literature in Honour of Margaret Schlauch.* Warszawa, 1966.

3 Capysranus. (An Anonymous English Epic Poem printed in London in 1515). The text edited by William A. Ringler, Jr. = *The New Hungarian Quarterly* 27, 1986. No. 104. 131-139.; István Petrovics – György Endre Szőnyi, „Capysranus”. A Late Medieval English Romance on the 1456 Siege of Belgrade. Ibid. 141-146. It should be noted that the research of the historical relations of England and Hungary – thanks to József Laszlovszky and Attila Bárány – from the 1980's onward received an increased impetus again. We can say without exaggeration that the in the 1980s a new era of research started in Hungary. For a summary of the achieved results and of the research history of medieval English-Hungarian relations cf: Attila Bárány – József Laszlovszky – Zsuzsanna Papp, *Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban.* I-II [English-Hungarian relationships in the Middle Ages]. Máriabesnyő, 2008-2012.

György Endre Szőnyi got acquainted with Professor William A. Ringler, Jr. (1912-1987) an American expert of the (mainly English) literature of the 14-17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Professor Ringler with the help of György Endre Szőnyi published the text for the Hungarian and international research in modern spelling, followed by his own emendations and annotations. Almost 50 years after Éva Róna's report the epic poem still called 'Capystranus' became available for study again.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to state that the text edited and published by William A. Ringler, Jr. in 1986 can be considered the first full edition not only in Hungary but also internationally. There was an attempt to publish the 'Capystranus' abroad previously, but Douglas Gray's *The Oxford Book of Late Medieval Verse and Prose* published in 1985 cited only a lengthy part of the full text.<sup>5</sup> At this point we have to note that only three known copies exist of the small octavo booklets published around 1515 by the London printing house of Wynkyn de Worde, the successor to the first English printer William Caxton. Unfortunately all of them are fragments. The title page and the ending are missing, and an additional problem is that the pages were originally unnumbered. A copy considered to be the most complete from 1515 contains twelve and a half pages and two beautifully crafted woodcuts. The variant made by the collating of the three existing copies narrates the siege of Nándorfehérvár (today Beograd, Serbia) in 1456 and the preceding events in 579 lines divided into five sections.<sup>6</sup>

Two of the three copies bequeathed to posterity are part of the collection of the United Kingdom's national library, the British Library formed in the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1973 following the separation from the British Museum. One of these, namely the one made around 1515 and numbered STC 14649, Brit. Lib. C 71, c. 26 was acquired by the British Museum in March 1922, when Mr. S. R. Christie Miller donated the booklet containing the most complete text to the illustrious institution, which always considered itself the world's leading museum. Of the second copy owned by the British Library [STC 1649.5, Brit. Lib. C. 40. m. 9(18)] we only know that it was published by the printing house of Wynkyn de Worde possibly in 1527. The third, likewise fragmentary copy also printed

4 The title page of the booklet containing the poem is missing. On the inside cover there is an old handwriting: 'Capystranus – sold at Roxb. Sale 4.10.0 – 6.5.' On the first page is another note with old handwriting: 'Capystranus a metrical Romance probably by Winken de Worde'. The title we use today came from this note. Cf. Róna, 'Capystranus', 60.

5 Gray, Douglas (ed.), *The Oxford Book of Late Medieval Verse and Prose*. Oxford, 1985. 199-203. (lines 360-521.) Cf. The notes on page 459.

6 Róna, „Capystranus”, 60-61.; Petrovics-Szőnyi, „Capystranus”, 141-142.

by Wynkyn de Worde is now in the collection of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the oldest library in Europe and Great-Britain. Its number is STC 1465, Douce frag. f. 5 and was printed possibly around 1530.<sup>7</sup>

Romances were the most popular works of the medieval English literature performed by minstrels and common people, but after the mid-fourteenth century – as Geoffrey Chaucer in his *Canterbury Tales* notices – became less prevalent. All that changed in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>8</sup> when with the appearance of the printing press, printers wanted to entertain their readers with interesting stories. This situation is well illustrated by the fact that out of the 640 books printed by Wynkyn de Worde 150 books were romances.<sup>9</sup> If there was demand for them, some works were reprinted several times depending on their curiosity and actuality. The expansion of the Ottomans in Europe, the fall of Constantinople and the successful defence of Nándorfehérvár were precisely that kind of subject.<sup>10</sup> It is not surprising at all that the ‘*Capystranus*’ was published three times in the first part of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Unfortunately none of the

7 Róna, „Capystranus”, 60-61.; Ringler, „Capystranus”, 140.; Petrovics–Szőnyi, „Capystranus”, 141. For Wynkyn de Worde and his activities cf: Plomer, Henry R., *Wynkyn de Worde and His Contemporaries to 1535*. London, 1925.; Duff, Edward Gordon, *A Century of the English Book Trade: Short Notices of All Printers, Stationers, Book-binders, and Others Connected with it from the Issue of the First Dated Book in 1457 to the Incorporation of the Company of Stationers in 1557*. London, 1905. As an interesting fact we note that Plomer was not aware of the ‘Capystranus’. In his later work Edward Gordon Duff notes only that this interesting work issued by the printing house of Wynkyn de Worde is privately owned and difficult to access. Cf: Róna, „Capystranus”, 66-67. For the activities of Wynkyn de Worde see: Róna, „Capystranus”, 66-67.; *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Literature*. Second Edition. Revised by Dorothy Eagle. Oxford University Press, 1970. 620.

8 Róna, „Capystranus”, 61.

9 Ibid. 61. In the literature there are different numbers about de Worde’s publications, primarily relating to books. The above cited *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Literature* for example mentions 800 *books* which number of course includes the re-publications and the broadside issues too.

10 The interest in the Ottoman’s expansion in Europe is well signified by the work of Sir Thomas More which he wrote during his imprisonment in the Tower of London, titled *Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulations*, in which the fictional conversation of two Hungarian lords, Antal and Vince takes place in the eve of the battle of Mohács. More, Thomas, *A Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation*. Edited by Martz, Louis L. and Manley, Frank. New Haven, 1976. Hungarian translation: Péter Benedek Tóta, *Morus magyaros ország-magyarázata: közelítés Morus Tamás Bátorító párbeszéd megpróbáltatás idején című dialógusához*. [More’s explanation of the country in a Hungarian perspective]. = *Vigilia* 67, 2002. 322-330. The interest in the same topic is also shown by the metrical romance ‘The Squire of Lowe Degree’ which will be discussed later.

existing copies refers to an original poem or a manuscript on which it is based, if such thing existed at all. Therefore the *Capystranus*'s date of origin is impossible to determine. It is not an exceptional situation: Henry VIII's dissolution of monasteries between 1536 and 1541 destroyed most of the manuscripts used by the first English printers.<sup>11</sup> Even if the printed copy contains direct reference to the year of publishing it is of no help to us in determining the time of origin, because the texts were "modernized" in accordance with the linguistic requirements of the time. With regard to the printing process, we must note that - as it was mentioned before - the three surviving copies' extents are different from each other. The explanation is - among others - that during the reprint it was common - especially if it was a 'facsimile' - to abridge the original text several times to reduce the scope of the work.<sup>12</sup>

It is certain that the '*Capystranus*' can be originated between 1456 and 1515. We haven't got much clue about the author's person either. Éva Róna assumed that the author was Wynkyn de Worde himself; more precisely Róna thought that de Worde heard the original poem before he came to England, during his stay in the Netherlands and compiled it to its final form later.<sup>13</sup>

It is important to recall that the famous printer was born in Wörth, Alsace. In his youth he moved to the city of Bruges in the Netherlands, and worked in the printing house of William Caxton and Colard Mansion. William Caxton and de Worde left the Netherlands in 1476 and soon established a printing house in London.<sup>14</sup> It is possible that before 1476 de Worde met some Hungarians, who reported to him the successful defence of Nándorfehérvár, viz. several Hungarians visited that region of Europe even before the Reformation. We also know that a Hungarian called Adrian de Tolna, who became a printer in London moved there from the Netherlands.<sup>15</sup>

Wynkyn de Worde had a special interest in Hungary. This fact is demonstrated by the '*Capystranus*' and '*The Squire of Lowe Degree*', a metric romance, which was published by Wynkyn de Worde around

---

11 Róna, „Capystranus”, 65.

12 Ibid. 65.

13 Ibid. 66.

14 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Literature, 88., 620.

15 Duff, A Century, 160.; Róna, „Capystranus”, 65.

1520. It is interesting for us because it is set in Hungary.<sup>16</sup>

Contrary to the opinion of Éva Róna, Professor Ringler thought the ‘*Capystranus*’ follows the tradition of the medieval heroic romances and shows similarities with the early Charlemagne poems. Its author probably was a minstrel and the poem made its way to the press by word of mouth. Ringler therefore ruled out the possibility that the author of the ‘*Capystranus*’ was de Worde himself, and dated the poem much earlier than 1515.<sup>17</sup> The earlier origin and the oral tradition would explain the deformation of the name of Hunyadi and many others occurring in the poem. The famous captain for example is called ‘Obedianus’ which is certainly a corrupted, but for a Hungarian speaker totally understandable form of the name John Hunyadi [in Hungarian: Hunyadi János – Obed(i) Ianus].<sup>18</sup>

The name ‘Gottauntas’ which according to the ‘*Capystranus*’ is the name of the biggest university in Hungary (*‘To an university he took the way / The greatest in Hungary I dare well say / Gottauntas it hight’*) is much more problematic. The poem states that John of Capistrano brought with him from there 26000 men to defend Nándorfehérvár. The problem is that at that time there was not a single university working in the Kingdom of Hungary. The name is also problematic. The ending ‘untas’ may refer to the Latin ‘universitas’, but the name of the town where it was situated is unfathomable. There is a possibility that the poet thought of Krakow where John of Capistrano indeed stayed between the August of 1453 and the May of 1454 and during that time he probably visited the university too. In fact he met in that town László Hunyadi, who had accompanied there Elizabeth, sister of King Ladislaus V, the later wife of Casimir IV King of Poland.<sup>19</sup> The Hungarian youths visited the university in Krakow in some numbers<sup>20</sup>, but it would be a mistake to place it in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, not to mention the fact that according to the

---

16 Ibid. 66-67.; Petrovics–Szönyi, „Capystranus”, 143. Published In. Kooper, Erik (ed.), *Sentimental and Humorous Romances: Floris and Blancheffour, Sir Degrevant, The Squire of Low Degree, The Tournament of Tottenham, and The Feast of Tottenham*. Kalamazoo, Michigan, 2006.

17 Petrovics–Szönyi, „Capystranus”, 142.

18 Róna, „Capystranus”, 66.

19 Petrovics–Szönyi, „Capystranus”, 145.; Péter Kulcsár, *Kapisztrán János*. [John of Capistrano] (Magyar História. Életrajzok) Budapest, 1987. 150.

20 For the Hungarian students of the university of Krakow cf. *Metryka Uniwersytetu Krakowskiego z lat 1400-1508*. I-II. Biblioteka Jagiellońska rkp. 259. Wydali Antoni Gašiorowski – Tomasz Jurek – Izabela Skierska przy współpracy Ryszarda Grzesika. Kraków, 2004.

available sources John of Capistrano during his recruiting visited only the counties Baranya, Bács, Bodrog, Csanád and Csongrád lying near Nándorfehérvár.<sup>21</sup>

The problems shown above lead us to a most important question, namely to what extent does the poem reflect the historical reality. But before we answer this, we have to describe its structure and content briefly.

As mentioned earlier the text reconstructed by William A. Ringler, Jr. contains 579 lines divided into five sections. The first section contains 59, the second 103, the third 164, the fourth 209 and the fifth 46 lines.<sup>22</sup> In the first section, after the obsecration to God the poet states that he wants to speak to those who like not the simple stories but those of brave knights, who fought for Jesus Christ. In the following we read about Charlemagne and how gloriously he recovered from the pagans the relics of Christ's sufferings: the spear, the crown of thorns, and the nails used for his crucifixion. In the second section the author tells us how the Turks took Constantinople in 1453, and how they demolished the city walls by their cannons. It is also mentioned that during the fight the streets of Constantinople run red with blood and many of the besiegers died. The poem describes in detail the cruelty of the Muslims, who spared not even the priests and churchmen. In the third section appears Capistrano of whom the author of the poem speaks with great admiration. The poet states: there were only a few monks like Capistrano, who by recognizing the enormous evil visited the Holy Father on his own volition. Capistrano begged the pope on his knees for help to save the Kingdom of Hungary. For the friar it was clear that the aim of the Ottomans was to conquer Hungary. Capistrano warnings the pope, that if the town and castle of Nándorfehérvár fell, all of Hungary will fall. (*'If he win the royal city / All Hungary is forlon'*). (We must note here that the author of the poem uses not the Hungarian Nándorfehérvár or the Slavic Belgrad/Beograd name of the town but the slightly deformed German form, Grecuswissinburgh.) Capistrano's begging and persuasion reached its aim. The Holy Father was extremely touched by Friar John's pleading and assured him of his complete support: he issued a bull, made a flag which he consecrated, blessed Capistrano three times and also gave him money. Capistrano started to recruit crusaders and collect gold and silver as a financial foundation of the undertaking. The first part of the fourth section is about

21 Gábor Barta, *Nándorfehérvár 1456*. Budapest, 1986. 217.; Kulcsár, Kapisztrán, 186.

22 Ringler, „Capystranus”, 131-139.

Capistrano's journey in Hungary: he first visited the university called Gottauntas, the biggest university of the kingdom from where he took 26000 people with him. After that he turned his way to Nándorfehérvár, where he met with János Hunyadi, the captain general (*'captain principal'*) and they joined their armies. According to the poem the men of Capistrano came from different countries (*'men of diverse country'*). The most interesting claim of the poet is related to the Christian army: he mentions that with Friar John and Hunyadi came two strange knights to fight the heathens, by name Richard Morpath from England and Sir John Black, who 'was a Turk' (*'And Sir John Black, I understand / That was a Turk before'*). They both fought bravely and killed a great many heathens. According to the author of the poem, the siege lasted for 14 weeks. The Turks attacked with a huge army and 500 cannons. After razing the walls they launched a general attack against the town. Soon a murderous battle ensued. While the leaders of the defenders, Obedianus, Richard Morpath and John Black were already bleeding from several wounds, new troops came to help the besiegers. In the critical situation Capistrano seized a crucifix and climbed on top of a high tower from where he begged for the mercy of the Almighty God and Holy Mary. His sonorous voice raised even the dead (*'Twenty, thousand dead for to see, / Within the twinkling of an eye / To life again they rose'*). The Christian force with renewed strength drove out the besiegers from the town. The fifth section is short and unfinished, containing only 46 lines. In this we read about a new victory of the Christian army who pushed back the Turks on every side.

After the brief description of the content and structure of the poem let us speak a few words about its reality. It should be clear that the *'Capystranus'* is a literary work about historical personalities (Giovanni da Capestrano, János Hunyadi) and major historical events (the fall of Constantinople, the siege of Nándorfehérvár). It also demonstrates that after the fall of Constantinople and the conquest of the Balkans not even the remote England remained indifferent to the Ottoman advances. The fall of Rhodes, the island controlling the Levantine trade to Suleiman I in 1522 aggravated the situation further. This also meant the fall of the last crusader base in the eastern Mediterranean. The loss of Rhodes held the Ottoman conquest in the forefront of European interest. Hungary could hope and get financial or military help only from the pope, Venice and the Holy Roman Empire, but it cannot be ruled out, that perhaps English help might have been expected in this fight, especially financially but also even in military terms.



Unfortunately, as we mentioned earlier, we know almost nothing about the identity of the author of the poem. Whoever he was, that much is certain: in his work he wanted to commemorate John of Capistrano truly. The whole poem is focused on the deeds of the Observant Franciscan. It is true, that in the recruiting and leading of the crusader army Capistrano had undying merits; but it is not, that he initiated the crusade. It was Calixtus III's own decision, as the Holy Father was fully aware of the Turkish threat. It is proved by a number of measures that have served the purpose of raising funds for an anti-Turkish campaign. In addition the pope negotiated with a number of European sovereigns and sent legates to the Holy Roman Empire, Poland and Hungary to recruit volunteer crusader troops. In Hungary it was Cardinal Juan Carvajal whose urging voice called John of Capistrano to Buda in February 1456, who previously was a missionary sent to the Romanian and Serbian population in the southern part of the Kingdom. This activity of Capistrano, which he considered as his main task, changed soon: his duty became the recruiting of crusaders. On 6<sup>th</sup> of February 1456 accompanied by Ladislaus V Cardinal Juan Carvajal arrived to Buda, and on 15<sup>th</sup> of February, after the high mass he declared the crusade. After reading the papal bull, the legate pinned the cross consecrated by Calixtus III, on Capistrano. The author of the poem fails to mention these important circumstances, and also remains silent about how Capistrano appeared in Central Europe after 1451, where he initially fought against the Hussite movement. In Poland, Moravia and Silesia he took actions against the Jews also. He burned many of them; just in Boroszló (today Wrocław, Poland) 41 people died this way. In Hungary his original aim was to convert the schismatics and the heretics, but later, shortly before the siege of Nándorfehérvár he realized that *'in this difficult time the Serbs, the schismatics, the Vlachs, the Jews, the heretics and heathens must be considered as a friend, if they willing to fight by our side. Now, we must fight the Turks.'* In this regard we must note, that John of Capistrano in the meeting of the Hungarian magnates held in Győr at the beginning of June 1455 greatly insulted George Branković, of whom he demanded to give up his orthodox faith and be baptized in the Roman rite. The old despot who offered significant military aid was not willing to do that and indignantly went to the fortress of Szendrő (today Smederevo, Serbia). It is not surprising at all that Serbs are not mentioned in the poem. However we know that many of them gave their life in the defence of Nándorfehérvár on the 14<sup>th</sup> of June in the battle fought on the river Danube. Not only the Serbs are neglected by

the poet but also the fortress' original defenders. János Hunyadi's figure was unavoidable, but the poem is silent about his brother in law, Mihály Szilágyi and János Geszti castellan of Miklós Újlaki who directed the defence of Nándorfehérvár, and is also silent about János Kórógyi Ban of Macsó and his banderium of thousands of tried horsemen. For the author the crusader army and its leader were important not the regular army.

The narrative of the siege is mostly accurate, although the 14 week battle and the 500 cannons are obviously exaggerations. It is also problematic that the poem makes no mention about the river-battle which took place on July 14 and allowed Hunyadi to supply the well trained regular troops and munitions to the surrounded town and castle.

The number of the troops involved in the siege and defence is also problematic. To hold the number of the Turkish army to 100 000 is an exaggeration but not an unsubstantiated one. The information concerning the biggest Hungarian university, the Gottauntas and its 26000 crusader is much more fanciful. Small but noteworthy inaccuracy that the sultan ordered the general attack not on 22<sup>nd</sup> of July the day of (Mary) Magdalene, but on 21<sup>st</sup> of July after the breach of the wall.<sup>23</sup>

All in all we can say that the poet did not make serious mistakes when presenting the siege. This is certainly explained by the fact that – thanks to the medieval chroniclers – János Hunyadi's fighting against the Turks including the triumph of Nándorfehérvár were well known everywhere in Western Europe, including England. The life, the political and military career of János Hunyadi were introduced most thoroughly by Jean de Waurin, nonetheless the chronicle of John of Whethamstede and the correspondence of Thomas Bekynton also contain valuable information in relation to Hungary.<sup>24</sup> The famous English historian Maxwell Lyte

23 For the announcement of the crusade, the recruitment of crusaders and the siege of Nándorfehérvár cf. Barta, Nándorfehérvár; Petrovics–Szönyi, „Capystranus”, 141-145.; Kulcsár, Kapisztrán; Tamás Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig 1396-1526* [From Nikopolis to Mohács]. Budapest, 2005. 108-117.; István Petrovics, A Délvidék és a török veszély: a nándorfehérvári diadal és előzményei. [The southern regions and the Turkish threat: the triumph of Nándorfehérvár and its antecedents] = *Bácsország. Vajdasági Honismereti Szemle* 37, 2006. 2. 11-19.; András Kubinyi, *Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig. A Mátyás- és a Jagelló-kor hadtörténete*. [From Nándorfehérvár to Mohács: Military history of the Mathias- and Jagiellonian era] Budapest, 2007. 11-29.

24 Johan de Waurin, *Recueil des chroniques et anciennes istories de la Grant Bretagne*. Ed. W. and E. L. C. P. Hardy for the Rolls Series with an English translation. I-V. London, 1864-1891. V. 7-367.; *Whethamstede's Chronicle*. Ed. H. T. Riley. London, 1870-1871.; *The Official Correspondence of Thomas Bekynton Secretary to King Henry VI*. I-II. London, 1872. Cf.: Éva Róna, *Középkori angol krónikák magyar*

(1848-1940) in his work about the history of the Oxford University noted: when the news of the triumph of Nándorfehérvár reached Oxford, the multitude of the teachers and students went to the temple of the patron saint of Oxford, Saint Frideswide/Frithuswith for thanksgiving. In the church they solemnly sang the *Te Deum* and listened to the ad hoc sermon of Sir Thomas Gascoigne.<sup>25</sup> Sir Thomas Gascoigne (1404-1458) was a noted theologian who between 1434 and 1445 acted as the chancellor and vice-chancellor of the Oxford University several times. In his main work, *Liber Veritatum* he also remembered the above mentioned occasion. Gascoigne wrote that a Hungarian priest called Erasmus Fullár brought to England a letter sealed with Hunyadi's own seal about the triumph of Nándorfehérvár and gave it to Thomas Bourchier the Archbishop of Canterbury. Gascoigne who saw the letter with his own eyes and met with Erasmus Fullár in Oxford himself, mentioned that the English archbishops and bishops were not seemed particularly enthusiastic. However this surprisingly cold behaviour was compensated well by the celebration of the enthusiastic Oxonians.<sup>26</sup>

Overall we can say, that although the '*Capystranus*' is not belonging to the masterpieces of literature and contains a number of minor historical mistakes, it is an important and unique work, because after its printing in 1515 it drew the attention of the English public to the Ottoman expansion and the heroic efforts of Hungary to restrain it.

Finally we note that in this review we did not examine all the problems of the '*Capystranus*' and did not analyze it meticulously. We only wanted to make a general observation and pose the most important questions. We hope that this brief summary will convince the reader that the republication of the poem's text was useful, and may encourage the experts to make a more in-depth research.

vonatkozású adatai. [Hungary-related data in medieval English chronicles] = *Egyetemes Philológiai Közlöny* 60, 1936. July-December: 377.; Róna, „Capystranus”, 69. It is worth mentioning that a copy of pope Calixtus III's letter to János Hunyadi after the triumph of Nándorfehérvár in which he expresses his best wishes is in the collection of Lambeth Palace Library. See: György Kurucz, *Guide to documents and manuscripts in Great Britain relating to the Kingdom of Hungary from the earliest times to 1800*. London – New York, 1992. 50. (20.3)

25 Lyte, Henry Churchill Maxwell, *A History of the University of Oxford: From the Earliest Times to the Year 1530*. London, 1886. 334. Cf. Róna, „Capystranus”, 69.

26 For Thomas Gascoigne cf. E. A. Livingstone, Gascoigne, Thomas. In: *The Concise English Dictionary of the Christian Church*. Oxford, 2000.; Lajos Kropf, Fullár Erasmus. (Adalék az 1451. és 1456. évek történetéhez.) [Erasmus Fullár. Additions for the history of years 1451 and 1456]. = *Századok* 30, 1896. 223-227. Cf. Róna, „Capystranus”, 69.

**Capystranus**

I.

O mighty Father in heaven on high,  
One God and persons three,

    That made both day and night,  
And after, as it was thy will,  
Thine own Son thou sent us till  
    In a Maiden to light.

Sith the Jews, that were wild,  
Hanged Him, that was so mild,  
    And to death Him dight.

When He was dead, the sooth to say,  
To life He rose on the third day  
    Through His own might.

Then to hell he went anon  
And took out souls many one  
    Out of that hold he hent,  
Maugre the fiends that were bold,  
He took the prisoners out of hold,  
    With them to heaven he went.

On his Father's right hand he him set,  
That all should know withouten let  
    That he was omnipotent.

And after wisdom He was sent  
That all should keep his commandment  
    And for to believe in Him verray.

That is our Savior  
That born was of that blessed flower  
    That hight Mary I say,  
That shall us deem withouten miss,  
Some to pain and some to bliss  
    At dreadful doom's day.

Those that believe on him aright  
To bliss they gone with angels bright,  
    To bliss and joy for aye.

Now Jesu, as thou bought us dear,  
 Give them joy this gest will hear  
     And harken on aright.  
 Some men loveth to hear tell  
 Of doughty knights that were fell,  
     And some of ladies bright,  
 And some miracles that are told,  
 And some of venturous knights old  
     That for our Lord did fight—  
 As Charles did, that noble king  
 That heathen down did bring  
     Through the help of God almighty;

He won from the heathen hounds  
 The spear and nails of Christ's wounds,  
     And also the crown of thorn,  
 And many a rich relic mo  
 Mauger of them he won also,  
     And killed them even and morn.  
 The Turks and the pagans bold  
 He felled down many a fold,  
     Durst none stand him befor.  
 Charles gan them so affray  
 That the caitifs might course the day  
     And the time that they were born.

II.

Now Machamite, that Turk untrue  
 To our Lord Christ Jesu  
     And to his law also,  
 Many Christian men slain hath he,  
 And won Constantine, that noble city,  
     With many towns mo.  
 He brent and slew, and left none on life,  
 Neither man, child, ne wife,  
     To death he made them go;  
 Young innocents that never did guilt  
 That false Turk hath them spilt.  
     He played the king Pharaoh.

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

All the streets of Constantine  
Ran blood, redder than wine,  
    That marvel was to see.  
There could no man his foot down set,  
I give you knowledge withouten let,  
    But on a dead body.  
The Christian men went to wrack.  
The churches and our images they brake  
    That were made of stone and tree;  
The crucifix of our Saviour,  
They cast it down with dishonor,  
    And also Our Lady.

They slew our priests at the mass,

...

    God's men had no grace.  
They killed them down in every stead,  
Both priests and clerks they put to dead,  
    Within God's holy place.  
The Turks, keen with shield and spear,  
Our priests before the high altar  
    They ran through in a race.  
Many gan die for Christ's love;  
Angels their souls bare above  
    To bliss and much solace.  
Thus the Turk, the wicked qued,  
Christen people he put to dead  
    And left few upon live.  
The heathen cried with great despite  
On Mahound and Machamite,  
    The Turks men full rive.  
There was none that durst on Jesu cry  
But they were taken and slain in high,  
    Anon and that believe.  
The Turk himself a cry did make  
There should no man a prisoner take.  
    God let them never thrive.

Then the dogs that believed on Mahound  
The Christian people killed to the ground;  
    No gold might be their meed.  
The Christian saw that they should die,  
And on their masters laid hand quickly,  
    And fought a well good speed.  
Every prisoner then on live  
Killed of the Turks four or five:,  
    To hell their souls yede.  
Or our prisoners after were take,  
Many a Turk they made blake,  
...

There was no helm, nor habergeon,  
Plate, or mail, nor good acton,  
    Their dints might refrain.  
Machamite saw his men so die,  
And loud on Mahound he gan cry;  
    In heart he was not fain.  
Our Christian needed no weapon crave,  
The streets lay full, take who would have,  
    To fight with men of main.  
Anon, within a little throw,  
Five thousand Turks on a row  
    In the streets lay slain.  
When Machamite that spied,  
Out on Mahound he cried,  
    And as a fiend did yell.  
Our Christian stood in full great doubt,  
As doughty men laid fast about  
    Upon the hounds of hell.  
Our Christian men were then too few,  
For the Turks came ever new,  
    In sooth as I you tell.  
Our men hewed on hastily  
And made [the] Turks loud to cry.  
    The false [Turks] down they fell.

Thus 'countered with Saracens keen  
Till eighty thousand were laid bedene,  
    In a little thought.  
Machamite was never so wo  
To see so few so many slo,  
    His sorrow was not short.  
He cried ' Mahound' as he would brast.  
Our Christian on Jesu cried fast,  
    That all the world wrought.

Some 'scaped away with God's grace,  
On live mauger the Turk's face;  
    But many then gan die.  
At the destruction of Cyvys  
Were not so many slain iwis  
    As were on both party.  
Alas, save Christian will of heaven,  
Our Christian were made uneven  
    With a false company,  
For of the Turks and Saracens keen  
An hundred were, withouten ween,  
Against one of our meinie.

III.

The emperor of Constantine,  
A doughty man at a time,  
    ...  
The Turk him took, that heathen hound,  
And gave him many a grisly wound,  
    I pray God give him grame.  
He bound him till the blood out brast,  
And bade him forsake Jesu in haste,  
    Or else thou shalt have shame;  
"Have done anon and him defy,  
And also his mother Mary,  
    That thou callest his dame."



Valerian answered and said,  
 “Nay, Thou shalt never see that day  
     That I shall Him forsake.  
 Turn thee, Turk, and all thy men,  
 Or else in hell thou shalt bren  
     Among the fiends black.  
 Live in Jesu, full of might,  
 And that Maiden that He in light,  
     For Christian men’s sake.”  
 Then the Turk waxed evil apaid,  
 Commanded his men, at a brayd,  
     Anon to make him naked.

He bade them beat him with scourges keen,  
 And after bore out his eyen  
 With wimbles hot and red.  
 They plucked his heart by and by,  
 And both his ears on high;  
 They cut off his head.  
 With pincers his teeth they brake;  
 Bade him anon his God forsake,  
 Or he should never eat bread.  
 They saw in no wise that it would be  
 Anon they made a saw of tree  
 And sawed him to dead.  
 Then the Turks, with much pain,  
 This doughty man have they slain,  
     For Christ’s sake I say.  
 And so they did with many mo.  
 The Turks might curse the time also  
     That they there came that day.  
 Of Christ’s people was many a part mart  
 There was no Turk paid of his part,  
     By the last end of the fray.  
 They had hell for their fight;  
 The Christian went to heaven bright  
     To be in bliss for aye.

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

Thus is Constantine, the noble city, won,  
Beaten down with many a gun,  
    And Christian people slain.  
There the Turk with his meinie  
Keeped still that noble city,  
    Durst no man him with-sayen.  
Forty mile round about  
Durst no man by him route,  
    Neither on hill ne plain.  
The Turk kept the field many a day,  
Christian people in the country,  
    Of him were dread I sayen.

Where they might any Christian get,  
I tell you now withouten let,  
    They left their life to wed.  
All suffered death for Christ's sake,  
That this Turk might overtake,  
    But thus they from him fled.  
Thereof heard a holy friar  
The works of the fiends far,  
    And to Rome him sped.

John Capistranus the friar hight,  
I dare say he was God's knight,  
    An holy man was he.  
To the Pope anon he wan,  
Capistranus that holy man,  
    And kneeled upon his knee.  
He said, "Father, for Christ's love of heaven,  
That made this world and days seven,  
    Harken now to me.  
There is a Turk, I understand,  
That burns and slays God's land;  
    Great dole it is to see.

"The Turk his purpose is,  
I let you wit withouten miss,  
    To win all Hungary.

Therefore, Father, put thy holy hand  
 And help to warre God's land,  
     His true vicar if thou be.  
 He burneth churches in every place;  
 Christian men goeth to death apace,  
     To behold is great pity.  
 Now, Father, help with thy succor,  
 For Mary's love, that sweet flower,  
     Our hope is much in thee.

“With two hundred [thousand] this same day  
 To Grecuswissinburgh he took the way,  
     This is no scorn;  
 Many a thousand there shall die  
 If he win that royal city,  
     All Hungary is forlorn.  
 I am the messenger of Jesus,  
 Truly, Lord, it will be thus,  
     As I have said beforne;  
 Therefore help with all thy might  
 For God's love for to fight  
     That was of Mary born.”

Then the Pope said anon,  
 “Good brother, Friar John,  
     As I understand,  
 Thou preachest God's words wide  
 In the country on every side,  
     In many a diverse land.  
 Thou knowest many a noble man;  
 Take a captain where thou can,  
     Whether that be he free or band;  
 And, as I am God's vicar true,  
 This false Turk his rese shall rue,  
     And thereto my holy hand.”

Now, Father, I thank thee heartily,  
 To choose a captain ye bid me,  
     Certain without any miss.

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

Now, Holy Father, withouten lain,  
This shall be my captain,”  
    He said the Pope iwis,  
“A banner of Christ’s Passion,  
That man’s soul did redemption  
    And brought them from pain to light.  
Hallow it with thy hand,  
The people may the better stand  
    That under it doth fight.

“This shall be my captain.  
Another would I have fain,  
    That is thy bull of lead,  
That all that under it doth fight  
For God’s love most of might  
    Ever in any stead  
If it happen them to be slain,  
That their souls come never in pain  
    After that they be dead.”  
The Pope said, “Blessed might thou be;  
A holy man I hold thee,  
    I will do after thy rede.”

Anon the banner was made and hallowed,  
The bull sealed and up folded,  
    And the pardon of grace  
Delivered to the Friar truly.  
The Pope blessed him times three,  
    And thus his leave he takes.  
Barefoot he bare out of the town  
The banner of Christ’s Passion,  
    Toward the Turk he hastes  
And preached God’s law as he yede,  
And much people to him gan speed  
    To get their soul’s solace.

Great gold and silver was him given,  
And ever he dealt it even  
    The people that with him yede.

So certainly, as I you say,  
 All Rome for him did pray,  
     And so it was great need.  
 Such Friars we have too few;  
 Pray all we Christ Jesu  
     To be his help and speed.  
 For of this I find a fit  
 Further; and ye will sit,  
     Harken and take good heed.

IV.

This friar went to Hungary  
 And many men with him truly  
     That for Our Lord did fight,  
 To an university he took the way  
 The greatest in Hungary I dare well say  
     Gottauntas it hight.  
 Out of the university there went in fere  
 Six and twenty thousand with the friar  
     Of religious men full right,  
 The most part was priests I say,  
 Everich proved him that day  
     That he was God's knight.  
 The friar with great devotion  
 Bore the banner of Christ's Passion  
     Among the people all,  
 Displayed abroad great joy to see  
 Men of diverse country  
     Fast to him gan fall.  
 Thus passed forth Capistranus  
 And met with the good Earl Obedianus  
     A captain principal,  
 Twenty thousand and mo  
 Among them was but knights two,  
     And thus men doth them call

Richard Morpath, a knight of England,  
 And Sir John Black, I understand  
     That was a Turk before,

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

And now he is a courteous knight,  
I let you wete, and a wight  
And steadfast in our lore.

...

Many a Turk hath grieved sore  
Their lives they left behind.  
He hath made them hop headless,  
Many one withouten les,  
Where he might them find.  
There twenty thousand met in fere  
With Obedianus and the friar  
In helm and hauberk bright.  
To Grecuswissinburgh he took the way  
There the Turk at siege lay  
With many a knight.  
Fourteen weeks the Turk had been there  
And put the Christian to much fear,  
To him they had no might,  
Five hundred guns he let shoot at once,  
Brake down the walls with stones,  
The wild fire lemed light.

To hear it was great wonder  
The noise of guns, much like the thunder,  
That was a fearful din,  
The noise was heard many a mile,  
Obediance the mean while  
Entered the town within,  
At six of the clock the sooth to say  
After noon on the Magdalen day,  
And neither less ne mo;  
And Capistranus, good friar John,  
Assoiled our men everichone  
To battle or they did go;

And cried loud with voice clear,  
“Let us fight, for our supper  
In heaven is ready dight;

Our banner shall I bear today  
And to Jesu fast shall pray  
    To speed us in our right.”  
Anon they together met,  
Five thousand deed withouten let,  
    In helm and hauberk bright.

Obedianus, that noble man,  
Slew them fast that served Satan.  
    Through Christ their crowns had care.  
All that he with his falchion hit  
There was no slave, I let you wit,  
    That ever might heal that sare,  
There was no Turk that he with met  
But he had such a buffet  
    That he grieved never Christian man mare.  
He was a doughty knight,  
The false he felled for God’s right:  
    I pray God well might he fare.

Morpath and Black John  
That day killed Turks many one,  
    Certain withouten let.  
There was none so good armor  
That their dints might endure,  
    Helm nor bright basinet.  
They hew upon the heathen on high,  
The fire out of every side gan fly,  
    So boldly on they bet.  
Many a Turk there was cast,  
Beaten till the brains brast;  
    Their masters there they met.

Many a thousand of priests there was;  
The Turks heard never such a mass  
    As they heard that day.  
Our priests Te Deum sang,  
The heathen fast down they dang,  
    Then pax was put away.

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

There was schoolmasters of the best,  
Many of them were brought to rest  
That would not learn their lay.  
Thus our Christian people did fight  
From five of the clock on Magdalen night  
Till ten on the other day.

Then came the Turks with new battail,  
Clean clad in plate and mail,  
A hundred thousand and mo.  
On dromedaries gan they ride  
And killed our men on every side,  
Two thousand were there slo.  
Our men to stand they had no main  
But fled to the town again  
With wounds wide and blo,  
Twenty thousand of our men  
Were borne down at the bridge end,  
The Turks were so thro.

Dromedaries over them ran  
And killed down both horse and man:  
In the field durst none abide.  
Obedianus had many a wound  
Or he would flee the ground,  
For all the Turks' pride  
Morpath and Black John  
Had wounds many one  
That bloody were and wide.  
To the town they fled on foot,  
They saw it was no better bote,  
Their steeds were slain that tide.

The Turks followed into the town  
And killed all before them down  
Great dule it was to see;  
Into the town the great Turk wan  
And killed wife, child, and man,  
The innocents thick gan die.



John Capistranus see that it was thus  
And hent a crucifix of Christ Jesus;  
    Ran up til a tower on high;  
The hallowed banner with him he bare,  
In the top of the tower he set it there  
    And cried full pitifully.

He said, Lord God, in heaven on height,  
Where is become thine old might  
    That men were wont to have?  
O my Lord, Christ Jesus,  
Why hast thou forgotten us?  
    Now help of thee we crave.  
Look on thy people that do thus die;  
Lord, once cast down thine eye  
    And help thy men to save.  
Now Lord send down thy much might  
Against these fiends for to fight,  
    That so thy people disprave,

Think, Lord, how I have preached thy law,  
Gone barefoot both in frost and snaw  
    To please thee to thy pay.  
I have fasted and suffered disease,  
Prayed all only thee to please,  
    The Psalms oft I say.  
For all my service I have done thee,  
I ask no more to my fee,  
    But help thy men today;  
For, and thou let them thus spill,  
I am right in good will  
    Forever to forsake thy lay.

“Now Mary maiden help me today,  
Or else thy matins shall I never say  
    Days of all my life,  
Ne no prayer that thee shall please  
But if thou help now our disease,  
    Ne menye thy joys five.

Appoint is for thy maidenhead  
That all this people suffereth death;  
    Now help to stint our strife;  
Now, Lady, of thy men have pity,  
Pray for them to thy son on high,  
    As thou art maiden and wife.

“Lord, Father omnipotent,  
Think on the miracle that thou Charles sent,  
    That for thee did fight.  
Through his prayer and grace  
The sun stood still three days space  
    And shone with beams bright.  
Pharaoh thou drowned in the sea;  
Those that thou let go free,  
    Away thou led them right.  
This day, Lord, thou help thy men;  
Thou art also big now as thou was then  
    And of as much might.”

The friar loud on God cried.  
A long mile on every side  
    The people heard his voice.  
Twenty, thousand dead, for to see,  
Within the twinkling of an eye  
    To life again they rose.  
Each one a weapon in hand hent  
And freely began to fight [?-ent]  
    And felled down fast their foes.  
The good earl Obedianus  
Fought freely for our Lord Jesus  
    On every side sprung his los.

**He** drove the Turk out of the town,  
The Christian felled the false **down**  
    **And** drove them to the field **again**.  
Twenty thousand with them met,  
Or else the Turk, withouten let,  
    Surely had been slain.

Then were they fain for to fight,  
Then ever was foul of day light,  
    Certain withouten lain.

V.

Now beginneth a new battail,  
I let you wit withouten fail,  
    Of mighty men of main;  
Each one hew on other with ire  
That all the field seemed fire,  
    Also light as learn of thunder;  
Every man hurt other in haste  
And laid on basonets to brains brast,  
    And ever the false fell under;  
The blood ran all the field  
Of doughty men under shield,  
    To see it was great wonder.

There was hewing from the hals,  
The helms and the heads als,  
    Rich knights were unknit.  
Many a Turk, withouten fail,  
Tumbled top over tail  
    That never rose yet.  
So hard on helms they hew  
That there were Turks but few  
    That in saddle could sit.  
There was no Turk there  
But he might tell of much care,  
    I let you well wit.

There was sticked many a steed,  
Great dromedaries made bleed.  
    Though they for faint fell,  
The Christian men had quarrels good,  
They dread nothing to shed their blood  
    When Jesu did them call.

ISTVÁN PETROVICS

They hewed on with swords keen,  
Of helms with the heads bedene,  
    Tumbled as a ball.  
So dealt they strokes on a-braid  
That no Turk held him apaid,  
    The proudest of them all.

There was hurtling in fere,  
Broken many a sharp spear,  
    And drawn many a knife.

...

...

    Steeds started out of strife  
And cast their masters in the way

...

    Utterly belive.  
Many a heathen in their gear  
His fellow gan down bear  
    And to the earth him drive.

The blood ran through the breast,

...

**CAPYSTRANUS**

Ismeretlen angol szerző epikus költeménye

1515

I.

Ó, fenséges Atya a magasságos égben,  
egy Isten három személyben,

ki napot és éjt teremtett,

s azután, mert úgy akartad,

hozzánk küldted saját fiad,

egy szűznek ki született.

De a zsidók, vad népesség,

szelíd fiad megfeszíték,

és tőlük halála lett.

Mikor elhalt – s szavam igaz –

harmadnap feltámadott az:

saját erejéből ilyet tett.

Aztán rögvest szállt pokolra,

sok lelket onnét kihozva,

bugyraiból a mélységnek,

letarolva vad ördögöket,

tőlük foglyokat kimentett:

velük szállt a Mennyeknek.

Leült az Atyának jobbára,

hogy mindenkinek adja tudtára:

mindenható herceg.

Az ő bölcsessége úgy akarja,

törvényét mindenki megtartsa,

s benne hitet tartsanak.

Mert a mi Megváltónk ő,

áldott virágnak születő:

akit hívnak Máriának.

Ő fog ítélni mindünket:

áldásra, kárhozatra lelkünket,

ha jó a szörnyű ítéletnap.

Akik helyesen hisznek őbenne,

fényes angyalokkal szállnak Mennyekbe,

hol áldás és öröm várnak.

Mármost, Jézus, ki szeretsz minket:  
áldd meg, ki hallja e történetet  
és arra illőn odafigyel.  
Soknak abban lelik kedve,  
ha vitéz lovagról szól a rege,  
mások beérik nemes hölgygel,  
másokat nyűgöznek varázslatok,  
régmúlt kalandozó lovagok,  
kik vívtak Krisztus-hittel,  
mint a nemes Károly király tette,<sup>27</sup>  
aki a pogányt leterítette  
a Mindenható segedelmével.

A kutya pogányoktól elnyerte  
a lándzsát s a szöveget, mi Urunkat átverte  
és a töviskoronát  
és még sok más ereklyét  
őket gyilkolva elért,  
reggel s este irtott pogányt.  
Vad hitetlent és törököt  
vastag sorban ő ledöntött:  
előtte meg egy sem állt.  
Károly nekik oly csatát adott:  
a kalifákátkozzák azt a napot,  
mikor meglátták napvilágát.

## II.

Mármost Machamite, a török hitetlen,<sup>28</sup>  
aki nem hisz Jézus istenben  
és nem tartja törvényit,  
sok keresztényt legyilkolt,  
foglalta híres Konstantinápolyt,  
meg sok egyéb várost is.  
Őt és pusztított, életet nem hagyott  
férfit, nőt, gyereket gyilkoltatott,  
küldte őket halálba mind;

---

27 I. (Nagy) Károly frank király és császár (ur. 768-814).

28 II. Mohamed oszmán szultán (ur. 1444-1446 majd 1451-1481).

sosem vétkes ártatlan csecsemőt,  
 a pogány török mind leölt,  
 a Fáraó szerepe szerint.

Konstantinápoly utcáin mindenhol  
 folyt a vér, veresebb, mint a bor:  
 csoda volt annak, aki látta.  
 Ember lábát úgy nem tette le  
 - elmondom ezt neked, hitemre –  
 hogy holttesten ne járna.  
 Pusztította a keresztény fiakat,  
 rombolt képeket s templomokat,  
 amit véstek kőbe, fába;  
 Krisztus urunk keresztjét  
 dicstelenül ledöntötték  
 s Miasszonyunk is így jára.

Papjainkat a misén ölték le  
 [...]
   
 Úr szolgáinak nem kegyelmeztek,  
 gyilkolták őket mind egy szálig,  
 papot, klerikust levágtak szablyáik  
 a szent házában Istennek.  
 Pajzsot, kardot a kezükbe fogva  
 a szentséges oltárnál papjainkra  
 rohantak, mint örültek.  
 Sokan haltak Krisztus hitéért:  
 lelkük az égbe angyalok vitték,  
 hogy ott vigaszt leljenek.

Így a török, gonosz fajzat,  
 irtott keresztény fiakat,  
 keveset hagyva csak életben.  
 Pogányok szörnyűn üvölték  
 Mahound<sup>29</sup> és Machamite nevét:  
 török férfiak nagy bőszen.  
 Senki sem mert Jézust kiáltni,  
 elfogatni, kardélre jutni,

---

29 Mohamed, a próféta.

mert az lett sorsa menten.  
A török vezér azt kiáltja:  
foglyot nem ejtünk hiába!  
Hogy verje meg az Isten!

Mahound hitetlen kutyái ekkor  
keresztényt mind lekaszabol,  
pedig érte pénzt sem vártak.  
Keresztények látták, halál vár rájuk:  
üldözőikre emelték hát karjuk,  
derekasan harcnak láttak.  
Minden fogoly, ki még mozgott,  
négy-öt törökkel végzett legott,  
lelkük küldve alvilágnak.  
Mielőtt hőseink legyűrettek volna,  
sok töröknek lettek ők gyilkosa,  
[...]

Sem sisak, sem vértzet,  
páncél, láncing, bőr mellényzet  
csapásuknak ellen nem állt.  
Machamite látta, emberi hullnak,  
Mahoundhoz kiált erre hangosat,  
szívében a félelem rág.  
A mieinknek fegyver sem kellett,  
az utcára rohanva hoztak többeket  
a sokaságot, hogy megvívniák.  
S még egy pillanat sem telt bele,  
ötvenezer török leverve,  
holtan borítja az utcát.

Mikor ezt Machamite látta,  
Mahoundhoz hangosan felkiálta,  
mint az ördög, úgy rivall.  
Keresztényeink kétség gyötri,  
ahogy vitézül mentek vívni  
a pokol kutyáival.  
A keresztények kevesen voltak,  
törökök jöttek folyvást újak –



szólok igaz szavakkal.  
A mieink vadul csapkodtak,  
vágásuktól törökök jajongtak,  
hullottak el nagy számmal.

Így vágták a szaracénokat,  
míg nyolcvanezren nem pusztultak,  
rövid összecsapásban.  
Machamite ilyet még nem látott,  
kevés győzzön nagy sokaságot:  
volt is sokáig gyászban.  
Torka szakadt: „Mahound!” – kiált,  
mire a keresztény mondja Isten fiát,  
hogy hallja mind e világban!

Isten kegyéből volt, ki túlélte,  
ahogy a török őket leölte,  
de sokkal több kidől.  
Cyvys pusztulásakor bizonyos,  
hogy annyi el nem hullhatott,  
mint akkor a két seregből.  
De jaj, az ég legyen irgalmas,  
a keresztények meginganak,  
most a gonosz seregtől.  
Mert vad török és szaracén,  
száz is jutott – nem túlzok én –  
egyre a miéinkből.

### III.

Konstantinápoly császára,  
egykor fenséges királya,  
[...]  
Török elragadta, pogány kutya,  
testét súlyos sebekkel sújtotta,  
az Isten verje érte!  
Kötéllel húsába vágva,  
kényszerítnék Krisztus-tagadásra,  
vagy szégyenítés lesz a része.

„Most azonnal tagadd meg őt,  
és Máriát, az anyját, a nőt,  
akit így neveznétek!”

Valerian<sup>30</sup> így szólt, mondva:  
„Oly’ nap néked nem virradna,  
hogy én megtagadjam őt!  
Kotródj innen, minden embereddel,  
vagy a pokol tüze emészt majd el,  
fekete ördögök között.  
Hiszek Jézusban, mindenhatóban,  
és a szűzben, kibem megfogam,  
hitem kereszthez kötött.”  
A törökben gazság forrong,  
emberinek parancsot mond,  
a császár hogy levetközzön.

Kívánta, csípős korbáccsal verjék,  
aztán tolják ki szemét,  
kampóval, mi izzó, veres.  
Szívét átdöfték újra meg újra,  
füleit nyesték azon nyomba’:  
megcsonkítják a fejet.  
Fogókkal a fogát törték:  
csak tagadja meg istenét,  
vagy kenyeret már nem ehet.  
Látván, hogy meg nem törik,  
egyiküket fűrészért küldik,  
s azzal oltottak életet.

A törökök nagy kín alatt,  
így ölték meg e nemes urat,  
én mondom, a Krisztusért.  
Így tettek még sok mással is,  
deátkozzák majd napjait,  
hogy lábuk a városba tették.

---

30 XI. Kónsztantinosz bizánci császár (ur. 1449-1453).

Krisztus népéből sok lett mártír,  
 ami a törökre nem áll így,  
     mire a csata véget ért.  
 A török tettéért jut Pokolra,  
 keresztényre meg vár égi hona,  
     hol kárpótolják szenvedését.

Így nyerték el nemes Konstantinápolyt,  
 sok ágyútól fala leomolt,  
     sok keresztény is elhullt.  
 Ott a török seregével,  
 nemes várost némán figyel,  
     féltében mind elnémult.  
 Negyven mérföldre közelébe menni,  
 emberfia nem mer senki,  
     se síkon, se hol domb vonult.  
 Sok napig a török táborozik,  
 a keresztények színét rettegik,  
     - mondom én ezt igazul.

Ha nyomát lelték kereszténynek,  
 - elmondom rögvest tinéktek –  
     azt ott helyben levágták.  
 Mind meghalt a Krisztusért,  
 akit a török épp elért,  
     előle futottak hát.  
 Hallott arról egy szent szerzetes,  
 az ördög messze mit cselekedett,  
     így indult látni Rómát.

Capistranus János volt a neve:  
 Krisztus lovagja – nem túlzok vele:  
     egy szentéletű férfi.  
 Rögvest a pápához<sup>31</sup> ment,  
 Capistranus, az igaz szent,  
     s menten térdet hajt néki.  
 Szólt: „Atyám, az égi Krisztusért,  
 kinek műve a világ, s annak napja: hét,

---

31 III. Callixtus pápa (1455-1458).

szavaim hallgassad ki!  
Úgy hallottam, van egy Török,  
aki Isten földjein öldös:  
de siralmas azt nézni!

Ez töröknek az a célja,  
elszólom mit sem habozva:  
Magyarországot, hogy igázza.  
Ezért, atyám, avatkozz be,  
tetted Isten földjét segélje,  
ha vagy néki igaz pásztor.  
Templomokat éget mindenütt,  
keresztényeket halálra küld:  
siralmas a látványa.  
Mármost, atyám, segíts erőddel,  
szép virágra, Máriára légy tekintettel,  
reményünk benned áll ma!

Kétszázezerrel éppen máma,  
Grecuswissinburgh<sup>32</sup> alá álla.  
Nem megvetés szavam célja:  
sok ezren fognak elhullani,  
királyi várost, ha az beveszi,  
elvész egész Hungária.  
Én Jézus hírnöke vagyok,  
s bekövetkezik, mit mondok,  
szóról szóra, meglátja.  
Ezért segítsen minden erővel,  
eme harcban, Isten szerelmével,  
ki Máriának egy fia.”

A pápa rögvést így beszél:  
„János barát, jó testvér,  
ha én jól értesültem,  
Isten szavával szónokolsz,  
ahogy az országban kóborolsz,  
mindenféle vidéken.

---

32 Nándorfehérvár, Belgrád.

Számos jeles férfit tudol,  
 kapitánynak egyet mondol,  
     szabad vagy szolga légyen;  
 én mondom, az Úr helytartója,  
 a török fut majd tőle tova,  
     s szent földem lesz békében.”

„Atyám, szívből hálás vagyok,  
 kapitányt, hogy választhatok,  
     s nem kellett késlekednem.  
 Szent atyám, nem beszélek mellé,  
 kapitányom nem lesz csekély  
     - pápának így szóla menten –  
 Krisztus szenvedésének jelvénye,  
 aki lett lelkek megmentője,  
     kiknek helye lett a fényben.  
 Áldd meg saját kezeiddel,  
 hogy alatta ki harcol, ember,  
     legyen bőven erőben.

Ez lesz az én kapitányom,  
 de egy kérés még van a számon:  
     ólombullás leveled;  
 hogy ki megvív az alatt,  
 szolgálva mindenható Urat,  
     jó szolgálatot ki tesz,  
 ha elesnék a csatában,  
 lelke legyen makulátlan:  
     ha kilehelte, üdve lesz.”  
 A pápa felelt: „Áldás rajtad,  
 valóban szent ember vagy,  
     kívánságod mind meglesz.”

Zászlót varrtak, felszentelték,  
 hajtott levelet pecsételték,  
     s adtak kegyelmes áldást  
 a derék János barátira,  
 őt a pápa háromszor megáldja,  
     így vette a búcsúját.

Csupasz lábbal a várost elhagyja,  
kezében zászló: a passió rajta.

A török felé vette útját,  
útján szólt, mi isteni ige,  
emberhad gyűlt hamar köribe,  
hogy lelkük megtisztítsák.

Arannyal, ezüsttel halmozták,  
ő meg azt egyenlőn adja át,  
minden útitársának.

S igaz, amit nektek szólok,  
egész Róma érte imádkozott:  
szükségét látták annak.

Az ilyen barátból igen kevés van,  
imádkozunk is érte az Úrban,

Jézus Krisztus segítsen annak.  
Erről fogok szólni nektek,  
ez lesz tárgya az új éneknek,  
figyeljenek s hallgassanak.

#### IV.

Ment a barát Magyarországra,  
és sokan mentek őutána,  
hogy Urunkért harcoljanak.

Egy egyetemre vette útját,  
mi ott a legjobb, mondhatnánk,  
annak neve Gottauntas.

Az egyetemről tartott véle,  
huszonhatezer, hogy segítse,  
mind hívei ők az Úrnak.

Többségük pap, úgy tudom,  
de bizonyították aznapon,  
hogy lovagjai Krisztusnak.

Nagy odaadással a barát,  
vitte Krisztus lobogóját,  
szét az emberek közé.

Nagy örömet kelt látványa,  
 minden ország sok fiába',  
     akik szegődtek mellé.  
 Így vonult hát Capistranus,  
 s lelt rá nemes Obedianus,<sup>33</sup>  
     a legfőbbik hadvezér.  
 Katonája húszezer vagy annál több,  
 de lovag csak kettő közöttök,  
     őket így nevezik nevén:

Richard Morpath, angol lovag,  
 és Sir John Black, akit úgy tartanak,  
     hogy török volt korábban,  
 de most mégis nemes lovag,  
 és mily derék – halld szavamat:  
     rendítetlen hitt Krisztusban.  
 [...]

[...]  
 Sok török szomorú gyászban:  
     életétől meg nem válna.  
 Lemetszette ő fejüket nyomban,  
 késlekedéssel nem volt e dologban,  
     ahol éri, őket ott vágja.  
 Húszezer férfi gyűlött egybe,  
 Obedianus és a szerzetes serege,  
     csillog sisakja, láncruhája.  
 Grecuswissinburghba vették útjukat,  
 amit a Török hadai ostromoltak,  
     sok a lovagjai száma.  
 Tizenegy hete tart már az ostrom,  
 keresztény szívekben nagy félsz vagyon:  
     semmik voltak a számára.  
 Ötszáz ágyúval lövette egyszerre,  
 hullott tőle a falak köve,  
     ég vad tüzek ragyogása.

---

33 Hunyadi János.

Hallani is csodaszám megy:  
ágyúk zaja, döngő fergeteg,  
    rettentő egy hangjáték,  
sok mérföldre elhallat.  
Obedianus ennek alatt  
    a városba most belép,  
igazat szólok - hat órakor,  
délután, Magdolna-napkor,  
    nem előbb-később, akkor épp.  
És Capistranus, jó János barát,  
minden embere előtt járt,  
    csatába vezet ekképp:

Tiszta hangon imígy kiált:  
„Harcba, vacsoránk terítve vár  
    a magasságos Mennyekben!  
Én viszem zászlónkat ma,  
közben Jézushoz imádkozva,  
    tartson minket erőben!”  
Akkor ott ők összecsaptak,  
ötezret a halál elragad,  
    fényes sisak-, vasvértben.

Obedianus, nemes ember,  
Sátán-szolgát bőszen szedel,  
    Krisztus akaratából fejük bezúzza.  
Akit szablyával lecsapott:  
nincs oly szolga – igazat mondok -  
    aki azt meggyógyítsa.  
Ami törökkel szembeszállt,  
arra olyan csapást vált:  
    kereszténynek nem lesz gondja.  
Vitéz ő, derék lovag,  
Istenért irt pogányokat,  
    az Urat kérem, vigyázza óvva.

Black John és Morpath  
sok török végzete lett,  
    - szólok én színigazat –



nem volt olyan jó vértzet,  
 mi csapásukat kivédhetett,  
     sem sisak, sem páncélzat.  
 Sújtottak az ellenségre:  
 harci kedvük lett megtörve,  
     az ő vitézségük miatt.  
 Sok törököt legyilkolnak,  
 csapják, amíg agyuk hasad:  
     bennük emberük akadt.

A seregben sok ezer a pap,  
 töröknek misét úgy tartanak,  
     amilyet soha sem még:  
 felzengett a Te Deum ajkukról,  
 közben a pogány hull a karjuktól,  
     félretették ők a békét.  
 Ott voltak a legjobb tanítómesterek,  
 kik sokat a földre vetettek,  
     ha nem tanulta meg a leckét.  
 A keresztények így harcoltak,  
 este öt órájától Magdolna-napnak,  
     tízíg másnap reggelén.

Akkor jött új török sereg,  
 rajta tiszta páncél, vértzet:  
     százezernél is többen.  
 Tevéken ülve nyargalnak,  
 a mieinkre halált hoznak,  
     elhulltak akkor kétezeren.  
 Seregünk nem bírta tovább,  
 várnak vették hát az irányt,  
     testük véres, kék sebesen.  
 Húszezer emberünk vágta le,  
 a városhíd végébe érve  
     a törökök kíméletlen.

Tevék vágattak rajtuk át,  
 eltíporva embert és lovát,  
     kinn maradni nem mert senki.

Obedianust sebek borítják,  
mire otthagyja csata forgatagát.

A török örvend nagyon neki,  
Black John és Morpath vitéz  
testét borítja ezer sebzés:

mind széles és vér színezi.  
Gyalog rohantak a városba,  
jobb menedéket nem találva,  
hisz levágták már lovaik.

A török a városba követte őket,  
ki elé került, gyilkolva mindet:  
mily gyászos látni olyant!  
Bevonult a városba a nagy Török,  
hol asszonyt, gyereket, férfit ölt,  
sűrűn irtva az ártatlant.  
Capistranus János barát mindezt látta,  
Jézus keresztjét markába zárta,  
s magas toronyba felrohant;  
a szent jelvényt magával vitte,  
s a toronycúcsra azt kitűzte,  
majd siralmasan így rikkant:

„Úristen a magas Mennyben,  
régi hatalmad hová leend,  
mellyel néped segítetted?  
Ó Jézus Krisztus, én Uram,  
népednek rád szüksége van,  
miért feledtél el minket?  
Nézd, hogy halnak híveid,  
Uram, emeld rájuk szemeid,  
s biztonságba vidd őket!  
Uram, küldd le égi hatalmadat,  
ördöggel, hogy szembe szálljanak,  
így segéld a híveket!

Emlékezz: törvényed mint prédikáltam,  
hóban, fagyban mezítláb mint jártam,  
hogy téged engeszteljelek!

Böjtöltem és betegséget nyögtem,  
 de végig hozzád könyörögtem,  
     tőlem zsoltáraid zengtek.  
 Érted tett szolgálatoméért,  
 nem kell jutalom egyéb:  
     csak ma segíts a híveknek,  
 mert ha elvesznek miattad,  
 bánatomban megtagadlak,  
     örökre elhagyom hitedet!

Szűz Mária, most segíts meg,  
 vagy nem dicsérek én már téged,  
     soha többé életemben;  
 ahogy imát sem nem mondok,  
 ha gyötrelmünk nézni bírod,  
     öt örömöd nem zengem.  
 Szégyen volna szüzességedre,  
 ha ez a sok ember ma elesne:  
     csillapodjon a gyötrelmem!  
 Asszonyom, irgalmazz nekünk,  
 szent fiadhoz imádkozz értünk,  
     ki szűz vagy és anya egyben!

Uram, mindenható Atyám emlékezz,  
 Károly királynak mily csodát küldesz,  
     ki viaskodott miattad!  
 Imájára és áhíthatára cserébe  
 a Nap három nap állt egy helybe',  
     úgy ragyogott sugarat.  
 Fáraót a tengerbe ölted,  
 s kiket szabadnak engedted,  
     mutattál nekik jó utat.  
 Segíts, Uram, a mai napon,  
 ki fenséges vagy mindenkoron,  
     és bírsz minden hatalmat!"

A barát Istenhez ezt kiáltotta,  
 hangját mindenki meghallotta,  
     egy széles mérföldön át.

Húszezer halott – így történt –  
egy szempillantás telt csak épp,  
hirtelen feltámadva állt.  
Mindjük fegyvert ragadt kézbe,  
vagdalkozni azzal kezdve  
ellenséget gyorsan levág.  
A jó Obedianus, a nemes,  
Jézusért vívni nem volt rest,  
nevét mindenki áldva kiált.

Kiűzte a törököt a városból,  
pogányt a keresztény mészárol,  
s zavarja a nyílt mezőre.  
Húszezer állt ott szembe velük,  
s ha ezek nem állnak elébük,  
lett volna mindnek vége.  
Voltak azok oly harciasak,  
amennyire utálják a napsugarat  
- szavam igazság vivője.

V.

Új csata kezdődött mostan,  
éneklek is nektek nyomban,  
harcos, erős vitézekről;  
haraggal egymásnak esve,  
harcmező, mint tűzben égne;  
könnyen, mint villám az égből,  
mind egymásnak ugranak,  
sisakon agyat loccsantanak:  
a pogány hullik ezektől.  
A mezőt vér áztatja el,  
harcosé, ki pajzsot emel:  
látni is megdöbbentő.

Lecsaptak a nyakra,  
a fejre és sisakra,  
gazdag lovagokat öltek.

Számos török – nem hazudok –  
felbukott akkor és ott,  
    azóta ők fel nem keltek.  
Oly vadul vágtak sisakjukra,  
hogy kevés az, ki ott maradna,  
    s megüli még a nyerget.  
Nem volt ott olyan török,  
Aki bajjal nem küszködött,  
    elmondom ezt tinektek.

Sok lovat ott ledöfték,  
dromedárok kivéreztek.  
    És bár majdnem összeestek,  
a keresztények tovább vívtak,  
vérontástól nem riadtak,  
    ha Jézusért küzdhettek.  
Éles kardokkal lecsaptak,  
lemetszve fejeket, sisakokat,  
    mik golyóként gördültek.  
Úgy sorjázták csapásaik,  
a török állni nem bírt nekik,  
    légyenek bár vitézek.

Mindenütt egymásnak estek,  
hegyes lándzsát sokat törtek,  
    majd elő kést rántottak.  
[...]  
[...]  
    Lovak a csatából elrohantak,  
magukkal ragadva lovasokat  
[...]  
    mind egyetlen pillanat.  
A nyergükben sok pogány,  
saját társán vágtat át,  
    és a földre tiporja azt.

Vér patakzik mellükön,  
[...]

Fordította: Kiss Sándor

**Katalin Schrek**

## **Anglo-Russian Mechanisms for Crisis Management in the First Period of the Greek Cause (1821 – 1826)<sup>1</sup>**

The basis of the European System which was set up again in 1814-1815, was constituted by the practical application of the balance of power theory. The first serious challenges for the continental structure were indicated by the revolutions of the 1820s. The Greek Revolt, which later developed to be a war of independence fit in this sequence. The movement, unlike former revolutions set up a claim for achieving a national autonomy. The firmest part of the Congress System was the observance of the principle of legitimacy and upon which the Greek Revolt was not more than a movement against the legitimate. Russia as the member of the Holy Alliance disapproved the movement and acknowledged the Sultan's right to intervene in the events. Although England was not a member of the Alliance, it had a similar opinion. The turn concerning the Greek Cause took only in 1825 as the foreign affairs of England and Russia had changed. As a result of this the states which had been rivals in the Eastern Question brought common cooperation into prominence.

I put the cooperation of the Cabinet in London and St. Petersburg concerning the St. Petersburg Protocol (1826) in the centre of my study. Elaborating the subject I aim for throwing light on the similarities and differences in the conceptions and attitude of the two states in foreign affairs concerning the Greek Cause and the motivational factors for collective behaviour by comparing the English and Russian conceptions.

The most important principle of Great Britain's foreign affairs was the maintaining of the scheme of continental balance, so in the beginning like other Great Powers it disapproved the Greek Movement. However, the events in the Balkans gave cause to serious apprehension in the British Government which was afraid that the Greek Revolt would cause the flaring up of Russia's expanding policies towards southern territories. The probable armed intervention of St. Petersburg caused alarm about the court in Vienna. The common idea to keep the Russian Empire within bounds prompted both England and Austria to cooperate with each other more closely. Robert Castlereagh, who was the head of the Foreign

---

1 This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 'National Excellence Program'.

Office, accepted the status quo policy of Metternich concerning the Eastern Question and emphasized the importance of the coordination with Vienna. In his concept the strengthening of the cooperation of European Allies played an important role. Castlereagh thought that the idea, which Alexander I also considered so important could be one of the main ideas of the reasoning scheme against Russian intervention<sup>2</sup>

After Castlereagh's tragic death in August 1822 George Canning succeeded him as Foreign Secretary. In his policy the idea of European cooperation, which was earlier urged by Castlereagh, was overshadowed and the breaking up of the Holy Alliance's coalition came into prominence. He showed a moderate stance towards the Greek War of Independence. Although he accepted the principle of non-intervention but he made more concessions for the insurgents. Before the Congress of Verona in October 1822 Canning ordered the Duke of Wellington to demand better governance and amnesty for the Greeks from the Porte.<sup>3</sup> Not so long after this the Cabinet in London formally acknowledged the Greeks as belligerents. The amendment of the insurgents' status was basically motivated by the English commercial interests. In the region of the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea the buccaneering became more common than ever. As the Porte seemed to be unsuccessful in handling the existing issue, the English cabinet wanted to shift the solution of the problem to the Greek Government.<sup>4</sup> The attitude of the English Government was not only influenced by these factors but the Philhellenic movement which was spreading all over Europe and by the public opinion put additional pressure on the Houses of Parliament.<sup>5</sup> Probably London provided financial support to the Greek freedom fighters in 1824 by the means of large sums of loans owing to this fact.

At the period of consultation with the Continental Powers the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs insisted on his views on neglecting intervention from the beginning to the end. It is now worth highlighting that neither of the Concert of Europe's member countries urged on the use of armed intervention. The Court of Vienna upheld the conception of

2 Alison W Phillips, Great Britain and the Continental Alliance. In *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*. Vol. II. Eds. A. W. Ward–G. P. Gooch. Cambridge, 1923. 43.

3 Ibid. 87.

4 Mária Ormos – István Majoros, *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtérén*. [Europe in the international struggle for power] Budapest, 2003. 48.

5 Harold Temperley, British Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey. = *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1938. no. 1. 4.

preserving the status quo in the Balkans, while Berlin and Paris adapted to the Austrian policy as a result of their moderate policies.<sup>6</sup> In the case of St. Petersburg there were still some uncertainties.<sup>7</sup> In spite of the fact that Alexander I dissociated from the alternative of intervention again and again in his declarations, the changes in the relation of Russia and the Porte and the unsolved problems between the two states included the chance of an armed conflict to break out. For this reason Canning aimed for making the system of allies, which guaranteed safety for St. Petersburg, inoperative. A new Russian initiative provided an opportunity for putting his plan into action.

In order to settle the Greek Question Alexander I suggested convening a conference of the Great Powers in his circular of January 12, 1824.<sup>8</sup> The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs interpreted the meeting of allied states as an attempt to revive the Congress System, of which implementation would have been contrary to the interests of London. Although the weakness of the European system of alliance provided favourable conditions for achieving Canning's aims, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had to take the possible problems of enforcing his conception into consideration. In his letter addressed to Robert Liverpool, Prime Minister he indited as follows: „*The Greek Question is full of peril and plague [...] France and Prussia have signified their complete adhesion to the Russian plan [...] Austria pretends to Russia a similar acquiescence, but confides to us her perfect conviction that the whole project will come to nothing. We who cannot take either of these courses are placed in great embarrassment. If we refuse our cooperation, France and Prussia, and Austria too, will lay the failure upon us; if we engage in the discussion, they will endeavour to make us responsible for its success.*”<sup>9</sup>

In order to solve the impasse the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs found middle ground: he did not refuse to reconcile with the Great Powers

---

6 J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question. A Historical Study in European Diplomacy*. Oxford, 1917. 185.

7 Erzsébet Bodnár, Orosz-osztrák együttműködés és vetélkedés a keleti kérdésben a 18. században és a 19. század első felében [Russian-Austrian co-operation and rivalry in the Eastern Question in 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> c.]. In: Eadem (ed.), *A keleti kérdés és a Balkán az orosz külpolitikában a 19. század első felében*. Budapest, 2008. 69.

8 Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820–1827*. In: Ward–Gooch, *The Cambridge History*, 87.

9 Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool, Gloucester Lodge, October 17, 1824. In: *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*. Vol. I. Ed. Edward J. Stapleton. London, 1887. 177.



concerning the Greek Cause, however he subjected the participation of London in the St. Petersburg Conference to strict conditions. Canning demanded the fulfilment of two criteria: the restoration of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, and these states' renouncement of using armed forces.<sup>10</sup> He entrusted Stratford Canning with the settlement of the preliminary negotiations.<sup>11</sup> As a part of his embassy, the British ambassador first paid a visit to Vienna, where he strived for reconciling the Anglo-Austrian viewpoints through negotiations with Metternich. However, London's attempts for rapprochement did not live up to the expectations. At that time the Chancellor had already supported the arrangement of the conference in the frame of the solidarity of the allies.<sup>12</sup> It soon became quite clear for Stratford Canning that he would not be able to fulfil his duty. The unsuccessful mission of the British diplomacy, however, had a prompting effect on George Canning. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs thought his conception was right by means of the Austrian attitude. The strenuous opposition of the Greek Government also asserted his point of view, which was expressed in connection with the proposal of Alexander I and K. R. Nesselrode, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs that was put forward in order to pacify Greece.<sup>13</sup> The declaration of the Greek Government created a fundamentally new situation. Besides giving a handle for staying away from the St. Petersburg Conference, it clearly precluded the possibility of the consensus between the Russian Cabinet and the Greeks.

In an early stage of Canning being a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the principles of crisis management of the English diplomacy were made up by the alignment with the isolation policy. However, Great Britain's division from the continental matters did not result in staying away from the Eastern Question completely. The moderate policy of the British Cabinet showed itself in solving the Greek problem on a European scale. Besides declining the Concert of the Great Powers, the Liverpool Administration strove to have an influence on the development of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in compliance with the British interest and keeping the country's economic and political position in

---

10 Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 88.

11 C. W. Crawley, *Anglo-Russian Relations 1815–1840*. = *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1929. no. 1. 53.

12 Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of The Right Honourable Stratford Canning Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*. Vol. I. London, 1888. 347–348.

13 The Russian draft was revealed prior to the conference for which—according to some assumptions—George Canning was responsible. See Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 88–89.

view. Canning framed his characteristic conception, which emphasized Great Britain's independent power of disposal, by taking these ambitions into consideration and which proved to be successful on the whole. England's isolation and the passive attitude of the Great Powers resulted in the failure of Alexander I's initiative and the increase of distrust felt towards its allies.<sup>14</sup> In consequence of the unsolved nature of the Greek Cause and the lack of European co-operation the British Cabinet could shape its policy connected with the Eastern Question without undertaking any obligation towards the Great Powers from the turn of 1824 – 1825.

The Greek Question had a significant role in Russia's foreign policy from the very outset. The negative attitude of St. Petersburg in the early stage of the uprising changed in the turn of 1821 – 1822. From this point on the ambition for enforcing the imperial interests of the empire was linked with the idea of protecting the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire, for this the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji provided an opportunity which was signed on July 21, 1774.<sup>15</sup> From this moment Alexander I strived for consolidating the Eastern Crisis together with the European Great Powers whereby an opportunity presented itself for the conflicting parties to come to an agreement. This was the purpose of the St. Petersburg conference, which was announced in 1824 and where the Russian idea developed to settle the Greek Question was also discussed.<sup>16</sup>

Nesselrode's memorandum was essentially a plan for division, which provided an opportunity for establishing independent Greek nation-state/

---

14 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I. Political Attitudes and The Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801–1825*. Berkeley, 1969. 284.

15 The full text of the Treaty can be found in Friede von Kutschuk Kaïnardji (10/21. Juli 1774). In: *Ausgewählte diplomatische Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage*. Hrsg. Karl Strupp. Gotha, 1916. 18–24. Concerning the circumstances of signing the Russian-Turkish peace treaty please see, Erzsébet Bodnár, Oroszország déli törekvései és a fekete-tengeri szorosok problémája (1700–1774) [Russia's southern ambitions and the problem of the Black Sea Straits]. In: *Két világ kutatója. Urbán Aladár 80 éves*. Eds. Béla Háda – István Majoros – Zoltán Maruzsa – Margit Petneházi. Budapest, 2009. 44–45.; Roderick H. Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility". *The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered*. = *Slavic Review*, 1976. no. 3., 463–483; Marriott, *The Eastern*, 1917. 133–135; E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks. From the Beginning of Their Empire to the Present Time*. Vol. II. London, 1856. 257–263.

16 Erzsébet Bodnár, Oroszország keleti törekvései, 1792–1830. [Russia's eastern ambitions] In: *A keleti kérdés és a Balkán az orosz külpolitikában a 19. század első felében. Tanulmányok*. Ed. Eadem. Budapest, 2008. 125.

states besides preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire apparently.<sup>17</sup> However, the alternative offered by the St. Petersburg Government was rejected by both the negotiators and the belligerents. It is important to note that the draft itself, more specifically its details were revealed even before the real negotiations could have begun and it caused the objection of the parties concerned. The Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs accounted this for the reason of failure of the Russian plan for peace. As he wrote in his letter a few months later: „[...] *revealing our draft served a malicious intent, it falsified our ideas, suppressed most of them, and the rest was represented in a false perspective [...]*.”<sup>18</sup> The St. Petersburg Conference meant not only the failure of the cooperation of the Great Powers but the Nesselrode idea as well.

The realization that the system of the allies was dysfunctional implicated the modification of the Russian crisis management. The moderate nature of Alexander I's foreign policy started to become more explicit and dynamic. One of the key results of changing the order was the appreciation of the Anglo-Russian relations. After considering the potentials of the St. Petersburg diplomacy the Tsar urged on closer cooperation with London. Besides the passivity of the Great Powers, which was present during the negotiations two other factors played an important role in the background of his decision. The first one was the worsening of the Danubian Principalities' problem. Moldova and Wallachia were occupied by Turkish troops after the Greek Revolt had broken out. The aim of the occupation was to prevent them from supporting the revolutionists. The armed presence of the Constantinople Government in the Principalities though meant the violation of the points of the Treaty of Bucharest, which had been officially valid between Russia and the Porte since 1812. The suspension of Moldavia and Wallachia's autonomy and the limitation of Serbia's rights were the neuralgic points of the Russian-Turkish relations. The constant pressure of St. Petersburg

---

17 Originally the draft suggested setting up three principalities which would have been under the authority of the Porte nominally. On this topic see, *Внешняя политика России 19 и начало 20 века, (ВПР) Документы Российского Министерства Иностранных дел. Сер. II. т. 5 (13). Москва, 1982. Док. 122. Записка российского правительства правительствам Австрии, Великобритании, Пруссии и Франции.* стр. 308–314.

18 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 84. Циркулярная депеша управляющего Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде дипломатическим представителям за границей 4 (16) сентября 1825 г. стр. 262–263.

and the intermediary activity of the Russian chargé d'affaires proved to be effectless. „[...] *Minciaky's representation [...] did not meet our expectations. Neither Russia's moderate policy, nor its persistent patience, nor the explicitness of its rights [...] changed the policy of the Porte.*”<sup>19</sup>

The other factor was the uncertainty detected concerning the attitude of the London Cabinet in the Greek Cause. In his letter to Nesselrode on 16 October 1825 the Russian ambassador in Vienna referred to the fact that in the opinion of the Emperor of Austria „[...] *it has no probability that the British Government will contribute to the need of (Greek) protectorate but it is absolutely likely that England will take advantage of the situation that arose and it will intervene in the conflict between Greece and the Porte [...].*”<sup>20</sup> And in case if it happened, the Ottoman Empire would certainly „[...] *resort to the interposition of the four continental Great Powers since it can rely more on the sincerity of their goodwill in the relation between them than England's.*”<sup>21</sup> It seemed quite clear that London's scope for action was significantly enlarged by the changing of the power relations of the coalition forces. It was beyond question that the British Government took the opportunity of the new situation to solve the Greek Cause.

So George Canning's confident policy in the Eastern Question accomplished his purpose on the whole: the chance of collective intervention in the war conflict had gone by 1825, the consensus of the Holy Alliance states was beginning to break, and in the St. Petersburg Government a kind of distrust started to develop towards its former partners. In the meantime the military success of the Porte continued to endanger Russia's influence in the Balkans. As a result of a common campaign of the Ottoman Empire and its vassal, the Egyptian Governor most of Morea was under Turkish jurisdiction.<sup>22</sup> After seizing the territory, the Constantinople Government wanted to strengthen its influence in this region by drastically changing the ethnic relations. The extirpation of the Greek population regardless of age and sex was started by involving Egyptian forces, and in parallel with this the resettlement of the Arabians

---

19 Ibid. стр. 259–264.

20 Ibid. Док. 92. Д. П. Татищев управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде, Вена, 4 (16) октября 1825 г. стр. 276.

21 Ibid.

22 M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923*. London, 1966. 63.

to Morea was taking place.<sup>23</sup> The danger of establishing a new Ottoman satellite state hurt not only the Russian but the essential British interests as well. For this reason in his letter George Canning told his ambassador in Constantinople to demand the immediate reducing of Ibrahim Pasha to obedience from the Turkish Government.<sup>24</sup>

The revival of the English diplomacy implied automatically the rapprochement to Russia. Although London insisted on its intermediate part further on, it was more obvious to them that without the approval of St. Petersburg taking considerable steps will not be possible. A change in the relation between the two powers took place in the autumn of 1825. As Canning wrote in his letter to Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister: „*I begin to think that the time approaches when something must be done; but not till Austria as well as France has put into our hands the dealing, first with Russia, and then with the parties to the war.*”<sup>25</sup> Canning did not have to wait for long. In the autumn of 1825 Alexander I had an attempt to urge the cooperation between the powers for the last time. George Canning reported on the Russian diplomatic attempt in his memorandum of October 25. The interesting thing about that was Count K. A. Lieven forwarded information confidentially concerning the cause without the authorization of the Russian Government to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. According to the report of the Russian ambassador to Great Britain, Canning was informed of the fact that the St. Petersburg Court sent a note to the Russian Embassies of the three Continental Powers not so long ago. According to the supposed content of the document, the Russian party wanted to solve the disputes between the allies and come to a decision concerning the Greek Cause in a conference in the following year. The report mentioned in detail the exposition of the allies' policy applied towards Russia and the reasons for the conflicts between them.<sup>26</sup>

---

23 Memorandum on the Conditions on which the Duke of Wellington is to Allow His Majesty's Ambassador to go to a Conference on Greek and Turkish Affairs, and of his View of the Intentions of the Cabinet; also Queries Regarding the Wishes of the Government on Certain Points. London, January 26, 1826. In *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*. Vol. III. Ed. The Duke of Wellington. London, 1871. 75.; Paul Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*. Oxford, 1994. 642.

24 Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 91–92.

25 Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool, Seaford, October 25, 1825. Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence*, 317.

26 Memorandum of Mr. Canning, Seaford, October 25, 1825. *Ibid.* 313–315.

The new initiative though proved to be unsuccessful again. The idea of armed intervention in Alexander I's policy came into prominence at this point. Based on the original ideas the Russian troops would have forced the Porte to review its policy towards St. Petersburg and the Greeks by occupying the Danubian Principalities. In order to take the preliminary steps for the spring campaign Alexander I travelled to Taganrog in November 1825 and died a few weeks later.<sup>27</sup> His successor, Nicholas I as a really resolute and firm emperor committed himself to a more intense policy in foreign affairs. The Eastern Question and the changing of the tendencies which can be observed concerning European causes, though did not mean a total separation from Alexander I's policies. Actually, in some ways Nicholas I had a strict adherence to the ideas of his predecessor. By way of example we can mention the cause of the Danubian Principalities, the need for normalizing the relation with the Porte and the assuring of the penetrability of the narrows.<sup>28</sup> In connection of these questions we cannot speak about political order change. The Tsar had a similar point of view in the matter of intervention. He insisted on maintaining the possibility of an armed intervention. Unlike Alexander I's conception Nicholas considered war not only as a method of crisis management or a temporary solution in the case of Eastern Crisis, but a means of forming international relations.

The idea of Anglo-Russian cooperation had been an integral part of St. Petersburg's diplomacy but this could have been interpreted in the frames of the general European cooperation. But now after the continental relations had changed Alexander I thought that the only way of solving the problem of Russian isolation and the Eastern Crisis was to cooperate with the British Cabinet. His circular written to the Russian ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin and Paris in August 1825 foreshadowed this guideline and in which he informed them about the impasse which emerged after the St. Petersburg Conference and gave instructions which should be applied to their attitudes in the future. He instructed his delegates to represent a neutral attitude concerning both the Eastern Question and the proposals of

---

27 Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *Alexander I's Death and Destiny*. = *American Slavic and East European Review*, 1945. no. 1/2. 33–50.; Princess Lieven to Earl Grey, Brighton, December 27th, 1825. In *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*. Vol. I. 1824 to 1830. Ed. Guy Le Strange. London, 1890. 17–19; Princess Lieven to Metternich, London, January 6, 1826. In *The Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich*. Ed. Peter Quennell. New York, 1938. 356.

28 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.

the above mentioned Governments in connection with European Causes.<sup>29</sup> The moderate attitude formed the basis of the conception prepared by the Tsar. While he urged to cooperate with the Liverpool Administration, he thought it was important that the official initiative should arrive from London. Although the St. Petersburg Cabinet has to show its openness towards British proposals, it should be presented as moderate as possible.

The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs was in possession of thorough information about the viewpoint of St. Petersburg concerning the Eastern Question. The primary source was K. A. Lieven, ambassador of Russia in London, who gave a detailed account of the information to the head of the Foreign Office on 25 October 1825. It is found out from Canning's note that it was the first time when he got knowledge of that an agreement between Mohamed Ali and Mahmud II had been established. „*The court of Russia has positive information that before Ibrahim Pacha's army was put in motion, an agreement was entered into by the Porte with the Pacha of Egypt, that whatever part of Greece Ibrahim Pacha might conquer should be at his disposal [...]*.”<sup>30</sup> The main point of the plans to manage the seized territories was „*to remove the whole Greek population, carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere, and to repeople the country with Egyptians and others of the Mohammedan religion.*”<sup>31</sup>

The report of the ambassador of Russia to Great Britain must have influenced Canning's foreign policy concerning the Eastern Question. The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs considered the Turkish aspirations relating Greece as a serious circumstance, the most obvious result of this was that he asked for complete information from Admiral Sir George Cockburn on the number of the fleet which was stationed in the Mediterranean.<sup>32</sup> The first, and few days later on 30 October the second meeting of Count Lieven and Canning in Seaford created an

---

29 Temperley, Princess Lieven and the Protocol of 4 April 1826. = *The English Historical Review*, 1924. no. 153. 59.; ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Управляющий Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде Д. П. Тагищеву посланнику в Берлине Д. М. Алопеусу послу в Париже К. О. Поццо-ди-Борго 6 (18) августа 1825 г. стр. 237. The full text of the source can be found In. Copie d'une dépêche réservée aux Représentants de l'Empereur près les Cours de Vienne, de Paris et de Berlin. St. Petersburg, le 6 Août 1825. In. Theodor Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I.* Bd. I. Berlin, 1904. 608–610.

30 Memorandum of Mr. Canning, Seaford, October 25, 1825. Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence*, 315.

31 Ibid.

32 Mr. Canning to Sir Georg Cockburn [S. d.]. Ibid. 321.

ideal atmosphere for outlining the policy which aimed at the Anglo-Russian cooperation to which the declaration of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs was added with a reference to the cooperation of the two states. Nesselrode found it important to emphasize that „*The work of restoring peace in the Levant depended on the establishment of a perfect understanding between Russia and England.*”<sup>33</sup>

Under these circumstances a consultation took place on 16 December where an alternative for creating an Anglo-Russian alliance was definitely outlined. During the consultation between Lieven and Canning a consensus was made in that regard that „*The agreement should be made mainly between Russia and England.*”<sup>34</sup> The need and necessity of the exclusive partnership of the two states was explained by the policy of Vienna, Berlin and Paris in the Greek Cause.<sup>35</sup> The Russian Cabinet had been confirmed by the letter of the ambassador of Russia that there was a common intent to align the English and Russian interests. It had a far-reaching importance as in the meantime there had been significant changes in St. Petersburg. After Nicholas I came to the throne a possible armed intervention against the Porte was more presumable.<sup>36</sup> The English diplomacy must have assumed a more determined point of view given the circumstances.

The next step of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement was the delegacy of the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg. Lieven informed Nesselrode on his appointment to ambassador in a letter of 21 January 1826.<sup>37</sup> The Count thought it was important to emphasize that Canning himself insisted on the person of Wellington. The scepticism he felt concerning the work of the Britain’s ambassador to Russia played an important role in the decision of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Lieven emphasized that „*in regard to the special circumstances the British Government must receive reliable proofs on the direction the new Russian Emperor would like to give to his policy. The Government cannot rely on Lord Strangford’s untrustworthy truth in this highly responsible matter because we need someone whose*

33 Quoted: Ibid. 348.

34 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 103. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 4 (16) декабря 1825 г. стр. 302.

35 Ibid.

36 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 125–126.

37 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 120. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 9 (21) января 1826 г. стр. 334–337.



*prestige absolutely inspires confidence.*"<sup>38</sup> The source indicates clearly that the relations had been quite strained between Canning and Britain's ambassador to St. Petersburg since December 1825. The reason of the disagreement was Percy Smythe Strangford's irresponsible behaviour. During the preliminary negotiations with the Russian Cabinet the British ambassador had informal reconciliations with the representatives of the Continental Powers. By the terms of his conception the states concerned published a statement to the Porte. In the event that Constantinople refuses to intermeditate between the Great Powers in the Greek Cause, the allied powers will recognize Russia's right to an armed intervention. So St. Petersburg can declare war on the Ottoman Empire without a word of protest.<sup>39</sup> The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs was informed of the developments from a report that Nesselrode forwarded to Count Lieven. Thereafter Canning started to distrust Lord Strangford. He also expressed his doubts in his letter written to Lord Granville, Britain's ambassador to France.<sup>40</sup> The replacement of Lord Strangford seemed reasonable in respects of successful negotiations.

During the precursory negotiations in Seaford the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs assured Count Lieven, reacting to the temporary standstill as a result of the demise of the throne, that the character of the relations between London and St. Petersburg were unchanged. Nevertheless he emphasized that „[...] *England strives to strengthen the friendship and the faith that bonds both countries [...]*."<sup>41</sup> The rhetoric of the English Cabinet and the delegation of Duke Wellington to the enthronement of Nicholas I were gestures that clearly traced a path towards rapprochement. The previous consultations and the positive reactions of both parties set the stage for substantive negotiations on the whole.

To start the Anglo-Russian negotiations Canning required the preliminary fulfilment of three conditions. Relying on the first criterion „[...] *all the Powers parties to the conference declare beforehand their determination not to go to war, whatever may be the result of the*

---

38 Ibid. стр. 336.

39 Temperley, Princess Lieven, 68.

40 Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville, F. O., December 26, 1825. Stapleton, Some Official Correspondence, 347–348.

41 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 120. Личное письмо посла в Лондоне Х. А. Ливена управляющему Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде 9 (21) января 1826 г. стр. 337.

*effort to produce peace between Turks and Greeks.*"<sup>42</sup> The question of the avoidance of the armed intervention was the neuralgic point of the English diplomacy. As a second criterion Canning laid down that Russia and the Ottoman Empire should establish an official contact and the Russian Embassy in Constantinople should be established again. And finally according to the third criterion „[...] *That each of the Powers parties to the conference shall declare the determination of its government not to use the influence which it may possess over the councils of the belligerents, for its own aggrandizement or advantage.*”<sup>43</sup> In spite of the fact that Russia did not accept the conditions laid down in the memorandum, through the preliminary intervention of Count Lieven the Anglo-Russian reconciliations could have started. As a result of this the Duke of Wellington arrived to St. Petersburg in February 1826 as an official delegate of the Cabinet in London. Following George Canning's instructions of 10 February the British ambassador strived to assure the Tsar on the sincerity of Great Britain's desire to „[...] *come to the aid of Russia [...]*” in settling the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece.<sup>44</sup>

The restoration of the influence in the Balkans and the normalization of the relation with the Porte belonged to the basic aspirations of the Russian diplomacy. In order to reach these aims Nesselrode proposed a new foreign affairs policy programme in February 1826. The settling of the situation of the Danubian Principalities and the assuring of the penetrability of the narrows had a distinguished role in his draft. In the case of the Greek War of Independence he emphasized that the conflict between the Porte and the insurgents must be solved as a result of the Russian and British cooperation.<sup>45</sup> Taking the Russian opportunities into consideration the Secretary for Foreign Affairs outlined two alternatives: settling the existing situation in a peaceful way and a possible war against the Constantinople Government.<sup>46</sup> One of the central elements

42 Memorandum on the Conditions on which the Duke of Wellington is to Allow His Majesty's Ambassador to go to a Conference on Greek and Turkish Affairs, and of his View of the Intentions of the Cabinet; also Queries Regarding the Wishes of the Government on Certain Points. London, 26 January, 1826. *Despatches, Correspondence...* Vol. III. 74.

43 Ibid.

44 The Right Hon. Canning to the Field Marshal Duke of Wellington, 10 February, 1826. *Despatches, Correspondence...* Vol. III. 87.

45 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.

46 ВПР. Сер. II. т. 6 (14). Москва, 1985. Док. 142. Управляющий Министерством Иностранных дел К. В. Нессельроде поверенному в делах в Константинополе М.

of his memorandum was the establishment of a close cooperation with Great Britain.

The Russian diplomacy strove to reach an agreement with the Ottoman Empire in parallel with the consultation with the British. As there were no changes in the cause of the Danubian Principalities, in March 1826 the Tsar decided to show determination and he demanded the implementation of the points of the Treaty of Bucharest. In his letter to M. Ja. Minciaky Nesselrode gave detailed instructions on the attitude towards the Turkish Government.<sup>47</sup> The most important instruction that was sent to the Russian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople was the consequent insistence on the Russian claims. The cabinet wanted to come to an agreement with the Porte in three major questions. The first one was the cause of the Danubian Principalities. St. Petersburg urged on the reconstruction of the status quo of Moldavia and Wallachia before 1821 and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the area. In accordance with the second point the Russian Government made a proposal that the relation of the Porte and Belgrade must be settled, which included the assurance of Serbia's autonomy and the privileges that were laid down in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). Finally, the Porte should delegate ambassadors to the Russian border in order to reach an agreement with the delegates of the St. Petersburg Cabinet on the conflict between the two states.<sup>48</sup> Nesselrode emphasized that the Russian needs are „*ultimatum like claim*” so if the conditions set in the list are rejected, St. Petersburg will apply sanctions.<sup>49</sup>

The Russian attitude towards the Porte was probably mainly influenced by the strengthening of the Anglo-Russian relations. On the whole, St. Petersburg thought that by the means of an outlining coalition of the Great Powers it would be able to put pressure on the Constantinople Government which would be inclined to adapt to the claims Russia had made. Nesselrode's tactic was successful. In May the Porte accepted the conditions and a few months later it initiated an agreement with St. Petersburg.<sup>50</sup> The difference between the dynamism of the Russian diplomacy and the controlling nature of the British foreign affairs broke

---

Я. Минчаки 5 (17) марта 1826 г. стр. 411–421.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid. стр. 419.

49 Ibid.

50 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126–127.; Ormos – Majoros, Európa a nemzetközi, 50.; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801–1917*. Oxford, 1967. 298.

the tie in the favour of the Russian Empire in March 1826. The decided manner of Nicholas I could pursue the goals of his empire despite the pressure of the London cabinet.

As a result of the Anglo-Russian negotiations the two powers signed the Protocol of St. Petersburg on April 4, 1826, which declared the intermediate part of the contracting states in the Turkish-Greek conflict.<sup>51</sup> In accordance with the recommendations of the protocol „*Greece should be a dependency of that (Ottoman) empire [...]*”, which meant that „[...] *the Greeks should pay to the Porte an annual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent.*” Furthermore „*In order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions [...]*” the Great Powers made a propose concerning the removal of the Turkish population living in Greece and the Greek islands and the buying up their properties by the Greeks.<sup>52</sup> Under the third provision the peacemaking negotiations between the belligerents should be made through the British ambassador to Constantinople and with the full support of the Tsar. In case if the Porte does not accept the principles of the Protocol, „[...] *his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangement specified in No. 1 of this protocol [...] and they will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to exert their influence with both parties in order to effect this reconciliation on the above mentioned basis.*”<sup>53</sup>

The contracting parties emphasized that „[...] *his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty being desirous that their Allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this Protocol contains [...]*.”<sup>54</sup> They forwarded this wish to the Continental Powers in a confidential manner. The most interesting thing about the protocol is that in case the Anglo-Russian initiation towards the Porte fails it guarantees the right to St. Petersburg to implement the proposals concerning the Greek Cause, either on their own or together with Great Britain. The protocol did not have any facts concerning the questions of territory.<sup>55</sup> Although it is worth emphasizing that concerning the area of the new

---

51 Bodnár, Oroszország keleti, 126.; Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*. Washington, 1977. 48.

52 Protocol of St. Petersburg, 23rd March (4th April), 1826. In. *Despatches, Correspondence....* Vol. IV. 59.

53 Ibid. 60.

54 Ibid. 61.

55 Schroeder, *Transformation*, 646.

state both the British and the Russian had totally dissimilar conceptions.<sup>56</sup>

When considering the importance of the Protocol of St. Petersburg more factors must be taken into account. First, the reality of the implementation of the goals established in the document must be kept to the fore, on the other hand the effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement on international relations must be examined. Considering the first question, Great Britain's involvement played a determining role. The agreement between London and St. Petersburg was the alliance of two leading European Powers (considering both political and a military factors) which had a satisfactory influence and tools for forming European Causes and the events of the Eastern Question. In the protocol the conditions needed for given intentions were to be found still it was not carried out. The British Government insisted on its own isolation policy parallel with the cooperation with St. Petersburg. The duality of English foreign policy was revealed by the fact that the British Government isolated itself from the undertaking of the obligation concerning the absolving of the points of agreement. In this aspect the protocol of 1826 did not contain any elements that would assure the observance of its provisions besides the determining of the principles.

On the other hand it can be a plus of the Anglo-Russian agreement that it drew the passive Continental Powers' attention to the Greek Question. Although Austria and Prussia further on insisted on neutral policy, France was keenly interested in the coalition of the Great Powers. The French Government thought that the Anglo-Russian initiative could provide a real chance to resolve the Eastern Crisis, on the other hand taking part in the pacification of Greece could be a great opportunity to increase the prestige of France. However, Paris expected that as a result of the territorial changes in the Balkans Russia would be inclined to support the French revision aspirations aimed at the Rhineland.<sup>57</sup>

After long reconciliations with Paris, Russia, England and France signed the Treaty of London on July 6, 1827, which based on the Protocol of St. Petersburg again declared the claims toward the Porte.<sup>58</sup> In the provisions of the agreement, the three allied powers laid down the establishment of commercial and diplomatic connections and they

---

56 The London Conference of 1830 brought change concerning the territorial questions. On the European Powers' conceptions of the settlement of frontier see, Temperley, *The Foreign Policy*, 103.; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 658.

57 Schroeder, *Transformation*, 1994. 650.

58 Ormos – Majoros, *Európa a nemzetközi*, 50–51.

specified the deadline for the Ottoman Empire to fulfil its obligations.<sup>59</sup> The secret clause of the contract laid down that all the three parties have the right for an armed intervention. On the whole, the importance of the St. Petersburg agreement should be emphasized in the establishment of an extensive and in the first place fit to act coalition of the Great Powers.

The changes in the international relations and the political consolidation going on in Greece created the internal and external conditions of executing an armed intervention. In case the deadline laid down in the London agreement was over, the three powers would wish to enforce their claims against Constantinople. The allied forces achieved the victory over the Porte on 20 October 1827, in Navarino. The military success though resulted in the weakening of the relation between the coalition partners. The situation emerged from the intervention of the Great Powers allowed Russia to strengthen in the Balkans. The distrust felt towards St. Petersburg London modified its foreign policy. The Anglo-Russian cooperation temporarily disintegrated and the Greek Cause entered a new phase concerning both the diplomacy and crisis management methods.

---

59 Treaty of the Settlement of Greece, 6th July, 1827. In. Despatches, Correspondence... Vol. IV. 61–62. The full text of the Conference in London can be found In. Protocol of the Conference held at the Foreign Office, the 12th of July, 1827. In. *Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece*. London, 1830. 177–180.



Ferenc Velkey

**„Jouer à la Talleyrand?”  
István Széchenyi lors du tournant de mars 1848<sup>1</sup>**

„On dira que je joue mes cartes finement, à la Talleyrand ... Puisqu'en ce moment je suis ministre... et même si Apponyi avait gagné, je le serais toujours” – écrit István Széchenyi le 27 mars 1848 dans son journal sur la réception possible de son nouveau rôle comme ministre du gouvernement Batthyány. Széchenyi écrivit son journal en allemand, mais utilisa des expressions et des phrases hongroises, anglaises, françaises, italiennes, grecques et latines. La note citée ci-dessus représente bien le monde linguistique de son œuvre, donc elle mérite d'être montrée en original et dans sa version complète: „Die Leute werden sagen, ich spielte meine karten fein, à la Talleyrand! ... Weil ich jetzt minister bin ... und würde Apponyi gesiegt haben, auch dasselbe geblieben wäre. Ich spielte aber nichts. Bennem «ügyszeretet» volt a vis motrix – ez vezetett ..., ezért estem és esem a lábaimra és nem a seggemre!”<sup>2</sup>

1 La version française de cet essai a été écrite en 2002 pour un volume dont la publication avait été envisagée par l'Institut Hongrois/Collegium Hungaricum de Paris sous le titre *Les Hongrois et l'Europe, la révolution de 1848/49*. Comme ce volume n'a pas vu et ne verra jamais le jour, il convenait de publier cet essai dans un autre recueil. Pendant ce temps une nouvelle version élargie a été publiée en hongrois:

Velkey, Ferenc, „à la Talleyrand játszottam [?]” Széchenyi István önértékelő dilemmája 1848 márciusában. [„J'ai joué à la Talleyrand”. Le dilemme et l'examen de soi d'István Széchenyi en mars 1848] dans *Történeti Tanulmányok* XIII. [Études historiques, XIII, publié par l'Institut Historique de l'Université de Debrecen] A Debreceni Egyetem Történelmi Intézetének kiadványa. [Acta Universitatis Debreceniensis Acta Historica. LVII.] Ed. Velkey, Ferenc, Debrecen, 2005. 73–95. Le résultat de la recherche sur le discours d'István Széchenyi, tenu le 14 mars 1848 a été publié sous forme d'une étude méthodologique et expérimentale plus ambitieuse: Velkey, Ferenc, „Szívemből szólok.” Széchenyi állásfoglalása a fordulóponton, 1848. március 14-én. [“Je parle à mon cœur” La prise de position d'István Széchenyi le 14 mars 1848], = *Századok*, 144, 2010/3. 695–753. Cette deuxième version française a été partiellement retravaillée et complétée en y incluant les nouvelles références bibliographiques et en révisant certaines propositions professionnelles.

2 Voir la traduction de la phrase hongroise ci-dessous (p.) •••. En citant le journal d'István Széchenyi, nous suivons les volumes de *Magyarország újabkori történetének forrásai. Gróf Széchenyi István Összes Munkái* (SziÖM) [Les sources de l'histoire moderne de Hongrie. Les œuvres complètes d'István Széchenyi]. *Gróf Széchenyi István Naplói I–VI.* (SziN I–VI.) [Les journaux intimes du comte István Széchenyi]; [SziÖM X–XV.]. Ed. et prés. par Vizota, Gyula, Budapest, 1925–1939.; *Gróf Széchenyi*



Le fait que lui, nouveau ministre des Transports et des Travaux publics avait rempli une fonction importante sous “l’ancien régime” aussi, éclaire la signification de la remarque. A partir de 1845, il fut président de la Commission des Transports au sein du Conseil de Lieutenance. Et, bien qu’avant 1848 le gouvernement au sens moderne n’existait pas– l’Etat fut dirigé par des offices administratifs dits *dicasteria* – sa position l’attacha au régime Metternich-Apponyi. Lorsque les révolutions de Vienne (le 13 mars) et de Budapest (le 15 mars) provoquèrent la chute du régime, l’ancienne élite politique fut écartée de la scène. Metternich, le chancelier d’Etat, qui jouait un rôle primordial dans la politique hongroise, et son fidèle dévoué, György Apponyi, chancelier hongrois, durent s’enfuir. L’opinion n’identifiait pas István Széchenyi avec le régime rejeté, bien au contraire, il était considéré comme un des leaders les plus importants des réformistes voulant créer une Hongrie moderne. Pourtant, son affirmation est exacte: si l’ancien régime n’avait pas été emporté par la vague révolutionnaire, il aurait gardé une position élevée, quoique marginale. A partir de 1844, Széchenyi établit une coopération politique étroite, une sorte de liaison d’intérêt avec le chancelier Apponyi, le chef des conservateurs du pays, et garda cette relation jusqu’au 9 mars 1848<sup>3</sup>.

La situation comporta donc vraiment la possibilité que les contemporains prissent Széchenyi pour un “caméléon talleyrandien”. Peut-être est-ce une opinion concrète entendue ou lue qui l’amena à écrire les notes du 27 mars déjà citées. Le 25 mars, il informa son

---

*István döblingi irodalmi hagyatéka* [L’héritage littéraire de Döbling du comte István Széchenyi] I. Ed. et prés. par Dr. Károlyi, Árpád, Budapest, 1921. Ses notes écrites jusqu’au 19 mars 1848 se trouvent dans SzIN I–VI; les plus tardives sont dans SzIÖM VII. Dans: SzIÖM VII, 284.

3 Sur la carrière, l’importance historique d’István Széchenyi, il y a une littérature abondante. Pour sa bibliographie (non complète) v. Szentkirályi, Elemér, *Kalauz Széchenyi István megismeréséhez*. [Guide pour connaître István Széchenyi]. Budapest, 1987. Sa biographie la plus récente: Oplatka, Andreas, *Graf Stephan Széchenyi. Der Mann, der Ungarn schuf*. Wien, 2004. (En hongrois: Oplatka, András, *Széchenyi István*. Budapest, 2005); Csorba, László, *Széchenyi István*. Budapest, 1991. Sur sa relation ambiguë avec György Apponyi v. leur correspondance éditée partiellement (surtout *Adatok gróf Széchenyi István és kora történetéhez 1808–1860*. [Données sur l’histoire du comte István Széchenyi et de son époque] II. Ed. par Bártfai Szabó, László, Budapest, 1943.) et les témoignages du journal de Széchenyi. V. encore Viszota, Gyula, *Bevezetés*. [Introduction]. Dans: *Gróf Széchenyi István írói és hírlapi vitája Kossuth Lajossal*. [La polémique littéraire et journalistique du comte István Széchenyi avec Lajos Kossuth] II. (SzIÖM VI/2) Réd. et prés. par Viszota, Gyula, Budapest, 1930.; et Andics, Erzsébet, *Metternich és Magyarország* [Metternich et la Hongrie] Budapest, 1975, 209–259.

secrétaire, Antal Tasner qu'il avait reçu les numéros 3, 4 et 5 de la revue radicale *Marczius Tizenötödike* [Le 15 Mars]<sup>4</sup>. Même avant le 23 mars, quand Lajos Batthyány publia à Presbourg<sup>5</sup> la liste des membres de son gouvernement, les jeunes radicaux de Pest, constatèrent avec surprise "qu'il s'agissait encore d'István Széchenyi", en observant qu'avant la révolution il était conseiller d'Etat et adversaire des réformistes<sup>6</sup>. Il n'était pas visé particulièrement, mais l'article dit clairement que c'est le comte Pál Esterházy, ancien ambassadeur de Metternich à Londres, et Széchenyi qui ruinaient l'idée d'un cabinet d'«opposition compacte» (c'est-à-dire composé uniquement de représentants de l'ancienne opposition libérale). Les radicaux parlèrent d'une «crise ministérielle» à Presbourg en suggérant que le «ministère de coalition» ayant une «liste mixte des noms» ne serait pas viable dans le long terme. Széchenyi lut les critiques des jeunes dans les jours où il doutait déjà la justesse de sa décision d'avoir accepté la proposition du premier ministre Batthyány.

Il n'était pourtant pas confronté à des d'accusations directes (plusieurs journaux ont accueilli sa nomination avec enthousiasme) et le temps verbal de sa note de journal (*on dira*) renforce notre suggestion qu'il avait cherché les arguments contre une critique possible plutôt que concrète.

Il est intéressant de noter que le même jour (le 27 mars) Széchenyi a formulé cette idée dans une lettre, écrite à János Lunkányi, son intendant et collaborateur de confiance. Il répéta presque mot à mot les notes de son journal déjà citées. Pourtant quelques différences sont révélatrices. Le texte de la lettre met mieux en évidence qu'il prenait position contre un type d'arrivisme politique et non contre une accusation concrète. „Suite de mon zèle et de mon patriotisme propre, je suis tombé sur mes pieds, puisque je suis, moi aussi, ministre. Ils sont nombreux qui disent d'après Talleyrand: «Il faut jouer aux cartes finement!» Moi, par contre, comme je viens de dire, je n'use jamais la moindre ruse, c'est grâce à mon patriotisme pur et chaste que je ne suis pas tombé par terre!”<sup>7</sup>

4 *Gróf Széchenyi István levelei* [Les lettres du comte István Széchenyi] III, Ed. par Majláth, Béla, Budapest, 1891, (SzIL III) 605–606.

5 la Diète hongroise siégeait à l'époque à Presbourg, en hongrois Pozsony, aujourd'hui Bratislava en Slovaquie.

6 *Marczius Tizenötödike* [Le 15 Mars] (MT,) No. 4, le 22 mars 1848.

7 *Széchenyi István válogatott művei II.* [Œuvres choisies d'István Széchenyi]. (SzIVM II.) Ed. par Spira, György. Choiesies et prés. par Gergely, András – Spira, György – Sashegyi, Oszkár. Budapest, 1991, 421. La double version du texte (lettre/journal) peut exprimer, d'une part, combien profondément vécu-il le dilemme et, d'autre part, qu'il trouva le jeu de mot digne d'être répété.

En analysant le contexte de la formation de cette idée, nous devons souligner le fait qu’à partir de l’après-midi de 26 mars, Széchenyi passa quelques jours extraordinairement calmes et optimistes. La raison directe de son apaisement fut l’information qu’il a reçue de Vienne concernant l’acceptation du ministère. Son calme paraît encore plus impressionnant si nous comparons ces notes du journal avec celles des jours précédents, pleines d’exclamations discontinues reflétant une grande tension et de fragments de phrases visionnaires sur «la mort de la nation» et truffées d’évocations de «la Sainte Némésis», du « destin» et des « furies»<sup>8</sup>. La note du journal de Széchenyi déjà citée, datant le 27 mars, et les fragments de sa lettre reflètent de l’optimisme. Car cette fois-ci, il ne se demande pas (comme avant) si la nation est plus proche de la survie ou de la mort; il ne s’interroge pas si la Hongrie modernisée serait viable et durable; et il ne se pose non plus la question si le fait d’avoir rejoint le gouvernement s’avérerait juste ou pas. Il se demande davantage si le public politique considère son statut de ministre légitime ou pas. C’est la question d’un homme politique qui accepte et s’identifie avec son rôle. Le même jour (le 27 mars), il commença à écrire un article pour essayer de montrer sa loyauté aux changements révolutionnaires et au gouvernement Batthyány. Sa correspondance montre aussi que, ce jour-là, il trouvait l’avenir de la Hongrie prometteur. Dans cet article il a exprimé son engagement politique en ces termes: « le comte Lajos Batthyány m’avait désigné parmi d’autres et je l’ai accepté sans hésitation. Est-ce en ayant des prétentions ? Mais non ! Comme dans la politique je n’avais jamais d’autre motivation que la responsabilité et la fidélité aux miens.»<sup>9</sup> À ce troisième niveau textuel (journal→lettre→article) il ne se défendit pas directement, mais formula sa réponse de la même manière et son « message » fut le même: c’est son engagement national et réformiste qui explique et son passé de haut fonctionnaire (de l’ancien régime) et son avenir en tant que ministre. Même si le motif Talleyrand est omis dans ce troisième exemple, il vaut la peine d’examiner pourquoi le nom de cet

8 Voir notamment Spira, György, *1848 Széchenyi és Széchenyi 1848-a*. [Le Széchenyi de l’an 1848 et l’an 1848 de Széchenyi]. Budapest, 1964, 81-88.; le 27 mars, il écrivit des lettres optimistes à ses collaborateurs, Lajos Kovács et János Lunkányi, ainsi qu’à son frère, Lajos Széchenyi (SzIVM II, 420–422). Voir aussi: SzIL III. 605–607.; Bártfai, Adatok, 666–667.; SzIVM II. 418–422.; SzIN VI. 746-751. et SzIÖM VII. 275-295.

9 Le titre de l’article: *Mi lesz belőlünk magyarokból?* [Que deviendrons nous, Hongrois?] *Pesti Hírlap*, (PH) et *Jelenkor* (J), le 8 avril 1848. Édité plusieurs fois, p.ex. SzIVM II, 423–427.

homme politique et diplomate apparaît dans les deux autres versions. Il y décrit le prince Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Périgord comme l'archétype même du carriériste, survivant de régime en régime, mais il faut noter que Széchenyi avait des informations plus précises et plus détaillées sur le diplomate français que ses contemporains. Il étudiait l'histoire de la France d'après 1789, qui fut pour lui „l'histoire contemporaine”. *L'Histoire des Girondins* de Lamartine exerçait une grande influence sur lui en 1847, et il faisait la comparaison entre la situation hongroise et celle de la France révolutionnaire. Dans sa bibliothèque, il pouvait étudier les mémoires et les synthèses sur la révolution, l'époque napoléonienne, la restauration des Bourbons, la vie des salons parisiens, etc. et l'un des personnages principaux de ces livres fut Talleyrand, qui – selon une phrase célèbre – a prêté serment treize fois au cours de sa carrière. Il s'agit donc d'un homme politique qui servit treize pouvoirs et régimes différents<sup>10</sup>.

Comme acteur de la politique internationale, ayant d'excellentes relations avec de nombreuses personnalités, il connaissait personnellement l'homme politique français. Széchenyi, présent au Congrès de Vienne, en 1814-1815, comme capitaine de hussards au service du roi de Bavière, observa avec attention le „joueur” de la grande politique, notant sur lui deux anecdotes dans son journal. Pendant son voyage d'Angleterre en 1834, il dînait plusieurs fois chez Talleyrand, ambassadeur de la France de Louis Philippe à Londres, et plus tard, se plaisait à citer ses bons mots<sup>11</sup>. Dans un de ses articles en citant une anecdote sur Talleyrand, Széchenyi le décrivit comme « un homme de statut illustre et un homme d'une sagesse rare »<sup>12</sup>. Et même si Széchenyi trouva l'habileté et la finesse de Talleyrand impressionnantes, le 27 mars 1848, il voulut s'assurer de la justesse de sa décision d'avoir accepté le portefeuille ministériel en critiquant le parcours talleyrandien. Sa réponse à la question imaginée et posée à lui-même dans son journal prouve notre supposition (l'extrait du journal cité ci-dessus en

10 Dans sa bibliothèque, il y avait une certaine d'ouvrages sur l'histoire et la politique de la France. Dans: *Gróf Széchenyi István könyvtára* [La bibliothèque du comte István Széchenyi] A Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum könyvtárának címjegyzéke VIII [Liste des titres de la bibliothèque du Musée national hongrois]. Ed. par Bártfai Szabó, László. Budapest, 1923.

11 Pour les anecdotes, voir ses notes du 21 novembre 1814 et du 17 janvier 1815: SzIN I. 50–51 et 86; pour leur rencontre à Londres v. les notes des 26 et 29 janvier et du 28 février 1834 (SzIN IV. 447–448 et 456); pour ses allusions: p.ex. SzIN VI. 701 et Bártfai, [Données], 829.

12 Széchenyi, István, Mély számoló tanítványom. [Mon disciple au calcul profond] VI. = *Jelenkor*, No. 42. 28 mai 1843.

hongrois): „Moi, au contraire, je n’ai point joué. En moi, c’est le zèle qui fut la *vis motrix* [la force motrice] ... c’est pourquoi je tombais et je tombe toujours sur mes pieds et non sur mon cul!”<sup>13</sup>

En poursuivant plus avant cette réflexion, nous pouvons découvrir une des motivations qui put conduire Széchenyi à utiliser le motif Talleyrand deux fois le même jour du 27 mars 1848. Quelques formules du texte du comte Széchenyi (« je n’utilisais pas la ruse » ; « je ne jouais pas ») cernent bien l’image que se faisait de Talleyrand l’opinion publique de l’époque, c’est-à-dire qu’il est étai parvenu à se maintenir dans les hautes sphères en dissimulant, en jouant aux cartes avec finesse. En effet, Lajos Kossuth, au début de leur polémique en janvier 1843, sans accuser directement son adversaire de dissimulation, y faisait allusion d’une manière ambiguë: [...] parce qu’au moins nous ne sommes pas les disciples de Talleyrand qui profitent des mots pour cacher leurs pensées<sup>14</sup>. Une note partiellement effacée et très ambiguë du journal de Széchenyi mentionne que, le 24 février 1845, deux dames aristocrates de l’opposition (il s’agit des célèbres sœurs Zichy : la femme de György Károlyi et la femme de Lajos Batthyány) apostrophèrent Széchenyi devant le bâtiment du Conseil de Lieutenance par la remarque ironique „Bravo Talleyrand”<sup>15</sup>.

Au printemps 1848, Széchenyi a été une nouvelle fois mis en parallèle avec Talleyrand. Dans un pamphlet anonyme intitulé *La dernière ruse des Pecsovics (A pecsovicsok utolsó fortélyá)*, écrit soit par Lajos Kossuth soit quelqu’un de son entourage, le comte est sévèrement blâmé pour avoir quitté l’opposition et rejoint les conservateurs (surnommés « les pecsovics »). L’accusation d’apostasie est formulée ici très directement: „L’ancien comte István Széchenyi diffère autant de l’actuel que le ciel de la terre. L’un fut réveilleur, l’autre est endormeur; celui-là fut encourageant, celui-ci est intimidant, celui-là fut le porte-parole de l’esprit du temps, celui-ci lui résiste, celui-là fut citoyen, celui-ci est un oligarque colérique, celui-là fut unificateur, celui-ci est désorganisateur, l’un fut Hongrois par le cœur, l’autre ne l’est que par la bouche.” En traitant longuement des contradictions de Széchenyi avec soi-même, de sa célébrité et de son caractère bizarre, l’auteur évoque l’homme politique français : « le comte a tendance à dire, et c’est la base de son orgueil comme c’était le cas de Talleyrand, qu’il n’est pas compris, que le sens de ses plans

13 Cité plus haut. SZIÖM VII. 284.

14 Kossuth, Lajos, *Igazolás és feleletek*. [Justification et réponses] = *Pesti Hírlap*, No. 217. 29 janvier 1843.

15 SZIN VI. 175.

n'est pas perçu, et qu'on n'est pas capable de saisir ses objectifs par l'esprit. » Cette référence directe est significative pour nous, d'une part, parce qu'elle est entourée d'expressions comme « tromperie » et « ruse », termes similaires à ceux utilisés par Széchenyi<sup>16</sup> et, d'autre part, parce que le pamphlet a été rédigé en mars 1848 et publié le même mois. Bien que Széchenyi ne l'ait cité nulle part, il n'est nullement exclu que ce texte fût à l'origine de sa réflexion sur le reproche qu'on lui faisait de se comporter à la Talleyrand.

Son autre source d'inspiration a pu être l'œuvre déjà citée, l'*Histoire des Girondins* de Lamartine. Széchenyi a commencé à lire ce livre juste après sa publication en avril 1847, et sa première note est déjà remarquable : « cela me bouleverse » (« regt mich auf ») – écrit-il. Il revenait plusieurs fois par la suite à ce sujet dans son journal, aux moments où il soulignait les similitudes entre la révolution française (ses origines et son déroulement) et la situation hongroise. La formule « tout comme chez nous maintenant » (« Ganz wie jetzt bei uns ») qu'il a utilisée dans son journal est très caractéristique de son interprétation.

Il considéra les militants de l'opposition hongrois encore moins chevaleresques que les héros de la Révolution Française, il compara le Cercle d'Opposition au Club des Jacobins et il prévit une Hongrie victime du désordre des idéologies puis du paroxysme des passions. Il fut tellement intéressé par cette œuvre que fin juin, possédant déjà les cinq premiers tomes, il s'est arrangé pour acquérir les trois derniers le plus vite possible. Il n'a pas attendu l'arrivée des volumes commandés (la quittance date du 28 décembre), il a terminé la lecture de l'œuvre entière dès le 3 septembre. „Lese den 8ten Band – den Letzten der Girondins aus.” Sa note résumant son opinion, datée de ce jour, est très expressive : « Quel livre ! Il est très utile à ceux qui veulent savoir jusqu'où peut conduire le fanatisme. Vertu sur les lèvres et soif de sang insatiable dans les cœurs. („Welches Buch!! Sehr nützlich für jene, die einsehen wollen, wohin Phanatismus endlich führt! Tugend auf den Lippen, und insatiabler Blut Durst im Herzen.”<sup>17</sup> )

16 Le pamphlet figure dans: SZIÖM VI/2. 946–974. Passages cités: 963., 966. Sur la rédaction et l'auteur du texte: Vizsota, [Introduction], 303–308.; Kosáry, Domokos, *Kossuth Lajos a reformkorban*. [Lajos Kossuth dans l'ère des réformes] Budapest, 2002, 439., 477.

17 Il lisait l'ouvrage de Lamartine de l'avril au septembre de 1847, et après avoir fini les cinq premiers volumes, il ordonna à son secrétaire, Antal Tasner d'acheter les trois derniers. V. sa lettre SZIL III, 510, 566; ses commentaires SZIN VI, 556–557, 588, 619, 623 et 629–630, 646; Oplátka, Széchenyi 373.

Les notes de Széchenyi sur le livre ne mentionnent pas le nom de Talleyrand ; Sándor Petőfi qui a lu l'œuvre de Lamartine la même année, l'admirait autant que Széchenyi (c'était en effet sa « Bible »), mais en se passionnant pour la Révolution. De nombreux hommes de lettres et personnalités de la société civile ont lu et apprécié le livre de Lamartine dès l'année de sa publication. Historiens et historiens de la littérature citent régulièrement les observations de Mór Jókai,<sup>18</sup> Albert Pálffy,<sup>19</sup> Pál Vasvári,<sup>20</sup> Károly Vadnay,<sup>21</sup> Teréz Brunszvik<sup>22</sup> et Blanka Teleki<sup>23</sup> de même que l'opinion de Ferenc Deák<sup>24</sup> notée par Ferenc Pulszky.<sup>25</sup> Il n'y a rien de surprenant dans le fait que le nom du diplomate ne apparaisse pas dans ces textes. L'œuvre de Lamartine se réfère peu à Talleyrand, et même si elle en évoque le talent et les succès, elle blâme son manque de magnanimité, son inconstance et sa versatilité. Ce passage de l'*Histoire des Girondins* rappelle ce que Széchenyi avait noté sur Talleyrand, en 1830 à Londres, lors de leur rencontre<sup>26</sup>. Ainsi, la lecture de Lamartine

18 Mór Jókai (1825-1904), romancier, journaliste, homme politique.

19 Albert Pálffy (1820-1897), journaliste.

20 Pál Vasvári (1826-1849), historien ; commandant en 1849, tué au combat en Transylvanie.

21 Károly Vadnay (1832-1902), journaliste.

22 Teréz Brunszvik (1775-1861), pionnière de l'éducation des jeunes filles, créatrice des premières écoles maternelles.

23 Blanka Teleki (1806-1862), nièce de Teréz Brunszvik et sa collaboratrice ; emprisonnée pour délit politique de 1853 à 1857, après sa libération elle rejoint à Paris sa sœur, veuve d'Auguste de Gérando.

24 Ferenc Deák (1803-1876), dirigeant de l'opposition libérale à partir de 1834, ministre de la Justice dans le cabinet Batthyány, artisan du Compromis de 1867 transformant l'Empire d'Autriche en Monarchie austro-hongroise.

25 Ferenc Pulszky (1814-1897), militant libéral, archéologue, historien de l'art ; délégué du gouvernement révolutionnaire à Londres en 1849 ; directeur du Musée national de 1869 jusqu'à sa mort ; grand-maître de la maçonnerie hongroise.

Les titres les plus récents de cette littérature abondante: Fekete, Sándor, Petőfi evangéliuma. A költő és a francia forradalmak. [L'évangile de Petőfi. Le poète et les révolutions françaises] Budapest, 1989, en particulier: 301–309.; Fenyő, István, Eötvös és Lamartine. = *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 111, 2007. 4–5. 458–477.; Miskolczy, Ambrus, Forradalom és nemzetiség (Modell és valóság). [Révolution et nationalité. Le modèle et la réalité] = *Pro Minoritate*, 10, 2006. été-automne, 90–126.; Miskolczy, Ambrus, Olvasmány és történelem. [Lecture et histoire] = *Valóság*, 45, 2002. IX. 74–100.

26 Lamartine, A. de, *Histoire des Girondins*. Tome Cinquième. Meline, Bruxelles, 1847. Le chapitre sur Talleyrand : XI. 114–117. Leur rencontre personnelle est longuement décrite dans: Niederhauser, Emil., s.l. 2004. 128.

incita les contemporains à formuler des critiques éthiques. Lajos Gyulai, diariste connu de l'époque, finit également les cinq premiers tomes en mars 1848 et commença à résumer les parties plus importantes<sup>27</sup>. Il exprima ses regrets de ne pas avoir eu assez du temps pour cette activité<sup>28</sup>, il est donc très significatif qu'il fit une note dans son journal sur le passage jugeant Talleyrand. Il fait une réflexion à propos de la suggestion de Lamartine sur le rôle (supposé) du ministre britannique William Pitt dans l'éclatement de la Révolution Française. A ce point il parle de Talleyrand: « à l'époque, c'était Talleyrand, le malveillant, l'ambassadeur à Londres! » Par la suite, Gyulai a traduit un autre extrait de Lamartine sur le diplomate français:

„Trônes, assemblées populaires, Convention, Directoire, Consulat, Empire, Restauration ou changement de dynasties n'étaient pour lui que des expédients de la destinée. Il ne se dévouait pas à ces expédients un jour de plus que la fortune. Il se préparait, dans sa pensée, au rôle de serviteur heureux des événements. Courtisan du destin, il accompagnait le bonheur. Il servait les forts, il méprisait les maladroits, il abandonnait les malheureux. Cette théorie l'a soutenu cinquante ans à la surface des choses humaines, précurseur de tous les succès, surnageant après tous les naufrages, survivant à toutes les ruines. Ce système a une apparence d'indifférence surnaturelle qui place l'homme d'État au-dessus de l'inconstance des événements et qui lui donne l'attitude de dominer ce qui le soulève. Ce n'est au fond que le sophisme de la véritable grandeur d'esprit. Cette apparente dérision des événements doit commencer par l'abdication de soi-même. Car, pour affecter et pour soutenir ce rôle d'impartialité avec toutes les fortunes, il faut que l'homme écarte les deux choses qui font la dignité du *caractère* et la sainteté de l'intelligence : la fidélité à ses attachements et la sincérité de ses convictions ; c'est-à-dire la meilleure part de son cœur et la meilleure part de son esprit”<sup>29</sup>.

27 Miskolczy, Ambrus, Lamartine bevezetése a forradalmi demokratikus kultúrába. [L'introduction de Lamartine dans la culture démocratique] In: *Gyulai Lajos Napló*. [Les diaires de Lajos Gyulai] I. Csetri, Elek – Miskolczy, Ambrus, *Gyulai Lajos világa. Bevezetés a naplókhoz*. [Le monde de Lajos Gyulai. Introduction aux diaires], Budapest, 2003, 108–137.

28 *Gyulai Lajos Napló*. [Les diaires de Lajos Gyulai] Sur la période de la révolution et la guerre d'indépendance, du 5 mars 1848 au 22 juin 1849, II. Voir V. András, János – Csetri, Elek – Miskolczy, Ambrus, Budapest, 2003. Dans le 46<sup>ème</sup> volume de son diaire (p. 262–326), Gyulai traite abondamment du livre de Lamartine.

29 Lamartine, Histoire des Girondins, 116–117. La traduction de Lajos Gyulai suit presque mot-à-mot le texte. Voir Gyulai, *Napló* [Les diaires de Gyulai], 13. (Dans l'original: 46: 264–265.)



István Széchenyi fut certainement inspiré par le même passage quand il exprimait son appréhension d'être accusé d'une sorte de « talleyrandisme » pour avoir changé de position. Pourtant, il y a un élément dans la réflexion de Széchenyi qui rappelle les interprétations « compréhensives » de Talleyrand. Nous pensons, notamment, à la position de Széchenyi qui transparaît dans les extraits du journal, la lettre et l'article du 27 mars, cités plus haut. Même si jusqu'à présent il n'y a aucune analyse complète qui porterait sur la réception de Talleyrand en Hongrie au cours du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, la curiosité extrême que suscitaient la Révolution Française et l'époque de Napoléon et, partant, le grand nombre de lecteurs des histoires de la Révolution, rendent incontestable que le phénomène Talleyrand fut l'un des sujets préférés des salons de l'époque. Les révolutionnaires hongrois de 1848 qui se voulaient émules de la Révolution Française, exclurent de la liste de leurs héros les pactiseurs et ceux qui changèrent de position avec succès. Ainsi, Sándor Petőfi ne donna pas de place au diplomate dans son « panthéon révolutionnaire » qui existe également sous forme d'une galerie de portraits. D'après son éthique révolutionnaire, Talleyrand était un caméléon. (Ajoutons que les historiens de la littérature s'intéressant au sujet suivirent tous cette interprétation.) Il aurait pu être réputé dans la Hongrie du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle par ses succès, sa vision européenne et sa carrière, on n'a retenu que son amoralité, si bien que les traits dominants de l'image de Talleyrand furent ses alignements sur les régimes successifs et son habileté à se positionner. Pourtant, même en Hongrie parurent des évaluations différentes. Nous citons comme exemple l'essai de János Asbóth sur *Talleyrand*. Il a relevé que la plupart des historiens tout en reconnaissant l'habileté et le talent du diplomate français, le tenaient pour le prototype de l'amoralité, de l'infidélité et de la trahison. Mais selon Asbóth, bien que Talleyrand ne satisfît pas à l'idéal médiéval de la fidélité (d'ailleurs qui put y satisfaire parmi les contemporains? – posa-t-il la question), il y a un fondement éthique de sa carrière brillante : le patriotisme et le respect des intérêts de la France qu'il représentait quel qu'en fût le contexte. Nous citons cet exemple du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle pour montrer que le discours « compréhensif » sur Talleyrand reposait sur les mêmes arguments que ceux utilisés par Széchenyi pour se défendre contre les accusations: un engagement personnel total dans l'action politique au service des intérêts de la nation. Malgré donc le fait que Széchenyi ait présenté le diplomate français comme un contre-modèle, il nous semble qu'il suivait à la fois le

discours indulgent et le discours critique<sup>30</sup>. Pourtant, la double question reste ouverte: comment caractériser son changement de fonction et dans quel sens sa réponse est-elle authentique ?

István Széchenyi avait peut-être besoin de se calmer, mais il ne devait pas s'excuser. A partir du début mars – et même avant la révolution! – son nom était sur toutes les listes des gouvernements possibles. Après la nomination de Lajos Batthyány au poste de premier ministre (le 17 mars), les acteurs politiques comptaient sur le comte Széchenyi comme futur membre de gouvernement. Le public n'était pas donc choqué par son „tournant” politique, et son changement de fonction se déroula naturellement, sans trop de difficultés. Selon l'opinion de ses contemporains, István Széchenyi rejoignit le «nouveau régime» par conviction<sup>31</sup>, parce que c'est sa carrière entière qui fut prise en considération et non ses années dernières.

---

30 Notons que grâce à Péter Hahner l'interprétation compréhensive est dominante dans la bibliographie hongroise récente sur ce sujet. Les interprétations hongroises précédentes décrivent Talleyrand à partir des notions comme caméléon ou rapacité, mais Emil Niederhauser a proposé une interprétation plus nuancée en tenant compte de la bibliographie francophone du sujet. Péter Hahner a soumis à une analyse approfondie les différentes étapes du parcours de Talleyrand, son rapport avec la Hongrie et son séjour à Presbourg (etc.). Il a également essayé de convaincre (et il le fait toujours) les lecteurs hongrois que Talleyrand n'était pas un collaborateur servile et amoral des différents régimes, mais il avait un point de vue ferme en matière de diplomatie, il a très bien compris l'intérêt de la France, et il était loyal à chaque régime jusqu'au dernier moment. Sur cette réévaluation voir : Hahner Péter, *Újabb 100 történelmi tévhit, avagy amit biztosan tudsz a történelemtől – és mind rosszul tudod*. [Cent erreurs historiques récentes ou ce que tu sais de l'histoire à coup sûr – tu sais tout faux] Budapest, 2011. Talleyrand szélkakasként minden rendszert kiszolgált [Talleyrand, était-il une girouette servant tous les régimes?], 187–192.; Idem, Ki volt Talleyrand? [Qui était Talleyrand] = *Rubicon*, 23, 2012/12. 46–47. Quelques exemples des derniers articles de l'auteur : Hahner, Péter, Talleyrand Pozsonyban. [Talleyrand à Presbourg] = *Kommentár*, 2010. 3. 38–44.; Id., Talleyrand, a forradalmár. [Talleyrand le révolutionnaire] = *Kommentár*, 2008. 2. 57–69.; Id., Talleyrand a vadnyugaton, [Talleyrand au Far West] = *Aetas*, 27, 2012. 3. 5–19.; Idem, Talleyrand, az Alkotmányozó Nemzetgyűlés képviselője (1789–1791). [Talleyrand, député de la Constituante, 1789-1791] = *Századok*, 146, 2012. 1339–1376. Voir aussi : Tarle, E, *Talleyrand*. Budapest, 1959, 10–17.; Paléologue, Maurice, *Három diplomata*. [Trois diplomates] *Talleyrand, Metternich, Chateaubriand*. Budapest, s. d.; Nógrády, György, *Talleyrand*. Pécs, 1997, 5.; Ferrero, Guglielmo, *Újjáépítés. Talleyrand Bécsben. 1814–1815*. Reconstruction. Talleyrand à Vienne. 1814-1815] Budapest, 2002.; Niederhauser, Talleyrand – Metternich, 7–141.

31 Sur les projets de listes et leurs “problèmes” v. Urbán, Aladár, *Batthyány Lajos miniszterelnöksége* [Lajos Batthyány, premier ministre]. Budapest, 1986, 65–100 et Spira, [Le Széchenyi de l'an 1848], 71–88.

Pourtant, si nous examinons son parcours politique à travers ses luttes avec Kossuth et avec l’opposition réformiste, les sept années précédant la révolution procédèrent d’une césure manifeste. Entre 1841 et 1848, il menait un débat de presse avec Lajos Kossuth dont l’influence ne cessait de croître parmi les réformistes. Széchenyi n’adhérait pas au parti de l’opposition libérale (fondé en 1847), au contraire: il essayait par tous les moyens possibles de le discréditer. Il accepta un poste de haut fonctionnaire (en 1845) et coopéra étroitement avec le gouvernement. Son argumentation lors de ces débats (1841-1848) – sur les dangers de la «révolution», sur les «illusions indépendantistes», sur la conservation de la stabilité sociale et des limites de la «Gesamtmonarchie» – montre qu’il ne put se rallier aux événements de 1848 qu’en effectuant un tournant important. Grâce aux événements de mars, Széchenyi, l’ancien adversaire de l’opposition réformiste devint ministre du gouvernement libéral. Cet ancien opposant de Kossuth sera son compagnon et un des réalisateurs du programme libéral qu’il critiqua plusieurs fois pour des raisons stratégiques et tactiques. Si les réformistes ne regardaient pas avec hostilité ce virage en mars 1848, c’est qu’ils pouvaient considérer l’adhésion du comte comme une *rentrée*, comme une sorte de *réparation*. Pour eux, c’est plutôt sa carrière d’avant 1848 qui posait des problèmes – c’est-à-dire pourquoi Széchenyi, “progressiste” constitutionnel et nationaliste avait-il accepté un poste dans un gouvernement absolutiste, conservateur et antinationaliste<sup>32</sup>. A ce moment-là, il fut qualifié d’*apostate*. Ainsi, il est naturel que ce nouveau virage ne fût pas considéré comme un changement à la Talleyrand, mais comme la renaissance de l’ancien Széchenyi, celui des années 1830. Les contemporains comprirent que le *Vormärz* du comte était une période de dilemmes concernant les valeurs et les rôles. Széchenyi incarnait une “formule politique” trop complexe pour qu’il pût être jugé simplement par les tournants de son parcours<sup>33</sup>.

32 Pour ses considérations politiques et les ambiguïtés de son rôle v. de l’auteur de ce travail: Velkey, Ferenc, “Párt szólj, ki vagy?” Politikai önmeghatározások 1846–47 pártprogramjaiban [“Parti parle: qui es-tu? Les auto-identifications dans les programmes des partis en 1846–1847]. dans *Az Ellenzéki Nyilatkozat és a kortársak* [La Déclaration de l’Opposition et les gens de l’époque]. Conférence scientifique, Zalaegerszeg, le juin 1997. Ed. par Molnár, András. Zalaegerszeg, 1998.

33 Andics, Metternich, 237–259; Gergely, András: *Egy nemzetet az emberiségnek. Tanulmányok a magyar reformkorról és 1848-ról* [Donner une nation pour l’humanité. Essais sur l’ère des réformes et 1848]. Budapest, 1987. 182–201; Réz, Mihály, *Széchenyi problémák. I. Széchenyi és az érzelmi politika. II. A következetesség és Széchenyi rendszere* [Les Széchenyi-problèmes. Széchenyi et la politique émotionnelle. Le fermeté dans le système de Széchenyi]. Budapest, 1907.

Ce sont les raisons qui motivent les jugements sur le rôle d'István Széchenyi en mars-avril 1848. C'est lui que l'opinion publique tenait pour l'initiateur de l'Ère des réformes, pour celui qui par des œuvres importantes publiées dans les années 1830 avait montré une direction claire pour les réformistes, avait créé un public progressiste, défini les termes fondamentaux du libéralisme hongrois, et fondé plusieurs entreprises pour accélérer la modernisation et le progrès national. Le surnom "le plus grand des Hongrois", qui lui a été décerné, s'explique par les idées qu'il avait développées sur la réforme nationale et sociale. Les libéraux trouvèrent le nouveau rôle de Széchenyi légitime, parce que pour eux, mars 1848 n'était pas un tournant aigu, mais l'aboutissement de l'époque réformatrice (1830-1848), la réalisation légale des objectifs annoncés. Rien ne montre mieux la prédominance de ce point de vue que les reproches adressés à Széchenyi par les dames de l'aristocratie conservatrice (la première fut la princesse Sophie Liechtenstein, le 16 mars). Selon elles c'est lui qui fut le promoteur de la révolution<sup>34</sup>.

L'acceptation du portefeuille ministériel n'a donc pas mené à l'accusation que supposait István Széchenyi dans son journal (jouer à la Talleyrand), l'opinion publique a admis son nouveau rôle. Par contre, l'historiographie – connaissant déjà le déroulement des événements de 1848-1849 et leurs conséquences – jugeait autrement la position du comte prenant en compte d'autres considérations. Le rôle de Széchenyi en 1848 fut expliqué surtout en partant de la période du débat Széchenyi-Kossuth (1841-1848). Il est pourtant légitime de réétudier la question, parce que la succession dans le temps des interprétations demandent des examens plus attentifs, plus nuancés et aussi d'éviter des qualifications simplistes. Nous avons choisi quelques lignes importantes d'un document lié au "tournant", pour examiner quelles sont les conclusions possibles des interprétations différentes. Ce document est *le discours de Széchenyi prononcé le 14 mars 1848, à la session de la Diète*. Nous présentons brièvement ses activités de l'époque et la portée historique de la journée du 14 mars pour mettre en lumière pourquoi ce document peut être considéré comme le texte essentiel relatif à son "virage".

István Széchenyi, élu député du comitat de Moson à la dernière Diète (1847–1848), passait l'hiver à Presbourg. A la fin de février 1848, le débat sur les projets ferroviaires prit une tournure politique. En faisant

---

34 Széchenyi répondit à l'"indignation" de Sophie Liechtenstein par une phrase courtoise, tout comme aux accusations des épouses des comtes Félix Zichy et Károly Szécsen, le 22 mars. Dans: SzIN VI, 748–749 et SZIÖM VII, 278.

adopter son projet, Széchenyi poursuivit l’objectif de réorganiser les forces politiques, de pousser Kossuth, leader de l’opposition à l’arrière-plan et de créer un parti réformiste modéré. Cependant, les nouvelles des révolutions, surtout celles des événements parisiens, créèrent une nouvelle situation à Presbourg. *Mundus se expedit* [Le monde s’expédie] – écrivit-il dans son journal le 1<sup>er</sup> mars. Dans les jours suivants, pour “conjurer le danger” – c’était sa préoccupation majeure au cours des années 1840 – il prit position contre le projet de loi de Kossuth, qui revendiquait des réformes fondamentales (par ex. un gouvernement hongrois responsable devant le Parlement) et demandait une constitution non seulement pour la Hongrie, mais aussi pour les autres pays de la Monarchie. Lorsqu’en séance circulaire<sup>35</sup> la Chambre basse se rallia à ces revendications, Széchenyi alla à Vienne (il y fut invité!) pour discuter de la crise avec les hauts dignitaires de la Monarchie. Comme ultime mesure pour éviter la révolution, il voulait se faire nommer “délégué royal muni des pleins pouvoirs”, mais lors des conférences de Vienne (du 6 au 9 mars) Metternich écarta cette solution. De retour à Presbourg, il ne cessa de travailler contre le projet de loi de Kossuth, et le 13 mars, il déposa une version modérée du projet.

Le 14 mars, les événements se précipitèrent. À la conférence du palatin, il fut informé de la révolution de Vienne et de la démission de Metternich. Il pouvait même se préparer à un changement fondamental à la Diète, parce qu’à la suite de l’intervention de l’archiduc Etienne (le palatin), la Chambre haute accepta le projet de loi de Kossuth. Széchenyi participa activement à la session de cette journée, il prit la parole, et fut élu dans la délégation qui devait se rendre à Vienne pour remettre au roi l’adresse contenant le projet de loi. Jusqu’à ce moment, il menait un combat acharné pour faire rejeter ou modifier le projet de Kossuth qu’il avait simplement qualifié de “sottise”. Mais le 15 mars c’est lui qui, à bord du bateau transportant la délégation à Vienne, fit des propositions pour garantir l’application de la nouvelle loi: il suggéra de faire écrire par le roi Ferdinand V une déclaration dans laquelle il nommerait le palatin de Hongrie son *alter ego*, son substitut. Lors de son séjours à Vienne (les 15-17 mars), grâce à ses relations familiales et politiques, Széchenyi joua un rôle considérable dans l’assouplissement de la position de la Cour et dans

---

35 Les décisions de la Chambre basse se préparaient en séance dite circulaire (*circularis sessio*, en latin) pour être ensuite approuvées en séance dite nationale. Sur la séance circulaire de la Diète, voir: Charles Kecskeméti, *Le libéralisme hongrois, 1790-1848*, Paris, 2010, 96–104.

l'obtention de la validation de la loi. Après le succès, il rentra à Presbourg et participa, comme président de la séance circulaire, à la rédaction des lois fondamentales réformistes (abolition de l'immunité fiscale de la noblesse dite « port commun du fardeau », abolition du servage, etc.). A la demande de Lajos Batthyány, il accepta un portefeuille ministériel dans le gouvernement (le 23 mars) et défendit énergiquement les intérêts de la nation contre la Cour de Vienne. Il fit même une déclaration publique en faveur du nouveau gouvernement et des transformations récentes dans son article *Mi lesz belőlünk magyarokból?* [Qu'est-ce que nous deviendrons, les Hongrois?]<sup>36</sup>.

Le jour du tournant est le 14 mars 1848. Date intéressante, que l'historiographie hongroise n'a pas retenue comme significative, peut-être parce que beaucoup de dates du printemps de l'année 1848 passaient pour "plus importantes": présentation du projet de loi devant la Diète, le 3 mars, révolution à Pest, le 15 mars, et signature des lois par le roi, le 11 avril. Et même si le 14 mars fut oublié, de nombreux témoignages de l'époque en soulignent l'importance. Nous pouvons citer par exemple Lajos Kossuth, qui, dans ses Mémoires, classa ce jour parmi les dates les plus importantes de l'année, car, nota-t-il, c'est pendant la période entre l'adoption du projet de loi par la Chambre haute, le 14 mars, et la clôture de la Diète, le 11 avril, que s'engagea la transformation du pays. Selon lui, ce fut le jour "du tournant de la vie de la Hongrie" par lequel la noblesse hongroise remplit sa "mission millénaire"<sup>37</sup>. Un autre analyste contemporain partageait la même vision historique, lorsqu'il appela cette

---

36 Sur le mars de Széchenyi, il y a beaucoup de sources et d'ouvrages dont nous ne citons que quelques titres. Les événements furent reconstitués dans les détails par György Spira, dans: Spira, [Le Széchenyi de l'an 1848] 11–96. Il faut encore mentionner l'introduction très précise de Gyula Vizsota: Vizsota, *Bevezetés* [Introduction], 310–360. Sur les luttes de février voir encore: Gergely, András, *Egy gazdaságpolitikai alternatíva a reformkorban. A fiumei vasút* [Une alternative politico-économique à l'ère des réformes. Le chemin de fer de Fiume]. Budapest, 1982. 121–155.; Jean Bérenger – Charles Kecskemeti, *Parlement et vie parlementaire en Hongrie, 1608-1918*. Paris, 2005, 333, 336, 338.; Kecskeméti, Le libéralisme hongrois, 229–234. Les sources concernant les jours de mars sont rassemblées dans: SzIVM II. 382–431. Les citations du paragraphe sont tirées des notes du journal de Széchenyi et de sa lettre écrite à Antal Tasner (les 5 et 6 mars). Dans: SzIN VI, 737–751, SzIÖM VII, 275–286. et SzIL III, 599.

37 Lajos Kossuth, *Visszaemlékezések* [Mémoires] II. Kossuth écrivit le texte entre 1883 et 1885; il sera publié après sa mort. Pour les textes cités v. SzIÖM VI/2. 1049–1051 et 1063–1065.

journee “une des plus belles délibérations législatives de la Hongrie”<sup>38</sup>. Etant donné qu’en mars-avril la dernière Diète sanctionna les acquis de la révolution, nous pouvons être d’accord avec les jugements contemporains sur l’importance de la journée. Selon cette interprétation, ce n’est pas la pression d’une révolution hongroise qui conduisit la Diète de Presbourg à accepter les réformes, mais la volonté d’éviter un événement semblable à la révolution de Vienne.

Il n’est donc pas possible de décrire la transformation hongroise par des termes qui suggèrent des dualités nettes et que l’historiographie utilise en général (*Vormärz – März*, ou l’ère des réformes – révolution). Lancé par István Deák, un nouveau terme s’est répandu dans la littérature hongroise actuelle, la « *lawful revolution* » [révolution respectueuse de la loi] pour exprimer qu’en Hongrie le changement de régime fut paisible, assurant la continuité légale par une transformation quasi constitutionnelle du système<sup>39</sup>. Dans ce processus, le 14 mars est réellement une date-clé lorsque la Diète “s’est élevée au niveau des circonstances”<sup>40</sup> et rendit incontestable la légitimité des mesures prises. Ainsi la Diète était non seulement partie prenante, mais un des principaux artisans de la transformation de 1848.

Si Széchenyi ne s’était pas prononcé, son silence aussi aurait eu valeur de message, puisque dans la situation exceptionnelle du moment, une non-prise de position pouvait être considérée comme une position. Mais lui, il prit la parole à la séance de la matinée.

Le 14 mars, la ville de Presbourg se réveilla à la nouvelle de la révolution de Vienne, et la séance de l’assemblée commença par l’intervention de Lajos Kossuth<sup>41</sup>. Il présenta brièvement les événements

38 Irinyi, Dániel – Chassin, Charles-Louis, *A magyar forradalom politikai története 1847–1848* [L’histoire politique de la révolution hongroise]. Ed. par Spira, György. Budapest, 1989, 136–137.

39 Deák István, *The Lawful Revolution : Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979, 415. L’ère des réformes et les événements du printemps de 1848 sont présentés dans une approche de „longue durée” dans Bérenger–Kecskeméti, Parlement, 227–343.

40 La citation est tirée du premier discours prononcé par Kossuth le 14 mars . Cette particularité du „48 hongrois” fut récemment traitée dans: Gergely, András: Közép-Európa parlamentjei 1848-ban [Les parlements d’Europe-centrale en 1848] dans *A magyar országgyűlés 1848/49-ben* [L’Assemblée nationale hongroise en 1848-1849]. Ed. par Szabad, György, s.d., s.l. [Budapest, 1999.] 15–63.

41 Les événements du 14 mars sont reconstituables à partir des articles de presse de l’époque. Les informations les plus détaillées se trouvent dans les numéros du 15 mars de *Budapesti Híradó*, du 16 mars de *Nemzeti Ujság* et du 18 mars de *Pester Zeitung*. Le

de Vienne, la chute de Metternich et souligna la responsabilité historique de la Diète hongroise. Après ces remarques introductives, il énuméra les devoirs les plus urgents: approuver le projet de loi, rédiger une loi libérale sur la presse et faire une proposition pour assurer la paix intérieure. Sa parole fut suivie d'une longue et bruyante acclamation par les États et Ordres et la majorité parlementaire soumit le texte adopté au palatin, l'archiduc Etienne. Celui-ci donna son accord à l'envoi de l'adresse. Dans la salle, les questions furent posées sur les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour, mais l'Assemblée ne pouvait plus continuer son travail normal. Kossuth présenta la déclaration du palatin et récapitula les devoirs à faire. L'assemblée décida de continuer sa séance à trois heures de l'après-midi pour accepter le projet de loi. C'est le moment où Széchenyi prit la parole pour répondre à une question qui lui fut posée en sa qualité de président de la commission de la presse. Il répondit spontanément, donc ni le texte, ni son esquisse ne nous sont parvenus. Nous ne connaissons ses propos qu'à partir des articles des journaux de l'époque<sup>42</sup>. Les notes de son journal sont aussi laconiques: "Je parle à cœur ouvert. Ça fait du succès."<sup>43</sup>

Les articles de la presse, font état de l'adhésion des auditeurs aux propos de Széchenyi. Le *Nemzeti Ujság* [Journal National] écrit à la fin de son commentaire: "approbation", le *Pester Zeitung* ajoute: "approbation bruyante" et "ovation". Le *Budapesti Híradó* [Courrier de Budapest]

---

numéro du 15 mars de *Pressburger Zeitung*, et celui du 19 mars de *Jelenkor* donnèrent des comptes rendus, tout comme l'article du 17 mars de *Hetilap* qui reprenait les informations de *Nemzeti Ujság*. L'historiographie traite les événements de l'Assemblée d'après ces reportages, surtout de celui de *Pesti Hírlap*. Kosáry, Domokos, A forradalom és szabadságharc sajtója 1848–1849 [La presse de la révolution et de guerre d'indépendance], dans *A magyar sajtó története* [L'histoire de la presse hongroise]. t. II/1. 1848–1867. Ed. par Kosáry, Domokos et Németh G., Béla. Budapest, 1985, 32–34 et Vizota, [Introduction], 319–321.

42 Fort heureusement, les informations abondantes publiées dans la presse suppléent relativement bien le manque du manuscrit original et du procès-verbal de la séance. Le discours de Széchenyi parut le 15 mars dans *Budapesti Híradó* [Courrier de Budapest] (BpH), le 16 mars dans *Nemzeti Ujság* [Journal National] (NU), le 18 mars dans *Pesti Hírlap* [Gazette de Pest] et la *Pester Zeitung* (PeZ) et finalement dans le numéro du 19 mars de *Jelenkor* [Époque contemporaine]. Rendaient compte sommairement des événements la *Preßburger Zeitung* (PrZ) le 15 mars et le *Hetilap* [L'Hebdomadaire] (H) le 17 mars. Les analyses plus détaillées du procès-verbal ont suivi ces reportages, de la Gazette de Pest en particulier. Voir : Kosáry, A forradalom és 32–34. et Vizota, [Introduction], 319–321; Varga, János, *A jobbágyfelszabadítás kivívása 1848-ban* [L'affranchissement des paysans en 1848] Budapest, 1971, 49–52 et de manière plus détaillée: Velkey, ["Je parle à mon cœur"], 695–715.

43 *SzIN VI*. 748.



montre mieux le rapport entre Széchenyi et son public: d’abord “murmure”, puis “approbation bruyante” – “bravos” – “acclamation”. Pourtant, quelques voix discordantes se mêlèrent à l’enthousiasme général. Trois députés (József Justh, László Madarász et Dénes Pázmándy) trouvèrent que la réunion de la commission de la presse proposée par Széchenyi était superflue. Mais ces critiques ne représentaient pas l’avis de la majorité. L’auditoire ne considéra pas son discours comme une “voix étrange”, mais comme un apport renforçant l’enthousiasme général.

Un témoin, Elek Bezerédj, dans une lettre écrite à son père, présente bien l’effet que les mots de Széchenyi avaient exercé: “Les députés libéraux discutent toute la nuit. Ce matin, l’assemblée se réunit. Objet: le cas des villes. Kossuth entre [...]. A l’entrée de Széchenyi, on murmure. On applaudit son discours courageux dans lequel il fait la distinction entre la réforme et l’anarchie”<sup>44</sup>. Le témoignage de Bezerédj, lui aussi membre de l’opposition, nous montre le changement de la situation de Széchenyi pendant son discours: d’abord “murmure”, puis “applaudissement”.

Par contre, les premiers historiens de l’époque (Mihály Horváth, Miksa Falk), en écrivant du discours de Széchenyi, relevèrent ses angoisses et les distances prises avec les événements de 1848<sup>45</sup>. Lajos Kossuth, au contraire, dans ses mémoires mit en relief le “changement” de son ancien adversaire. Selon son interprétation, le 14 mars 1848, Széchenyi fit un virage fondamental: abandonnant ses objectifs, accepta le point de vue de Kossuth, adhéra à l’opposition libérale, et devint un participant actif de la transformation légale de 1848<sup>46</sup>.

Cette première discussion anticipa les interprétations de l’historiographie postérieure. Les œuvres d’Antal Zichy, István Friedreich, László Bártfai Szabó et Gyula Vizsota, publiées au tournant du 20<sup>e</sup> siècle ou peu après, citent le discours du 14 mars pour présenter un Széchenyi

---

44 Archives Nationales de Hongrie, fonds P/626: Collection Széchenyi, archives de la famille Széchenyi. liasse n° 12 (janvier-juin 1848), fo. 119. Copie de László, Bártfai Szabó. Bezerédj résuma également dans cette lettre, le discours de Kossuth, le succès de la députation envoyée au palatin, et le discours de Madarász (d’ailleurs plus tardif que celui de Széchenyi).

45 Horváth, Mihály, *Huszonöt év Magyarország történetéből 1823-tól 1848-ig* [25 ans de l’histoire de la Hongrie. 1823–1848]. III. (3<sup>e</sup> éd.), Budapest, 1886. 368–369. Falk, Miksa, *Széchenyi István gróf és kora* [Le comte István Széchenyi et son époque]. Pest, 1868, 250–251.

46 Kossuth, [Mémoires] II. Dans: SzIÖM VI/2. 1051–1053.

angoissé, craignant la révolution<sup>47</sup>. En revanche, selon les interprétations plus récentes, notamment, celles de Márton Sarlós et de György Spira, le discours annonçait un tournant fondamental, constituait un “désaveu” de sa politique préalable, la “victoire” du comte sur lui-même<sup>48</sup>. Il est clair que les deux interprétations portent la marque du débat des années 1841-1848. Les nuances se sont peut-être estompées du fait que les historiens ne pouvaient s’affranchir du souvenir de la polémique, tandis que la génération de 1848 traitait le “tournant” de Széchenyi comme naturel. Il s’ensuit que les éléments des deux perceptions étant présents dans le discours du 14 mars, les deux lectures sont admissibles<sup>49</sup>.

La première idée du discours est liée à la réunion de la commission de la presse que Széchenyi prévoyait pour le lendemain et à ses explications sur cette convocation tardive. Cependant, il s’écarta de son sujet original, et la situation de la presse n’étant qu’un prétexte. Széchenyi passa vite à un autre thème: à l’analyse de “grands événements”.

Le comte commença la partie la plus importante de son discours en faisant état de son hésitation, pour montrer que face aux événements il n’a pas encore arrêté son choix. Széchenyi présenta sa conception comme mûrement réfléchi – une telle analyse de soi accompagna habituellement ses interventions politiques. Après avoir utilisé le sujet général: *nombreux sont ravis et nombreux sont tristes*, il passa à sa propre personne: *je ne sais si je suis plutôt ravi ou plutôt triste*. Après ce dilemme sentimental, il poursuivit en évoquant ses angoisses: les conséquences des événements (*l’avenir prometteur ou la mort de la Hongrie*), la peur des révolutions des pays voisins (*réforme ou anarchie*). Ces dualités dubitatives servaient de

47 Zichy, Antal, *Gróf Széchenyi István életrajza* [La biographie du comte István Széchenyi]. t. 2. Budapest, 1897, 118–119; Friedreich, István, *Gróf Széchenyi István élete* [La vie du comte István Széchenyi], t. 1–2. Budapest, 1914–1915, II, 206–207; Bártfai Szabó, László: *A sárvár-felsővidéki gróf Széchenyi család története* III. 1820–1920. [L’histoire de la famille des comtes Széchenyi de Sárvár-Felsővidék]. Budapest, 1926, 410 et Vizsota, [Introduction], 320.

48 Sarlós, Márton, *Széchenyi és a feudális jogrend átalakulása* [Széchenyi et la transformation du système juridique féodal]. Budapest, 1960, 136–137 et 141; Spira, 1848 Széchenyije, 32–51. Dans le même sens: Spira, György, *A negyvennyolcas nemzedék nyomában* [A la recherche de la génération de 1848]. Budapest, 1973, 23–24.

49 Naturellement, la compétence professionnelle des auteurs, le contexte, et les questions posées influencent les interprétations. Et bien que les “lectures” du discours soient liées à la situation du 14 mars, nous pouvons les confronter et les combiner en utilisant correctement les normes de la recherche historique. Si la connaissance historique ne peut être absolument objective, elle peut devenir “plus fidèle à la réalité” grâce à un questionnement bien conçu.

cadre intellectuel à son intervention, mais son discours ne tournait pas au pessimisme. Dans l'exposé, il ne cherchait pas à énumérer les tendances négatives, il attirait simplement l'attention aux dangers. Dans la deuxième partie de son discours, il ne parla plus de ses angoisses, mais s'efforça à promouvoir la réconciliation. Ainsi le texte passe du dilemme personnel à la responsabilité commune (nationale) et à l'appel à l'action. La voie du discours mène du “moi” au “nous” souligné. La communauté d'esprit exprimée par la grammaire et par la rhétorique fut encore renforcée, parce que, dans son discours, le comte se déclara d'accord avec les intervenants qui ont pris la parole juste avant lui (“les députés des comitats de Pest et d'Ung”). Il s'agissait de deux hommes politiques (Lajos Kossuth et Zsigmond Bernáth) avec lesquels Széchenyi avait eu de nombreuses controverses et qu'il avait considérés comme des adversaires<sup>50</sup>. Széchenyi déclara que c'étaient eux (Kossuth et Bernáth) qui avaient montré la “clé” du succès, et les assura de sa coopération en faveur de “l'ordre”. Il fit ensuite d'autres gestes envers son ancien adversaire, Lajos Kossuth, et réévalua leur débat. À la lumière des événements de la journée, il ramena leur désaccord à une simple différence de “méthode” (“il n'était pas content de la méthode de Kossuth”). L'“objectif” commun avec Kossuth prit plus d'importance.

Certes, dès le début de leur controverse, Széchenyi a toujours décrit les raisons de leur dissension par les termes “méthode” et “tactique”, voulant ainsi exprimer qu'il partageait les idées et les objectifs de Kossuth, et ce n'étaient que les méthodes de la politique proposée par celui-ci qu'il ne pouvait accepter. Cependant, leur polémique allant en s'envenimant, il fut de moins en moins crédible que seules la *méthode* et la *tactique* les séparaient. La critique prit des allures de plus en plus politiques, sociales et personnelles. Il n'est pas nécessaire de prouver que dans leur débat ne s'agissait pas seulement de la “méthode”. Il suffit de montrer que le discours sur la “méthode” peut véhiculer des messages bien différents. Auparavant, Széchenyi écrivit toujours: *nous nous accordons sur l'objectif, mais la méthode...*; dans son discours du 14 mars, il inversa l'ordre: la différence n'est que dans *la méthode, mais nous nous accordons sur l'objectif*. Autrefois, au lieu de l'expression neutre “simplement la méthode”, Széchenyi utilisa toujours une autre,

50 Zsigmond Bernáth, député réformiste attira l'attention de Széchenyi en 1848. A la séance du 12 mars, lorsque le comte essaya modifier le projet de loi du 3 mars, Bernáth a pris la parole „contre lui”, en soutenant la position de Kossuth. Plus tard, Bernáth devint pour Széchenyi le type même du politicien irréfléchi, touché par l'esprit révolutionnaire. Dans: *SzIN VI*, 746–751.

beaucoup plus négative: *la méthode de Kossuth conduit le pays au tombeau*. Les gestes de Széchenyi envers Kossuth devaient aussi rendre le “tournant” du comte *crédible*, en mettant l’accent sur l’ensemble de l’ère des réformes (1830-1848), sur les objectifs communs des libéraux, et non sur la période de la polémique (1841-1848).

Outre ces gestes, Széchenyi entendait identifier dans son discours les similitudes essentielles entre ses idées et celles de ses anciens adversaires. Après avoir énuméré les dangers, il parla de la “grande chance”, des résultats possibles des événements de Vienne qui promettaient pour la Hongrie un “avenir plus beau”. Il estimait que les nouvelles conditions politiques pouvaient aboutir à l’autonomie réelle du pays et renforcer sa position au sein de l’empire.

Il devait souligner avec force une des expressions parce que – exceptionnellement – les trois comptes rendus parus dans la presse la citèrent littéralement: *que la Hongrie tourne sur elle-même*. Cette métaphore, exprimant le nouveau statut du pays au sein de l’empire, revient de temps en temps dans les écrits de Széchenyi. L’idée exacte de l’expression fut expliquée ailleurs: “[...] les différents pays de la Monarchie doivent ressembler à un système solaire où les planètes tournent autour d’un soleil mais aussi sur elles-mêmes”<sup>51</sup>. Ainsi, selon Széchenyi, le 14 mars donna une chance pour créer une monarchie bâtie sur la fédération de pays autonomes (et égaux!). Ce pronostic fut complété par deux réflexions: d’abord, il souligna que cet objectif fut “son ancienne aspiration”, puis montra que sans autonomie, “le progrès n’est pas réalisable”<sup>52</sup>.

Du dilemme entre “réforme” et “anarchie”, un avenir positif doit sortir: c’est la “base constitutionnelle” qui peut être la garantie de l’avenir, puisque la constitution établira les cadres institutionnels permettant de ratifier les réformes et donnera la sécurité à la dynastie menacée par la révolution. La nouvelle mission de la nation hongroise – selon la rhétorique du comte – consiste à rester la „base” et le “défenseur de la dynastie”, comme dans le passé quand elle fut le défenseur de l’Europe

51 Cité de son exposé du 22 novembre 1847, prononcé lors du débat de la Diète et répété sous forme abrégée le 26 novembre de la même année. *Gróf Széchenyi István Beszédei* [Les discours du comte István Széchenyi]. (SZIB) *Gróf Széchenyi István Munkái* [Œuvres du comte István Széchenyi], II. Ed. par Zichy, Antal. Budapest, 1887. 538, 540 et 545.

52 La version la plus possible selon les articles (mise en première personne du singulier et traduite en français): „C’est mon ancienne aspiration que la Hongrie tourne sur elle-même, puisqu’autrement la progression, que je souhaite, ne sera pas réalisable.”

chrétienne contre les Turcs. Si la Hongrie est capable de remplir ce rôle, de défendre le trône, une nouvelle perspective s’ouvre devant le pays: “*Il peut cesser d’être province, pour devenir métropole!* [le centre de la Monarchie des Habsbourg]”<sup>53</sup>.

Cette phrase fut accompagnée par une “approbation bruyante” de la part des délégués (*BpH, PZ*). L’avenir ainsi esquissé correspondait aux objectifs des réformistes, formulés d’abord de façon imprécise dans la “Déclaration de l’Opposition” (1847), puis plus concrètement dans le projet de loi du 3 mars, mais Széchenyi rendait la perspective encore plus attirante en décrivant la Monarchie des Habsbourg comme un empire avec la Hongrie au centre («métropole»). Suivant cette prévision, attachée à la métaphore antérieure, dans le système solaire de la Monarchie, la Hongrie peut être non seulement une planète (pays autonome) parmi les autres, mais se plaçant le plus près du soleil (la dynastie?!), elle peut devenir son centre.

Dans le discours de Széchenyi, la dimension temps occupe une place importante. Il a d’abord souligné que l’autonomie était “son *ancienne* aspiration”, puis que la Hongrie pouvait devenir centre “*maintenant*”<sup>54</sup>. Ce “maintenant” exprime à la fois que le moment présent (la révolution de Vienne) offre une possibilité pour la Hongrie, et que cette possibilité ne lui était pas offerte plus tôt. Cette phrase permet deux lectures : qu’auparavant la Hongrie était une “province”, mais “maintenant” ... et que cet objectif n’est devenu actuel que “maintenant”. István Széchenyi avait toujours la tendance à décrire la relation *de facto* Autriche-Hongrie par la dualité centre-province<sup>55</sup>: “[...] en réalité – écrivit-il dans un article – nous ne sommes qu’une province autrichienne”<sup>56</sup>. Le “maintenant” accentué du 14 mars peut donc suggérer que la Hongrie provinciale n’a acquis la possibilité de devenir centre qu’après les événements de Vienne (et non avant). C’est le contexte dans lequel Domokos Kosáry traite du discours,

53 La version la plus probable selon les journaux: “*A magyar nemzetnek (most az) a feladata, hogy [...] (ügy) most bázisa (s védője/támasza) legyen a dinasztíának. Most (itt az ideje/eljött a pillanat) szűnhetik meg provincia lenni, most lehet anyaországá!*” [La nation hongroise a maintenant la tâche qu’elle [...] soit la base de la dynastie. Maintenant, elle peut cesser d’être une province, elle peut devenir une métropole!]

54 Dans la phrase du *Nemzeti Ujság* le mot *maintenant* revient quatre fois.

55 Voir le manuscrit de l’article de Széchenyi, *Wesselényi és Kossuth* [Wesselényi et Kossuth] (1843), dans lequel la dualité province (Hongrie) et métropole (Autriche) revient plusieurs fois dans *SziÖM VI/1. 307–308*.

56 Széchenyi, István: *Két garas* [Deux sous]. XIV. dans *SziÖM VI/2. 98*. Les pages 94–98 donnent d’autres exemples.

en écrivant que la déclaration de Széchenyi, son “maintenant” significatif et son rôle joué en 1848 étaient les conséquences des transformations opérées après la révolution de Vienne (le 13 mars)<sup>57</sup>.

L’autre message du discours est une réflexion sur soi à plusieurs sens. Même si nous le lisons comme une affirmation simple concernant le temps – c’est l’objectif “ancien” de sa carrière qui peut se réaliser –, les phrases reflètent son état affectif : le plaisir ressenti par la réalisation de son ancienne aspiration. Pourtant, le „maintenant accentué” peut exprimer que la Hongrie “tournant sur elle-même” n’est pas une nouvelle, mais son “ancienne” “aspiration”. Széchenyi, parlant du passé et de l’avenir, suggère donc qu’il n’a pas changé en désignant ces objectifs, puisque l’un (le pays tournant sur lui-même) était toujours son désir, et l’autre (la Hongrie métropole) n’était pas réalisable avant.

Dans ses mémoires, Kossuth analysa le discours du comte autrement: “Széchenyi, [...] le 14 mars, accepta mon point de vue en déclarant: «c’était son ancienne aspiration que la Hongrie tournât sur elle-même, parce qu’autrement la progression désirable était impossible». Cette déclaration de la part de mon plus grand adversaire me donna satisfaction pour ses accusations d’autrefois, puisque la cause de notre différend fut justement sa critique de ma volonté « que la Hongrie puisse tourner sur elle-même »<sup>58</sup>.

Tandis que, selon Széchenyi, cette volonté était, dès le début, la sienne, selon l’interprétation de Kossuth, le comte ne faisait qu’adopter les valeurs de l’opposition réformiste qu’il (Széchenyi) n’avait pas partagées auparavant. Mesurées à l’aune de la “vérité historique”, aucune de ces affirmations n’est prouvable ni réfutable. Dans l’œuvre de Széchenyi, nous pouvons montrer des allusions validant la justesse de chacune des deux interprétations: la suggestion de Kossuth (Széchenyi a changé son programme) ou celle de Széchenyi (son “aspiration” – son système de valeurs – restait la même).

Kossuth devait avoir une “expérience” directe sur la différence entre le programme de la *Déclaration de l’Opposition* et celui de l’ouvrage polémique de Széchenyi (*Fragments d’un programme politique*, paru en

57 Kosáry, A forradalom és 33. et Kosáry, Domokos: Széchenyi és a nemzetközi politika [Széchenyi et la politique internationale]. dans: Idem, *Nemzeti fejlődés, művelődés – európai politika* [Progression et culture nationale – politique européenne]. Budapest, 1989, 58.

58 Kossuth développa plus longuement cette idée dans Kossuth, *Visszaemlékezések* [Mémoires]. II, SziÖM VI/2. 1051–1053., et Kossuth, *Visszaemlékezések* I, SziÖM I, 768–769.

1847). La divergence était évidente, puisque l’opposition – pour assurer la liberté de la nation – désira la transformation constitutionnelle de la Monarchie entière, Széchenyi, par contre, voulait garder la structure de l’“usine compliquée”, de la situation “complexe” et “anormale”, du “mariage indissoluble” qu’il considérait comme la base<sup>59</sup> de toute politique fondée sur les réalités historiques. Et, non seulement parlait-il de la Hongrie comme partie “intégrante” de la Monarchie, mais il prit part aux discussions pour parvenir à un compromis entre les parties constitutionnelles et absolutistes de l’empire<sup>60</sup>.

Pour prouver que l’autonomie fut une des “anciennes aspirations” de Széchenyi, nous citons un passage qui caractérise bien sa vision tout au long de sa carrière : “Si l’argent est sûr et bon marché, ce que seul le crédit rend possible, il sera facile de venir en aide à nos lignages ruinés ou menacés de l’être : nos Lazares ressusciteront de leurs cendres [...] les friches abandonnées et les marécages deviendront des jardins gaiment traversés par des canaux, notre Danube un fleuve régularisé, Budapest un port etc. et, enfin, la Hongrie sera non seulement *de jure* mais *de facto, regnum per se et pro se existens et independens*” [un royaume indépendant, existant par lui-même et pour lui-même] conformément à la loi<sup>61</sup>. La mise en œuvre du programme que Széchenyi avait esquissé au début des années 1830 dans le *Stádium* [Étape], n’allait commencer qu’en 1848. Et si c’est pour un pays “existant en lui-même et pour lui-même” (donc indépendant) que le comte “régularisa” le cours du Danube,

---

59 *Kossuth Lajos Összes Munkái XI*. [Œuvres complets de Lajos Kossuth] – (Magyarország újkortörténetének forrásai [Les sources de l’histoire moderne de Hongrie]). *Kossuth Lajos 1848/49-ben I. Kossuth Lajos az utolsó rendi országgyűlésen 1847/48* [Lajos Kossuth en 1848/49. Lajos Kossuth a la dernière Diète]. Ed. et prés. par Barta, István. Budapest, 1951, 152–157. Széchenyi, István, *Politikai program töredékek* [Fragments d’un programme politique], dans SZIÓM VI/2. surtout 702–716. Sur le programme de droit public de l’opposition disputant la conception de Széchenyi: Gyurmán Adolf röpirata [Le pamphlet d’Adolf Gyurmán], dans *Hallgatásra kárhoztatva, Gyurmán Adolf kiadatlan röpirata* [Condamné au silence. Le pamphlet inédit d’Adolf Gyurmán] Ed. par Varga, János. Budapest, 1985, surtout 87–93. Globalement: Szabad, György, *Magyarország önálló államiságának kérdése a polgári átalakulás korában* [La question de l’indépendance de Hongrie à l’époque de la modernisation]. Discours inaugural à l’Académie Hongroise. Le 4 mars 1983.

60 D’après l’interprétation de János Varga dans Varga, János, Bevezetés [Introduction], dans *Hallgatásra kárhoztatva. Gyurmán Adolf kiadatlan röpirata* [Condamné au silence. Le pamphlet inédit d’Adolf Gyurmán]. Ed. par Varga, János. Budapest, 1985, 37.

61 *Stadium*. Írta gróf Széchenyi István 1831-ben [Écrit par le comte István Széchenyi en 1831]. Leipzig, 1833, 66.

développa et embellit Pest, etc., il pouvait vraiment voir son “ancienne aspiration” se réaliser en 1848<sup>62</sup>.

Le message contenu dans le discours montre clairement le cheminement de la pensée de Széchenyi, par lequel il a pu se joindre “de façon naturelle” aux événements de 1848. Et étant donné que ces arguments n’étaient pas sans fondement – prouvés par sa carrière entière –, cette explication pouvait être acceptable aux gens de l’époque. Ce point de vue contemporain – relégué au second plan par l’historiographie – nuance l’interprétation de l’activité de mars de Széchenyi, mais n’exclut pas d’autres considérations préalables. Son discours mentionne que, devant le public, Széchenyi s’est solidarisé avec les objectifs fondamentaux de 1848, mais suite à un combat interne et à son pressentiment du danger, il n’a pu s’identifier complètement, au sens psychique, avec la nouvelle situation. Le 14 mars 1848, il fit le pas décisif, lorsqu’au lieu de s’opposer aux réformistes et à Kossuth, il opta pour l’unité, pour la coopération. Ce changement de position fut suivi de la “correction” stratégique indispensable de son programme, par une série des gestes pour rendre crédible le choix de la nouvelle direction, mais ne lui demanda pas de réviser ses convictions: Széchenyi ne changea pas d’objectifs, il s’en tint à ceux auxquels il était attaché durant toute sa carrière, et qui lui paraissaient *maintenant* réalisables. Son activité pendant les journées de mars différait donc de celle de l’opposition réformiste allant du *Vormärz* au *März*; la conception originelle de Széchenyi fut davantage transformée que le programme réformiste de l’opposition, radicalisé sans changement de cap par la dynamique du printemps de 1848. Son “tournant” était pourtant différent de celui des pitres politiques qui, naguère encore adversaires de toute réforme sociale, voulaient maintenant cueillir des lauriers. Notre analyse procède d’une approche plus différenciée de l’attitude Széchenyi vis-à-vis la révolution, elle ne se limite pas à la narration de son choix entre refus et acceptation. Les chercheurs comme Domokos Kosáry, Aladár Urbán, László Csorba et – plus récemment – István Pelyach et András Oplatka ont suivi cette direction<sup>63</sup>.

62 L’insensibilité de Széchenyi envers le droit public et les défauts de son programme (qui omettait de donner des garanties constitutionnelles) avaient leurs conséquences politiques. Toutefois, la Hongrie “existant par elle-même et pour elle-même” restait la base du système réformateur de Széchenyi.

63 Csorba, Széchenyi, 156–169.; Kosáry, A forradalom, 33.; Kosáry, Széchenyi és 58.; Oplatka, Széchenyi, 372–389.; Pelyach, István, Széchenyi és a forradalom 1848 tavaszán. [Széchenyi et la révolution au printemps de 1848] dans *Széchenyi Magyarországa és Európa*. [La Hongrie de Széchenyi et l’Europe] Éd.: Pelyach, István,



Le « tournant » de Széchenyi est donc similaire aux ralliements de Talleyrand tels que présentés dans le discours indulgent qui relève dans son parcours la permanence des concepts et le service constant de l'intérêt de la France (ici : la Hongrie). Mais si on considère les interprétations critiques du parcours du diplomate français qui le décrivent comme un joueur rusé, approche partagée au début par Széchenyi, l'adhésion de ce dernier au nouveau régime en mars 1848 ne ressemble guère au méandre parcouru par l'homme politique français. *Son “tournant” n’était donc point fait à la Talleyrand.*

---

Kőrösiné Merkl, Hilda [...]. Széchenyi Társaság [Budapest], 2004, 165–176; Urbán, Aladár, „Mi lesz belőlünk magyarokból?” Széchenyi István a Batthyány-kormányban. [Que deviendrons nous, Hongrois? István Széchenyi dans le gouvernement Batthyány] = *Forrás*, 1991. sept. 59–67.

**György Miru**

## **Ideas and languages in Hungarian politics during the period of Dualism**

This study has been written as a summary of the ideologies that gave orientation to the political thinking in Hungary, in the second half of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century. Basically, I have focused on the evolution of liberal nationalism with respect to its association with social progress and nation-building. Further aspects to study have included the social perception and social sensitivity of the political elite and intelligentsia, and the way they viewed the role of the state in handling community responsibilities. From this perspective, I want to interpret the transformation of nationalism, the process how liberalism was losing grounds, and giving way to the appearance of competing ideologies.

The nineteenth century was the age of great ideological systems, as the ideas of the thinkers discussing the new principles of community formation were gradually consolidated and organized into major systems that were subsequently interpreted in normative terms. Following the traditions of the studied age, the researchers of the era also have preference for thinking in extensive, comprehensive categories of ideologies. On the other hand, today's intellectual history expressly aspires to deconstruct schools, ideologies of cultural history and political thought. Certain trends of political thought are often labelled with descriptive attributes that are to highlight their complexities, as well as be indicative of the diversity of transitional forms. Contextualist-conceptualist approaches direct attention to political discourses, languages and parlances, as well as the associated set of notions and network of concepts. This methodology offers a more palpable view on the nature and formulation of political argumentation, reflects the relationship between the speaker and his audience more clearly, yet the functions of the differing languages and styles remain different as depending on the varieties of ideologies, values and political objectives.

At the turn of the nineteenth century and the following decades, partly as a heritage of the early modern age, the languages of republicanism, ancient constitutionalism, politeness, enlightened governance prevailed in the Hungarian political texts. According to *József Takáts*, the vocabulary of politics underwent major renewals in the Reform Era, as well as in

the 1870–1880s. In view of political languages and key concepts, the political debates of the Hungarian Reform Era have been analyzed by *Iván Zoltán Dénes*, with several concrete references to the language and ideological orientation of the founding fathers.<sup>1</sup> The political parlances that had been characteristic of the Reform Era with the thematization of economic underdevelopment as a novelty lost some of their rigidity, became re-interpreted during the political debates of the age, and were increasingly aligned with the form of reasoning associated with the new ideas. Similarly to the rearrangement of ideological constructions, their transformation continued in the second half of the century.

From the end of the eighteenth century and especially in the Reform Era, the Hungarian advocates of reforms wanted to follow the developmental patterns of successful Western European societies, yet they were to take their own traditions and endowments into account as well. Their basic experience was described by underdevelopment and a sense of weakness and threat. The key to the renewal and reinforcement of the political community was seen in the emergence of the civil nation, that is, the conversion of their society fractured by privileges into a middle-class society, and improved community-wide cooperation and cohesion via assimilation and the extension of rights. With reliance on their condemnation of absolutism based on ancient constitutionalism, they aspired to modern constitutionalism, self-determination and broader autonomies. Liberals were active in nation-building, the determination and formulation of the national identity, culture, distinctiveness. In their approach, freedom and nation, liberalism and national tradition, made up a smoothly integrated system, though it was viewed by them as a problem difficult to handle since the community was socially, ethnically and religiously much more fragmented when compared to Western examples. When interpreting East-Central European liberalisms, a useful term is liberal nationalism,

---

1 Iván Zoltán Dénes, *Political Vocabularies of the Hungarian Liberals and Conservatives before 1848*. In *Liberty and the Search for Identity: Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*. Ed. Iván Zoltán Dénes, Budapest, New York, 2006. 155–196.; József Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet* [A history of modern Hungarian political ideas]. Budapest, 2007. 14–21., 75.; see also Quentin Skinner, *Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas*. = *History and Theory*, 1969. no. 1. 3–53.; László Kontler, *Az állam rejtelsei. Brit konzervativizmus és a politika kora újkori nyelvei* [The mystery of the state: British conservatism and the early-modern languages of political thought]. Budapest, 1997.; Balázs Trencsényi, *Conceptual History and Political Languages: On the Central-European Adaptation of the Contextualist-Conceptualist Methodologies of Intellectual History*. In *Prague Perspectives I. The History of East Central Europe and Russia*. Eds. Petr Roubal – Václav Veber, Prague, 2004. 142–163.

which meant that the defining of the modern nation and its framework was accompanied – especially in the first half or even three-quarters of the nineteenth century – by efforts to eliminate social underdevelopment and to adopt norms aiding in the evolution of civil society. The hardest cause of liberals in favour of the expansion of liberties was the ethnic issue and the program of the homogeneous nation-state, which also determined their attitude to regional and confederation-based solutions.<sup>2</sup>

In Hungary, the ideological orientation of the intelligentsia and political elite was thoroughly impacted by the events of 1848–49. Disappointment intensified skepsis and the feeling of disillusionment. Previously, approaches to existence and communion had been penetrated by self-confidence and the intention to govern reality, as fostered by the romantic strive for genuineness and the feeling of commitment, as well as supported with objectives defined in the name of extending the scope of liberty, but after the fall of the freedom fight the image of destined development was broken, the faith in divine providence looking out for the nation as the community became unsettled. Philosophy, literary criticism and creative arts, which also gave orientation to public thinking, started to emphasize that there had arisen a need for a more responsive approach to existence, sober comprehension of reality. Undeceiving the society, promoting self-understanding became a distinct programme, and it largely contributed to the rejection of several projected objectives, ideologies and social pattern as describing them to be just ideas and illusions. The wrecked drive of progress invited some people to replace certain elements of their liberalism for conservative features.<sup>3</sup>

---

2 John Plamenatz, Two types of Nationalism. In: *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*. Ed. Eugene Kamenka, London, 1976. 22–36.; *Szabadság és nemzet. Liberalizmus és nacionalizmus Közép- és Kelet-Európában* [Liberty and nation: Liberalism and nationalism in Central and East Europe]. Ed. Iván Zoltán Dénes, Budapest, 1993.; Maciej Janowski, Kecskék és tokhalak. A közép-kelet-európai liberalizmus sajátosságai a francia forradalom és az első világháború között [Goats and sturgeons: The characteristics of East-Central European liberalism between the French Revolution and World War I]. = *Aetas*, 1999. nos. 1–2. 130–146.; Iván Zoltán Dénes, Liberalism and Nationalism: An Ambiguous Relationship. In: *Liberty and the Search for Identity*, 1–17.

3 Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, *Világkép és stílus* [Worldview and style]. Budapest, 1980. 300., 305.; Endre Kiss, A magyar filozófia fő irányai a szabadságharc bukásától a kiegyezésig [Main trends in Hungarian philosophy from the 1849 fall of the freedom fight until the 1867 compromise]. = *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle*, 1984. nos. 1–2. 34.; Péter Dávidházi, *Egy nemzeti tudomány születése. Toldy Ferenc és a magyar irodalomtörténet*

Exactness and the acquiescence of realities grew into a universal demand, and philosophy tried to provide intellectual footings to this tendency. As a countertrend of idealistic thought and speculative philosophy, the principles of materialism emerged and were on the rise, but their advocates were subjects to poignant attacks, and even by those who otherwise regarded the spread of scientific thinking. Among other scientific theories, Darwinism had an early take-off in Hungary, and exercised thorough influence on public thinking. The members of the former Centralist group, for instance *Antal Csengery*, departed from the romantic approach to history, because they opined that historiography no longer had to teach the public enthusiasm: it could easily result in extreme “exaltation”, revolutionary day-dreaming. Historiography was to promote moderation and the correct apprehension of reality, and the suggested methods to be applied included source criticism and philology with special emphasis on the importance of factuality.<sup>4</sup>

Literary criticism also followed the above-mentioned philosophical efforts, and moreover it accentuated the public, communal responsibilities of literature, its role in the reinforcement and protection of the national character, as well as in continuing the programme of national originality that rooted from popular culture. It definitely strived for consensus, made an attempt to bring about the synthesis of old and new approaches on a theoretical basis. Critics, such as *Pál Gyulai*, *János Arany*, *János Erdélyi*, *Ferenc Toldy* and *Zsigmond Kemény* recognized that arts could not return to the idealizing patterns of Classicism or Romanticism, but endeavoured to prevent complete disillusionment by reinterpreting the role of idealization. They elevated rapprochement (the reconciliation of conflicts) to be an ontological and aesthetic norm, that is they coveted the restoration of man’s inner harmony, as he had been disappointed, at variance with himself, the world and even God. The norm concentrating on the effect of any piece of art assumes the path to composure to be fought and atoned. The intellectual and critical group, also designated as the literary Deák Party, played a crucial role in defining the norms of public thinking, and from the 1860s they started to find their positions in

[The birth of a national science: Ferenc Toldy and Hungarian literary history]. Budapest, 2004. 604–618., 649–652.

4 Kiss, A magyar filozófia fő irányai, 35–60.; Béla Mester, *Magyar filozófia. A szenvedelmes dinnyésztől a lázadó Ikaroszig* [Hungarian philosophy: From the passionate pumpkin grower to the rebellious Icarus]. Kolozsvár, Szeged, 2006. 71–143.; László Percz, *Nemzet, filozófia, “nemzeti filozófia”* [Nation, philosophy, and “national philosophy”]. Budapest, 2008. 92–132.

public life in the institutional framework. Yet, their perception of culture that had gained an official standing became anachronistic in the eyes of the new generation emerging.<sup>5</sup>

Hungarian political philosophy responded to the new, post-revolutionary situation almost simultaneously with changes in the European political thought, and arrived at an identical interpretation. *Zsigmond Kemény*, the belletrist, who also called for a more dispassionate analysis of the situation, tried to detain ideologies regarded as dangerous, such as radicalism, republicanism and socialism, in his political writings (*Forradalom után* [After the revolution] 1850, *Még egy szó a forradalom után* [One more word after the revolution] 1851). *József Eötvös*, the former member of the Centralist group came to a similar conclusion in his work of state philosophy (*Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat* 1851, 1854 [*The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century and their Impact on the State* 1996–1998]): in the revolutionary movements of 1848, and not only in the Hungarian struggles, he saw the degeneration of political ideologies, and suggested that to reintegrate the dominating conceptions of the age that oriented the ways of community formation as in order to ensure proper social progress, these conceptions were to be reinterpreted.<sup>6</sup>

5 Kiss, A magyar filozófia fő irányai, 60–68.; Béla Németh G., *Hosszmetszetek és keresztmetszetek* [Longitudinal sections and cross-sections]. Budapest, 1987. 394–420.; Péter Dávidházi, *Hunyt mesterünk. Arany János kritikus öröksége* [Our late master: The legacy of János Arany as critic]. Budapest, 1992. 221–239.; Pál S. Varga, *A gondviseléshittől a vitalizmusig. A magyar líra világvépe alakulása a XIX. század második felében* [From belief in providence to vitalism: Evolution of the worldview of Hungarian poetry in the second half of the nineteenth century]. Debrecen, 1994.; Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, A romantika: világvépe, művészet, irodalom [Romanticism: worldview, arts, literature]. = *Literatura*, 1998. no. 4. 333–346.; Dávidházi, *Egy nemzeti tudomány születése*, 736–740., 798–799.

6 Szegedy-Maszák, Világvépe és stílus, 287–318.; Kiss, A magyar filozófia fő irányai, 29–34.; András Gergely, *Egy nemzetet az emberiségnek. Tanulmányok a magyar reformkorról és 1848-ról* [A nation for mankind: Studies on the Hungarian Reform Era and 1848]. Budapest, 1987. 308–320.; Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, Enlightenment and Liberalism in the Works of Széchenyi, Kemény and Eötvös. In. *Hungary and European Civilization: Indiana University Studies on Hungary* 3. Ed. György Ránki, Budapest, 1989. 11–30.; Idem, *Kemény Zsigmond*. Budapest, 1989. 300–356.; Idem, Az újraértelmezés kényszere. Kemény Zsigmond két röpirata a forradalomról [An urge of reinterpretation: Zsigmond Kemény's two pamphlets on the revolution]. In. *Romantika: világvépe, művészet, irodalom* [Romanticism: worldview, arts, literature]. Eds. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák – Péter Hajdu, Budapest, 2001. 208–218.; István Fehér M., Forradalom és rendszerváltás. Kemény Zsigmond két politikai röpirata mai szemmel [Revolution

Instead of the excessive political dominance of freedom, he wanted to strengthen individual liberty against both despotism and equalitarian ideologies. He considered political equality as dangerous, because it inferred social equality, which he reckoned to be inconsistent with freedom. He regarded the equality of chances essential, instead. He attributed significant perils to national thought demanding distinct rights and clamouring for dominance, as it menaced freedom, equality, as well as the political stability of strong states. It was only the second volume of his work where he seemed to be able to accommodate the national thought in his philosophical system. He assigned it to the scope of self-governments as a restriction of central governmental power, while later viewed it as the conscience of the nation's distinct individuality, the primary guarantee against the expansive claim of the state. Consequently, Eötvös thought that a balance could definitely be found between the strong, centralized political sphere firmly seeking the ways of expanding its powers and individual liberty that safeguarded the realm of individuals. He intended to ensure the power of the state by centralization, while individual liberty through autonomies, civil societies, local governments, the autonomy of religious communities and the self-government of linguistic and cultural communities.

Eötvös was thus studying the relationship among great ideologies, while having a major role in the dissemination of state-oriented approach and the use of state-related concepts. Similarly to his contemporaries, he feared the consequences of political equality as opposed to the emigrant *Lajos Kossuth*, who urged broader suffrage, active engagement in public life and local governance towards the enforcement of political freedom. He was not looking for an equilibrium between the private sphere and the political sphere in the protection of freedom – as Eötvös – but rather thought that freedom could be the firmest in the case of active participation of citizens in public life. He stood out for popular sovereignty, and wanted to offer extensive grounds for social self-organization and local government. Kossuth's abhorrence of tyranny, his republican orientation, and his emphasis on the role of local governments and communal ethos all

---

and change of the political regime: Zsigmond Kemény's two political pamphlets from today's perspective]. In. *Romantika: világkép, művészet, irodalom, 188–208.*; Gábor Gángó, *Eötvös József uralkodó eszméi. Kontextus és kritika* [The dominant ideas of József Eötvös: Context and criticism]. Budapest, 2006.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 40–45., 55–60.

suggest that he expressed his democratic objectives through reinterpreting the republican tradition.<sup>7</sup>

The intellectuals brought up in the 1860s and producing the bulk of their works in the Dualistic period found their principal experience in positivism. Positivism in Hungary, as in other countries, gave a considerable impetus to the development of the various fields of studies; the evolvement of natural sciences was pronouncedly striking, yet social sciences were also willing to adapt the principles of the new methodology. Positivists were deeply interested in the rules of development for societies being understood as parts of nature, furthermore the study of social laws created a separate discipline, sociology, nonetheless, the process of its reaching autonomy was a rather slow one, social theory still remained in the domain of state studies, the philosophy of law and history. In jurisprudence, natural law was slowly being overcome by positivistic approaches, yet historical aspects of jurisprudence and the underlying historical school of law counterworked its emergence. The approach to public law and concepts associated with the ancient constitution had long dominated the political tongue, too. The demand of social studies for empirical facts was satisfied by statistics having seceded from the branch of state sciences. Another group of factual information was provided by history. Hungarian intellectuals were highly receptive to the social-minded evolutionary theories of the influential historiographers' civilizational and cultural histories, though positivist historical approaches could not entirely outpace romantic views on history, primarily because they were built around the concept of nation, and efforts to generate national myths turned back to them for support time and time again.<sup>8</sup> As an influence of positivism, scientific concepts, evolutionary doctrines and the categories of social Darwinism found their way into the political parlance.

The young generation of the 1867 Compromise regarded themselves professional intellectuals in the first place, could be characterized by European culture and refinement, and aimed at changing the attitude of the elite and the wider public into of a more bourgeois character. As

---

<sup>7</sup> *Kossuth és alkotmányterve* [Kossuth and his draft constitution]. Ed. György Spira, Debrecen, 1989.; Lajos Kossuth, Summary of the Principles of the Future Political Organisation of Hungary. = *The Daily News*, 1851. (25, 26 Nov.) 1718–1719.; György Miru, From Liberalism to Democracy: Key Concepts in Lajos Kossuth's Political Thought. = *East Central Europe*, 2014. no. 1. 15–22.

<sup>8</sup> Ágnes R. Várkonyi, *A pozitivisták történetnézete a magyar történetírásban* [The positivist historical perspective in Hungarian historiography]. vols. 1–2. Budapest, 1973.; Németh, Hosszmetszetek és keresztmetszetek, 452–473.



critics, they worked under the influence of various intellectual trends, and under the aegis of generational opposition they turned against Gyulai – as well as its circle –, the great survivor of the literary Deák Party, who pursued to canonize the principles of the popular-national school, monopolize the most important positions in literary politics. This latter movement that seemed to be unable to attain to a revival of approach conceived to find the national criteria in peaceful rural life, while the successors reasoned for urban, bourgeois literature. As publicists and politicians, they were questing the ways for making Hungarian social progress, bourgeois development more intensive with no regard to their actual party affiliation. Relying on their apprehension of society propagating organicity, evolutionary laws and the need for competition, they encouraged the political sphere to be the driving power behind social development, the acceleration of the nation's economy, as well as the promotion of welfare and popular education, and in these responsibilities appropriated a leading role to state institutions.<sup>9</sup>

Based on the concept of liberty restructured by Eötvös and the highly influential interpretation on liberty by *John Stuart Mill*, the focal point of their political ideas was individual liberty. In defense of individual liberty, they had certain reservations against social, and even more political movements, and in this way they arrived at imposing restrictions on political rights, as well as the rejection of democracy. On the one hand, as closely related to Mill's ideas, they were concerned about individual liberties in the face of the society's oppressive power (*Béni Kállay*), while on the other hand thought it to be menaced by the predominance of political liberty and the strengthened central power (*János Asbóth*). There were some who did not contrasted individual and political liberty, but emphasized the cohesion of the two (*Gyula Kautz*, *Ágost Greguss*), but even these thinkers hierarchically ranked the two concepts: individual liberty could prevail in a wider scope, while political liberty proceeded just gradually and as conditioned. Consequently, they followed another path to the theory of restricting political rights, and thus negating democracy.<sup>10</sup>

9 Béla Németh G., *A magyar irodalomkritikai gondolkodás a pozitivizmus korában. A kiegyezéstől a századfordulóig* [Approach of Hungarian literary criticism in the age of positivism: From the 1867 compromise until the turn of the century]. Budapest, 1981.; Tibor Huszár, *Nemzetlét–Nemzettudat–Értelmiség. Tanulmányok* [National being–national consciousness–intelligentsia: Studies]. Budapest, 1984. 115–138.

10 Gábor Gángó, Asbóth János és Eötvös József. = *Világosság*, 1995. nos. 8–9. 93–109.; Mester, *Magyar philosophia*, 164–223.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 78–83.; Csilla Kiss, *A szabadságészmé Magyarországon a XIX. század*

After the 1848 revolutions, European liberals turned against radical and democratic aspirations, and the tradition of Hungarian liberalism also came to incorporate strong opposition to radicalism. Considering either political principles or cultural criticism, the majority apprehended the consequences of the equalitarian thought. Naturally, there can be politicians and thinkers found who were positively related to Kossuth's democratic conception of self-governments. Apart from the politicians of the Forty-Eighters' Party, it was *Gyula Schvarcz*, a scholar of positivist education and étatist commitment who worked out a democratic social and political programme by the early 1870s. With extensive public education and social policy, as well as the social expansion of the equality of rights he wanted to empower society to exercise political rights properly, while improving the institutions of the constitutional state was to ensure the democratic control of the political sphere. His ideas of shifting liberalism towards democracy, however, remained fruitless.<sup>11</sup>

Nation-building remained one of the major issues of the age. In multinational Hungary, competitiveness intensified the alarm reactions related to the nationalism of the generation being active after the 1867 Compromise. *László Arany* in the 1870s and the leading publicist, *Gusztáv Bekszics* in the 1880s expedited social progress, bourgeois development and civilizational advancement pleading the struggle for existence in order to have a national communion assisting the political sphere in realizing national objectives. Social modernization called for by the need to preserve the nation encouraged the evolvement of a more bourgeois national consciousness, but later only the role of the political sphere in the preservation of the nation was emphasized, and social issues were gradually falling off. However paradoxical it may seem, intellectuals having been urging social advancement came to trust less in the initiative of the society, they did not count on their spontaneous organizations, furthermore feared their independent movements. The Hungarian political elite of the Dualism did not only hold political rights in closed circles as alluding to the upsurge of nationalities, intrinsically towards the stability of the Dualistic system, but tried to refrain the drive of social transformation, started to foster a hierarchical approach to society. While the liberals of the Reform Era could be described by strong social perception, the elite in the age of the Compromise were

---

*közepén európai kontextusban* [The idea of freedom in Hungary in the middle of the nineteenth century, in European context]. Szombathely, Kőszeg, 2008. 9–36.

11 *Schvarcz Gyula*. Ed. Miru György, Budapest, 2000.

not be able to renew the policy of reconciling the interests of various social layers, and this negative tendency could not be set back even by their intellectual aspirations. When manifesting their progressive ideas, the intelligentsia prepared the path for the headway of the bourgeoisie still in the process of emergence, but nor the intellectuals, neither the later bourgeoisie seemed to be able to transform political life, come to dominate the institutions of power independently.<sup>12</sup>

As it has been mentioned above, Hungarian liberalism cast a lot from its former social receptivity. As liberals did not hold society prepared enough for accomplishing public responsibilities, they relied on political institutions more and more emphatically. In the center of establishing the public interest, there stood – in an increasingly abstract form, as well as far away from the actual network of various interests – the national interest, and many of the theoreticians whole-heartedly propagated that national interests, as opposed to society ensuing individual and material interests, could be represented by the state the most effectively. In order to expand the orbit of the state protecting the nation, they even inclined to place restrictions on civil liberties, particularly as against the nationalities, which antagonized the predominance of equal chances. The state-oriented approach and concepts was increasingly spreading in jurisprudence and political science (*Ernő Nagy*), as well as in the language of politics. The meaning associated with the concept of the country in ancient constitutionalism was now shared between nation and state, and then the two notions became closely interlinked. Obviously, the reconciliation of the old constitutional approach based on shared sovereignty and the state-centred phraseology assuming uniform sovereignty carried certain contradictions, as it was pointed out by *Győző Concha* for his contemporaries. In the 1880s, state approaches were also reached by the conservative turn, in the conception of the “nation state” (*Ignác Kuncz*) the state itself was not an organization of the society any longer, but the manifestation of an abstract communal notion, a general end in itself, a separate entity. The emphasis was definitely laid on the national collective, as opposed to the active, creative individual. The

---

12 Németh, *Hosszmetsetek és keresztmetsetek*, 466–473.; János Veliky, *Liberális közvélemény-értelmezések Magyarországon a 19. században* [Interpretations of the liberal public opinion in nineteenth-century Hungary]. In: *Forradalom után – kiegyezés előtt. A magyar polgárosodás az abszolutizmus korában* [After the revolution – before the compromise: Hungarian social modernization in the age of absolutism]. Ed. Béla Németh G., Budapest, 1988. 313–335.; *Bekszics Gusztáv*. Ed. Rolf Müller, Budapest, 2005.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 78–80.

nation state overwhelmed the conception of the cultural state that had championed social initiatives, as well.<sup>13</sup>

In the consolidated period of the Dualism, liberalism gave an effective support to the processes of market development, economic growth, while on the other hand came to be guarding the attained positions, thus several of the contemporaries pointed out the formerly dominant ideology having been emptied. The pragmatism of the age had an important part to be played in the process. Back in the 1850s, a certain indisposition to ideologies could be felt, and the period just before the 1867 Compromise evidently concentrated on the set-up of the required institutions, instead of any ideological orientation. Political pragmatism seemed to have a value in itself, and liberalism acted with a reduced degree of intellectual offensiveness.<sup>14</sup>

Positivism exercised a thorough and long-lasting influence on intellectual life, yet it did not mean a uniform intensity of ascendancy all through the studied period. The stark rationalism of scientific positivism, or even materialism, its perception suggesting determination, as well as its character that overshadowed individuality, foreclosed, excluded the transcendent, always evoked the demand to find new intellectual directions. Neo-Kantian thinkers were also more or less influenced by positivism. The intelligentsia having an outstanding role in the mediation of various ideas responded susceptibly to the novel life philosophies and new, myth-creating tendencies, but they rather inspired scepticism, disillusionment, defection from the community or artistic interpretations of existence. The new ideologies were adapted through the sieve of national approaches becoming gradually dominant, as well as in accordance with an increasingly conservative view of the society, and the new theories and propositions of positivist scientific methodology came to be applied in pursuance of the conservative historical approach to jurisprudence and in the name of preserving the nation.<sup>15</sup>

Originating from the fears of the national communities, nationalism was on the rise in the examined period, which disrupted the internal

13 László Péter, *Az Elbától keletre. Tanulmányok a magyar és kelet-európai történelemből* [East of the Elbe: Studies in the history of Hungary and Eastern Europe]. Budapest, 1998. 138–186., 219–263.

14 Kiss, A magyar filozófia fő irányai, 57–58., 64–66.; Németh, Hosszmeteszetek és keresztmeteszetek, 444–445.

15 Ibid. 400–407., 448–450.; Tibor Hanák, *Az elfelejtett reneszánsz. A magyar filozófiai gondolkodás századunk első felében* [Renaissance forgotten: Hungarian philosophical thought in the first half of our century]. Budapest, 1993.

balance of liberal nationalism. The cornerstone of the process was when more significance came to be attributed to old-standing traditions than to the reinforcement of the national community. Intellectual life was also affected by these tradition-oriented attitudes, historicist approaches to constitutional law, as it strived for discovering modern political institutions in the historical past, thus justifying the chosenness of the Hungarian for political leadership. Traditional elements were prevailing, either in the transfer of a nobiliary observance, or in any idealized image of the peasantry that also appeared in the novel national characterologies. The nationalism of the period evolved in the track of the cultural interpretation of the nation. This had two considerable consequences: first, minorities tracing back their national identities in linguistic and ethnic constituents could not be won over by the political conception of the nation that was offered by the Hungarian elite and sought to ensure civil equality; second, the Hungarian governing class, who professed the political unity of the country and initially seemed to be willing to accept its multicultural nature, started their programme to accelerate social homogenization in language and culture, made assimilative claims on the nationalities. At the beginning of the new century, it was the intensification of cultural nationalism that played the chief role in the acuteness of national conflicts.<sup>16</sup>

Determining the national character, distinctiveness was also motivated by efforts to find the peculiarly Hungarian civilizational momentums in an age that had a high esteem for the procreation of civilization. Even science (anthropology, prehistory, ethnology) was inspired by the quest for Hungarian uniqueness. The theoreticians of intellectual life gave rise to a strongly conservative national myth, and dogmatically exacted the norms of Hungarian taste, mentality, spirit, the model of Hungarian particularity, and thus rejected new aspirations as phenomena being out of accordance and corrupting national unity through public thinking. *Zsolt Beöthy*, a professor of aesthetics and the official literary historian of the age outlined a system of national characteristics by the means of literary history. The increasing aversion for the foreign and the progressive encumbered the adoption of European patterns, models, as well as their

---

16 József Takáts, Irodalom és historizmus [Literature and historicism]. In. *“Mit jelent a suttogásod?”: romantika: eszmék, világgép, poétika: tanulmányok* [“What does your whisper mean” – Romanticism: ideas, worldview, poetics in studies]. Eds. Annamária Merényi – Imre Nagy, Pécs, 2002. 111–118.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 69–73.

accommodation to national traditions; indeed, this brought about frequent conflicts in Hungarian intellectual and political life.<sup>17</sup>

As some overcompensation for the alarm reflexes of the small-nation consciousness, political writings provided instances of imperial plans, or a structurally transformed, Budapest-centred empery, or images of a Hungarian empire amalgamating a population of thirty million perspectively (*Jenő Rákosi, Gusztáv Beksics, Pál Hoitsy*). Nationalism and conservative liberalism was not receptive to social problems, thus often it was literature that undertook to present the existing tensions, which was, in turn, rejected by the official criticism. A typical example of how nationalism created a diversion from social issues was the scholar, *Ottó Herman's* case, who in the 1880s intervened towards the ends of democracy and gave evidence of his social perception several times, but at the turn of the century he could not counterbalance his national views being under the influence of the principle on the struggle for existence with his former democratic claims, and finally withdrew to the side of Hungarian nationalists.<sup>18</sup>

Around the turn of the century, liberal politics became active again, effectuated a number of ecclesiastical reforms having outstanding significance with respect to equal social chances, and established some new institutions to strengthen the constitutional state, but with these measures they lost their breath, as the late reform tide was not carried on. Neither the evolution of the constitutional state, nor the formation of the civil society could keep pace with political centralization. Under the influence of the livening social movements, discontent rose against liberalism, primarily due to its social deficiencies. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, another anti-liberal direction emerged in Hungary: neo-conservatism. Its representatives regarded the social transformation having taken place in the liberal era as erroneous, intended to reorganize society on new grounds with certain scientific background,

---

17 Iván Zoltán Dénes, *Európai mintakövetés – nemzeti öncélúság. Értékvilág és identitáskeresés a 19–20. századi Magyarországon* [Adoption of European models or national self-centeredness: Value systems and a search for identity in Hungary in the nineteenth–twentieth centuries]. Budapest, 2001. 15–33.; Dávidházi, *Egy nemzeti tudomány születése*, 847–877.

18 Németh, *Hosszmeteszetek és keresztmeteszetek*, 449–450.; Gábor Erdődy, *Herman Ottó és a társadalmi-nemzeti felemelkedés ügye. Kísérlet a demokratikus ellenzékiesség érvényesítésére a dualista Magyarországon* [Ottó Herman and the cause of social-national development: An attempt to act in democratic opposition in Hungary under Dualism]. Budapest, 1984.; Beksics Gusztáv.

and focused on the role of communal existence, social solidarity and social configurations. In community formation, they attributed profound significance to conventions and traditions, therefore they set a high value on religion. In order to correct the conditions of economic competition, they initiated the establishment of cooperative societies and labour organizations, as well as expedited effective social policy by the state to aid social layers dropping behind. Agrarians, farmers and landowners tried to utilize the arguments of neo-conservatism to gain economic advantages, yet the influence of the ideology was more direct in the case of the gentry, as well as of officer-intellectual groups who were taking on the former nobility's spiritual and mental legacy, and who began to represent their opinions in an increasingly radical manner. The radicalism of neo-conservatism deepened the still existing xenophobia to anti-Semitism, and maintained an extremely active form of nationalism. The publicists of the movement deliberately stood up against any progressive intellectual schools appearing at the turn of the century.<sup>19</sup>

With the ideological arsenal of neo-conservatism and as activated by the ecclesiastical reforms, the scene was set for Catholic revival in Hungary. One of the manifestations of Catholic reaction was the way how *Ottokár Prohászka*, who made quite an expeditious career in the Church, used every endeavour to show the trueness of faith as beside any recent ideology relying on the novel scientific results, to find a place for religion in the life of modern man. For this end, he was willing to tackle even with the most prepared representatives of radical social sciences. The other direction of Catholic reaction pursued to deepen religious life, and reorganize Church forces, while completely rejected any of the new ideological tendencies. Under the leadership of the Jesuits (*Béla Bangha*), they mounted a massive offensive in the press, as well as in the fields of education and civil societies so as to control the ideological orientation of the middle classes, especially to counteract the influence of progressive schools. Christian socialists trying to relieve social tensions with reliance on church organizations and Christian principles also appeared.<sup>20</sup>

---

19 Miklós Szabó, *Politikai kultúra Magyarországon, 1896–1986. Válogatott tanulmányok* [Political culture in Hungary, 1896–1986: Selected studies]. Budapest, 1989. 109–190.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 52–55., 100–102.

20 Jenő Gergely, *A keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon 1903–1923* [Christian socialism in Hungary, 1903–1923]. Budapest, 1977. 22–63.; Idem, *A politikai katolicizmus Magyarországon (1890–1950)* [Political Catholicism in Hungary, 1890–1950]. Budapest, 1977. 11–92.

Still another direction that tended to criticize liberalism was socialism. Even in the highly doctrinaire Hungarian social-democratic movement, the prevailing wing intended to approach their technique of policy-making to parliamentary norms, consequently, at the beginning of the twentieth century they framed their primary political objective to be the attainment of universal suffrage. *Ervin Szabó*, who took a major part in the introduction of Marxism in Hungary, remained an adherent of revolutionary methods, and to maintain class-struggle radicalism he refused the assimilation to bourgeois political parties, because he regarded trade unions coordinating mass strikes to be a more efficient basis of political and economic struggles. After the declaration of the social-democratic programme (1903), *Oszkár Jászi* considered that socialism was not the exclusive concern of the proletariat any longer, but the cultural issue of the age. He cautioned his friend, Ervin Szabó to make the socialist movement more open to national interests and the intelligentsia, have it break with the dogma of internationalism, and instead of the theory of the collapsing capitalism it was to adopt reformist methods. Jászi, as a social reformer was receptive to the principles of socialism, but as an intellectual deterred from the movement by its doctrinarianism.<sup>21</sup>

By that time, there also emerged a considerable public of urban bourgeois, and Jászi can be viewed as the typical representative of the new intellectual generation that appeared in public life at the turn of the century, had a formidable bourgeois background, and were of assimilate origin to a considerable extent; they were heading for disengaged vocations, and launched downright offensive on the uncomplying, dogmatic and empty norms of intellectual life. Intellectual revival involved several fields including creative arts, art criticism, scientific theory and political thought. The underlying ideological footings were provided by vitalistic and individualistic ideas, as well as a new wave of positivism. Initially, it was the relativistic influences of empirical constituents that seemed to dominate, particularly in aesthetic judgments and artistic taste, then sociologic circumstances, as well as their analytic and evolutionary intendments prevailed. The most committed advocates of this attitudinal shift belonged to the radical sociologists who freed the theory of society from the former disciplinary bonds, and established the first Hungarian

---

21 Péter Hanák, *Jászi Oszkár dunai patriotizmusa* [Oszkár Jászi's Danube patriotism]. Budapest, 1985. 5–29.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 88–93.



school of sociology and sociography in order to analyze the alternatives of social progress.<sup>22</sup>

The independent sociology rooted from the positivist jurisprudence of the liberal politician, *Ágost Pulszky*, who was the chief Hungarian interpreter of *Herbert Spencer's* ideas. His followers, the young sociologists reckoned Spencer as the scholar who worked out the first complete system of a “scientific ideology”. These Hungarian scientists did a lot for the propagation of Spencer’s concepts that emphasized the importance of individualism, professed unbroken progress and interpreted society as being analogous to living organisms, as well as for making them the bases of later social policies. Their attitudes were thoroughly influenced by another professor of jurisprudence, *Gyula Pikler*, who – as opposed to Spencer – claimed that societies had been “made” deliberately. According to Pikler, man always acts self-consciously and determinately, triggered by the identification and acknowledgement of his own needs; the aim of his social cooperation – and in this respect, certain constraints can be more expedient than free, individual action – is satisfy these needs as suitably as possible. His interest-oriented jurisprudence rejecting the existence of national characteristics was described as unpatriotic and morally destructive by conservative circles. Sociologists were also interested in historical materialism, as a methodology of explaining social phenomena, but regarded it as one-sided, because in their opinion it neglected man’s spiritual life, the functioning of his innervation, though social phenomena were shaped by both external factors and the human nervous system. According to Jászi, the deficiencies of Marxism could be corrected by Pikler’s theory.<sup>23</sup>

Sociologists radicalizing at a quick pace sought cooperation with other intellectual groups who were also interested in social reforms, including the ones concerned with improvement of liberalism, within the forums, such as the periodical entitled *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century) and the *Társadalomtudományi Társaság* (Sociological Society) both established in the early twentieth century, but their approach to society, as well as the related political objectives interrupted this concurrence, and parted them. One of the prestigious members of the dissidents justified his choice by saying that in Hungary the Hungarian thought was more tenuous

---

22 Huszár, *Nemzetlét*, 150–186.; Németh, *Hosszmetszetek és keresztmetszetek*, 450–451.

23 Hanák, *Az elfelejtett reneszánsz*, 57–72., 205., 252–275.; *Pulszky Ágost*. Ed. Kupa László, Budapest, 1999.

than free thought, therefore the former one needed to be reinforced. After the break-up (1906), the theoretical work on sociological issues was suppressed by political struggles, the bourgeois radicals started to shape their action programme. Jászi thought that the final goal of social progress was a higher stage that could be reached through socialism, while to modern socialism the road was running via “civil democracy”; as this latter one was viewed to be the point of departure to workers’ democracy, the direct political objective was necessarily to arrive at this stage. In his opinion, civil democratic rights had to be fought for in contemporary Hungary against monopolcapitalistic circumstances and feudal remains, “agrarian feudalism”. Since neoconservatives saw the developments of the monopolistic economy as analogous with some organizational structures of pre-modernization ages, such as with guilds, Jászi and his circle was offered a chance to criticize imperialism and the elements of underdevelopment simultaneously, as using the argumentation of neoliberalism. As we can see, Jászi stepped back from reform socialism to neoliberalism and democracy, yet his radical democratic, bourgeois radical approach went beyond civil democracy. To solve the most serious social problems, he offered a programme for the democratization of the country with a pursuit of linking democratic and national purports. He considered the nationality issue as the key question of democracy, thus paid an increasing attention to the problem. He felt the basic discrepancy bulging not between Hungarians and nationalities, but noble-feudal and democratic forces.<sup>24</sup>

The sharp conflict taking place between the bourgeois radicals and the conservatives aimed at determining the intellectual and political orientation of the intelligentsia and the middle classes in general. As a result of the struggle, an ultimate chasm seemed to open in the standpoint and political position of the middle classes: on the one hand, there emerged a side – as together with a group of liberals demanding governmental independence – urging democratic reforms, i.e. the elite of the oncoming revolutions,

---

24 Hanák, Jászi Oszkár, 29–80.; György Litván, *Októberek üzenete. Válogatott történeti írások* [The message of Octobers: Selected writings on history]. Budapest, 1996. 13–107., 131–164.; Attila Pók, *The Social Function of Sociology in Fin-de-Siècle Budapest*. In: *Hungary and European Civilization*, 265–283.; Idem, *A magyarországi radikális demokrata ideológia kialakulása. A “Huszadik Század” társadalomszemlélete (1900–1907)* [Emergence of the Hungarian radical democratic ideology: Social approach of the periodical “Huszadik Század” (1900–1907)]. Budapest, 1990.; György Litván, *A Twentieth-Century Prophet: Oscar Jászi, 1875–1957*. Budapest, New York, 2006.; Takáts, *Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet*, 93–97.

while on the other hand there stood the conservative ideological arsenal that would centre around national and religious cohesion in the next historical period. By the early years of the twentieth century, liberalism and nationalism – similarly to most of the countries in the region – departed from each other: liberalism now incorporating democratic requirements became the proponent of individual autonomy, individual rights, free society, parliamentary traditions, whereas nationalism was intertwined with conservatism, and turned antiliberal.

**János Mazsu**

## **Right Way or Dead End: What Kind of Turning Point is the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867?<sup>1</sup>**

The Compromise of 1867 is one of the most controversial events in the dualist period, an event that has provoked extremely conflicting judgments in Hungarian historiography, and, more broadly, in Hungarian historical public opinion. The Compromise has been discussed in books, articles and historical essays to fill a whole library. And both as a cause of and background to the „good old peace-time days” or the „dungeon of peoples”, the dualist monarchy is still alive and intensely debated in every-day historical public thinking.

Paging through a library of literature<sup>2</sup>, the historian coming from another field of history is, first, surprised and envious: why is there so great interest extending way beyond both the strict and broad confines of the profession? He is, then, somewhat perplexed, for on his first inquiry, it becomes clear what elicited and still elicits the unusual interest is only in a very small part the spectacular ceremony of crowning Franz-Jozef King of Hungary; or the operation of the political-constitutional system created by the Compromise; or the success or failure of economic modernization extending up to World War I. After he has delved thoroughly in it, he will,

1 Paper written for American Hungarian Educators Association 39<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference, 8-10 May 2014. University of Florida, 215 Dauer Hall, Gainesville, Florida, USA

2 Endre Kovács (ed.), *Magyarország története 1848–1890* [History of Hungary 1848–1890] Budapest, 1979.; Péter Hanák (ed.), *Magyarország története 1890–1918* [History of Hungary 1890–1918] Budapest, 1978.; Erik Molnár (ed.), *Magyarország története II.* [History of Hungary] 5–360. Budapest, 1964.; Gusztáv Gratz, *A dualizmus kora – Magyarország története 1867–1918* [The Age of the Dual Monarchy – History of Hungary 1867–1918] Budapest, 1934.; József Galántai, *Az 1867-es kiegyezés* [The Compromise, 1867] Budapest, 1967.; József Galántai, *A Habsburg-monarchia alkonya: Osztrák-magyar dualizmus, 1867–1918* [Decline of the Habsburg Monarchy–Austrian-Hungarian Dualism 1867–1918] Budapest, 1985.; Éva Somogyi, *Abszolutizmus és kiegyezés 1849–1967* [Absolutism and Compromise 1849–1867] Budapest 1981.; András Gergely – Zoltán Szász (eds.), *Kiegyezés után* [After the Compromise] Budapest, 1978.; András Gergely (ed.), *19. századi magyar történelem* [Hungarian History in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century] Budapest 1998.; A Történettudományi Bizottság vitája a dualizmus kora történetének egyes kérdéseiről (1960. december 19.) [Debate on specific questions of the Age of Dual Monarchy in the Committee of History of Hungarian Academy of Sciences]. = *Századok*, 1962. 1–2. 206–239.; Péter Hanák, *Magyarország a Monarchiában* [Hungary in the Monarchy] Budapest, 1975.

however, realize that he has entered one of the mythic halls of mirrors in the edifice of Hungarian history where the pieces of furniture are not identical with themselves, but everything has a symbolic meaning, too, moreover, the objects reflected by the mirrors hanging on the wall show new dimensions revealing their hidden relationships.

## 1 THE SYMBOLIC STRATA OF THE MEANING OF THE COMPROMISE

One group of the symbolic meanings of the Compromise in Hungarian historical thought emerged from the close association of the Compromise, the Reform Age and 1848/49, the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence. When assessing the Compromise, the Hungarian historian cannot go around the question which of the Reform-Age political programs offered good realistic responses to the serious challenges of the transition to capitalist market-economy, the renewal of social and national self-determination and to the challenge of the reshaping the relations to the Danube-valley peoples and to the whole of Europe and to catching up with the general western development. *Because one point of comparison for the assessment of the Compromise is which Reform Age political program is considered positive (realistic, manageable) on the basis of one's own value system.* The historian will evaluate the Compromise according to how it related to the Reform-Age program deemed positive by him. The relationship of the Compromise to 1848/49, as well as to its specific stages (1847, April of 1848, and 1849) or to the politicians personifying those stages (Széchenyi, Deák, Kossuth or even Petőfi) is the symbolic manifestation of the above value-judgment<sup>3</sup>.

---

3 Gyula Szekfű, *A tizenkilencedik és a huszadik század* [The Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries] In: Bálint Hóman – Gyula Szekfű (eds.), *Magyar történet VII.* [Hungarian History] Budapest, 1933.; Erik Molnár (ed.), *Magyarország története I.* [History of Hungary I. vol.] 408–551. Budapest, 1964.; Gyula Mérei (ed.), *Magyarország története 1790–1848 I–II.* [History of Hungary 1790–1848] Budapest, 1980.; and chapters by Tamás Dobszay, Zoltán Fónagy, András Gergely, Gábor Pajkossy In: András Gergely (ed.), *19. századi magyar történelem*; György Spira – Jenő Szűcs (eds.), *A negyvennyolcas forradalom kérdései* [Questions of the Revolution in 1848] Budapest, 1976.; *Vita Magyarország kapitalizmuskor fejlődéséről* [Debate on Hungary in the age of capitalism] Budapest, 1972.; András Gergely, *Egy nemzetet az emberiségnek* [A Nation for Humankind] Budapest, 1987.; András Gerő, *A magyar polgárosodás* [Hungarian Bourgeois Transition] Budapest, 1993.; Iván Zoltán Dénes (ed.), *Szabadság és nemzet* [Liberty and Nation] Budapest, 1993.; György Szabad, *Kossuth Lajos politikai pályája* [Lajos Kossuth's political carrier] Budapest, 1977.; János Varga, *Helyét kereső Magyarország* [Hungary seeking her role] Budapest, 1982.; Domokos Kosáry, *Újjáépítés és polgárosodás 1711–1867* [Reconstruction and Bourgeois Transition 1711–

Another group of hidden meanings of the *Compromise* is constituted by *its relation to the Trianon Peace Treaty*. How far is the Compromise, and the political-constitutional structure created by it responsible for the disintegration of the Monarchy and in this way for the subsequent disintegration of historical Hungary? How far did the system, the integrated market of the Monarchy provide favourable or unfavourable conditions for the balanced growth of Hungarian economy and society, and for the development of a national-middle class society that permitted the prevalence of national interests? To what extent was the development in the dualist period successful/unsuccessful, that is, did Hungarian economy and society get any closer to the level represented by Western Europe? If there were successful growth elements in the period of dualist Monarchy, the question arises, whether or not the „lawful revolution” of 1848 or the Compromise is to be credited with providing the conditions? The researcher in the field of the Compromise will address these questions even if he does seemingly not articulate them<sup>4</sup>.

*Behind the two major groups of the meanings of the Compromise beyond its own significance there looms a whole series of basic issues of modern Hungarian history:*

Were there (are there) any alternatives in Hungarian social development or do regional factors, backwardness carried on since medieval times demarcate a compulsory pathway? Had there been and when any chance for western-like and democratic development, for catching up with Western Europe, or for a break-out of the peripheral

---

1867] Budapest, 1990.; László Csorba–Ferenc Velkey, *Reform és forradalom 1790–1849* [Reform and Revolution] (Debrecen, 1998).

4 Iván Berend T. – György Ránki, *A magyar gazdaság 100 éve* [A century of the Hungarian economy] Budapest, 1972., Iván Berend T. – György Ránki, *Európa gazdasága a 19. században* [European economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century] Budapest, 1987.; Iván Berend T. – Tamás Csató, *One-and-a-Half Centuries of Semi-Successful Modernization (1848–1989)*. Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado & Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., Highland Lakes, New Jersey, 2002.; György Kövér, *Iparosodás agrárországban: Magyarország gazdaságtörténete 1848-1914* [Industrialization in a rural country - Economic history of Hungary 1848-1914] Budapest, 1982.; György Kövér, *The Economic Achievements of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Scale and Speed*. In: Gerő András (ed.) *The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Revisited*, Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2009. 51-83.; Péter Hanák, *1867 – európai térben és időben* [1867 – in European space and time] *Beszélő*, III. ser. II., 1997. November, 11.; Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében. Magyar történetírás a 20. században – nemzetközi kitekintéssel*. [Clio spell. Hungarian historiography in the 20<sup>th</sup> century – with an international outlook] (Osiris, Budapest, 2011).

state of backwardness? Had there been a reconcilable and balanced solution to the questions of national self-determination and the regional and/or European integration and which answer was realistic or unrealistic and when? As a consequence of the aforesaid, was there (is there?) a room for manoeuvre resulting in a real change of course and what is the responsibility of the Hungarian political elite and its leading personalities?

## 2 THE TYPES OF EVALUATING THE COMPROMISE AND THEIR ARGUMENTS

Within our limitations we must confine ourselves to the discussion to the dominant or most influential *typical positions and the lines of reasoning brought forth in support of them* that shaped thinking in specific periods. The sketchy nature of this presentation offers, however, the advantage to perceive trends and relationships spanning over longer historical periods.

### 2.1 THE GROUNDWORK

The first debate about the Compromise had started before the deal was struck. *Ferenc Deák*, who had done the preparatory work, and his friends had been shaping, since the Parliament of 1861, the position which in their view would lead to a compromise between the Hungarian nation and the ruling dynasty and which is capable of obtaining a settlement of interests and a balance between the two hegemonic nations of the Habsburg Empire without having to give up on the achievements of 1848, that is, on the already attained state of national self-determination and the fought-out reforms. In the view of the Deák camp, the dualist reorganization of the Monarchy along Deák's line would consolidate the whole Monarchy in such a manner that it would facilitate the restoration of Hungarian historical statehood and the hegemony of the leading Hungarian political elite. The dominant legal philosophy of the dualist period naturally regarded the dualist Monarchy a personal union in which the sovereignty of the two states of equal status was not limited and their unity was only embodied in the identity of the ruler.

*In Deák's position, the Compromise was thus a realistic one* which, apart from the above mentioned, offered a chance to block the economic decline of the historical landed class, and to preserve its social and cultural positions and also to occupy the bureaucratic posts in the Hungarian state administration and even offered a chance for the restoration of the political hegemony. Among the arguments of the Deák camp one can find the one

that the long-term destabilization of the Monarchy would, in case of the success of German and Russian-Pan-Slavic unification attempts, break into pieces Saint Stephen's Hungary by encouraging the break-away of national minorities. The unity of the Deák camp was not undermined by the fact that the „grand old men” of the Compromise, e.g. Ferenc Deák acclaimed as the „Sage of the Nation” or József Eötvös back from emigration, regarded the Compromise but the first step from which to move on to the further realization of the program of the Reform-Age liberal opposition. While the younger „more pragmatic” generation in this camp – among them the first responsible prime minister of the new era, Count Gyula Andrassy – viewed it as a guarantee of keeping the nationalities at bay, that is, as an instrument that enables Hungary, otherwise too weak for separate existence, to consummate Hungarian statehood mutilated in medieval times, and to restore her regional power status she used to have at the time of the reign of King Mathias – albeit as part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. *The mutual enactment of the Compromise in the now two countries of the Monarchy and the spectacular reconciliation between Emperor Franz-Josef and the „Hungarian Nation” at the magnificent crowning ceremony in Pest-Buda on June 8, 1867, appeared entirely to validate the realistic nature of the Compromise.*

The descendants of the Reform-Age *conservatives* were less eager to disturb the success of Deák, their former liberal opponent. In fact, they were really not in a position to do so, for they had also been backing a power-based compromise between the Hungarian political elite and the dynasty and consistently rejected political solutions based on self-determination especially if it offered a chance for the application of the principle of public representation which the lower classes and the national minorities could take part in without limitation. They were not in a position to argue against the concrete form and legal system of the Compromise, since it was one of their leaders, Count György Apponyi who first published the idea of the dualist reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy in his own journal in 1862. In this manner, as supporters of the Compromise, they acted only as silent partners to the deal and they were only saddened by the fact that the deal they had invented was not struck with them, for the simple reason that the conservatives who were referred to in public life as „guides of the Muscovites” had no significant social influence at this time.

Relevant contemporary criticism of the Compromise was given by *Lajos Kossuth* in emigration *and his followers*. Kossuth considered it a



*tragic compromise* and had listed his counter-arguments to his former comrade, Deák, well before the actual compromise was contracted. Kossuth discarded the Compromise primarily because he believed it to be a waiver of rights: waives those rights once achieved by the 1848 transition, which secured constitutional statehood based on national self-determination. A waiver of the legal system that secured the basic civil liberties to all, regardless of nationality or religious denomination. According to this critique, Deák gave up on these principles they jointly represented in the Reform-Era and in 1848. Moreover the Compromise was not one between the Cis-Leithan nations, and the Hungarian political nation, but a deal struck with the leadership of the absolutist Empire that oppressed the aspirations of nations. As he wrote: „It is the alliance of the conservative, reactionary and seemingly liberal Hungarian element to the freedom-hating Austrian Germans aiming at the oppression of other nationalities and ethnic groups”.

Kossuth finds the move a *tragic mistake* from the viewpoint that it lengthens the existence of an empire that has outlived itself both in its principles and in its structure, at the expense that the Hungarians will find themselves on the side of the Monarchy at the time of its collapse, sinfully pitched against the peoples of the region. Additionally, in the view of Kossuth and his supporters the consolidated Monarchy functioning as a „lightning conductor” second-rate power will not be able to bar the German and Russian expansionism (pan-German and pan-Slavic menace) let alone facilitate the realization of Hungarian dreams of attaining regional great power status.

Kossuth criticizes the Compromise also because it „isolates from the world” by artificially encapsulating a microcosm, where the major trends of Western-European growth cannot be felt and they cannot exert this influence. His critique of the Compromise also includes the argument that the legally masterful and balanced political construct has the obverse side of functioning as a rigid institution in which it becomes impossible for the Hungarian governing elite to accommodate to the changing political requirements.

In answer to the counter-argument that he is unrealistically exacting for the Hungarian political leaders, and there is hardly any chance for their real-political materialization, Kossuth says „We are not calling upon Deák to take charge of a revolution, but to help the Nation keep the door open on the future”.

Kossuth's real „counter-argument” to the contention that he had no real alternative was his Danubian Confederation Plan. The plan that replaced power-based compromise by an alliance of the peoples in the Danube valley based on the principles of national self-determination and equality, which in his view offered a better chance for catching up with the more developed Western half of Europe than that offered by the, in his view, improbable independent Hungarian nation-state or by the Habsburg Monarchy surviving as a second-rate European power based on obsolete principles.

*The fact that the Danubian Confederation was not embraced by the political leadership of any one of the involved nations, nor by any of the major European powers, did in fact seem to substantiate that the Compromise was an act of ‘realpolitical’, a good deal. And also that the critics of the Compromise were day-dreaming prophets who needed to be respected but was a mistake to believe them.*

## 2.2 THE „FIRST GENERATION” OF ASSESSORS OF THE COMPROMISE IN HUNGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Kossuth's view was hardly shared by others than his surroundings in emigration and a few steadfast and marginalized supporters at home (László Böszörményi, János Vidáts and the poet János Vajda). The leaders of the left-center party who showed the flag with Kossuth's name on it and tried to round up the masses that awaited „our father Kossuth” back, did not either question the basic principle of the Compromise. Their approach is characterized by Baron Frigyes Podmaniczky's derisive response to Kossuth's confederational ideas: „If even Kossuth thinks, that we cannot stand alone on our own, then I prefer to turn to the Germans in Vienna rather than to the Serbs (‘‘rácok’’) in Belgrade”. Kálmán Tisza and his circle criticized the given construction of the Compromise by dusting off the weapon of grievance politics skilfully used by the liberal opposition, they put forth such demands that are more suitable for securing political hegemony both in relation to the other half of the Empire and the national minorities at home. After the 1875 party fusion, the left-centre actually merged into Deák's party, making the majority of former critics the mainstay of the Compromise.

In this way the independent grievance based criticism of the Compromise set off on such a path of development, where it opt farther and farther away from Kossuth's views that extended national self-

determination to the domestic nationalities as well as to the neighbouring peoples. Same as from steadfastly demanding Reform-Era liberal representational democracy.

Apart from the methodological schools in Hungarian historiography two characteristic groups had taken shape by the turn of the century and by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century: one was a pro-Compromise group that gathered around the Academy and was loyal to the Viennese Court; the other was that of the *pro-Independence one under the leadership of Kálmán Thaly* whose favourite topic was the 16th–17th century Hungarian freedom-fights and could pride himself upon considerable results in publishing the sources of those periods. Their short-term retrospective opinion clearly illustrated the ultimate course of the independence-grievance position: *In their view the Compromise was a bad deal, almost treason, the abandonment of Hungarian statehood and independence. The Compromise, in their view, drifted the country into colonial status and deprived the government of the ability to take stronger action against the demands of the national movements. This confronted the principles of the Compromise with the principle of independent Hungarian power status.*

*Although their phraseology was almost identical with that of Kossuth, their freedom-fighter style, romantic approach, the aspects of national self-determination and democracy were subordinated to the aspect of pro-independence nationalism while almost entirely oblivious of the decisive factors in the regional or general European situation.*

At the turn of the century the former pro-Compromise school of historians were not able to react in a relevant manner to the strengthening of the radical anti-Compromise criticism of the nationalist-romantic historiography. The leading group that in the post-1867 decades included Mihály Horváth, Ferenc Pulszky, Pál Gyulai and Ferenc Salamon disbanded by the turn of the century. And the younger generation of historians spinned off this school into the conservative, the liberal democratic and then the radical middle-class lines. Among the causes the most important, by all means, is the gradual emptying and weakening of liberalism, of noblemen origin and limitations, which was increasingly unable to offer explanations, let alone solutions, in circumstances that had remarkably changed by the turn of the century.

The disgruntled social groups, adversely influenced by the actual realization of modernization or by the growing social and nationalist tensions wanted new political tendencies to represent their interests more effectively.

The same processes were found in the background of the strengthening of the (new) *Hungarian Conservatism* lacking social or political influence in the Reform-Era and at the time of the Compromise. As early as the 1870s and 1880s a greater impact was exerted by *János Asbóth*, who, apart from his publicism wrote a monograph on Hungarian conservative politics, and it deserves special mention that the phrase and the analytical construct „three generations” was first used by him. Asbóth, dusting off the set of arguments of the Reform Era young conservatives – Aurél Dessewffy and his friends –, and that of the post War of Independence pamphlet literature – including the writings of Zsigmond Kemény, Károly Vida, and also Pál Gyulai – he pointed out the nature of liberalism that is alien to the Hungarian people’s mind, the radical solutions of which drives into revolution in juxtaposition to the idealization of the wise conservative reforms. It was first in Asbóth’s writing that the approach and method that transformed the problems of Hungarian social and political development into dichotomies of which only the conservative solution was to be effective, and national. Confronted peaceful and fruitful reform (conservative) with destructive revolution (liberal) on the one hand and the doctrinaire ideological program adaptation (liberal) with the organic, constructive, wise and patient realism (conservatism). Legal scholar *Mihály Réz* also followed this trail who, in his work on the constitutional relationship between Austria and Hungary, published in 1910, put forth his idea on the basis of the increasingly widespread conservative thought that the Compromise was the culmination of centuries of development of Hungarian Statehood, an act of ‘realpolitical’ the greatest achievement of 19<sup>th</sup>-century Hungarian politics.

*In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century only the conservative group of historians were willing and able to defend the Compromise (and the values it represented).*

Undoubtedly the most outstanding personality of the Hungarian conservative historiography of growing influence, *Gyula Szekfű*, was under the influence of the German school of history of ideas. Nevertheless, he strove consciously to oppose the pro-independence school of historiography which he found below standard and harmful. His first publication of importance „The exiled Rákóczi” stirred up a storm of the independents’ emotions based on the insurrectionist freedom-fighter mythology. He presented the life of the exiled prince not only in an idealized manner but its shady and degrading aspects as well based on sources. As early as the publication of this piece he betrayed his incredible

creativity in processing special constructions. While relying on the Asbóth-tradition of conservatism he contrasted the emigration's distorted picture of the situation with the wise realism of those staying at home, the politically unrealistic day-dreaming with the nation-saving role of the conservative historic compromise. The dichotomies are provided with their embodiments: Rákóczi versus Károlyi. His work, „The Biography of the Hungarian state”, (first published in German in 1917) was followed by perhaps his most influential work: *The Three Generations*. The approach of the book published in 1920 already bore the imprints of the shock of the dissolution of historical Hungary. With Szekfű, the unfairness of the Trianon Peace Treaty, rejection of the actual (mutilated) form of Hungarian Statehood appeared to substantiate retrospectively the correctness of the main justification of the Compromise: the Monarchy was the only vehicle for the survival of historical Hungary.

That is why *the Compromise* in Szekfű's great analysis looking back on the long 19<sup>th</sup> century *is a realistic deal*, „'48 made real” the materialization of the wise, foresighted plans of the conservative reformers of the Reform Era. His pro-compromise answer to the key questions of the Hungarian development in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is offered by synthesizing the previous historiographical achievements and conservative thinking in a single construct. This construct is the three generations also in the title of his great work which symbolizes the tripartite composition of 19<sup>th</sup> century Hungarian History. The first generation, that of the Reform Era, are the ones who first respond to the challenges of modern western development. With bold movements *Szekfű* retailored the main front-line of the Reform Era that consisted, on the one side, of the liberal factions which offered a chance for modernization by means of self-determination, and the unification of interests as well as by aligning to the dominant tendencies, in Western Europe while engaged in harsh polemy with each other, whereas, on the other side, it consisted of the authoritarian, „cautiously progressing” conservatives. The lack of popularity of the Reform Era conservatives and the posterior unacceptability of a part of their views made *Szekfű* render Széchenyi a basis of comparison. Széchenyi's polemy in the 1840s, his individual views about the appearance of mass-politics and the feature of representative democracy facilitating the forming of government-opposition wagon-circles and his fears of changes getting out of control and turning into a destructive force provided the basis for a conservative reinterpretation of Széchenyi in Szekfű' construct „the greatest Hungarian” and not the Reform Era conservatives ridiculed

as the Habsburgs' "yes-men" could represent the right response to the challenge of western development. In this way the patient and cautious Széchenyian reforms were authenticated alternatives to the illusionary and doctrinaire radicalism of the liberal opposition. And to popularize it, Széchenyi, „the greatest Hungarian” was compared with Kossuth. Széchenyi authenticates Szekfű's cornerstone thesis: Conservative reform is the norm of modern Hungarian development, the only possible framework for it is the Habsburg Monarchy while the road to European integration is the alignment to the Christian–German cultural community. *That is why the Compromise was an act of 'realpolitical' and in this sense the realization of the wise conservative reforms of the Reform Era, therefore it is „the feasible '48” as against the real 1848.*

If this is so, how does Trianon follow from this, that is, the disintegration of historical Hungary? Szekfű's genius – and the meaning of the tripartite construct – is truly manifested in the solution of this question. The last political figures of the first generation and the better part of the second one that aligned to the former made the compromise while the opportunities offered by it were dissipated by the wrong decisions of the dualist era political elite – Szekfű points out. The wrong decision was in fact the adoption of reform-age liberal traditions and the rejection of the conservative solutions. This is how the constituent Hungarian element of Hungarian background fell into the background vis-à-vis the economic flourish of the superficially assimilated ethnic groups; the Hungarian country vis-à-vis the „alien” city. The consequences of the dominance of liberalism is highlighted in extreme fashion by the outrageous circumstance, that the two greatest Hungarians of the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century who, in Szekfű's view, wanted the same thing – turned against each other in a tragic way. *It was, thus, not the Compromise, but the rejection of principles and solutions incorporated in it that lead to Trianon – goes the Szekfű solution.*

Szekfű's volume became the most essential book in inter-war Hungary. It justified for a whole epoch the exclusively beneficial nature of conservative real-politics. His methodological tool of condensing the diversity of development into such dichotomies that presents one solution as impossible while the other one is made absolute; along with the personification of these dichotomies Széchenyi or Kossuth? Who was right? Who is Hungarian? A lasting imprint of his questions are still to be found when we take a walk in the streets of our towns: in the Catholic „pro-Austrian” (*labanc*) Trans-Danubia the answer lies in the names of

streets and main squares, and reading the inscriptions on the statues, it is Széchenyi. Same is the answer with Kossuth in the Trans-Tisza region of Protestant and insurgent (*kuruc*) tradition and partly in the region lying between the Tisza and Duna rivers.

### 2.3 THE „SECOND GENERATION”

The most eminent among Szekfű's critics was *László Németh*, the trend-setting leading personality in the group of *populist writers*. On the pages of journal *Tanú* (Witness) he drew up his critical position in a major article bearing Szekfű's name in its title. László Németh's approach is based on a cultural history viewpoint. His approach is determined by a certain fatalism, primarily the fate of falling behind western development. And that he considers the most critical problem of all-time Hungarian development the parting of ways between popular/folk culture and elite/high culture. This led to the situation that elite/high culture, having lost contact with its roots, became diluted or thin, and had got confused in a centuries-long process. In this manner the „result” of 19<sup>th</sup> century modernization was that an elite/high culture, separated from its historical traditions and popular/folk culture, got into a prevalent and ruling position that controlled „national culture” while popular/folk culture became minority culture in its own land and was gradually forced outside the scope of the self-assessment of elite/high culture. *László Németh's* explanation for this fateful deformation is that Hungarian society emerged from centuries of Habsburg oppression with a deformed and racially diluted leading elite in the period of modernization. Thus the Hungarian political elite did not manage to rise to truly leading positions of Hungarian society. Short of a sufficiently high standard leading group what happened in 1867 was inevitable. *In László Németh's view the Compromise of 1867 was a national tragedy*, a surrender which accomplished and finalized the former deformations and placed the future development of Hungarian society on a deterministic track. Although pro-independence terminological elements can be found in his phraseology, his line of argument essentially differs from the anti-Compromise criticism of the romantic nationalists. In his view, the real curse of 1867 was not the lack of nation-state independence, the „three-fourths dependence” but *that the Compromise was a moral trap*, with no way out of it. The moral trap of the dualist structure brought about the further moral decline and dilution of the Hungarian leading groups, while

the Hungarian people could not – in spite of modernization – become a middle-class society. *Németh's* premises that one cannot entirely reconstruct from his analyses, arguments or conclusions cannot be fully linked back to the early archetypal evaluations of the Compromise, nor to the later spin-off positions. As an intellectual and thinker of his contemporary middle-class he registered the one-sidedness of the genesis of Hungarian popular culture of his own description, with the exclusion of Hungarian peasant society from economic modernization, from middle-class well-being and civilizational achievements and, as numerical majority, from the political decision-making system of society, too, behind the one-sidedness. *His cultural and social history inquiries are to seek explanations with moral motivation for the – in his views – harmful phenomena. Criticism – as compensation – for the unfairness of history. He also derives his intellectual mission from peasant-folk society that is incapable of asserting its claims, its historical interests.*

Since Németh is also looking primarily for answers in the past for the issues of his day he – not unlike Szekfű – also engages in historicizing. Thus, despite his harsh criticism – he points out first Szekfű's anti-liberalism, his commitment to the Habsburgs, and the conscious narrowing of European cultural development to the Christian-German cultural community – his analysis betrays a great deal of similarity to Szekfű's constructs. His concept of „fateful tragedy” conceals the tendencies contrary to the manifest one and excludes raising the question whether or not there were crossroads, alternatives in modern-age Hungarian development. His diagnosis of the disorders of Hungarian intellectual culture and the problems surrounding the birth of national culture is thorough and profound as well as thought-provoking. His insightful approach to cultural history was shifted to the plane of social-history in a short-circuited manner. So his own critical views also include the converted *Szekfűist* contrasts: instead of „small Hungarian–great Hungarian” or „insurgent–loyalist” (kuruc–labanc) contrasts, his dichotomy is „thin(diluted)-Hungarian–deep-Hungarian”. László Németh's critique is consummated by his concept of Eastern Europe. In contrast to the imperial Compromise based on power logic and meant to preserve hegemony, he considers the East-European peoples' community of fate a morally viable alternative for self-determination that makes it possible for the small nations even with the Christian-German sphere of interest to develop solidarity and establish links beyond the confines of the German cultural community.



Among the opinions formed between the two world wars there is one, the shaping and transfigurations of *the Marxist position* that needs to be looked at not at all because of its contemporary impact or its quality, but owing rather to its later official, compulsory status. The later ill-famed József Révai, regarded, in his articles written in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, *the Compromise as a realistic deal. Thus the first Marxist standpoint was very similar to the conservative one.* Among these articles the one titled „Marx and the Hungarian Revolution” deserves special mention. His arguments rely mostly on those of the „classics” of Marxism who considered the intra-Monarchy compromise a „closing the 1848 revolutions from above” in accordance with the interests of the Austrian and Hungarian ruling classes. However they regarded this „class-compromise” positive on at least two counts: first of all, it opened up an avenue for economic growth and industrialization while, in turn, capitalism, would, as a rule, lead to the most advanced stage, i.e. communism by the creation of a working-class. Secondly, it consolidated the Habsburg Monarchy through settling nationality problems, and in this way helped contain the expansion of despotic czarist Russia. Toeing that line of logic Révai found 1867 a compromise which, though favored the ruling classes, was realistic, because it was consistent with the level of development of contemporary Hungarian society and its balance of forces. The pendulum swung in 1848 and the Compromise represented the „middle line” according to Révai. Relying on the Marxian anti-Russian argument prompted by the actual super-power constellation in Europe, Révai considered even Kossuth’s Danubian Confederation Plan such that would ultimately have a reactionary role.

*A remarkable shift had taken place in Révai’s position by the late 1930s.* It is not hard to identify the impact of the advance of fascism and the opening of the popular front by the communist movement. From 1938 on, his article „Marxism and populism” suggests that although he still considers the deal of 1867 a realistic compromise, great emphasis is placed on the fate of the middle class and the peasant masses, formally ignored by the Marxist approach. The negative side of the Compromise is that it was conducive to a kind of development in which the middle class remained subordinate and the peasant class turned out to be the loser. *From the point of view of the solution of the social problems – from the viewpoint of social revolution the Compromise could thus only partially solve what 1848 offered to solve completely. Around 1941, however, he finds it opportune to rehabilitate Kossuth as one who was among the first*

*to realize the significance of the Hungarian–Slavic anti-German alliance.*

*After 1945, with the disappearance of the menace of fascism the shift became a complete turnaround: 1848 as a real social revolution was contrasted with 1867 as the restoration of treasonable landed aristocracy. The subtler fluent stream of romantic pro-independence historical approach could now join the rising tide of Marxist historiography with an upside-down perspective. Hungary was again in a „semi-colonial” position in the post-Compromise Monarchy.*

*Another shift of emphasis occurred in 1948 on the first centenary of the 1848 revolution: with the institutionalization of proletarian dictatorship in Hungary now on „remote control” from abroad the emphasis on national independence had to be removed only to be replaced gradually by stressing the virtues of social radicalism. The progressive nature of the Kossuthist liberal opposition that was unable to step out of their „class confines” and were replaced by the „plebeian” youth placed among the historical heavy-weight Jacobean and the banner of program was carried by „revolutionary” Petöfi.*

*By this time the principles of national and social self-determination as well as the principle of „lawful” reform had been replaced by the norm of Bolshevik-type revolution inflated to mythic dimensions. Instead of the legislation of April, 1848, March 15, 1848 became the official symbol contrasted to the Compromise. The aspect of catching up with developed Europe and western development had been replaced in Hungarian historiography by the mandatory requirement of „teaming up” with the Slavic peoples.*

#### 2.4 THE „THIRD GENERATION”

Failed as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was, it ushered in a new era in the evaluation of the Compromise, and meant the emergence of a „newer generation” in Hungarian historiography. The slowly increasing tolerance of the Kádár restoration was being tasted and tested – excluding the questions of the legitimacy of system and its relations to the Soviet Union – by groups of younger historians.

The mainly *young economic historians affiliated with the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy* benefited from the research findings and methods in the west while they did not question the basic tenets nor the hegemony of the Marxist theory. As a result of their research work, however, they came forward publicly with their revision of the

Compromise. First at a conference in 1958 and then, two years later, at a debate organized by the History Commission of the Academy. *György Ránki and Iván T. Berend* and others took turns to prove the dynamism of capitalist economic growth after the Compromise, the results of the unfolding industrial revolution, and that Hungarian economy, after centuries of lagging behind the European development centre, managed to get onto such a modernization orbit that again offered approximation or catching up. *The Compromise was therefore a positive step; it opened an avenue for Hungarian economic modernization.*

Another direction or line of economic history research yielded internationally acknowledged results in the clarification of the European and regional determinations of Hungarian economy, the regionally differential sets of conditions of industrialization and modernization. It was pointed out as a summary of all this, that the pre-19<sup>th</sup> century backwardness and peripheral regional position were the reasons for not having developed sufficient internal conditions for a capitalist market economy and industrial modernization simultaneously with its first wave in Western Europe or even the Cis-Leithan region. The missing conditions were allowed to develop by the integration of Hungarian economy into the imperial market with the help of „comparative advantages”. *Thus the Compromise was not merely a positive step but also a realistic deal which had no real alternative.* This school, besides breaking with the traditional political history focus of Hungarian historiography and evaluating the Compromise from a constitutional-legal point of view. Also, while they utilized the results of international historical research, they presented a new and higher level of professional expertise as a requirement for the Hungarian historians.

*The younger historians teaching at ELTE University and elsewhere* intended to revise the approach of the Rákosi period by returning to the European norms of social development. György Tolnai's research on peasant textile industry in the Highland-region and the concept of „independent capitalist development”, and the debate on the national issue hallmarked by the name of Erik Molnár then *György Szabad* and co-workers made their name by their research on the Reform Era and Kossuth that facilitated the formation of a school that, engaged in polemy with the economic history school, *intended to restore the significance of the principle of national self-determination in evaluating all-time Hungarian historical development.* According to this school the liberal opposition in the Reform Era was able to harmonize the requirement

of national self-determination and that of European realignment into a program. Reconciling homeland and progress, national self-determination and economic development would have led to a balanced, western-type „middle-class development”. 1848 was a decisive step in this direction. *1867, however, opened the gate for a one-sided economic modernization in which significant groups of Hungarian society were not able to participate in the industrial growth, in forming a capitalist market. The Compromise was, therefore, a giving up of the Reform-Era principle of reconciliation, in fact, backing down from 1848 and loosing the chance for a balanced national-democratic development. This was the basic conclusion of this school.*

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed an unprecedented upswing of specialized research in Hungarian historiography. This was significantly encouraged by the decision to publish a new 10-volume History of Hungary. The deepening expertise of research and the refinement of positions in the debates between the two schools seemed to hold out the promise which the published volumes of the 10-volume synthesis have not been able to deliver: the value points of the present are overshadowed in the historical research on the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the Compromise also fades as an emphatic element of national mythology.

However, the political developments at the end of the 1980s placed those core issues of Hungarian social development which generated the debates on the assessment of the Compromise high on the agenda of the day. The fall of the socialist system, the democratic transition opened new vistas. After the 1989-90 democratic transition we are living in a new generation of debates on the Compromise, but these debates are now on the political scene, partly outside of the historiography, yet. And, however, historians are taking part in debates rather as politicians than scholars.

I think that coming years bring up the rebirth and reinterpretation of myths that could lead to an interpretation of the newer generation in assessment of the Compromise.

#### SUMMARY

The complicated inter-relatedness of the Compromise and its close links to the fundamental modern-age issues of Hungarian historical development explain the intense professional as well as the broader public interest in it. The repeatedly erupting debates about the assessment of the Compromise

indicate, as it were, when the answer to be given to the fundamental questions became current concern time and again in Hungarian political life. On the whole, this is how the evaluation of the Compromise became part of the national historical mythology and the assessors of the Compromise most often offered a straightforward or oblique clarification of their own value system and their self-definition by taking positions in relation to modern-age Hungarian social development.

**Balázs Venkovits**

**A Changing Experience of Transport, Travel, and Mobility:  
The Transatlantic Crossing to the United States in  
19<sup>th</sup>-century Hungarian Travel Writing**

The nineteenth century brought about major changes in transportation and travel that facilitated the movement of goods, people, and ideas across countries and continents. These included the commercialization of travel, the widespread use of the railroad and steamships, as well as the fact that people began to see nature and its beauties differently, this providing a new incentive for travel for many.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, political and economic trends served as push and pull factors motivating people to leave their home countries and visit and/or settle in other regions. Such developments, in turn, influenced how people acquired knowledge about and understood the world, as well as the way they presented their experience to fellow citizens who were “traveling” in the comfort of their armchairs, reading reports from travelers and emigrants visiting distant and often little-known lands. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Ocean became the scene of one of the largest waves of migration with millions of people traveling from Europe, including Hungary, to the United States. The transatlantic voyage was also altered during the century: it gradually became cheaper, faster, and less demanding. The United States became more and more accessible.

First a few exceptional travelers, later hundreds of thousands of emigrants from Hungary embarked on the transatlantic voyage with the purpose of visiting the United States. As Tibor Glant noted, however, a journey from Hungary to North America involved several parts and the transatlantic crossing was only one, even if the most significant section.<sup>2</sup> First, Hungarians had to reach a port where they could embark on a voyage to the New World—this in itself was often full of challenges, especially in the first half of the century. The European section was followed by the chief part of the journey: the transatlantic voyage itself. During the century major changes took place here, including a shift from the use of

1 Sándor Gyömrei, *Az utazási kedv története* [The history of the pleasure of travel]. Budapest, 1934. 12.

2 Tibor Glant, *Amerika, a csodák és csalódások földje: Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok képe a hosszú XIX. század magyar utazási irodalmában* [America, the land of miracles and disappointments: The image of the United States in Hungarian travel writing during the long 19<sup>th</sup> century]. Debrecen, 2013. 35.

sailing ships to steam ships; while with the former it could take several weeks to reach America early in the century, by the end of the era the length of the voyage decreased to only a few days. After arrival, a third major trip awaited many Hungarians — travel within the United States — sometimes looking for attractive sites to visit while in other cases seeking new opportunities, new jobs, and even a new life.

Travel accounts written by people crossing the Atlantic stand as witness to the changes such a challenging journey underwent and the way the transatlantic voyage was perceived by Hungarians: as a place of transformations, a space of reckoning, an opportunity for social and political commentary, etc. Travelogues reflect technological changes, improvements in travel and the varied perceptions of mobility, while they also reveal a lot about the travelers and their home (including the reasons for leaving the mother country). In this paper, I am going to examine representative travel accounts (selected primarily due to their popularity and influence and/or their unique features) detailing the transatlantic voyage in the long nineteenth century<sup>3</sup> and the effect of technological changes on the voyage itself as well as its perception. I will discuss how Hungarians could actually reach the United States at different points in time, focusing on the first two sections of this trying journey.

#### THE UNITED STATES AS A DESTINATION FOR HUNGARIANS

During the nineteenth century, the United States became increasingly attractive and at the same time more and more accessible from Europe. This resulted in a growing number of visitors to the country also from Hungary and this meant that reports (both published and unpublished) also multiplied with time. The 1830s in Hungary brought about a wave of change as regards the United States and its place in Hungarian thinking. Prior to this period “the Hungarian public received only scarce, indirect and belated information about the U.S. from random newspaper articles, encyclopedias, or translations of foreign travelogues, geographical or historical works.”<sup>4</sup> However, from the first Hungarian travel writers on (the first travelogue was published in 1834) people at home could get

---

3 In this paper this refers basically to the time between the publication of the first Hungarian travelogue on the United States (1834) and the beginning of the First World War.

4 Anna Katona, *Hungarian Travelogues on Pre-Civil War America*. = *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, 1971. no. 5. 52.

new information about the North American country from Hungarian authors describing their first-hand experience of the US and significantly contributing to the evolution of its image in Hungary.

For early travelers the United States often served as a place of study and a possible model to be followed by their home country. Irina V. Popova Nowak claims, similarly to Glant, “in terms of travel abroad, Hungarian accounts outlined two geographically and symbolically polar destinations: travels to the West that were travels to the future, and travels to the East that were travels to the past.”<sup>5</sup> Travel to the West, especially during the Reform Era in Hungary (from 1825 to 1848), was seen as a form of education and the countries in these regions were often perceived as possible models for Hungary in terms of politics, technological development, and economic modernization.<sup>6</sup> This was clearly visible with regard to the United States.

For others arriving in greater number in the second half of the century the country represented the land of opportunities and a possibility for a better life than at home. This was true for revolutionaries leaving Hungary after 1849 as well as economic migrants at the end of the century; during the period of New Immigration (from 1870 to World War I) alone, more than a million Hungarians immigrated to the United States. For tourists, the United States was an attractive destination both for its urban development and natural scenery and their visits were made easier by the appearance of travel agencies, travel guides, and the improvement of infrastructure in North America. Besides these groups there were others visiting and writing about the country, including scientists, government officials, etc.<sup>7</sup> The different reasons for leaving the mother country and alternative objectives in the United States (i.e. their invisible luggage) were often already discernible in reports of the transatlantic voyage.

Hungarian travelers to the United States during the nineteenth century can be grouped together in various ways. Anna Katona, in her often-quoted works on Hungarian travel writing on the United States, distinguishes between Pre- and Post-Civil War Hungarian travelers. Glant refines this kind of approach and distinguishes three separate periods and

---

5 Irina V. Popova-Nowak, *The Odyssey of National Discovery: Hungarians in Hungary and Abroad, 1750-1850*. In: *Under Eastern Eyes: A Comparative Introduction to East European Travel Writing on Europe*, Eds. Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis. Budapest, 2008. 211.

6 Glant, *Csodák és csalódások*, 34.

7 See Glant, *Csodák és csalódások* for a detailed list and study.



groups, based not on historical events in the US but rather in Hungary. Glant distinguishes travelers from the Reform Age, Kossuth emigrants, and the travelers during the Dual Monarchy.<sup>8</sup>

The different perceptions of the US by these groups have been widely noted by scholars. As Katona claims, “the eleven travelogues published in Hungary between 1877 and 1900 bear little or no resemblance to the ten travel books written between 1834 and 1863.”<sup>9</sup> András Vári goes as far as to claim that “the model country of the Reform Era became the land of threats by 1890.”<sup>10</sup> Tibor Glant argues that travel writing of the period was more complex than what such statements would reflect and there were many more accounts written than examined before. Hungarian travel writing on the United States experienced its heyday between 1893 and 1908 and Glant concludes that although critical voices became more emphatic, the myth of the land of opportunities still survived in both a political and, especially, economic sense.<sup>11</sup> Many Hungarian travelogues became more critical of the US in this period and called attention to the downsides of the Gilded Age:

Bölöni and his fellow travelers in pre-Civil War America hailed in the U.S. a land of freedom, equality and plenty. To their counterparts in the second half of the last century America was far from being an Eldorado anymore and they tried hard to dispel the myth of America in Europe and Hungary as a fairy-land of plenty where ‘fried pigeons would fly into your mouth’ whenever you open it.<sup>12</sup>

According to Glant, the anti-American sentiment of the era as expressed in some of these writings was due to three main factors: “a major shift in the way Hungarians came to view the future of their own country, an imperial approach to the New World, and large-scale trans-

---

8 See footnotes 2 and 4 above.

9 Anna Katona, *Nineteenth-Century Hungarian Travelogues on the Post-Civil War United States*. = *Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok*, 1973. no. 7. 35.

10 András Vári, *Fenyegetések földje. Amerika a 19. század második felében – magyar szemmel* [The land of threats: America in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – through Hungarian eyes]. = *Korall*, 2006. no. 26. 153.

11 Tibor Glant, *Dualizmuskori Amerika-kép, utazási irodalom és paródia* [The image of America during the Dual Monarchy, travel writing and parody]. In: *Essays in Honor of György Novák*. Ed. Zoltán Varga. Szeged, 2012. 79–99.

12 Katona, *Post-Civil War*, 37.

Atlantic migration.”<sup>13</sup> I am going to use Glant’s classification and examine the travelers from the perspective of the experience of the transatlantic voyage; less attention is given to the development of the US image in Hungary, which occupies a central theme in other scholarly studies of the same texts.

#### THE FIRST SECTION: TOWARDS THE PORT

The initial, and especially in the first part of the century, already challenging section of the journey to the US involved reaching a European port with ships heading to North America. This could mean a journey to Germany (e.g. Hamburg) or England (e.g. Liverpool), while later many Hungarians embarked on their voyages from Fiume (Rijeka). While traveling by stagecoach and other slower means of transport, this section could already take several days as we will see. Thus, the time spent with traveling could be used to visit various European countries and cities. Sándor Bölöni, who is known as the writer of the first Hungarian travel account on the United States, did exactly this. Before visiting the US, the principal destination of his journey, he traveled in Western Europe (Germany, France, England) and shared his experience with his readers in his publication; the European section also became a worthy part of the journey to the United States.<sup>14</sup> With advancements in technology, the European segment was shortened, it became more marginal in terms of reaching the United States, and travelers often only saw and presented “snapshots” of places they passed by. For Nendtvich, for example, the European section was much less emphatic already: “Our crossing of Europe was only a flutter. As we had only four months for the entire trip there was no other choice but to fly through Europe so that we have more time for America. Germany was left behind only in a few days.”<sup>15</sup> Such a trend was even more visible with the more extensive use of the railroad by travelers as we will see.

In the first half of the century, the journey within Hungary was already rather uncomfortable and capricious for travelers. Béla Czére in

---

13 Tibor Glant, *Travel Writing as a Substitute for American Studies in Hungary*. = *Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies*, 2010. no. 1.-2. 175.

14 Sándor Bölöni Farkas, *Utazás Észak-Amerikában* [Journey in North America]. Kolozsvár, 1834. Translations, unless otherwise noted, will be mine.

15 Károly Nendtvich, *Amerikai utazásom* [My journey in America]. Pest, 1858. 4. Translation mine.

his insightful and detailed study of transportation in 19<sup>th</sup>-century Hungary introduces the conditions of roads at the time, the type of vehicles used, and various technical details calling attention to significant challenges travelers had to face.<sup>16</sup> Terrible road conditions characterized most of Hungary and although there had been various attempts to improve conditions, up to the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century this situation remained practically unchanged.<sup>17</sup> In the Great Plains region there were no permanent roads built until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century due to the swamps and flooding in the area.<sup>18</sup> In the period when the first travelers discussed here started on their journeys, most of the roads were largely neglected and especially in rainy weather they were practically impassable. This was especially true of places where no proper materials for road building were available nearby.

This meant that even without any special problems encountered only a few miles could be completed a day.<sup>19</sup> This is true even if the use of the coach became more and more widespread in Europe and gradually in Hungary as well. Traveling on horse was replaced by traveling in stagecoaches on longer distances. These became more and more comfortable, with different styles of vehicles appearing depending on class, the purpose and length of the journey, etc. The stagecoach service became more regular in Hungary as well from the 1750s with improvements taking place especially in the 1820s and 30s. Traveling by stagecoach provided the most reliable form of land transport before the railroad; it was limited only by the accessibility of roads and the cost of travel.

The Reform Era brought changes in transportation in Hungary and while the major improvement came about with the railroad, there were plans for developing the road network as well. We can claim that during the first part of the century (to the Revolution) there was significant expansion in terms of length, the number of public roads and bridges, and one could witness developments in travel by stagecoach as well partly because of better road conditions, stations for changing horses, the appearance of numerous competitors, etc.<sup>20</sup>

---

16 Béla Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése a 19. században (1780-1914)* [Transportation in Hungary during the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1780-1914)]. Budapest, 1997.

17 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 23.

18 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 9.

19 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 12.

20 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 80-82.

Slower travel by stagecoach provided opportunities for travelers to pay more attention to the landscape, to travel more flexibly, and also to ponder upon the changes perceived and associated with movement (in this case towards the West). Bölöni traveled through Transylvania, Hungary, and Germany, reaching France and then moving on towards England. The description of the journey towards and through the West already tells a lot about Bölöni's perceptions of the world and the movement in space provided him an opportunity to comment not only on the landscape but on people, culture, etc. His descriptions of visits to Paris, the French countryside, Belgium, Holland, England, Scotland, and Ireland stand as witness for his expression of wonder regarding the unfamiliar and provided a basis for comparisons between home and abroad. Travel in his case as well, as Carl Thompson defines it, was a constant "negotiation between self and other that is brought about by movement in space" and "all travel writing is at some level a record or product of this encounter, and of the negotiation between similarity and difference that it entailed."<sup>21</sup>

There is little if any discussion of actual means and details of traveling in Bölöni's account. Types of transportation are mentioned only if connected to progress in Bölöni's mind. In England, for example, steamships and railroads are already seen and used by the Hungarian and the latter is especially associated with advancement in his account. The railway is presented as a superior way of traveling and a new experience for travelers:

From Liverpool to Manchester we took the steam wagon. The steam wagon is one of the largest triumphs of the human mind. At the end of the city about 130 of us sat on the wagon and completed this trip to Manchester [...] under one hour and half a minute. But sometimes it runs this distance under 58 and even 57 minutes. Neither a bird, nor the fastest running horse can travel this fast. One can feel a special sense of pleasure when from one city he suddenly finds himself in another, far-away town.<sup>22</sup>

Ágoston Haraszthy, in his book published ten years after Bölöni's and similarly titled *Utazás Éjszakamerikában* (Travels in North America), summarized the European section of his journey between Pest and London in much more detail, providing insights into the "mechanics

---

21 Carl Thompson, *Travel Writing*. New York, 2011. 9-10.

22 Bölöni, *Utazás*, 9.

of the journey” as well.<sup>23</sup> He included insightful information not only with regard to the cost but also the forms of transportation used as well as the length of the different sections. He already used the railroad in Germany and steamships in different parts but he is more pragmatic than Bölöni and (just as in the rest of his account) focuses more on technical details, numbers, and statistics, than questions of progress in general; this attitude was also influenced by the different purposes of travel, of course. Haraszthy summarized his European journey that took more than six days the following way: the journey from Pest to Vienna by stagecoach took 36 hours, he used the same means to Prague and then to Dresden (36 and 26 hours respectively). To Leipzig he already traveled on the train, the journey taking only 3 hours. He used the steamship to get to Hamburg and then to London (for 26 and 36 hours), this way the entire journey took him 6 days and 12 hours between Pest and London.

Haraszthy also included the cost of different sections as well as what he paid for food and accommodation and it is visible from his account that reaching the United States was not an easy and certainly not a cheap enterprise even if we consider the European part of the journey only. Katona also emphasized that the first travelers to the United States from Hungary were representatives of the nobility as they had the money and the opportunity to travel.<sup>24</sup>

The second half of the century brought about major improvements in the Hungarian road network, especially after the Revolution and during the Dualist Era. Stagecoach use continued to grow (in 1850 there were 9.8 million passengers, by 1867 this increased to 39 million) but gradually the railroad became to be seen as the superior form of travel and most resources were allocated to the development of this new means of transport.<sup>25</sup> The opportunity to travel for the masses came about also with the railroad (together with the commercialization of travel<sup>26</sup>).

The railroad was often associated with progress and it brought about major changes not only in terms of commerce, communication, and the economy in general but, naturally, in travel as well. It influenced the way (as seen above in Bölöni’s quote) the way people sensed and related to the places visited and this provided a new travel experience. “Annihilation

---

23 Ágoston Haraszthy, *Utazás Északamerikában* [Journey in North America]. Pest, 1844. 17-20.

24 Katona, *Pre-Civil War*, 51.

25 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 117 and 167.

26 For more information on the latter see: Gyömrei, *Utazási Kedv*, 145 ff.

of space and time' was the early nineteenth-century characterization of the effect of railroad travel. The concept was based on the speed that the new means of transport was able to achieve. A given spatial distance, traditionally covered in a fixed amount of travel time, could suddenly be dealt with in a fraction of that time."<sup>27</sup> Railroad travel was not only faster but it also changed the way travelers related to the landscape and experienced the journey. "The empirical reality that made the landscape seen from the train window appear to be 'another world' was the railroad itself, with its excavations, tunnels, etc." and "[...] the machine ensemble [...] interjected itself between the traveler and the landscape. The traveler perceived the landscape as it was filtered through the machine ensemble."<sup>28</sup>

The Liverpool and Manchester Railway mentioned by Bölöni was opened in 1830 starting the first steam passenger service; of course steam locomotives had been used and passenger railway service had been introduced years earlier. However, it was this line that proved the viability of railroad transport and had a great influence on railroad building both in England and worldwide. In the 1830s steam-powered German railroad lines were opened, the Leipzig-Dresden line and the first Austrian line were also available for travelers.

The success of the railroad was obvious by the 1830s so construction became a central issue in Hungary as well.<sup>29</sup> It was only in 1846 that the first steam railroad line was inaugurated, connecting Pest and Vác. In 1847 the Pest-Szolnok line was opened, followed by several others later on. The immediately noticed positive effects of railroad travel were its speed and the shortening of travel time as mentioned above as well.<sup>30</sup> The latter decreased to about one fourth or one fifth of the time required before. The wide ranging social and economic benefits of the railroad were realized gradually and especially after 1867 a new era started in Hungarian transportation history when a "railroad building fever" could be witnessed (even if disrupted sometimes) that resulted in a huge expansion of the network.<sup>31</sup>

---

27 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey. The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*. Oakland, 1986. 33.

28 Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey*, 24.

29 For further information on the history of Hungarian railroad construction see: János Majdán, *A vasszekér diadala: A magyarországi vasútépítés 1914-ig* [The triumph of the iron wagon: Railroad construction in Hungary to 1914]. Budapest, 1987.

30 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 67.

31 Czére, *Magyarország közlekedése*, 123 and 131.

As mentioned above, railway travel changed the perception of the European section of the journey from Hungary to the United States and travel accounts from the second half of the nineteenth century prove this. Travel speeded up, it also became less flexible, and thus the journey itself became more practical, more of a means only of reaching the ports while visits to European cities were not necessarily part of the US trip any more. This is especially true for emigrants who did not want to do this and in most cases did not even have the means to spend a lot of time in Europe before the transatlantic crossing. Jenő Bánó traveling to the United States in 1889 was not a typical emigrant, he was much better off than the average migrant as we will see from his description of the voyage, but he still did not offer too much information on the European section of his journey. He traveled from Eperjes (Prešov) to Bremen (expressing the difficulties of leaving behind his family and home country) and emphasized the speed of train travel:

The train, with the few-minute-long stops at the stations, continued on its way at a dizzying speed, such a speed was only surpassed by the flight of my thoughts as by the time the train reached Oderberg, Wroclaw, Berlin, Hannover, and finally Bremen, I have already completed the long ocean voyage in my thoughts [...] <sup>32</sup>

Bánó reached Bremen in 30 hours. Before his ship left, he had one and a half days for visiting Bremen. The description of the city is positive but rather short, also reflecting a decreasing interest in the European section of the journey. This seems to be the case with regard to tourists visiting the United States at the turn of the century, too. Mrs. Béla Mocsáry did not even mention the European section of her journey in detail while Mrs. István Jakabffy described only Hamburg very briefly and without any close attention to details. They focused on the American trip and what they wanted to see there.

#### CROSSING THE ATLANTIC

The transatlantic voyage posed a major challenge for most people traveling to North America during the nineteenth century. The length and cost of the journey were the main obstacles for early travelers while

---

<sup>32</sup> Jenő Bánó, *Úti képek Amerikából [Images of a journey in North America]*. Budapest, 1890. 10-11.

for those in later groups the challenge was often represented by the lack of knowledge in terms of language and concerning the United States, the often bad circumstances of the journey, etc. As seen above, the first section was already difficult but the longest and most demanding section was, of course, the transatlantic crossing.

The nineteenth century saw a tremendous improvement in sea travel, not only regarding speed but also the level of comfort, costs, services, etc. Bölöni stressed these changes that were to continue with great speed later in the century:

Only sixty years ago, when the United States was not free yet, the crossing of the ocean caused lot of worries for and required great determination by the English as well, who live on the sea. Then it took months and usually half a year to cross the ocean. [...] However, since then the science of shipping took enormous steps forward.<sup>33</sup>

Improvement came with the appearance of sailing ships referred to as packet ships or packet liners that carried both freight and passengers. Their major innovation was their regularity as they departed port on a regular schedule. The first of the packet lines was the Black Ball Line sailing between New York and Liverpool from 1818. “The typical packet sailed between American and British ports, and the ships themselves were designed for the North Atlantic, where storms and rough seas were common.”<sup>34</sup> For several decades, until the steam ship finally took over, packet ships were the most efficient means of crossing the Atlantic even if they were not too fast as they were not specifically designed for speed. Bölöni introduced Hungarians to the innovations and the improvements brought about by the packet ships in his book: these ships, he wrote, started from the main ports of Europe on specific days of the month and regularly, providing a more reliable and comfortable service for travelers.<sup>35</sup>

Even if packet ships made the crossing more predictable and reliable, the voyage itself was still full of difficulties for contemporary travelers. Depending on the weather, the voyage could still take more than a month, passengers feared of a possible sinking, suffered from sea sickness, etc.

---

33 Bölöni, *Utazás*, 11.

34 Robert McNamara, Packet Ships. Available at: <http://history1800s.about.com/od/1800sglossary/g/packetdef.htm>. Date of Access: Nov. 30, 2014.

35 Bölöni, *Utazás*, 12.



These became standard elements (among others) of the descriptions of the voyage since Bölöni. Besides possible emerging hazards, the voyage was often perceived as boring, long, and very demanding, especially when the ship was not moving at all due to lack of wind.<sup>36</sup> At the same time the long days spent on board also offered a chance to think about home and abroad, expectations about the New World, the description of the character of fellow travelers, etc. and this way also allowed for political and social commentary.

Bölöni's voyage took 39 days, for Haraszthy the crossing required 42. For Károly Nendtvich (1858) it was only 12 days, which shows the remarkable advancement of technology in just two decades. Nendtvich wrote: "We reached the American coast at 11:20 on July 18; thus on the eleventh day after leaving Liverpool and during this time we completed 2,394 nautical miles, i.e. we traveled 217 miles a day."<sup>37</sup> The time of crossing decreased and became less dependent on weather conditions with the appearance and spreading of steamships and by the turn of the century a crossing would typically be around 10 days (of course depending on the actual port of departure, the number of stops, etc.). The *New York Daily Times* wrote retrospectively in 1891: "the old packet ship filled all the wants of transit in their day. They are no longer a necessity. Progress has put steamers in their place."<sup>38</sup> From the 1850s on, the use of steamships became more and more widespread and by the 1870s sailing ships crossing the ocean became a rarity.

Kossuth emigrants already arrived to the US mostly on steamships. The U.S. Steam Frigate *Mississippi* carried many former revolutionaries living in exile in Turkey to North America in 1851. Károly László, Kossuth's secretary during the Governor's American tour, described the voyage in his diary (published later in book form).<sup>39</sup> The circumstances of the voyage itself were different not only because of the changes in technology but also because of the background of travelers and purpose of their journey. Besides the description of meals, other people on board, the standard topics of storms and sea sickness, László used the transatlantic

---

36 Bölöni, *Utazás*, 16-17.

37 Nendtvich, *Amerikai utazásom*, 38.

38 Days of the Old Packet. *New York Daily Times*. Dec. 13, 1891. Available at: <http://www.theshipslist.com/accounts/packets.shtml>. Date of Access: Nov. 30, 2014.

39 Károly László, *Napló-töredék az 1849-iki menekülteket, internáltakat, különösen Kossuthot és környezetét illetőleg* [Diary fragment concerning the 1849 emigrants and internees, especially Kossuth and his entourage]. Budapest, 1887.

crossing as a space and time for pondering upon his “farewell to Old Europe” and expectations regarding the “land of freedom” awaiting them: talking about the past and their doubtful future. Forced to leave Hungary in 1849 and Europe in 1851, the transatlantic voyage provided the perfect opportunity to think about issues related to a failed War of Independence and his and fellow travelers’ role in the events.

Pál Rosti, another participant of the Revolution who went to North America not with Kossuth but after studying in Germany and France, also traveled on a steam ship in 1856, departing from France and reaching the United States in 16 days. He described the experience of the voyage in a series of articles in *Hazánk s a Külföld* in 1867. He provided a fascinating and entertaining account, as he said, “as if the reader was also traveling with him.” The farewell to the Old World and the expectations regarding the land of opportunities appeared in his text just as in László’s, contrasting the two worlds on the two sides of the Atlantic: “how calm and comfortable life is here in Europe [...] and see how merry and bustling life is over there [...] the New World appeared in my mind in newer and newer images struggling and progressing continuously.” At the same time, the description of the transatlantic crossing also revealed his background; Rosti came from the upper class and this resulted in a completely different type of travel experience that was much more enjoyable:

We had lots of fun after lunch. We held a rope climbing competition with the sailors, a steeplechase race on the deck, competing on all fours and jumping over small obstacles. And in the evening we played “Schwarz Peter,” the game probably well known by everyone at home, together with the women, “blackening” each other to a great degree, which provided an occasion for a lot of laughter.

Probably the most significant group of “travelers” in the second half of the century (simply based on their sheer number as well) included the immigrants leaving Hungary between 1870 and the First World War. By this time the cost of the voyage decreased significantly and crossing time was reduced but for them it still represented a major challenge. They had to leave behind their home probably for a longer time, the price (although low compared to earlier times) was still relatively high for them and for many this was the first journey away from home; thus they had no experience in organizing the journey itself. The different emotional

stance towards travel is also visible in accounts written by people who left Hungary in search of better opportunities abroad.<sup>40</sup>

The journey, and the transatlantic voyage in particular, was most difficult for poor migrants leaving the home country and maybe even their villages for the first time. They had to get passports, buy their tickets, learn English (at least at a very basic level)<sup>41</sup>, and organize their new life without knowing too much about the New World. Most of the ships left from Liverpool, but Hamburg and Bremen remained important ports for Hungarian migrants, with Fiume also serving as an alternative place of departure and one supported by the Hungarian government (from Fiume the voyage was longer, it could take 20 days).<sup>42</sup> German ports remained dominant during the unprecedented wave of migration, accounting for the large majority of Hungarian emigrants.

Major differences can be seen in the circumstances of the voyage depending on how much money one had and such differences were present even within the same ship, concerning first and third-class passengers. Jenő Bánó serves as a great example for a migrant who left Hungary for economic reasons but who was better off than the typical emigrant and thus could travel under better circumstances: “[t]his ship is equipped with most comfort and one might as well say luxury,” wrote Bánó about his ship, “light is provided by electricity, heating by gas, its rooms, besides the numerous cabins and nicely decorated dining hall, also included an elegantly furnished lady’s salon, a reading and smoking room, as well as a barber’s salon and bath with full comfort.”<sup>43</sup> Bánó continued and described his accommodation the following way: “[f]ortunately, I could use my cabin alone and thus my feeble dreams were not disturbed by the snoring of a German fattened on beer or a raw-meat eating Englishman, or, for that matter a Russian who has become tipsy from whiskey.” This was in sharp contrast with the circumstances of the majority of migrants who traveled on third class, in the cheapest and most uncomfortable parts of the ship (the steerage), crammed together with numerous other travelers.

---

40 See for example Bánó, *Úti képek*, 9-10.

41 On the last aspect see for example: István Kornél Vida and Balázs Venkovits, *Strange New Wor(l)ds: English Language Books for Hungarian New Immigrants; With Two Case Studies*. In *Hungarian-American Ties: Essays and Studies in Intercultural Links and Contacts*. Ed. Zsolt K. Virágos. Debrecen, 2013. 200–213.

42 This overview is mostly based on István Kornél Vida, *Megy a hajó éjjel-nappal mindig* [The ships keeps moving day and night]. Unpublished Manuscript.

43 Bánó, *Úti képek*, 13.

A special type of travel account was written by Sándor Tonelli in 1907 based on his voyage on *Ultonia*<sup>44</sup> and his book grants us insights into this type of crossing. He was a sociologist who disguised himself as an emigrant and conducted a sociological survey, traveling together with people on third class. He witnessed and took note of the terrible conditions and corruption and also illustrated his account with photographs that tell us a very different story of the transatlantic crossing than what one can get from Bánó's account. With regard to men's accommodation, for example, Tonelli wrote:

My home, the largest sleeping quarters ... were a large, uneven room which extended from one side of the ship to the other. It received light through several small, round windows, but its middle section remained dark even in broad daylight... There were about 300 berths. Each was prepared by fixing a wire network on four iron poles which had a straw mattress on it, with very little straw.<sup>45</sup>

He also noted the catastrophic hygiene conditions found on the ship:

The stink dominating the sleeping quarters can only be imagined, but impossible to describe. The rooms of any military barrack were sanatoriums as compared to the sleeping quarters of the *Ultonia*. The strongest smell was in our sleeping quarters as all the doors of rooms around and under us opened towards this place. Everyone was smoking the pipe here and the breath and bodily vapor of hundreds of people condensed into steam or gas.<sup>46</sup>

While travelers on the first class were well entertained and had good opportunities for relaxation, those traveling on the third class could not leave the crowded quarters and part of the deck designated for them; entertainment was provided by stories told by people (especially those who have completed such a voyage before, traveling between Hungary and the US multiple times as 'birds of passage'), as well as games and gambling.

44 Sándor Tonelli, *Ultonia: Egy kivándorló hajó története* [*Ultonia: The story of an emigrant ship*]. Budapest, 1929. For a more detailed study of Tonelli's book see: István Kornél Vida: 'An Immigrant in Disguise': Sándor Tonelli's *Ultonia* – A Written Photograph. In. *East Central Europe in Exile. Volume I: Transatlantic Migrations*. Ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz, Newcastle, 2013. 141–156.

45 Tonelli, *Ultonia*, 27. Translation from Vida's article, see the footnote above.

46 Tonelli, *Ultonia*, 28-29.

There is one more group of travelers that should be mentioned because their experience of the transatlantic journey offers other insights and aptly reflects changes of the time. Tourists who visited the United States for its natural beauties, tourist attractions as part of the commercialized travel market now using travel guides, staying in hotels, and focusing on specific attractions recommended for such visitors, also often provided accounts of their journeys. Such a trip was certainly not affordable for everyone and due to the status of the tourists, the voyage was most often completed under good conditions. Traveling by the turn of the century became safer, more comfortable, and less demanding; partly as a result of this, more and more women could also embark on longer journeys and such an act was not seen as so extraordinary as before. The two examples provided here are also from two female tourists, Mrs. Jakabffy and Mrs. Mocsáry (the former traveling to the US with her son in 1893, the latter traveling alone to the United States (1902) and Mexico (1905)). The description of the voyage tells a lot about their background, they witness similar conditions as Bánó did: “The dining hall, drawing and smoking rooms of *Columbia* were like many temples of luxury.”<sup>47</sup> They were also aware that such an experience was not available for everyone: “The greatest luxury called comfort which might not be available on land by many even for an entire lifetime of work.”<sup>48</sup>

It is also an important development that the transatlantic voyage became attractive in itself for tourists, of course enjoying the luxury of upper class travel: Mrs. Jakabffy emphasized that “the sea voyage itself deserves to become an objective of travel itself. That wonderful one-week ocean life is worth traveling by the railroad and cars for days and bothering with hoteliers, customs officers, and porters.”<sup>49</sup> Mrs. Mocsáry expressed a similar attitude where the transatlantic crossing became worthy on its own and served as a tourist attraction, the ocean itself providing enough entertainment:

Most people would believe that such a long sea voyage as the one between Europe and the Antilles and Mexico is boring. What could be interesting about everyday uniformity? This, however, is not mentioned by the travelers often visited by sea sickness either and those not so

---

47 Istvánné Jakabffy, *A nagy számok honában* [In the home of great numbers]. Budapest, 1893. 12.

48 Ibid.

49 Jakabffy, *A nagy számok honában*, 11-12.

sensible to the restless waves of the sea find such a sea voyage especially enjoyable and even varied.<sup>50</sup>

The ocean presented a very different image and experience due to the purpose of the journey and the background of these travelers.

As we have seen, during the nineteenth century there were major transformations and improvements in the circumstances of the transatlantic voyage. The travel accounts describing the crossing were influenced by the available transportation technology of the time (the length of the voyage, perceived hazards), the class and background of the traveler (who they met as fellow travelers, how much they could enjoy the crossing), as well as the objective of the journey and expectations regarding the New World (the journey providing an opportunity for commenting on home and abroad, past and future, familiar and unfamiliar). The image of the United States also depended on how people arrived and what they brought with themselves in their invisible luggage already from the transatlantic voyage which was a major adventure for most. At the same time, for a lot of travelers crossing the Atlantic was only the beginning of a life-changing experience.

---

50 Béláné Mocsáry, *Mexikói utazásom: úti jegyzetek* [My journey in Mexico: travel notes]. Budapest, 1905. 3.



## István Kornél Vida

### “His Second Beau Ideal of Statesman?”: The Invocation of Thomas Jefferson in Abraham Lincoln’s Political Career<sup>1</sup>

On February 12, 1809 a frontier couple living in a small log cabin on the obscure Sinking Spring Farm in Hardin County, Kentucky had a visit from the stork. The parents named the infant Abraham, after his grandfather. The little Abraham Lincoln, as he was this new member of the family of modest means, seemed to be destined for hard physical agricultural labor through his life. It was much more than the, then-considerable, 500-mile distance that separated him from the White House in Washington, D.C. His life, however, was to take a different course.

In the very same February, the occupant of the Executive Mansion was getting ready to pack his things and leave Washington, D.C. for good. As his second term of presidency was coming to an end, Thomas Jefferson was more than happy to return to his safe haven estate in Monticello. As he wrote in his letter to French expatriate Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours: “Within a few days I retire to my family, my books and farms; and having gained the harbor myself, I shall look on my friends still buffeting the storm, with anxiety indeed, but not with envy.”<sup>2</sup>

Of course, Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence, made his name into the great books of American history. He was to become the hero of many Americans in the upcoming generation, among them the young Lincoln, who discovered his lifetime heroes very soon: George Washington (one of his favorite readings was Parson Weems’ *Biography of George Washington*), Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson.<sup>3</sup> Later, as President-elect, he recalled the impact of “all the accounts [...] given of the battlefields, and struggles for the liberties of the

---

1 I am grateful for the generous support of the International Center for Jefferson Studies, whose two-month research fellowship enabled me to study the influence of Thomas Jefferson’s thinking on Abraham Lincoln at Monticello and Charlottesville, VA. I am particularly indebted to Saunders Director Andrew O’Shaughnessy for providing maximum support for my project.

2 Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, March 2, 1809: B. L. Rayner, *Sketches of the Life, Writings, and Opinions of Thomas Jefferson*. New York, 1832. 491.

3 Oates, Stephen B., *With Malice Towards None: A Life of Abraham Lincoln*. New York, 1994. 11.



country” had on him then.<sup>4</sup> His stepmother Sarah Bush Johnston Lincoln recalled: “Abe read all the books he could lay his hands on.”<sup>5</sup> Similarly to Jefferson, Lincoln kept a notebook of his early readings. When the family moved to Indiana in 1816, Abraham had a somewhat easier access to books. It was then that he read his first law book which had the text of the Declaration of Independence in the appendix: it became “his political chart and inspiration”, as his White House secretary, John Nicolay put it.<sup>6</sup>

When he moved to Illinois, he soon excelled both as a prairie lawyer and a frontier politician. When he was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives, he soon got entangled in the debates surrounding reforming the system of education. In the Illinois General Education Convention he advocated universal free elementary education and what he outlined was an unmistakably Jeffersonian program for education: it is most likely that one of Lincoln’s most important models was Jefferson’s comprehensive system of public education for the Commonwealth of Virginia from 1779. In 1832 Lincoln wrote in the “Handbill to the People of Sangamo County”:

Upon the subject of education[...] I view it as the most important subject which we as a people can be engaged in. For my part, I desire to see the time when education, and by its means, morality, sobriety, enterprise and industry, shall become much more general than at present, and should be gratified to have it in my power to contribute something to the advancement of any measure which might have a tendency to accelerate the happy period.<sup>7</sup>

These are obviously Jeffersonian ideas: if people are educated, they can resist mental and physical oppression by any form of tyranny and only then would they become capable of safeguarding constitutional principles. This is a remarkable application of Jefferson’s concept of education by somebody whose formal education added up to 18 months at the most.

---

4 Address to the New Jersey State Senate. Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1861. Quoted in John M. Hay and John G. Nicolay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*. Vol. III. New York, 2009. 297. [Hereinafter Hay-Nicolay, *Abraham Lincoln*]

5 Interview with Sarah Bush Lincoln. In. Douglas L. Wilson and Rodney O. Davis (eds.), *Herndon’s Informants: Letters, Interviews, and Statements About Abraham Lincoln*. Urbana, 1997, 107.

6 Quoted in Douglas L. Wilson, *Lincoln Before Washington: New Perspectives on the Illinois Years*. Urbana, 1997, 166.

7 Abraham Lincoln, To the People of Sangamo County, March 9, 1832. In. Roy P. Basler (ed.), *Lincoln Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858*. New York, 1984, 9. It is worth mentioning though that Jefferson’s bill was never passed.

As member of the Whig Party, Abraham Lincoln considered the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence as the quintessence of democracy and more and more frequently used them as points of reference in his political rhetoric. On January 27, 1838 he delivered a lecture entitled “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions” before the Young Men’s Lyceum at Springfield, Illinois in which he invoked Thomas Jefferson again:

As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws, let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor. Let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the character of his own, and his children’s liberty. Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap. Let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges. Let it be written in primers, spelling books, and in almanacs. Let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.<sup>8</sup>

In this early phase of his political career, Lincoln laid heavy emphasis on the development of the Midwest in general and the state of Illinois in particular. The three major pillars of his political agenda were protectionist tariffs, corporate welfare subsidies for transportation (mainly railroad and canal-building) companies (usually referred to as “internal improvements”), and a government monopolization of the country’s money supply. This is what he jokingly called his politics, “short and sweet, like the old woman’s dance.”<sup>9</sup>

Regarding internal improvements Lincoln reached back to Jefferson at a later stage of his career as well. In his speech delivered before the House of Representatives on June 20, 1848, he quoted Jefferson who “in his message to Congress in 1806, recommended an amendment of the constitution, with a view to apply an anticipated surplus in the Treasury »to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvements as it may be thought proper

---

8 Abraham Lincoln, *The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions*, In. William J. Bennett and John T. E. Cribb, *The American Patriot’s Almanac*. Nashville, TN, 2008, 28.

9 For an excellent analysis see, Gabor S. Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*. Urbana, 1994.

to add to the constitutional enumeration of the federal powers.«”<sup>10</sup> (It is interesting that once elected to Congress Lincoln frequented the congressional library, right across the street from the boardinghouse where he was staying. Many of the books in the possession of the library had actually belonged to Jefferson himself: the approximately 6,700 volumes of his library meant the foundation of the new congressional library after the British had burnt the original in 1814. It is quite likely that Lincoln read several of Jefferson's own books.)

These examples rather constitute exceptions in this early phase of Lincoln's career, however, as the young Whig rarely reached back to the political thoughts of Thomas Jefferson. This changed in the 1850s, however. The more and more sectionalized national politics, the heated debates over the future of the institution of slavery and the possibility of its territorial expansion offered a golden opportunity for Lincoln to give momentum to his stalling political career and step onto the stage of national politics. One of the first signs of his “political re-activation” was when he was asked to deliver the eulogy of Henry Clay, the renowned senator from Kentucky, Secretary of State between 1825 and 1829, to whom Lincoln referred to as his “beau ideal of statesman.”<sup>11</sup>

Lincoln attended a lecture of Clay in 1847 and was impressed by his approach to the institution of slavery in the United States. Clay considered it an “evil institution” and clearly opposed its expansion to any of the newly-acquired territories (this was hotly debated during the Mexican War), at the same time, ruled out that the two races could co-exist peacefully as equals. His solution to this problem was colonization – the movement supporting the transportation of emancipated slaves “back” to what they considered their “mother continent” – Africa. Gradual emancipation was a crucial element of his plan he called the “American System”, but it was unachievable without avoiding the “amalgamation of races”, undesired by many.

Thomas Jefferson also gave much thought to this “benevolent” solution to the race problem and had arrived to the same conclusion as Clay: “Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate, than that

10 Lincoln's Speech in the House of Representatives, June 20, 1848. Quoted in Ronald D. Rietveld, *Abraham Lincoln's George Washington*, In: Robert W. Watson (ed.) *White House Studies Compendium*, Vol. V. New York, 2008, 289.

11 Lincoln frequently used this reference to Clay. For an example see, First Debate with Stephen Douglas. Ottawa, IL. August 21, 1858. In: Don E. Fehrenbacher (ed.) *Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858*. New York: The Library of America, 1989), Volume I, 526. [Hereinafter *Lincoln: Speeches*]

these people are free; nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government. Nature, habit, opinion, have drawn indelible lines of distinction between them.”<sup>12</sup> He even claimed to have found the perfect new home for the expatriated blacks: the West Indies.<sup>13</sup>

To a certain extent Lincoln followed the footsteps of both Jefferson and Clay. Probably no historian has summed this up as well as Eric Foner, whose monograph entitled *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* won the 2011 Pulitzer Prize for history. He points out: “Lincoln’s thought seemed suspended between a ‘civic’ conception of American nationality, based on the universal principle of equality, and racial nationalism that saw blacks as in some ways not truly American. He found it impossible to imagine the United States as a biracial society.”<sup>14</sup> Besides the advantages he considered obvious for the American society, he was convinced that the colonization scheme was to be highly beneficial for the African continent as well:

There is a moral fitness in the idea of returning to Africa her children, whose ancestors have been torn from her by the ruthless hand of fraud and violence. Transplanted in a foreign land, they will carry back to their native soil the rich fruits of religion, civilization, law and liberty. May it not be one of the great designs of the Ruler of the universe, (whose ways are often inscrutable by short-sighted mortals,) thus to transform an original crime, into a signal blessing to that most unfortunate portion of the globe?<sup>15</sup>

Lincoln held on to his support of colonization, primarily, because he could not offer any solution to the American society turning into a biracial one – an unavoidable consequence of doing away with the institution of slavery.<sup>16</sup> He, however, was well aware of the limitations of the plan as well. As he put it in his often-quoted speech at Peoria, IL

---

12 Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography Draft Fragment (July 27, 1821). The Library of Congress. The Thomas Jefferson Papers Series 1. General Correspondence. 1651-1827.

13 For Jefferson and slavery see, Csaba Lévai, Discrimination and Tolerance: the Case of Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, In. Gudmundur Hálfðanarson (ed.) *Discrimination and Tolerance in Historical Perspective*. Pisa, 2009, 295-299.

14 Eric Foner, Lincoln, Colonization, and the Rights of Black Americans, Eric Foner et al. (eds.) *Slavery’s Ghost: The Problem of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation*. Baltimore, 2011, 38. [Hereinafter Foner, Lincoln]

15 Abraham Lincoln, Eulogy on Henry Clay, July 6, 1852. *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 271.

16 For a comparative analysis of the issue of colonization in the politics of Jefferson and Lincoln see, István Kornél Vida, ‘Sustained by Mr. Jefferson’: Colonizationism as Jeffersonian Heritage in Abraham Lincoln’s Thinking, = *Eger Journal of American Studies*. Special Issue in Honor of Professor Zoltán Abádi-Nagy. XII/2, 2010, 593-601.

in 1854: "If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution. My first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia, – to their own native land. But a moment's reflection would convince me, that whatever of high hope, (as I think there is) there may be in this, in the long run, its sudden execution is impossible."<sup>17</sup>

Despite the obvious impracticalities of colonization, it did remain on Lincoln's agenda during the first years of his presidency. His agents sought for possible locations for the colonies of emancipated slaves in Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica and in the Yucatán. A Washington newspaper even suggested that the proposed black colony should be named after him and called 'Lincolnia'. In August 1862 Lincoln invited a group of black delegates to the White House, for the first time in American history, but this special moment was definitely shadowed by what he told them, as he made an attempt to convince them of the necessity of colonization:

You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffers very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason at least why we should be separated.<sup>18</sup>

Lincoln also included colonization in his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 23, 1862 which was to follow "immediate, or gradual abolishment of slavery" and was to take place "with their [the emancipated slaves'] consent, upon this continent, or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the Governments existing there."<sup>19</sup>

The period between September 1862 and January 1, 1863, when Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was issued, marks a major turning point in Lincoln's approach to post-slavery American society: he called for immediate emancipation without compensation and did not even mention colonization – just like he never made any public mentioning of colonization afterwards. Frederick Douglass was proven right as he had

17 Abraham Lincoln's Speech at Peoria, IL, October 16, 1854, *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 316.

18 "Address on Colonization to a Committee of Colored Men", *Lincoln: Speeches*, II, 353.

19 "Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation". *Lincoln: Speeches*, II, 368.

predicted that “the progress of war would educate Mr. Lincoln out of his idea of the deportation of the Negro.”<sup>20</sup>

A major shift in the political career of Abraham Lincoln was brought about the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854: he became member and soon a leading figure of the new Republican Party, which was formed in the wave of resistance to the legislation making the territorial expansion of the institution of slavery possible. His transformation from a whig to a republican necessarily meant that he more frequently invoked the political wisdom of Thomas Jefferson, as the members of the new party equated Republicanism with true Jeffersonianism. As Foner pointed out, Jefferson supplanted Clay as Lincoln’s “touchstone of political wisdom”, and Lincoln’s speeches indeed reveal his growing familiarity with Jefferson’s writings and that he identified with his political views to a great extent.<sup>21</sup>

In 1854 Lincoln was running for the state legislature in Illinois and during the campaign he took part in a series of political debates with Stephen Douglas, followed with keen interest by many in the state as well as nationwide. In perhaps his most famous speech, delivered in Peoria, IL on October 16, 1854, Lincoln called Jefferson “the most distinguished politician of our history”, who, despite being a slave-owner himself “conceived the idea to prevent slavery ever going into the northwestern territory.”<sup>22</sup> According to Lincoln, the policy of prohibiting slavery in new territories, set in stone for several decades by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, had its roots in Thomas Jefferson’s thinking. Referring to the Missouri Compromise, he pointed out that the days of compromise were over, and the underlying issue was the relevance or irrelevance of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln expressed his concerns about the course the United States was taking, which seemed to deviate from what the founding fathers envisioned as the right one to follow:

Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be very rapid. As a nation, we begin by declaring ‘all men are created equal.’ We now practically read it ‘all men are created equal except negroes.’ When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read ‘all men are created equal, except

20 Quoted in: <http://www.mrlincolnanefreedom.org/inside.asp?ID=69&subjectID=4> (Accessed on December 7, 2013)

21 Foner, Lincoln, 38.

22 *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 309. The Northwest Ordinance was based on Jefferson’s proposal to create a federal domain through state cessions of western lands as well as dividing the territory into gridded townships so that they could be sold and thus provide revenue for the federal government.

Negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.’ When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty – Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.<sup>23</sup>

In 1857 in the *Dred Scott v. Sandford* case the Supreme Court reached the controversial decision that people of African descent held as slaves (or their descendants) did not enjoy the protection of the Constitution and could never become U.S. citizens. In his evaluation of the Court’s decision, Lincoln again took the Declaration of Independence as a standard to live up to and claimed that Chief Justice Roger B. Taney had been of the opinion that Negroes were not men in the eyes of the Declaration and the Constitution, hence had no claim to the inalienable rights of man. At this point, however, Lincoln himself believed in the “abstract” equality of African-Americans which could be achieved only on the long run and claimed that “they [the founding fathers][had] meant simply to declare the right, so that enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances would permit. He argued that “they [had] met to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all.”<sup>24</sup>

During a series of debates with Stephen Douglas for the senatorial seat of the state of Illinois in 1858, Lincoln was constantly accused of advocating abolitionist ideas. In return, he claimed that Douglas had been “the first person ever to assert that the Negro was excluded from the rights proclaimed in 1776.” He identified it as his primary goal to “combat [the] tendency to dehumanize the negro – to take away from him the right of ever striving to be a man.”<sup>25</sup>

Lincoln readily acknowledged that the principles of the Declaration of Independence meant no legal obligation under the Constitution, at the same time, read the two documents as being fully compatible with each other. In his speech delivered at Chicago on July 10, 1858, Lincoln took an unusually radical stand: “If that declaration is not the truth, let us get the Statute book, in which we find it and tear it out!”<sup>26</sup> He noted, however, that the word ‘slavery’ did not even appear in the text of the Constitution

---

23 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Joshua Speed, August 24, 1855, *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 363.

24 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on Dred Scott Decision, June 26, 1857, *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 398.

25 *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 798.

26 Abraham Lincoln’s speech at Chicago, IL, July 10, 1858, *Lincoln: Speeches*, I, 456.

what he took as a proof that the Founding Fathers had hoped it would soon disappear from the face of the Earth.

On April 6, 1859 Lincoln was invited to a Republican festival in Boston under the banner of Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence as well as the father of slavery restriction, as was emphasized at the event. In his letter responding to the organizers, Lincoln, who was unable to attend, wrote about Jefferson:

The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society. And yet they are denied, and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashinglly calls them “glittering generalities”; another bluntly calls them “self evident lies”; and still others insidiously argue that they apply only to “superior races... All honor to Jefferson---to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there, that to-day, and in all coming days, it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling-block to the very harbingers of re-appearing tyranny and oppression.<sup>27</sup>

During the presidential campaign of 1860, Lincoln and the Republican Party pledged fidelity to the Declaration of Independence. Later, already as president-elect, in his speech delivered in front of a distinguished audience at the Independence Hall in Philadelphia on February 22, 1861, he confessed: “I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”<sup>28</sup> Interestingly, during the secession crisis, both the Union and the Confederate governments appealed to the principles of the revolutionary fathers. Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederate States of America, took the same stand as the colonists during the revolution, which was, as he put it, “the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive to the ends for which they were established.”<sup>29</sup> The major difference between the Northern and Southern interpretation of the legacy of the Declaration

<sup>27</sup> Lincoln’s letter written on April 6, 1859. Quoted in Hay-Nicolay, *Abraham Lincoln*, II, 182.

<sup>28</sup> Abraham Lincoln’s Speech at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, PA, February 22, 1861, *Lincoln: Speeches*, II, 213.

<sup>29</sup> Inaugural Address of the President of the Provisional Government, February 18, 1861, In. James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener (eds.) *American Civil War: the Essential Reference Guide*. Santa Barbara, CA, 2011, 256.



of Independence concerned, of course, the status and future of African Americans: according to Southern spokesmen the subordination of the Negro to the superior white race was natural and normal. In contrast, Lincoln argued that the Union stood for something different: it fought for the American experiment which proved to validity of the principle of "Liberty to all." He warned the South that they wage "largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principles of popular government—the rights of the people."<sup>30</sup>

The most controversial element in Thomas Jefferson's career is the apparent contradiction between his ideas and the fact that he himself was a slave-holder. Historian Joseph R. Fornieri is right when he asks in his book entitled *Abraham Lincoln's Political Faith* whether or not this "excludes him from consideration as an important source of American republicanism."<sup>31</sup> Unlike his Southern contemporaries, Lincoln did not turn a blind eye to this fact and did not attempt to make excuses for it. He argued that Jefferson had been deeply ashamed of slavery and had considered it socially and politically incompatible with American republicanism, natural law and right. To support his statement, Lincoln frequently quoted Jefferson's writings in which he had condemned the institution of slavery: Lincoln saw them as proofs that Jefferson himself had wanted to place the "peculiar institution" on a path of ultimate extinction. Among these probably the most memorable was Jefferson's warning of a divine judgement for the national sin of slavery in his *Notes on the State of Virginia*: "Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that – God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever[...] that it may become probable by supernatural interference. The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest."<sup>32</sup>

Both Jefferson and Lincoln had reservations about the enlistment of African Americans in the military which soon, however, became a pressing military necessity in the War of Independence as well as in the Civil War. In 1779, Jefferson, then governor of Virginia, took a stand against the enlistment of African Americans. He acknowledged that they sometimes displayed courage, but, according to him, this was due to their inability to appreciate the dangers into which their actions took them. They were aware of the degree of their degradation, so when considering whether they could be used to fight for the freedom of their masters, he

30 "Annual Message to Congress," December 3, 1861 in *Lincoln: Speeches*, II, 295.

31 Joseph R. Fornieri, *Abraham Lincoln's Political Faith*. DeKalb, IL, 2003, 31.

32 Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*. Philadelphia, 1801, 321.

worried too much about the possibility of a slave insurrection to give them guns. Similarly, Lincoln had second thoughts about the blacks' military service, but later, out of military necessity, consented to the formation of colored regiments, what is more, their contribution to the military effort of the Union became the most important argument for emancipation.

Abraham Lincoln's speech delivered on November 19, 1863, at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania is one of the most famous orations in American history, and it is a most exciting source to trace Jefferson's influence on Lincoln. Historian Stephen E. Lucas called its second sentence, an enumeration of the desired human rights, "one of the best-known sentences in the English language"<sup>33</sup>: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." In his Gettysburg Address Lincoln realized that Jefferson's ideas were no longer considered to be points of reference: "It is no child's play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation...with no small show of success,"<sup>34</sup> he pointed out. He, therefore, "downgraded" the Jeffersonian principles to being a "proposition" instead of being self-evident, which would require no further proof. These all-essential principles included equality, natural rights, and the sovereignty of people.

Both Jefferson and Lincoln are clearly infixed in the American national memory. However, the reputation of both of them has undergone significant changes. Writing about Jefferson, historian Peterson points out: "The image of Jefferson in American culture has always been a sensitive reflector [...] of America's troubled search for the image of itself."<sup>35</sup> Gordon S. Wood took this idea further and concluded: "if something is wrong with America, something has to be wrong with Jefferson."<sup>36</sup> His observation seems to be valid, as in 2009's C-Span Presidents' Popularity Survey Thomas

---

33 Stephen E. Lucas, *Justifying America: The Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document*, In. Thomas W. Benson (ed.), *American Rhetoric*. Carbondale, IL, 1989, 85.

34 Another Letter from Mr. Lincoln: His Views of the Political Doctrines Advocated by Jefferson", *The New York Times*, July 9, 1860.

35 Merrill D. Peterson, *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind*. Charlottesville, VA, 1998, 9.

36 Gordon S. Wood, *The Trials and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson*, In. Peter S. Onuf (ed.), *Jeffersonian Legacies*. Charlottesville, VA, 1993, 395.

Jefferson ranked only 7<sup>th</sup>: his worst position in the past 50 years.<sup>37</sup> His views of black Americans and slavery made him most vulnerable to modern criticism: there is a huge contrast between Jefferson's great declarations of liberty and equality and the fact that he himself owned slaves. Many are ready to believe that he indeed hated the institution of slavery, but he never followed the example of George Washington, and manumitted only few of his slaves. William W. Freehling wrote about associating his figure with the abolitionist movement: "Jefferson's attitudes and actions towards blacks are so repugnant these days that identifying him with the antislavery movement actually discredits the reform movement."<sup>38</sup> A fatal blow to the public image of Jefferson was the Jefferson-Hemings controversy: the analysis of DNA results showed conclusive evidence that there was a match between the male line of the Jefferson family and a descendant of the Hemings family, suggesting an intimate relationship between Jefferson and his mixed-race slave, Sally Hemings, what is more, in all likelihood the father of the Declaration of Independence also fathered the six children of Sally. The Sally Hemings case caused many to come to the realization that Thomas Jefferson had not been perfect. Illustrative of this is Lois E. Horton's "Avoiding History: Thomas Jefferson, Sally Hemings, and the Uncomfortable Public Conversation on Slavery" in which the author made interviews with visitors at Monticello, Jefferson's shrine. She quotes one visitor: "Thinking of Jefferson as a slaveholder brought him down off the pedestal upon which the history they learned had placed him."<sup>39</sup> Another possible level of interpretation of this, equally or even more important in the eyes of the public, is that of a sex scandal: the appearance of the element of sexuality in general in the Jefferson myth seemed incompatible with how many viewed one of the builders of the nation, not to mention the fact that he abused his powers allotted to him by a racist society. Southern white males had denied the case for long decades due to deeming having sex with a black slave decadent and morally impure. Above all they denied that there could be a love relationship between Jefferson and Sally, as this would have given the African-American woman power over a white male.

37 For the full presidential ranking see, <http://legacy.c-span.org/PresidentialSurvey/Overall-Ranking.aspx> (Accessed on January 16, 2013.)

38 William F. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion: Volume I: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854*. Oxford, 1991, 123.

39 Lois E. Horton, "Avoiding History: Thomas Jefferson, Sally Hemings, and the Uncomfortable Public Conversation on Slavery," in James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton (eds.) *Slavery and Public History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory*. Chapel Hill, NC, 2008, 144.

At C-Span's already-mentioned Presidents' Popularity Survey Abraham Lincoln finished first<sup>40</sup>, and since then the bicentennial celebrations of his birthday and the invocation of his political legacy during the election campaign by President Barack Obama have further elevated the public interest in him. His myth, similarly to that of Jefferson, needed this, as in the late 1960s, with the coming of the Civil Rights Movements, the demand went hand in hand to take a measure of him with special attention paid to his record concerning racial equality and justice. As a result, Lincoln's "Great Emancipator" image became questioned, and in the anti-Lincoln tradition the white supremacist imagery emerged, which never managed to dominate the scholarly literature, but enforced the revision of earlier taken-for-granted assumptions by opening new debates. Interestingly enough, Lincolnia has not escaped having its sex scandal either. In 2003, C.A. Tripp stirred up the waters of Lincoln scholarship, with his *The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln*, claiming that Abraham Lincoln was homosexual, who had sexual relationship with his friend, Joshua F. Speed, and Captain Derickson, an officer of his bodyguard.<sup>41</sup> Most historians agree that the evidence presented by Tripp is inconclusive, some even suspect that Tripp's was an attempt to pull the rug out from under George W. Bush's proposed constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. This "outing" of Lincoln guaranteed that for a while every Lincoln scholar could count on getting a question about it at forums. This was harmful on two levels: 1) It is a perfect example of forcing contemporary expectations and value systems on the past 2) As well as of intrusion of contemporary politics into the realm of history, with more often than not historical accuracy falling victim.

In the immediate aftermath of the Lincoln bicentennial, it is not exactly fair to compare the standing of Jefferson and Lincoln in public memory. Many considered the election of Barack Obama as the fulfillment of what Abraham Lincoln had struggled for and the historical parallels drawn between them created an elevated interest in the legacy of the 16th president (and saved Lincoln from the sensationalism surrounding the 'Gay Lincoln' theory.) This has its own danger, however, as Lincoln clichés seem to replace meaningful analyses. As Eric Foner said in an interview: "Lincoln is a Rorschach test. Everybody finds themselves in Lincoln. Everybody finds what they want to find in Lincoln. There are

---

40 <http://legacy.c-span.org/PresidentialSurvey/Overall-Ranking.aspx> (Accessed on January 16, 2013)

41 C.A. Tripp, *The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln*. New York, 2005.

dozens of Lincolns out there. So saying I'm reading Lincoln or modeling myself on Lincoln' doesn't really tell us a heck of a lot."<sup>42</sup>

Thomas Jefferson is usually not mentioned among the politicians that influenced the political thinking of Abraham Lincoln, yet the close analysis of his speeches and writings reveal that from the 1850s on Lincoln, as one of the leaders of the newly-founded Republican Party, was familiar with Jefferson's work and frequently used it as a point of reference and source of inspiration on at least three levels: as a man, as a politician, Whig and Republican, and as an emancipator. They shared similar core values and their approach to the future of the institution of slavery also shows remarkable parallels. The historical period they lived in offered different opportunities for taking actual measures regarding it which gives Lincoln more appeal in the eyes of posterity. Nevertheless, both Lincoln and Jefferson are present and influence us on so many levels, which makes their understanding probably even more challenging, undoubtedly prompting lots of scholarly discussions in the future, too.

---

42 CNN interview with Eric Foner, January 17, 2009. See, [http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-17/politics/lincoln.obsession\\_1\\_lincoln-bible-16th-president-president-bush?\\_s=PM:POLITICS](http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-17/politics/lincoln.obsession_1_lincoln-bible-16th-president-president-bush?_s=PM:POLITICS) (Accessed on January 12, 2013)

**Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos**

## **Differing Interpretations of the South African War in Hungary<sup>1</sup>**

One can ask that what kind of connection could really exist between the South African War (1899 – 1902) (the Anglo-Boer War, the Tweede Vrijheidsoorlog in Dutch or as it is known mostly in our country the Boer War) and Hungary or we can say that the Carpathian Basin which is situated thousands of miles away from the South African subcontinent? That was the first main question that awakened my attention about the Hungarian aspects of the South African War and the starting line of my research in 2008. Furthermore, not just that issue but the South African War as well has been just very superficially examined by Hungarian scholars. In consequence of that only just a few data have been known about these points of connection between the South African War and the Hungarians. Moreover, there is another reason which proves that theme is worth for researching. Through the example of the South African War, one can get closer to understand how the Hungarian public opinion interpreted those wars and conflicts which took place far from the borders of Austria-Hungary during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

During the first years of the research, Hungarians who took part actively in the South African War stood at the focus of the examination. Especially one of these Hungarian participants, namely Tibor Péchy, a former Hungarian cavalry (hussar) officer who moved in 1896 to South Africa in order to start a new life and make his fortune in Transvaal. Then, in the direction of broadening the scope of the research, other aspects of the mentioned topic became involved, for instance reception of the South African War in different dimensions of the contemporary Hungarian public opinion such as the press or the Parliament.

During the research mainly with four groups of sources were examined:

- 1 Private papers (diaries, correspondence) of the Hungarian volunteers who participated in the war
- 2 Official (public) documents: for instance documentation of the

---

<sup>1</sup> This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/ 2 - 11 - 1 - 2012 - 0001 'National Excellence Program'

British horse purchasing in Hungary as well as the Hungarian and British Parliamentary Debates

3 Hungarian books about the South African War: three of the Hungarian volunteers wrote books about their South African experience, the war or the history and culture of the subcontinent: Károly Bulyovszky<sup>2</sup>, Vilmos Simon<sup>3</sup> and Lajos Szigethy.<sup>4</sup>

4 Contemporary Hungarian articles and pamphlets

The Hungarian aspects of the South African War can be classified into five categories. To the first one, which means the closest relation between the South African War and the Hungarians or we can say that the Carpathian Basin, belong those Hungarians who took part actively as a volunteer, a soldier or an interpreter in that war. According to the recent state of research, sixteen Hungarians are identified, whose activity in the South African War can be proved by the sources. The overwhelming majority of them chose the Boer side of the war, twelve of the sixteen participants exactly (Kálmán Bornemissza; Károly Bulyovszky; Gyula Edvi Illés; Mihály Ferenczy; Pál Fleischer; Géza Gössing; Lajos Janssen; Félix Luzsészky; Pál Mészáros; Tibor Péchy; Vilmos Simon; Lajos Szigethy; Albert Wass), and four Hungarians served in the British Army (Pál Bornemissza; Albert Teophilus Duka; János Propper; Lajos Vadász).

Several interesting stories and curiosity belong to some of the Hungarian volunteers. For instance Tibor Péchy, who met Paul Kruger, (the president of the South African Republic, 1883 – 1900) and had a coffee in the presidents' residence. Péchy was misidentified as the nephew of Pope Leo XIII by one of the South African correspondents of *The Illustrated London News*.<sup>5</sup> Namely an article was published in the said journal on the foreign officers who supported the cause of the Boer republics. The journalist of *The Illustrated London News* described the foreign volunteers as mercenaries, “*soldiers of fortune*” grasping the chance of the South African War in order to make their fortune. Tibor Péchy (who can be easily identified by the photo attached to the said article – that photograph can be found in Tibor Péchy's private papers as well) was misidentified as “*Count Pecci (Nephew of the Pope)*”.

---

2 Károly Bulyovszky, *Boer-angol tűzben*. [In Boer-English fire] Budapest, 1901.

3 Vilmos Simon, *A búr szabadságharcz*. [The Boer war of freedom] Budapest, 1901.

4 Lajos Szigethy, *Búr földön*. [On Boer land] Sopron, 1901.

5 Foreign Officers with the Boers. *The Illustrated London News*, November 22, 1900, 939.

Regarding the nephew of Pope Leo XIII the article is telling that: “*These wandering soldiers of fortune, who mostly belong to Italy and France, even when they are classed as serving with the Hungarian legion, include a nephew of Pope Leo XIII., Lieutenant Count Pecci, not the first of his family to seek a roving life far away from the narrow bounds of the family home of the Peccis in Carpineto.*”<sup>6</sup> Some of the Hungarian journalists reflected for this serious fault and traced back that misidentification for the similarity of the surnames of the Pope, whose name was Gioacchino Pecci and Tibor Pechy. Pecci and Péchy might have sounded very similar for the English correspondent.<sup>7</sup> There was no connection between the family of Pope Leo XIII and the Péchy family, in fact Tibor Péchy was protestant, Calvinist.

The second class consists of the commercial and economic relations. For example, the British Army purchased hundreds of horses in Hungary and transported them through the port of Fiume to the South African frontlines.<sup>8</sup>

To the third category belong the Hungarian political reflections (committed by Hungarian MPs) for the South African War. The fourth dimension, which is at the centre of the present paper, contains the reactions for that war from the Hungarian press and the public opinion. At last but not at least, several poems and novels were written by outstanding Hungarian poets and novelists such as Endre Ady<sup>9</sup> or Dezső Kosztolányi<sup>10</sup>, (and that is the fifth category,) which were concerned with the South African War.

The present paper discusses the different interpretations of the South African War in the contemporary Hungarian press and public opinion (the fourth class in the present order). Furthermore, it aims the comparison of the characteristics of the Hungarian pro-Boer and pro-

---

6 Ibid.

7 Magyarok a boer hadseregben. [Hungarians In. the Boer Army] = *Vasárnapi Ujság*, XLVII (52), 1900. 876.; XIII. Leó pápa [Pope Leo XIII] = *Szalon Ujság*, VIII (13), 1903. 7.

8 Report of the Committee on Horse Purchase In. Austro-Hungary, together Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. 1902. NA, WO 32/8757

9 Endre Ady, *Búrok* [Boers]. In. József Láng – Pál Schweitzer (eds.), *Ady Endre összes versei* 2. [Ady’s poems] Budapest, 1982. 471.

10 Dezső Kosztolányi, Ó, búrok, ha én most csak húszéves lennék [Oh, Boers, if I was only 20]. In. Pál Réz (ed.), *Kosztolányi Dezső összes versei*. Bratislava, 1989. 441.; Kosztolányi, Öreg pap [Old priest]. In. Pál Réz (ed.), *Kosztolányi Dezső összes novellái II.* [Kosztolányi’s short stories] Szeged, 2002. 325–327.



British journalism as well as the different narratives of a Hungarian volunteer, Tibor Péchy about the said war.

#### PRO-BOER JOURNALISM

One can easily categorize the Hungarian articles, news and journalism concerning the South African War by examining the attitude of the writers and journalists towards to that war. Through that process two main categories and attitudes could be identified: a pro-Boer and a pro-British one.

In line with the contemporary European press, except of course the British, the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian journals during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth century were pro-Boer. One can state that there is nothing special in that, because the bulk of the continental journals, especially the French or German newspapers and the public opinion of the mentioned countries supported the Boer's cause as well. In some cases it is true that the Hungarian newspapers took war stories, news of course and caricatures from French, German or even from British journals, dailies. For instance the cruelty of the concentration camps or the blood thirst and greediness of British war leaders, such as General Horatio Kitchener or Lord Chamberlain were overemphasized in these columns. Similar symbolism, symbols and representation of the Boer's fights against the British imperialism were implemented by the Hungarian and other European press either. Although there are similarities between the Hungarian and the other continental pro-Boer attitudes and statements, significant differences can be found as well. Differences or one can say special characteristics of the Hungarian way of interpretation, which highlight the Hungarian pro-Boer press and opinions from the other Europeans. Which are these factors and characteristics?

The bulk of the Hungarian journalists who sympathized with the cause of the Boer republics (Orange Free State, South African Republic) found serious and numerous similarities between the history, culture and some kind of fate or destiny of the Hungarians and the Boers. For instance the said columnists and editors emphasized that both of these nations were small nations and above all, characterised by freedom-loving. The most interesting point of that comparison was the parallel drawn between the Hungarian war of independence, 1848-49 and the South African War.

The main element of the said parallel was that the Boers had to fight desperately and hopelessly for the freedom of their republics against the British oppression just as the Hungarians had done it fifty years before against the Habsburg rule. Thus both of the said small freedom-loving nations faced with gigantic empires which outnumbered them not just in the field of power but in wealth and supply. According to these interpretations, although justice was in both cases on the heroic freedom fighter's (namely the Hungarians' and the Boers') side, and in the first part of the wars the Boers and the Hungarians won battles, they could not achieve the victory against the devilish enemy and failed. From the pro-Boer journalists' aspect two factors led to the failure in both cases as well: the numerical superiority of the enemy, the empires and the fact that the other foreign powers closed their eyes and did not support the cause of these small nations.

Apart from these elements, the war leaders and political leaders of the Boers and Hungarians, namely Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger (president of the South African Republic) and Lajos Kossuth (the emblematic leader of the Hungarian democratic opposition of the parliament and Governor of Hungary, 1848-49) were compared too. Paul Kruger was represented in some Hungarian articles as the "*Boer Lajos Kossuth*".<sup>11</sup> Similarities could be easily found between the President of the Transvaal who was described as a wise leader, fought tirelessly and with an uncompromising attitude for the freedom of his people and the former Hungarian Governor who is still pictured in that way in Hungary. The fact that Kruger had to leave his country because of the downfall of the Boer republics and Lajos Kossuth had emigrated from Hungary and finished his life far from his homeland just strengthened that parallel. Furthermore, Kruger himself expressed his views on the similarities between the past and present of the Hungarians and the Boers for a Hungarian delegation which visited him in Netherlands: "[...] you [*i.e.* – *namely the Hungarians*] had a war of independence as well, but you were not left as alone as we are. Nobody cares with us and nothing is done for us."<sup>12</sup>

---

11 Krüger Európai útja [Kruger's European journey] = *Vasárnapi Ujság*, XLVII (50), 1900. 832

12 Krüger a magyarokról [Kruger on Hungarians]. = *Világkrónika*, XXV (22), 1901. 172.

## PRO-BRITISH JOURNALISM AND THEODORE DUKA

First of all it is necessary to emphasize that in comparison with the pro-Boer journalism, those who supported the British side of the South African War meant the minority. Nevertheless, the picture of Cecil Rhodes was in some ways quite positive. In case of his death the *Vasárnapi Ujság*, which was a popular journal in Hungary (and published pro-Boer and pro-British articles as well), brought attention to Rhodes' vital role in the expanding the British territories in Africa.<sup>13</sup>

Only few pro-British articles and a book remained and the most of these belongs to one public figure, Tivadar Duka, or as he is well-known in the Western World: Theodore Duka. Duka is famous for his research on the life and times of an outstanding Hungarian explorer, Sándor Kőrösi Csoma (who edited the first Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary) as well as the books he wrote and based on his travels around India and his knowledge in the field of medical studies.<sup>14</sup> So he was a well-known person in Hungary and in Great Britain as well.

Theodore Duka had perpetually attempted to criticize the pro-Boer Hungarian writings since December 1899.<sup>15</sup> Every time when he had found something wrong or problematic (of course from his pro-British point of view) in the Hungarian newspapers about the South African War he sent an article or an open letter to that journal in which he corrected the said faults. Then, in 1901 Duka published a book (its title is: *Letters about the Boer-Anglo War*) which was a collection of his articles, open letters and other writings.<sup>16</sup>

Duka had three main intentions with reference to his pro-British activity:

- 1 to moderate the superiority of the pro-Boers in the Hungarian public opinion
- 2 to correct the misunderstandings and misinformation about the South African War

---

13 Rhodes Cecil = *Vasárnapi Ujság*, XLIX (15), 1902. 294.

14 Gyula Paczolay, *Duka Tivadar*. Budapest, 1998. 40.

15 Tivadar Duka, A boer háború Dél-Afrikában [The Boer war in South Africa]. = *Vasárnapi Ujság*, XLVI (51), 1899. 850–851.

16 Tivadar Duka, *Levelek a boer-angol háborúról* [Letters ont he Boer-English war]. Budapest, 1901.

3 and, at last but not at least to refute the parallel between the South African War and the Hungarian war of independence 1848-49.

As it is emphasized in the prologue of his book: *‘The purpose of the hereby collected, mostly already published letters and articles is to raise the question: is there any relevant similarity between the South African War and our war of independence of 1848-49?’*<sup>17</sup>

According to his argument the contrast between the said two wars was too sharp to draw such a parallel. First of all, while Hungary had been attacked by the Habsburg Monarchy, in case of the South African War, the Boers were who started the war with an ultimatum to Great Britain.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, he highlighted that the British people sympathized with the Hungarian cause in 1848-1849.<sup>19</sup>

Duka attempted to prove that the comparison of Paul Kruger to Lajos Kossuth was absolutely pointless. He reminded his readers and the pro-Boer Hungarians for the fact that Kossuth was welcome in Britain after the end of the war: *‘Kruger possesses millions, his retinue is abundantly supplied; the bulk of our fellows who survived, needed benefits from England and Kossuth died in abroad as a very poor man.’*<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, as one of the strongest points of his argument, he noticed that he took part actively in the Hungarian war of independence, thus he really possessed the experience required to examine properly the wars and he found nothing similar between them.<sup>21</sup>

Which factors stood behind these arguments? – One can conclude that the pro-Boer part of the contemporary Hungarian press and public opinion interpreted the South African War according to the journalists’ and editors’ attitudes towards their history and the actual political relations of Hungary. In line with this approach, it can be seen that the parallels and similarities between the Boers and Hungarians were emphasized mostly by those newspapers and public figures who criticized the conciliation with the Habsburg Monarchy and who were loyal to the ideals of the revolution of 1848.<sup>22</sup> The fact that Kálmán Széll, who was the Prime

---

17 Ibid. 3.

18 Ibid. 40.

19 Ibid. 20.

20 Ibid. 40.

21 Ibid. 44.

22 Zoltán Tefner, *Külpolitika, népcsoport, tömegtájékoztatás* [Foreign policy, people group, mass communication]. = *Valóság*, 45, 2002. no. 6.

Minister of Hungary during the South African War (1899 – 1903), took an absolutely neutral position about that war may prove the said approach. Széll attempted to moderate the harsh verbal attacks against Britain in the Hungarian Parliament. He reminded his pro-Boer opposition that while Great Britain was a world power, Hungary was just a small nation and the small nations like Hungary, required the friendship of great powers like Britain.<sup>23</sup> This was a very political standpoint.

In case of Theodore Duka, it is necessary to examine his personal history, his past. In my opinion, two factors could stand behind his pro-British attitude:

1 The borders of Great Britain were opened for Duka after the end of the Hungarian war of independence and he was loyal to Britain as his new home, his adopted country. In addition to this, he had been serving in the British Army in Bengal (1854 – 1874) as a major in the Medical Service. Thus, Britain meant for him a new home which provided him a chance for rebuild his life, make existence and start a new, successful carrier.

2 The second could be that one of his two sons', namely Dr Albert Theophilus Duka involvement in the South African War. He served as a surgeon captain in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Queensland Mounted Infantry and was designed with the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his great pluck proved in the defence of the Elands River Post and he is still known in Australia as the "*hero of Elands River*".<sup>24</sup>

#### TIBOR PÉCHY'S INTERPRETATION

In comparison of the Hungarian articles and columns about the South African War and the way how the Hungarian participants interpreted that war, similarities and differences can be found as well. For instance, in case of Tibor Péchy (one of the Hungarian pro-Boer volunteers who served for nine month in the Boer army) the contrast is harsh between the picture of the Boers in his South African correspondence or diaries and in his lectures and articles written after he came back from the South African subcontinent.

23 Széll, Kálmán in the Parliament, December 11, 1901

[<http://www3.arcanum.hu/onap/opt/a090302.htm?v=pdf&q=WRD%3D%28b%FAr%20h%E1bor%FA%29&s=SORT&m=7&a=rec> – January 23, 2015 )

24 Hero of Elands River, *Boer War Despatches*, March 2013. 5.

Péchy and his writings can be a very interesting object of the said comparison from several aspects. First of all Tibor Péchy had already been living in South Africa three years before the outbreak of the war. Thus he had not had a close contact with the way how the Hungarian public opinion reflected for the war before he travelled back to Hungary during the autumn of 1900. Furthermore among the Hungarian participants, Tibor Péchy spent far the most time in South Africa and opposite to the others he got closer to the culture of the Boers and other South Africans.

In the letters he wrote in the South African trenches, not at least one word can be found about the heroism of the Boers, the dignity of their cause or the parallel between the South African War and the Hungarian war of independence of 1848-49. Rather these lines testify about disappointment, apathy and high degree of criticism towards the Boers.

The first passage is from Tibor Péchy's journal which was written in Transvaal, during the war (in the spring of 1900 exactly): "*Now I start to believe that the war will end with English victory, but because of the Boers themselves; now they are paying for the faults they committed and at most their cowardice and that they do not need European officers.*"<sup>25</sup> The expression: "*European officers*" refers to Péchy himself. As a former highly educated and commissioned officer, a first lieutenant of the Austro-Hungarian cavalry he had expected to start his career in the Boer army as an officer and not a private. Here is the second passage from Péchy's lecture composed after he had come back from South Africa: "[...] *when the hyena of Omdurman sentences to death the last Boer hero or when the Almighty finally helps that heroic small nation*".<sup>26</sup> It is not so difficult to notice the differences between the present passages. Although both of these texts belong to the same author and both of these lines concerned with the same issue, the picture of the Boers in the first and the second quotation differ from each other in many ways. One can easily compare the language of the quoted texts and it is easy to note the difference between expressions, nouns and adjectives referred to the Boers in the first and the second passage, for instance: cowardice-heroic. While the Boers are characterized in the first passage by cowardice, in the second they are described as a heroic nation.

It is worth to make another comparison as well, namely the comparison of Péchy's papers, the text of his lectures and articles born

25 Tibor Péchy's War Diaries in the Transvaal, April 16-28, 1900. 68., Péchy Papers [hereinafter PP]

26 Péchy, Előadás Dél-Afrikáról, [Lecture on South Africa] PP.

after he arrived home and the pro-Boer writings. The first is a passage from an article (whose title is *Világos of the Boers*) published in the *Debreczeni Ujság*, the second one is from Péchy's paper on his South African experience. The first: "*On days of March we commemorate more painfully wars of forces. – The March wind brings back the past, dark memories. Concerning the Boers, appear the battle scenes gleaming in light of fire and under the flag with Virgin Mary on it charge the victorious giants from the darkness of the graves, who waged the battle for our freedom fifty years ago. [...] Thus, the tragedy of our nation revived in far South, in the country of the Transvaaler rocks.*"<sup>27</sup> The second one: "[...] *may the Almighty, who enforces the justice every time and everywhere, help these heroes to attain their independence in that bloodthirsty and the most unrighteous fight of the modern age which is happening in sight of all the European powers.*"<sup>28</sup>

The similarities are obvious between the quoted texts and there is no harsh contrast between the way how the columnist of the *Debreczeni Ujság* and Tibor Péchy (in that case in Hungary) interpreted the South African war and the war efforts of the Boers. In both of these passages, expressions can be found which refer to the Hungarian pro-Boer interpretation of the South African War. Expressions, for instance: victorious giants – heroes; as well as freedom – independence are a quite typical elements of the positive image of the Boers in Hungary and referring to the parallel that the Hungarian pro-Boer journalism drew between the South African War and the Hungarian war of independence of 1848-49.

## CONCLUSION

As a conclusion it is necessary to emphasize that the South African War as a topic had a special place and a special role in the contemporary Hungarian press and public opinion. The ideals of the revolution and war of independence of 1848-1849 and that historical event itself was a good brand (in some ways it is still a very good brand in Hungary and in abroad as well) and it influenced unquestionably the way and the patterns how the Hungarian public opinion interpreted the South African War. In other words, one can conclude that there was a special dimension of interpretation in Hungary during the second part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century whose borders was marked with the principles and ideals of the revolution and

27 A burok Világosa = *Debreczeni Ujság*, V (73), 1901. 1.

28 Péchy, Előadás Dél-Afrikáról, PP.

war of independence of 1848-49, and the contemporary Hungarian public opinion interpreted the South African War within the limits and borders of that dimension.

In case of the pro-Boer Hungarian volunteers, for instance Tibor Péchy or Félix Luzsénszky<sup>29</sup> references for the Hungarian revolution and war of independence as well as the similarities between the history of the Boers and the Hungarians appeared in the articles, columns they wrote after the arrival back to Hungary. Regarding Tibor Péchy, serious differences can be found between the text of his lectures or other published writings and his private papers written in the South African trenches. In South Africa, in his journal or his letters to her mother (Erzsébet Móricz) Péchy emphasized the negative characteristics of the Boers. For instance the Boers are characterised in these papers as coward, stubborn, greedy and arrogant people: “*Just who lives here or in a place similar to this may have any idea about the horrible arrogance and foolishness mixed with cruelty that a decent person step by step experiences here.*”<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, he became fed up with the Transvaal and returning back to Hungary meant a salvation for him: “[...] *day after day I hate more this country and its popular Boer population, so I think I will praised be the hour when I leave it even if I will have worse time there than here.*”<sup>31</sup> Opposite to this, Péchy depicted the Boers for the audience and readers in Hungary as a heroic small nation fighting against a great power (just like the Hungarians did in 1848-49). Péchy harmonized his narrative on the Boers to the Hungarian pro-Boer interpretation which process can be proved through the comparison of the text of his lectures or articles with the Hungarian pro-Boer articles.

Two factors could stand behind the said change in Péchy’s views about the Boers and the war. First of all, he could be influenced by pro-Boer journalism which absolutely dominated the contemporary Hungarian press and public opinion. Moreover, probably he altered his narrative in order to turn his story easily acceptable for the Hungarian readers and audience as well as to improve the marketing of his articles and lectures.

---

29 Félix Luzsénszky, Magyarok Transvaalban [Hungarians in Transvaal]. = *Magyar Salon*, 1900. 461–464.

30 Péchy to Erzsébet Móricz, October 24, 1896, Pretoria, PP.

31 Péchy to E. Móricz, November 17, 1896, Pretoria, PP.





**Zsolt Szilágyi**

## **The Perception of a Market Town in the Great Plain. The Representations of Kecskemét between 1880 and 1940**

Kálmán Mikszáth, in his novel, characterized the 16<sup>th</sup> century Kecskemét borderline during Turkish era as “A sea, made up of sand.” “It has already been confined by the arborist grandchildren, yet in those times the sand was free to run, wander and flow without restraint”.<sup>1</sup> The landscape had shown a complete change for the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Wineries, orchards, forests and new plough lands were established out from the seasand. The turn of the century saw profound changes in the economic structure of Kecskemét. In the 1880s Mikszáth, reflecting his own present into the past, quotes the town as a place well-known for its apple.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, in the 1930s Zsigmond Móricz mentions the trio of “sounding grapes, clinging apricot and smiling apple”.<sup>3</sup> The sand that caused so many problems earlier had turned into gold, as the local phrase goes, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Due to the destruction caused by vine-pest, the economic potential of borderlines around the Sandtown witnessed radical relocations.<sup>4</sup> The proportion of landowners and cottiers, compared to the other cities in the Great Plain, had notably rocketed by the end of the 1930s,<sup>5</sup> which asserted paramount effects on the local economic and demographic processes, configuration and the practice of proxemics. The population in the suburban areas was in excess of 31,000 inhabitants before the First World War, in 1935 this number approximated 47,000.<sup>6</sup> During the inter-war period Kecskemét was an agricultural (market) town where the settlement was concentrically surrounded by the homestead (*tanya*) zones that gave place for fruit and vegetable cultivation internationally recognised, thus it was gradually

1 Kálmán Mikszáth, Beszélő köntös. In. *Mikszáth Kálmán munkái*. Vol. 8. *Kisebb regények. A fekete kakas. A beszélő köntös*. Budapest, 1910 [1889]. 67–191. 90–1.

2 Ibid. 107.

3 Zsigmond Móricz, Szóló szőlő, csengő barack, mosolygó alma. In. *Riportok*. Vol. 3. (1930–1935). Ed. Zsigmond Móricz. Budapest, 1958 [1932]. 161–6. 162.

4 Zsolt Szilágyi, *Homokváros. Kecskemét történeti földrajzi látószögek metszetében*. Kecskemét, 2012. (Kecskeméti Örökség Könyvek, 2). László Bende, *A kecskeméti szőlő- és gyümölcstermelés fejlődéstörténete*. Kecskemét, 1929. 56–8.

5 Szilágyi, Homokváros, 120.

6 Zsolt Szilágyi, Város–tanya-kapcsolat a Horthy-kori Kecskeméten. = *Tér és Társadalom*, 25, 2011, n. 2. 29–47, 32.

prospering the contemporaries also remarked that Kecskemét competed in plant production with Cegléd and Nagykőrös.<sup>7</sup>

László Csikay a fur-maker, born in Kecskemét, recalls his childhood times of the 1880s and describes his hometown as follows, “In Wintertime, or in Springtime, when we wanted to cross [the street], we had to walk on planks laid on the ground, we were children those times and we skipped across those planks to protect our boots from sticking into the mud.” Then he goes on with close-ups and visualises his neighbourhood and the downtown area this way, “Across the Beretvás’ and the Savings Bank [...] there stood a long block which was aperted by a crooked street. [...] Here was Erlika’s tailor shop and the blind Tóth’s hatter shop, then in the row came the spitting café which kept open all day long, the butchers also stored their chairs at this place after they finished their business day at the market. The next in the line was the Ág’s confectionery, where the homestead folks had their cakes made. Then in the row followed another tailor shop that belonged to Sándor Tóth, a small-built man with a grand business site, he employed 18-20 apprentices at one time.” Csikay goes on with this confusingly lengthy graphic presentment even longer and he pictures the figures of lamplighters in the “almost dark streets at sundown”, those who “put their ladders on their shoulders in the evenings and kept strolling to light coal-oil lamps hanged on studs. Then in the mornings they came again and blew out those lamps.”<sup>8</sup>

The days of this “world” had all disappeared for the turn of the century. The later Szabadság Square and Széchenyi Square used to be a built-up area, but during the execution of urban renewal plans the buildings sited on this location were pulled down and spacious squares were extended within the town-centre; thus emerged the image of the town-centre for the inter-war period. The palace of Savings Bank was constructed in front of the Evangelical temple and the complex of the fair place (business house) that surrounded the Reformed temple was also built. All of these endeavours fitted well into the architecture of the downtown. Kecskemét was the one and only town at the turn of the century where the central square was closely surrounded by a Roman Catholic Church, by a Reformed and an Evangelical temple, also by a

7 Rezső Ruisz, Kecskemét. In: *Magyar városok*. Ed. Antal Csikvári. Budapest, 1941. 213–216, 214, (Városi és Vármegyei Szociográfiák, 14).

8 László Csikay, *Hogyan nézett ki Kecskemét 80 évvel ezelőtt*. (Manuscript, 1960.) Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Bács-Kiskun Megyei Levéltára (MNL BKML), Gyűjtemények, 1334–2008. 2009. Kecskemét városra vonatkozó történeti adatok gyűjteménye, 1700–1994 (XV-7). no. 13.

Greek Church and by a neolog Israelitic synagogue. The main square of the town was also referred to as the square of the *Seven Sanctuaries* (Figure 1).<sup>9</sup>



Figure 1 A panning from the Nagytemplom in Kecskemét in 1903  
Notes: Pious Order's Church (1), Evangelical Temple (2), Synagogue (3), Reformed Temple (4), St. Franciscan Order's Church (5).

Source: Dániel Lovas, *Élet a régi Kecskeméten. Hétköznapiak és ünnepek a 20. század első felében, magángyűjteményekben található régi fotókon és képeslapokon*. Kecskemét, 2006. 8–9.

The „wine recovery” after the vine pest had provided opportunities for local economic development. On the run up to the millennium, further institutions were given newly constructed buildings which were the Town Council and the Theatre. The transition in the economic structure made the town leaders bring new aspects to the fore and create a conception that a spacious, central square should be created, which could be efficiently utilized for commercial purposes and could give place for local farmers to merchandise their import or export products in an organized and monitorable manner. These were the origins of the birth of „main square”, a site of three smaller squares directly connected to the railway station by a lane of a width more than 40 metres and also by Rákóczi Street. (Figure 2).

9 The Reformed Temple was constructed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, during the years right before the dispatch of the Turks; the construction of the Roman Catholic Main Church, the Piarist Church Order's and the Franciscan (Friars) Order's Church was executed in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century; the Greek Catholic Church and the Synagogue was built in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; the Evangelical Temple and the New Synagogue (next to the old one) was designed in the second half of this century. – György Sümegi, *Építészeti törekvések Kecskeméten a századfordulón (1890–1919)*. In: *Bács-Kiskun megye múltjából*. Vol. 9. *Közművelődés*. Ed. Tibor Iványosi-Szabó. A Bács-Kiskun Megyei Levéltár kiadványa. Kecskemét, 1987. 357–422.; László Novák, *A Három Város építészete*. Arany János Múzeum, Nagykőrös, 1989. Katalin Borossay, *Magyarország műemlékjegyzéke. Bács-Kiskun megye*. Budapest, 2006. 60–82. Zsolt Szilágyi Zsolt, „Barackváros főterei”, 1880–1940. = *Történeti Tanulmányok*, 20, 2012. 123–142. 135–141.

Figure 2 Rákóczi Street after the turn of the century

Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125526<sup>10</sup>



Besides the booming economic status, this wide-scale town rearrangement went with several other processes. On one hand, the extension of civil service asserted a determining role. On the other hand, as part of this extension, the attainment of municipal rank in 1870 accelerated and allocated a new transitional direction for the local community. The blooming emergence of tertiary sector and diverse new services, plus the spectacular broadening of clerical circle altogether resulted in the formation of needs for constructing new buildings and for further conversion of the downtown. Besides the public buildings designed with representative quality, modern tenement builds came also into being and the extension of the Reformed Dormitory was also bound to be executed. The Roman Catholic tenement house, opposite the Council House still under construction, was opened in 1894. Soon after it, the construction of the Israelitic and the city tenement houses terminated.<sup>11</sup> By 1907, on the same side with the Greek Catholic Church, at Széchenyi Square, the Traders' House and three years later the second Israelitic tenement house were erected next to it. The vehement process of constructions was intermitted by devastating earthquakes in 1911.<sup>12</sup> Although most of the buildings suffered some considerable damage, a year later the Reformed New Dormitory,<sup>13</sup> the monoblock of Folks Bank and the second Roman Catholic tenement house were completed and opened.<sup>14</sup> Lastly, in the final peaceful year, the impressive structure of Evangelical tenement house, right next to the Savings Bank, was also given to the public (Figure 3).

10 Arcanum Postcards (electronic database, <http://postcards.arcanum.hu/hu/?v=pdf&a=start>)

11 The former one was built at the front part of Nagykörös Street, the later one was constructed at the junction of Szabadság Square and Rákóczi Street opposite the synagogue, on the other side of the street.

12 An impact of a massive earthquake measuring 5.6 on the Richter scale hit Kecskemét, which is quite a rare phenomenon in the Carpathian Basin. – KRSZO: <http://www.seismology.hu/index.php/hu/szeizmicitas/multnagy/89-kecskem-et-july-8-1911-m56-imax8> (Downloaded, 8 March 2014).

13 Opposite the Savings Bank, on the other side of Szabadság Square.

14 At the corner of Szabadság Square and the Széchenyi Square.



Figure 3 The Szabadság Square in 1913  
 Note: The Roman Catholic Main Church is (on the left), next to it is the complex of the Folks Bank and the second Catholic tenement house, next in the row is the Savings Bank annexed with the Evangelical tenement house (on the right).  
 Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125884

Besides the fact that these tenement houses represent the prestige of the constructor's, it also embodies "magnitude" (magnificence) and "power", these buildings were also intended to utilize the financial potentials via meeting the demands of the society that was undergoing certain profound transformations. A row of shops were opened and maintained on the ground floor of the tenement houses. On the upper floors, flats were offered to let primarily for public and civil servants – within a considerably attractive milieu.

The main square of the town was famed for its market place open from spring to autumn and busiest in summer. Móricz had tended to its fame to a remarkable extent. What made him enchanted is difficult to define. It is without doubt that the experiences he had gained here were incomparable to his previous ones: some unknown and unusual perceptions that back then seemed to belong to a well-structured and well-balanced phenomenon. In the 1930s thus he wrote about this place: "The first time I took a stroll through the wide fields towards the Tisza, astonished I saw the train crossing areas so rich and fertile that is only typical of certain spots there in Italy. Splendid wine yards, full with fruit trees. Rich soil with oceans of fruitages, a place that people used to call an earthly paradise."<sup>15</sup> „I was marvelling the fine spectacle of Kecskemét. A finer place is almost impossible to come by within the Great Plain. The Townhouse is the most impressive construction of Lechner Ödön's a delightful piece of architecture. Right in front of it lies a lane with a width of 45 metres, it crosses the sprawl of crooked old streets thus makes this town a European beauty. The town is lined – on its two sides – by beautifully constructed palaces of a so-called Hungarian style, which grants a particular nature to the town. If one winds into the narrow streets, then he can find stout and solid builds even in the remotest periphery,

<sup>15</sup> Zsigmond Móricz, *A föld meghódítása*. In. *Riportok*. Vol. 3. Ed. Zsigmond Móricz. Budapest, 1958 [1932]. 167–171, 167.

which houses clearly reflect some old-time wealth and prosperity.”<sup>16</sup>

The two sketches of Kecskemét, Móricz’s literary image capturing spectacles and Csikay’s colloquial depiction almost the exact reflection of real life with minute details, are undeniably wide apart in style. Half of a century had passed away over the city – which fact in itself can explain the differences of the two sketches – still it is not the traceable changes that are of primary importance but what can raise interest is the reason why the two observations of the town differ to such a large extent. The perspectives unveiled are apparently variant as they stem from different resources: from an “inlander”, from a “through passenger” and from a “trespasser” (jöttment). In the 1940s, Joós Ferenc<sup>17</sup>, born out of Kecskemét but lived mostly hereabouts and wrote books and taught at schools, was the latter sketcher type. His imagination presented the town in a characteristic way: „In this wide area there is always something worth seeing for a visitor from outland. The fruit gardens and vineyards stretching beyond the borderline areas surrounded the town as a forest and composed a scenic view teeming with colourful white and red flowers. The smell of peach blossoms wafted from all around. Later, at times of ripening fruits, Europe’s tray for fruits offers an abundance of the tastiest products. [...] During this fruit ripening so from Spring until Autumn, the borderline areas are like a grandiose plate serving endless treasures. In the middle of the palm, with the power of attraction, lies [...] the town. The treasures of the wide palm keep flowing in here. Thousands of loaded carts drew in here loaded with fruit baskets and cases. They arrive right at the market place brightly illuminated with floodlights. Here bring the small vineyard farm peoples their small harvest packed in their square baskets. Here are the most palatable delicacy of Europe to be sold and bought. [...] The main church is 75 metres high, the bell in the straight tower still has not tolled its wake-up call, yet the market has been opened up. When the city peoples wipe their night dreams out of their eyes, the merchants and buyers have all cleared off from the marketplace.”<sup>18</sup>

In case of Joós and Móricz, who must have arrived at the spot earlier, Kecskemét could be only visualized via its borders – only this narrowing

---

16 Zsigmond Móricz, Kecskemét. In: *Riportok*. Vol. 3. (1930–1935). Ed. Zsigmond Móricz. Budapest, 1958 [1932]. 155–160, 156.

17 Mária Péterné Fehér – Tamás Szabó – Ilona Székelyné Körösi, *Kecskeméti életrajzi lexikon*. Kecskemét, 1992. (Kecskeméti Füzetek, 4).

18 Ferenc Joós, *Kecskemét a dolgozók hirös városa*. (Manuscript, 1947.) MNL BKML XV-7. no. 12.

perspective could be the right angle of perception. Thus homesteads (as agricultural production facilities) made the representation of the town natural and inevitable via the pulsation of each season. It is visible, that one key factor to analyse the settlement was the export market. This is why both of the sketchers may feel to capture and create the “image” of Kecskemét through this factor. Taking this factor into account, the most essential symbolic emblem of the town-heart is the marketplace where not just the above mentioned image comes alive, but also where the manufacturers as vendors, the town-dwellers as buyers and the export traders as engrossers are envisioned. Their interactions took place at the marketplace founded at the turn of the century and was bound to enthrall the visitors to the town. “The dusk at dawn enthralls the visitor with a breath-taking view”, writes Erdei. “Hundreds and thousands of carts flood the area between the towers [...], as some kind of enchantment. By the time the peoples wake up from their dreams, the town has unblocked its colours. The towers and palaces parade proudly in the town heart which may seem to be eye-catching and deformed at the same time: one cannot know it exactly, but it is crystal clear that the intake is the most impressive kind and evokes deep admiration. The landscapes show no similarities with either any western or eastern sketches, they simply seem to have been born by sheer imagination, they have become like a piece of news floating above the town: something intangible, a sort of amazement, something that deserves adoration.”<sup>19</sup>

Ferenc Erdei is the only person, who although being a devoted enthusiast depicts Kecskemét during the inter-war years as follows: “Kecskemét is double-faced. On one hand it is the town of fame, the ‘Hírös Város’, on the other hand is the town of sand: the real Kecskemét.” The former characterization tells a lot about the well-planned propaganda created of the “Town gilded with colours and savours”; which attracts crowds into the town. The writer considered this depiction as the non-real Kecskemét: he thought that this place is a “gloomy and impatient” market town during its weekdays. He also assumed that the well-famed Kecskemét is nothing else but the “glorified copy of reality fantasised by the Hungarians to re-achallurement and comfort and to enchant the newcomers”.<sup>20</sup>

---

19 Ferenc Erdei, *Futóhomok. A Duna–Tisza köz földje és népe*. Budapest, 1937. 77–8. (Magyarország Felfedezése).

20 Ibid. 77.



It is apparent that the town was manifested by the contemporaries in the footsteps of Sándor Petőfi as being a “hot-summer mirage”: an allurements, a divine (inexplicable) phenomenon, an exemplary pattern to be followed. What also contributed to the emergence of myth is that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the landscape that emblemized Hungary was displaced from the mountains to the Great Plain – Ferenc Kölcsey or the above mentioned Petőfi are reckoned to have played a contributive role in this transition. The continuously growing interest for the Great Plain resulted in the emergence of the “Great Plain cult” countermarked indispensably with the wide fields (*puszta*). As Kecskemét also owned an abundance of mythical places, the town had emerged to be a vital element of the cult. Besides Mór Jókai and Mikszáth, different academic studies also revived and created their own Kecskemét – during the interwar years, at the latest, when attention was refocused on Great Plain. All of these factors mentioned above had a profound influence on town dwellers and on the picture they created about themselves, thus started the local middle class and the elite circle to conceptualize their position: the mythicized Kecskemét had become a real element of the dwellers’ self-awareness. This concept is presented tiled in the picture that the elite circle tended to depict about the town for instance this manner of presentation also appeared in the column of “Városkultura” (The Culture of the Town).

In 1933 this periodical discussed Kecskemét in separate thematic blocks. Important elite dwellers were requested to take pen in hand and write pieces that were to be published. The thematic assortment of the writings on the town was as follows: Jenő Szappanos focused on historical and architectural themes, Ödön Horváth wrote about agriculture and export trading, Sándor Merétey was in response of demography, Albin Cserey-Pechány dealt with health issues, Sándor Kovács focused on public education, and Pál M. Bodon traced cultural and art subjects.<sup>21</sup>

The above mentioned thematic classification authentically reflects the scientific practice of those times, also represents the historical, economic, social and cultural aspects asserted back then. The typical

---

21 Jenő Szappanos, A mai Kecskemét. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. 8. 144–7.; Ödön Horváth, Kecskemét a gyümölcs városa. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. no. 8. 148–9.; Sándor Merétey, Kecskemét a gyermek városa. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. no. 8. 149–150.; Sándor Merétey, Kecskemét a gyermek városa. (Offprint.) = *Magyar Statisztikai Szemle*, 13, 1935. no. 5. 78–87.; Albin Cserey-Pechány, Kecskemét közegészségügye. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. no. 8. 150–1.; Sándor Kovács, Kecskemét közoktatásügye. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. no. 8. 151–2.; Pál M. Bodon, Kecskemét zenei élete. = *Városkultura*, 6, 1933. no. 8. 152–3.

features of Kecskemét became apparently remarkable: the wide fields of Bugac, the already ruling picture of apricot culture, fruit trading, the outstandingly high rates of birth and the “exemplary” establishment of the local homestead schools’ network. The close link established with József Katona’s spirit and with Zoltán Kodály’s work are also clearly conceptualised. Last, but not least, the unique Town Hall, due to its role played in the representation, is exemplified to be more prominent. Besides giving home to the local civil services, the Town Hall also spectacularly embodies the power of the town governors’ elite circle and emblematically symbolises the self-awareness of Kecskemét dwellers’.

The building represents artistic values and accommodated decision making procedures, thus it soon emerged into a symbol that embodied the town even at the turn of the century, which fact is authentically affirmed by numerous photos and postcards. Later on, however, it’s rare to find captures where the Town Hall was snapped on its own aparted from its natural surroundings (Figure 4). Most of the snapshots are made from distant perspectives where the building is surrounded by temples and churches and the market crowd (Figure 5). As a result, by the 1930s the marketplace, especially the fruit market, turned out to be an emblem similarly important as the Town Hall. As a clear verification of the above mentioned remark, and as a proof that the local elite circle has perceived and conveyed this fact in the same way, ten representative pictures of Kecskemét were published in articles written by Szappanos. Namely, none of these pictures portray the Town Hall in a conventional way. As quite the reverse, breaking with the previous practices, one photo shows the Szabadság Square from the peculiar angle from the upper floor of the Town Hall. The shot captures one site of the marketplace and the line of shops that appears to be a spot from a busy metropolis. In the background the Beretvás Hotel and the synagogue are also exposed, in the foreground the hire-carriages and the passers-by are snapped (Figure 6).<sup>22</sup> This subject is also mentioned in the following remark made by the author, originally architect by profession: due to the fact that Kecskemét is a market town “it has its hardships with practising the outlook of a large city”.<sup>23</sup>

22 Different other pictures depict Rákóczi Street (the economic vein of the town), the theatre, the newly built palace suburb and the freshly opened Széktó Spa. Two out of the remaining five captures reveal the town in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the rest are of the József Katona’s grave, the main altar of the Roman Catholic Main Church and the mural “The Blood Oath” by Bertalan Székely in the town council’s boardroom wall (Szappanos, *A mai Kecskemét*, 145–6).

23 Ibid. 144.



Figure 4 The Town Hall of Kecskemét aparted from natural surroundings from the times before 1902  
Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125619



Figure 5 A photo of the Town Hall with the surrounding buildings and the local market in the front at around 1900  
Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125873



Figure 6 The Szabadság Square in 1933  
Source: Jenő Szappanos, *op. cit.*, 145.

The picture that the elite circle of Kecskemét wished to create and transmit about the town is clearly distinguishable in main terms. However, how this perception adjusted to practise of contemporary town sketching and what this practise resulted in will be discussed heretofore.<sup>24</sup>

Correspondingly to other towns, Kecskemét was detailed from birds' eye perspective.<sup>25</sup> Even at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, certain elements of this view are still traceable in a handful of photos (Figure 7). What is perceivable is that this time Kecskemét is depicted as a large town in the countryside: not from a perspective view or from a distant approach, but oftentimes from people's „downstairs” angle that any passers-by had the chance to experience (Figure 8). In contrast with the earlier ones, this conceptualisation atomized the townscape into small details via the individual's experience. Nevertheless capturing the “extensive complexity” of the town was not primarily important anymore but *a partial picture of the entire* caption became the focus of interest. Besides that fact until those times photos had already been taken of the buildings, building complexes and public sites, as a new theme, the market were also presented in the pictures. We should also mention that there are no sharp era lines between the town descriptions of Kecskemét. Both presentment styles had been used alternately via varying the above mentioned themes even at the turn of the century; albeit building photographing itself was gradually fading into the background from the 1920s.



Figure 7 Kecskemét from birds's eye perspective at the turn of the century

Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125517

24 Aspects gathered from, Gábor Gyáni, *Budapest – túl jön és rosszon. A nagyvárosi múlt mint tapasztalat*. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. 161–187.

25 See Szilágyi, Homokváros, 41–2.



Figure 8 The row of shops with passers-by in Szabadság Square during the interwar period  
Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125895

The miling crowds in the contemporary market photos were never taken from a zoomed angle, but from a distant point that makes the extension and size of the market perceivable (Figure 5). Anyhow unused this theme in the presentment of Kecskemét had been at the turn of the century, still it could not become a determinative element, as in those times the constructed setting deserved more attention, and the presentment of the crowds at the market place was executed only via overemphasising the décor components. Nonetheless, the market place had turned out to be a constant and perpetual theme, also an essential component of Kecskemét's image. From this point of view, the market in the representation of Kecskemét meant something completely different than aspect with regard to Budapest at the turn of the century, which may result in several explanations.

It occurs to ask, that in case of an market town how can a market place “deserve such paramount status above everything else”. In Kecskemét from the beginning of the century, export market had started to gain conspicuous efficiency due to the newly constructed main square, which asserted profound influence on both town economy and town society. Thus, as an accelerator of the transitional process, the market place had become the most vital characteristic element of the town.

According to a further possible explanation, in the captures of the market the homestead folks (farmers) and the townspeople (civilians) were presented together to evoke the illusion of the unified inland and outland. We can talk about only an “illusion” in this case, as personal interaction between the two

sides was only occasional, even if a seller had a habitual clientele. (There is no economic distinction between a seller and a buyer as one has goods to sell and the other has the money to purchase goods.) As a conclusion, the real wide gap between the homestead folks and the townspeople were not presented, thus evoked the illusion of a unified Kecskemét. This gap vanished amongst the crowds of the market in this way the mythical Kecskemét, the “Well-famed Town” image could come into being.

In contrast, during the 1920s and the 1930s a visible change in the intention of perception was traceable. Seemingly not the captured picture of the crowds was required anymore, but the accentuation of the individual and the visualization of diverse “Kecskemét folks” was the demand to fulfil (Figure 9). In these snapshots clearly defined human figures, oftentimes even their facial expressions are envisioned: their clothing, posture give evident hints to their approximate social status. Via this visualization method, when more national attention was directed onto homesteads after First World War, the Kecskemét town dweller and the homestead dweller “come alive” out of the illusion of the unified crowds.



Figure 9 Local producers’ market before First World War  
Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125820



Figure 10 The town as a work of art, the building of the House of Law at the beginning of the century  
Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125658

Besides the pictures taken of the market, the captures of *the* street also hold similar importance. At the turn of the century, it was a common practice that the photographer focused on snapping the constructed environment and that he was on to select a time of the day when the traffic of the public squares were supposedly the lowest (Figure 10). A snapshot like this may evoke a feeling that the streets in those times tended to be deserted in an inexplicable way. Although the logical assumption may arise that at the turn of the century the lower number of citizens may have induced this “phenomenon”, still it is not credible that the streets emptied to such a great extent during the morning hours. It was more likely that the photographer himself settled the setting for the snapshot with the lowest number of citizens. But what prompted the photographer to do so?

According to a reasoning, the town impressed the photographer as a “piece of art”.<sup>26</sup> This artistically constructed milieu was captured in the pictures, where the focus was not of human figures but of the newly designed buildings that for then somehow unfitted the townscape at the turn of the century. These buildings transparently represent the local elite’s “magnitude” and power, including the influence and role of the local clergy. They also hide some symbolic reference to the mental links the local elite took on unreservedly with the national elite circle in the capital city. A good example of this attitude can be the Cifra Palace and the Katona József Theatre (Figure 11). As Szappanos in the 1930s also remarks, the latter one is “a similar but smaller copy of the Vígyszínház in Budapest”.<sup>27</sup>



Figure 11 The Katona József Theatre in the 1920s

Source: Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125595

26 Gyáni, Budapest, 167.

27 Szappanos, A mai Kecskemét, 144.

At that time, during the interwar years, the man in the street appears in the photos more often. The buildings were still the focus of the captures, but they are important as the *décor* of the Kecskemét's proscenium, and not as works of art. Consequently, the addressee of a postcard tended to compose his impression about the (inner) town and the townspeople based on these characteristically idealized visualisations. This point of view diverted importance onto presenting the cumulative crowds and the pulsation of a town in the country (Figure 12).



Figure 12 The miling street in the 1920s

*Source:* Arcanum Postcards ZM 0125882

All in all, the elite circle clearly understood and also contributed to the transition of the townscape concepts. The focus of conceptualisations was first the buildings which were later replaced by civilians. The town gained presentation based on these changes. The primary symbol of Kecskemét was not only the Town Hall, but also the society of town dwellers, in particular the figures of manual workers who created the “town of fruits” out of sand with bare hands. It is no coincidence that Mayor Endre Balásfalvi Kiss pronounced, in connection with the large-scale event, the “Hirös Hét” (Well-famed Week), that “the workingmen of Kecskemét were to be presented before the country”.<sup>28</sup> The Mayor mentioned and exalted the ideas also formed by László Németh, the director of the Institution for the Deaf Mutes, also the president of the Vineyard Lords’ Association, as he announced broadly in 1919 that Kecskemét “is operated by the vineyard lords who made gold out of the wind-blown seasand via giving fruits of juicy apricots and apples to decorate the tables of Berlin, Paris, London and St Petersburg and via

28 Endre Balásfalvi Kiss, A „Hirös Hét”. = *Tolnai Világlapja*, 36, 1934. (electronic database, <http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1934-julius/gazdasag/hiros-het-kecskemeten>)



popularizing their smooth ‘kadarka’ wine overseas, in America.”<sup>29</sup>

In contrast, István Fáy, Lord Lieutenant seemed to think that Kecskemét is “also the town of reality and romance”. The previous concept – as “the picture and results of real living” – was to be exhibited on the above mentioned event with the intention of revealing what kind of townscape the town dwellers, in particular the elite circle had conceptualised. Nevertheless, the latter idea, “the town of romance” was formed in a completely different manner, as Fáy also recognised it, “Here are no blackened old-time castle walls, where ghost-ladies and armoured knights from folk tales stroll under the shadows of the hollow arches into the moonlight. This romance is different – a harmony of Hungarian air and colourful, forest birds’ clinging songs and meadow flowers’ scents: it is the music of Hungarian fields and the meeting of Petőfi’s and Katona’s spirit.”<sup>30</sup> The factual and romanticised pictures of Kecskemét in a complementary and collective way contributed to the overall image of the mythicized Kecskemét during the interwar period.

---

29 *Kecskeméti Közlöny*, 20 November 1919, 2. (A szőlősgazdák a főispánnál és a polgármesternél)

30 István Fáy, *Hirös Hét Kecskeméten*. = *Tolnai Világlapja*, 36, 1934, (electronic database, <http://www.husadikszazad.hu/1934-julius/gazdasag/hiros-het-kecskemeten>)

**Róbert Barta**

## **Churchill's Ideas on United Europe After World War II<sup>1</sup>**

### INTRODUCTION

Histories abound about Winston Churchill's political career after the Second World War<sup>2</sup> and post-1945 British foreign policy, and the list of such bibliographical items is continuously expanding.<sup>3</sup> This essay proposes to survey W. S. Churchill's views about Europe from the last year of World War Two, to his death on January 24, 1965. Instead of the classical approach of a history of politics or diplomacy, I prefer to seek an answer to what standpoint Churchill represented as regards post-1945 Europe, and how he attempted to convert it into the official stream of British foreign policy. Therefore, I will provide an overview of British foreign policy only when it radically differed from Churchill's position,

1 The study is a revised form of a former paper of the author published in *Hungary Through the Centuries*. Editor-in-Chief Richard P. Mulcahy. New York, 2011. 235–252.

2 Important works about Churchill's post-1945 activity (the list is by no means complete), James W. Muller, *Churchill as Peacemaker*. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. Washington D. C., 1997.; John W. Young, *W. S. Churchill's Last Campaign – Britain and the Cold War 1951-55*. Oxford, 1996. Martin Gilbert, *Never Dispair – W. S. Churchill 1945-1965*. Vol. VIII. London, 1988.; John W. Young, *Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration*. Leicester, 1988.; Henry Pelling, *Winston Churchill*. London, 1974.; Anthony Seldon, *Churchill's Indian Summer; The Conservative Government, 1951-55*. London, 1981.; John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance, The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57*. London, 1996.; John Ramsden, *The Age of Churchill and Eden 1940-1957*. London, 1995.; Anthony Montague Browne, *Long Sunset - Memoirs of Winston Churchill's Last Private Secretary*. London, 1995.; *Churchill. Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran*. Boston, 1966.; Paul Addison, *Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955*. London, 1992.; Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*. London, 2001.

3 For post-1945 British foreign policy see Elizabeth Barker, *Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-1970*. London, 1971.; Joseph Frankel, *British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*. London, 1975.; Brian White, *Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations*. London, 1992.; Martin Smith – Steve Smith – Brian White (eds.), *British, Foreign Policy, Tradition, Change and Transformation*. London, 1988.; John W. Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992*. London, 1993.; Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators. The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-1970*. London, 1991.; Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace. Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*. Oxford, 1990.; Kenneth O. Morgan, *The People's Peace – British History 1945-1990*. Oxford, 1992.; *Documents on British Policy Overseas*. Ed. by M. E. Pelly – H. J. Jasamee – K. A. Hamilton – R. Bullen – G. Benett. London, HMSO, Ser. I-II-III., 1986, 1991, 1997.

which happened on several occasions. With this, following an analysis of his address evaluating the immediate post-war situation, as well as the Fulton speech, I will discuss Churchill's vision of a United States of Europe. Aside from using published and unpublished archival sources,<sup>4</sup> it is necessary to analyze in detail some fundamental documents related to Churchill's post-1945 activities ("iron curtain telegram," Fulton Address, Zurich Address, documents related to the United States of Europe), because Hungarian studies of history, so far, have not dealt with them in a substantive manner.

The Europe that Churchill knew has ceased to exist. The author's aim is to present this controversial man's views about Europe, which themselves were controversial in their day. Nevertheless, without his predictions, concepts and visions of a united Europe, today's European Union would not exist.

#### ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FULTON

Churchill's ambivalent attitude regarding communism and the Soviet Union evolved during the years of the Second World War. Prior to 1939, he represented an uncompromising anticommunism (a characteristic feature until his death, that even his sharpest critics admit), which somewhat softened during the war years for practical reasons due to a necessary cooperation with the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> However, he remained suspicious of Soviet foreign policy, throughout the war. In October 1939, in a radio speech, he compared Soviet foreign policy to a mystery which is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."<sup>6</sup> Although this statement was obviously inspired by the shock felt over the Molotov-

4 From among unpublished archival sources we rely mostly on material in Churchill Archives, in Churchill College, Cambridge (Churchill Papers 2/18-2/377, United States of Europe, 5/2-5/9, Churchill Speeches, 5/2-5/7.), as well as Churchill's speeches, which are to be considered primary sources because he wrote most of them himself. His post-war speeches were published in Randolph S. Churchill's edition: *The Sinews of Peace*. London, 1948. *Europe United*. Cassel, London, 1950.; *In the Balance*. London, 1951.; *Stemming the Tide*. London, 1953.; *The Unwritten Alliance*. London, 1961.

5 John Charmley's works, primarily: *Churchill. The End of Glory – A political biography*. London, 1993.; Idem, *Churchill's Grand Alliance – The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-1957*. London, 1995.

6 Op.cit., Robert Rhodes James (ed.), *Winston Churchill. His Complete Speeches 1897-1963*. VI. 1935-1942. New York, 1974, 6161. Quoted in Viktor Mauer, Harold MacMillan and the Deadline Crisis over Berlin 1958-59. = *Twentieth Century British History*, 9, 1998. no. 1. 54-85.

Ribbentrop Pact and the rapid fall of Poland, still it provided the bottom-line upon which British foreign policy laid judgements about the Soviet Union's power politics. Churchill sensed acutely the dangers implied in the Yalta order, which the words of his telegram of May 14, 1945 to Lord Halifax commenting on the Soviet declaration of war against Japan aptly illustrate. He was convinced that the cost of the Soviet declaration of war against Japan could be very high: the upper hand for the Soviets in Central Europe and in the Balkans.<sup>7</sup>

He took a similar position regarding Hungary, when, in a private conversation two weeks later, he emphasized that:

“...The position of the Magyars has been maintained over many centuries and many misfortunes, and must ever be regarded as a precious European entity. Its submergence in the Russian flood could not fail to be either the source of future conflicts or the scene of national obliteration horrifying to every generous heart...”<sup>8</sup>

He contrasted the threat of communism and communist activity in Europe with the traditional values of the Christian world, but he never denied that communists are very practical and purposeful people. Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King noted in his diary that Churchill compared communists to Jesuits denying Jesus's principles, who would be willing to do anything to reach their aim and were to no extent naïve daydreamers. Since they were extremely pragmatic in their aims, it was the only way to manage them.<sup>9</sup>

Because Churchill had in all his life been convinced that big events only waited for him to direct them and that he held extraordinary skills in strategic thinking, he referred to many of his earlier predictions in and about his relation to the Soviet Union. In his telegram to Stalin on April 29, 1945, he called attention that the grave differences between the western and the “eastern” world would sooner or later tear Europe apart, unless

---

7 Churchill Papers, 20/219. Quoted in, Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 14.

8 Churchill Papers, M/529/5. PM. personal minute. Quoted in, Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 24-27. During his post WWII political career Churchill could gain valuable and up-to-date information on Hungary from his business partner and intimate friend Emery Reves (Révész Imre). On their cooperation, see Róbert Barta, *Az államférfi és a világpolgár. W. S. Churchill és Emery Reves*. [The statesman and the world citizen] Máriabesnyő, 2013. 147.

9 J. W. Pickersgill – D. F. Forster, *The MacKenzie King Record*. vol. 3. 1945-46. Toronto, 1970. 83-87. Quoted in Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 160-162.

leaders of the antifascist alliance prevented it.<sup>10</sup> Occasionally, however, he turned a critical eye on his own role, although he never denied that making big decisions in an informal way greatly appealed to him. Turning to his doctor in a confidential moment, he recalled the famous “percentage agreement” made with Stalin in October 1944:

“Read that. We made an arrangement with Stalin in the war about spheres of influence, expressed in percentages. Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and so on. Here they are in print . . . It seems rather cynical, I said to Stalin, to barter away the lives of millions of people in this fashion. Perhaps we ought to burn this paper. ‘Oh, no’ said Stalin, ‘you keep it.’ . . . You see the people at the top can do these things, which others can’t do.”<sup>11</sup>

The fact that the Soviet Union’s spread in Europe was relentless seriously worried Churchill. Such a fear indeed motivated the “iron curtain” telegram, which he sent to President Truman on May 12, 1945. Although the expression “iron curtain” originated much earlier, the telegram is more than a mere analysis of the situation.<sup>12</sup> He found it very urgent to make a lasting agreement with the Russians, before everybody got too comfortably settled in the occupied zones. Churchill’s “iron curtain” telegram was motivated by a double fear. At all costs, he wanted

---

10 Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram, T. 657/5. No. 2255 to Moscow, Premier Papers 3/356/6. Quoted in, Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 659.

11 *Moran Diary*, August 16, 1953. Moran, 481–482.

12 Historical studies claim that the phrase “iron curtain” was first used by Russian emigrant philosopher Vasilii Rozanov in his 1918 book *Apocalypse of Our Time*, which discussed Russian development (“With a rumble and a roar, an iron curtain is descending on Russian History.”) Two years later, in a book about her travels in Soviet-Russia (*Through Bolshevik Russia*), Ethel Snowden also mentions it (“... a country ... being behind an iron curtain.”) The expression also appears in a speech by Goebbels, Nazi minister of propaganda, delivered on February 25, 1945 (“... ein eisenes Vorhang.”), as well as in a radio speech by Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, German minister of foreign affairs, delivered on May 2, 1945 (“... In the East the iron curtain behind which, unseen by the eyes of the world, the work of destruction goes on, is moving steadily forward.”) Krosigk’s speech was published in details in *The Times*, 3 May, 1945. The term was also used by Allen W. Dulles in a position paper he presented to the Council on Foreign Relations in September 1945. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for which Dulles had worked, had just been disbanded. Dulles came to New York to give the Council his assessment of the immediate post-war European situation. In relation to this, he stated that with regard to the Soviet Union’s activities in Eastern Europe it was “as if an iron curtain has fallen.” This position paper was not published at the time, and remained in the Council’s archive. However, it was eventually published in the Fall 2005 edition of the Council’s journal *Foreign Affairs*, as part of its commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the conclusion of World War Two.

to prevent an American withdrawal of troops from the continent when the war ended – this had been his primary aim in Yalta too – and, because he did not trust the Russians, he wanted to come to terms with them from a position of power.

The new first secretary to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan's long telegram, cabled in spring 1946, already regarded the expansive Russian foreign policy as a crossbreed between Marxist hegemony and an old czarist politics of conquest. Thus, when Churchill delivered his speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, he underscored an already crystallizing American policy of containment. The speech did not contain surprising new elements, but its tone was unusually frank. It featured all of the major points of Churchill's future foreign policy. Soviet occupation did not ensure democratic development in Eastern and Central Europe, with special regard to Poland and those German regions under Soviet control. Dictatorships and police states were forming everywhere with the help of the Soviets and local communists, which fundamentally threatened peace in Europe and divided the continent. Churchill opined that an extraordinary danger was present since the Soviet Union enjoyed military superiority on the European mainland. He believed that even if the Russians did not want war, they did want to utilize their wartime victory to a maximum extent. In order to achieve this, they wanted to push the border of their European zone of influence as far West as possible. Besides systemically plundering the areas they controlled, the Soviets interpreted democracy to mean an autarchy of the local communist parties.

In this situation, the most important task the English-speaking democracies needed to do was to cooperate closely in matters of economic, political and military, as well as pursue common action under UN auspices. The West needed to negotiate from the position of power: it must rearm and not allow any of the Western occupied German areas to fall into Soviet hands. Nevertheless, Moscow and surrounding satellite states must not be rejected from a coming reorganization of Europe; they must be negotiated with. Churchill was optimistic for the future because, when English-speaking peoples join efforts it must be for world peace and such an alliance would inevitably be invincible. Of course, in this unity he relegated a triple role to Great Britain: to be the focal point of the Western European democracies, the British Commonwealth, and the special American-British relationship. Hence, the western world,

together with the British Empire, was to face a charming future, as long as Churchill's recommendations were considered and followed.

Churchill's Fulton Address was not received with unanimous enthusiasm. Truman's administration distanced itself from the principles advertised in Fulton, although they had received Kennan's "long telegram" a week earlier and it reoriented American foreign policy in the exact direction that Churchill proposed. The British Labour government, naturally, did not take a speech by a conservative politician in opposition to be part of its official foreign political considerations, and foreign policy documents testify that the British could not do much against the sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe – at least, not in the field of economics. A final note of the summative document assessing the situation in Eastern Europe between 1945–46 stated that British commercial and economic interests in the region were negligible, but that existing ones needed to be protected.<sup>13</sup> Thus, the leading economic and political personalities in the least "sovietized" countries needed to be approached and dealt with, primarily through cooperation within international organizations. It would be an oversimplification to claim that British foreign policy "wrote off" the region: for instance, they continued to follow Hungarian domestic affairs attentively, but they did not have, nor could have, any influence over the proceedings.<sup>14</sup>

The most violent response to the Fulton Address, of course, came from the Soviet Union. Stalin himself gave an unusually long and very sharp-toned statement for *Pravda* on March 14, 1946.<sup>15</sup> In his opening he called Churchill a warmonger, who, much like Hitler, proclaimed the superiority of certain peoples – in this case the English-speaking peoples. Those who did not speak English had no choice but to accept Anglo-Saxon hegemony because it was good by nature. If they did not act accordingly, it meant war. Concerning sovietization in Eastern Europe and building dictatorships, Stalin commented that as to his best knowledge there was a one-party government in Great Britain and the opposition could not have a say in how the country was governed. All around Eastern Europe, however, multiparty coalitions operated with active involvement of the parties in opposition. The Soviet leader did not avoid cynical words. To

---

13 *FCO Documents on British Policy Overseas*. Ed. by M. E. Pelly – H. J. Jasamee – K. A. Hamilton. Series I. Vol. VI. HMSO, London, 1991. East-Europe 1945-46. 363–378. An analysis of Soviet economic policies in the region.

14 *Loc. cit.* 157–158, 199–201, 305–312.

15 Stalin's answer to the Fulton Address. = *Pravda*, March 14, 1946.

a statement by Churchill that the communist movement takes a growing space in the areas occupied by the Soviet Union, he observed that this time Churchill was close to the truth, except that the communist movement was taking space all over the world. Then, in accordance with the tone of the article and Stalin's unusually turbulent temper, further lines followed to glorify the communists' heroic antifascist stance.

It is difficult to regard Stalin's acute explosion merely as his subjective opinion, because the marshal directed the country's foreign policy. In all likelihood, Soviet explosions against the Fulton Address perfectly fitted into a conception – supported by recent historical research of the early cold war – that the Soviet Union and Stalin, personally, thought the breakout of a third world war to be a real possibility as early as summer of 1946. As it was, Stalin came to believe it was an inevitability well before the creation of the Kominform.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the Fulton speech touched upon a sensitive issue, and the British Labour government's ambassador to Moscow (Frank Roberts) pointed to it in a telegram to Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, dated March 18, 1946. Roberts noticed that influential members of the Soviet political elite became particularly angry over that part of the speech where Churchill asserted that the only thing the Soviets respected was military power.<sup>17</sup>

Summing up we can argue that Churchill's Fulton Address cannot be considered as the opening of the cold war. Neither the phrase "iron curtain" nor his evaluation of the contemporary European scene were original. The Fulton speech was in keeping with Churchill's style, but he was in opposition and his statements did not reflect the views of Mr. Attlee's Labour government. As for the United States, its foreign policy was already moving toward containment prior to the Fulton speech. In the language of sport: undoubtedly, the Soviet Union hit the high ball offered by Churchill, and using all mechanisms of the machinery of propaganda, they named the former wartime ally a warmonger. By this time, Soviet foreign policy was also inclined toward an unavoidable confrontation with the West. The same thing happened here was what happened several times during Churchill's career: he analysed the situation with brilliant sensitivity, he predicted future and, without him being involved, the events proved him right. All of the major elements of his foreign policy vision featured in the Fulton Address, as we have argued above, unfolded the way he said they would, with the possible exception of the United States of Europe.

16 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now – Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford, 1997. 23.

17 FCO Documents, Ser. I. Vol. VI. 326–331.



## CHURCHILL AND THE IDEA OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

Churchill first used the expression “United States of Europe” in Brussels on November 16, 1945, in a speech given in a joint session of the Belgian Senate and House of Representatives, although he acknowledged that it originated from Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of pre-war pan-European movement.<sup>18</sup> This part of his speech contained generalities only and served for rhetorical purposes: “United States of Europe...would unify this continent in a manner never known since the fall of the Roman Empire, and within which all its peoples may dwell together in prosperity, in justice and in peace.”<sup>19</sup>

In front of the Dutch National Assembly in the Hague he practically repeated the Brussels speech; however, he also mentioned the integration of East Europe and the Soviet Union, and he envisioned these under United Nations’ control.<sup>20</sup> After such antecedents came his famous Zurich address, where he expatiated on his full concept of the United States of Europe. In his lecture delivered at the University of Zurich, on September 19, 1946, he attempted to connect a European image of the future with the democratic and federalist system of Switzerland, which was an obvious gesture towards his audience. He mentioned Kalergi’s important role too, in the context that the Count influenced Aristide Briand’s Europe-plan, which in turn inspired Churchill’s idea of a united Europe, and that he largely inspired his [Churchill’s] ideal of a United Europe. Sharp but correct, Churchill criticized the League of Nations’ pre-war activity. In his opinion, the principles that the League proclaimed – which were essentially good – were only followed by states

---

18 Graf Kalergi met Churchill four times between 1946-1950. The preface to his book published in 1950 (*An Idea Conquest the World*) was written by Churchill. Further important works by Kalergi, *Pan Europe*. Vienna, 1923. *Totalitarian State Against Man* (1938), *Europe Must Unite* (1940). Although Churchill acknowledges Kalergi’s achievements, but did not agree with the pan-European movement being so sharply anti-Russian, “...I think it would be a pity for me to join an organization which had such a markedly anti-Russian bent, but I was not aware that this was Count C. K.’s conception.” (Letter to Duncan Sandys, June 29, 1946. Churchill papers, 2/23. Quoted in Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 243.) More about Kalergi’s activity in detail, Emma Kövics, *Az európai egység kérdése és Németország 1889-1933*. [The issue of the European union and Germany] Budapest, 1992.

19 Speech of 16 November 1945, Brussels. Churchill Papers 5/2.

20 “... I see no reason why, under the guardianship of the World organization, there should not ultimately arise the United States of Europe, both those of the East and those of the West...” Speech of 9 May 1946, The Hague. Churchill Papers 5/5.

whose interests demanded the creation and running of this international organization. Quite obviously, this was a critique of the victors of World War One, and Churchill's conclusion was that one must not commit the same mistakes again. Germany must be disarmed and a Franco-German rapprochement, which would be the centre-piece of a peaceful and United Europe, had to be furthered at all costs. He cited Gladstone's words, who thought that after serious conflicts a healing dimness of forgetting should veil participants. Thus, Churchill was among the first to urge reconciliation between the two arch-enemies, even if at this time he envisioned it with a unified and demilitarized Germany. We know, today, that German and French statesmen took decisive, practical measures for the post-war reconciliation of the two peoples (exchange holiday trips for orphans, charitable cooperation for the missing-in-action, family reunion programs, etc.). Still by investing his authority or the friendship of the two peoples at all international fora, Franco-German reconciliation became a pan-European issue. Churchill emphasized that in a united Europe the smaller needed as much influence as the larger ones (!), and he wished to integrate German provinces into a United Europe in a federation (in smaller units), referring back to the disjointed medieval principalities.

The Zurich address touched upon a timely issue: nuclear weapons. He found it encouraging that this new weapon formed a protective shield over the Western world (because the USA enjoyed a nuclear monopoly then), but pointed out in no uncertain terms that this situation was bound to change and, if used for aggression, the atomic bomb would lead to a world catastrophe. Everybody took the hint that the speech did not mention explicitly: an effective security system must be developed before the Soviet Union came into possession of a similar piece of arms. Churchill was, nevertheless, wary of excluding the Soviet Union and other Eastern European peoples from United Europe. When, as a first step, he proposed the foundation of a Council of Europe, he mentioned that in the creation of a United Europe, France and Germany must act as leaders, but Great Britain, peoples of the British Commonwealth, possibly the USA and hopefully the Soviet Union must also participate.

Media responses to Churchill's Zurich address were very mixed, most of them highlighted the surprise element of the speech: Franco-German reconciliation. More realistic responses emphasized Churchill's consideration of the interests of the Soviet Union. Russians refused it unanimously, the French took it grudgingly, and British reactions were also contradictory. Even Churchill acknowledged that his Zurich address

contributed largely to the Labour Government's not supporting the British delegation travelling to a session of the Congress of Europe held in the Hague between May 7–10, 1948, because it was led by him.<sup>21</sup> An article in the liberal *Manchester Guardian* reflected the most realistic British opinion:

“Europe is at present divided into two parts by the quarrel between the Soviet world and the Western world. If this division persists the best we can hope for is a closer union of the nations in the western half, which Russia would certainly consider a hostile “block”. True unity can to be achieved only by agreement with the Soviet group, which will not be favourably impressed by any speech of Mr. Churchill's.”<sup>22</sup>

French pouting is quite understandable after considering a report sent by Churchill's in-confidence son-in-law, Duncan Sandys about his visit to De Gaulle. The initiative came from Churchill, who, in a letter dated November 26, 1946, asked De Gaulle's opinion about Franco–German reconciliation as proposed in the Zurich address. Sandys delivered the letter in person and he reported in writing to his father-in-law about the French politician's answers during their conversation:

“He said (De Gaulle) that the reference in Mr. Churchill's Zurich speech to a France-German partnership had been badly received in France. Germany, as a state, no longer existed. All Frenchmen were violently opposed to recreating any kind of unified, centralized Reich, and were gravely suspicious of the policy of the American and British Governments. Unless steps were taken to prevent a resuscitation of German power, there was the danger that a United Europe would become nothing else than an enlarged Germany.”<sup>23</sup>

He emphasized that if the French can be gained for the idea of a United Europe, then it must commence in such a form where both Great Britain and France are founding members. Furthermore, these two countries need to develop a shared platform into details in each measure that concerns Germany. De Gaulle also thought that France would support the idea of an European federation if she could come to terms with Great Britain in

21 Churchill as chairman of the British United Europe Committee led the delegation, and only two Labour Party politicians supported travelling (Gordon Lang, Hugh Delargy). Gordon Lang of the Labour Party, who participated in Churchill's United Europe movement, got totally isolated within Labour because of his article published in London *Cavalcade* on May 10, 1947, in which he ensured the Conservative politician of his support.

22 East and West. = *Manchester Guardian*, September 20, 1946.

23 Churchill Papers 2/20.

questions of debate. Churchill, like leaders of the official British foreign policy, knew exactly well that De Gaulle's not quite modest "conditions" needed to be treated with concern. Although they were convinced that France was not, and would not, for quite some time, be in a position to act as a European leader, they also sensed that such a vacuum on the continent needed to be filled in by Great Britain. This did not, however, match with the British Europe policy, traditionally based on a balance of power. The dilemma was well illustrated by a September 25, 1946 letter from the British Ambassador in Paris (Duff Cooper) to Churchill:

"...France is not in a position, and probably never will be again to take the lead in Europe. There are only three possible starters: Russia, Germany and Great Britain. In the last war the English Channel saved us, as it so often done before and which it can never do again. We are more a part of the continent of Europe than we have ever been, and if we refuse to play our part in it properly we shall be guilty of a greater folly than the United States will be if they refuse to play their part in the world."<sup>24</sup>

Because De Gaulle, like Churchill, was in opposition, his opinion could not be considered an official standpoint but, regardless, the British treated French weakness as a fundamental tenet in foreign policy for nearly two decades after the close of the Second World War.

The American response to the Zurich address is also worthy of attention. Newspapers wrote about the speech often highlighting only parts of it, at times rather critically, with a frankness unusual in the European press. The *St. Louis Post Dispatch* reduced the speech into a European peoples' union being created under British auspices, while the *Globe Democrat*, also of St. Louis, emphasized what they perceived as an anti-Russian edge with Franco-German cooperation within a United States of Europe.<sup>25</sup> Some more critical voices objected to Churchill's trying to create European unity within, or enlarging, the scope of the United Nations. In the *New York Herald Tribune* the influential columnist Walter Lippman expressed his opinion that whether Germany became a part of United Europe depended primarily upon Moscow's attitude about the matter because the Soviets had half the country under occupation.<sup>26</sup>

On June 12, 1946, General George C. Marshall announced at a press conference that Churchill's Zurich address inspired the US administration to a great extent in launching a program later known as the Marshall Plan. For

---

24 Churchill Papers 2/20.

25 *St. Louis Dispatch, Globe Democrat*, September 21, 1946.

26 *The Star Times*, St. Louis; *New York Herald Tribune*. In, Churchill Papers 2/22.

this reason, and also for the wide international response, Churchill prided himself on this address for the rest of his life. He referred back to it several times and, perceptibly, he thought of it as a major political success. He repeated the key elements of the speech almost word by word in Parliament on June 26, 1950, highlighting the leading role Great Britain was to play in the western world. Hardly more than two months later, in a letter to President Truman, Churchill attributed Franco-German reconciliation to the speech delivered in Zurich, and considered it a great personal success.<sup>27</sup> As Prime Minister, in a radio speech on December 22, 1951, yet again he recalled Zurich's spirit and contrasted it with the communist menace, while offering a fine critique of America's world hegemony:

"If war comes it will be because of world forces beyond British control. On the whole I don't think it will come. Whatever happens we stand up with our strength in defence of the free world against Communist tyranny and aggression. We shall do our utmost to preserve the British Commonwealth and empire as an independent factor in world affairs. We shall cherish the fraternal association of the English-speaking world. We shall work in true comradeship for and with United Europe."<sup>28</sup>

However, the concept of the United States of Europe was not only present in speeches and debates. Archival documents dealing with the movement show that it was inspired by Churchill's speeches in Brussels, the Hague and Zurich, and that the British organization had been in existence since the winter of 1946.<sup>29</sup> This is probable because the aims of the United Europe Movement in Britain had, in all likelihood, been composed in October 1946. Accordingly, the major aim of the movement was:

"...To unite Europe...from the Atlantic to the Baltic Sea. Eastern Europe...for the present...unable to join the proposed "European Federation"...should make a start on their own, always leaving it open to the other states to join later as when they can... The United States of Europe would be neither dependent on nor opposed to the USA or the Soviet Union. ...it would be fitted into the structure of the United Nations Organization and subject to the authority of the Security Council."<sup>30</sup>

The movement, however, had to pay special attention to affairs of the British Commonwealth and it could not represent a radically anti-Soviet position:

---

27 Churchill Papers 2/32 and Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 536.

28 Gilbert, *Never Despair*, 670.

29 Churchill Papers 2/18-27.

30 "United States of Europe," Statement of Aims, undated. Churchill Papers 2/19.

“United Europe would have been the status of a Regional Group under the Charter of the United Nations Organization and would naturally seek the close friendship and co-operation of the Soviet Union and the United States of America... Britain has special obligations and spiritual ties which link her with the other nations of the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, Britain is a part of Europe and must be prepared to make her full contribution to European Unity.”<sup>31</sup>

Although the movement’s formal membership was limited to a few hundred people, it did have several thousand supporters, and so created a temporary executive committee, with Churchill presiding, and with all of its important offices filled by either by his old friends and followers, or by reliable but insignificant politicians. It is not too far-fetched to say that British United Europe Movement was nothing but Churchill’s creation to save himself for action in higher politics and to build political credit by propagating a European unity. Although the movement’s leaders took precautions to include politicians from all colors of the political palette into the executive, even moderate opinions abroad recognized that the organization was structured around Churchill.<sup>32</sup> In his program speech delivered in the Royal Albert Hall, the ex-Prime Minister insisted that Great Britain have key-role not only in a united Europe but in world politics too. In his view, three of the world’s four power centers had Great Britain in the focus. Of course, besides controlling the British Commonwealth, United Europe would also be centered in London, which was tied to America with a set of special relationships based on Anglo-Saxon values and solidarity. Despite these facts, however, it cannot be said that the movement served as nothing more than a springboard for

---

31 United Europe Speeches, Royal Albert Hall, London, May 14, 1947. Churchill Papers 2/18.

32 Unarguably, the power of Churchill-believers in the leadership of the movement was overwhelming; Leo Amery (Churchill’s old friend), Lady Violet Bonham Carter (Asquith’s daughter, leader of the Liberal Party in 1946-47), Lord Layton (economist, ex-leader of the *Economist*, director of *Reuters* between 1945-53), Duncan Sandys (Churchill’s son-in-law) all took side with the ex-Prime Minister during his long political career. Representatives of churches, active and retired leading military officers, and even famed politicians such as Lloyd George, Harold MacMillan and Anthony Eden participate in the executive of more than 36 people (in summer 1947). On March 17, 1948, the *Glasgow Herald* cited an article by Leon Blum published in *Le Populaire* the previous day, “...The stamp of his approval brought with it the danger that the European federation would have a character too narrowly Churchillian... The Federalist movement would have great difficulty in emerging from the shadow of a too illustrious name.” Churchill Papers 2/18. United Europe.

Churchill's political ambitions. It played a significant role in Britain's preparation for the European Congress held in the Hague between May 7–10, 1948, as well as the British public's acceptance of those institutions associated with Western European economic integration.<sup>33</sup> A British delegation of 140 members that went to the Hague was led by Churchill, who reiterated the idea of a United Europe in his congressional speech and urged participants to create an assembly of United European nations as soon as possible.

More than merely supporting Western European integration with words, the British United Europe Movement built a widespread international network of relations. Besides the Central European Federal Movement created by refugee migrant politicians of the Baltics and Soviet client states as well as the College of Europe founded in 1950, they held relationship with a sub-organization of the European Movement, the so-called Eastern and Central European Group, a colorful medley of politicians having emigrated from the region.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, the movement had American supporters who provided financial help for the British. Influential leaders of the Morgan Rockefeller and Armco companies supported Churchill just as much as Senator J. William Fulbright or future secretary of state for foreign affairs John Foster Dulles. British supporters did not lag behind either. They collected £35,000 over dinners in the movement's fundraising campaign in summer 1947 and 1948. Not only did such large companies as British American Tobacco, Dunlop, Shell Union, Unilever donate, but so did financial institutions including the Bank of England, Lloyds, and Baring Bros., as well as individuals, notably N. M. Rothschild.

The reception of Churchill's United Europe Movement was identical in spirit with his general postwar reputation; it was very controversial. Serious polemics and conflict developed between him and Graf Kalergi,

---

33 Primarily, we refer to organizations named The European Coal Organisation, The European Committee for Central Inland Transport, The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, Economic Commission for Europe, and the non-official Independent League for European Cooperation.

34 On behalf of Britain, this was presided by Harold MacMillan, with his deputy E. Beddington-Behrens (retired military officer, leading figure of the League of Nations and the European Movement later), but the chairman of SDAP, the Dutch socialist party (K. Vorrink) and G. M. Dimitrov, as presiding secretary of the International Peasants' Alliance also acted as vice-presidents. With 34 members, the organization also maintained a Hungarian section, headed by Pál Auer, ex-ambassador to Paris, and members such as Lipót Baranyai, Baron György Bakách-Bessenyei and Károly Peyer.

who saw a dangerous competition in Churchill's activity in the field. In a letter addressed to Churchill, dated December 4, 1948, Kalergi grieved that the British consider him a competitor rather than a cooperating colleague. He wrote dozens more of letters to Churchill, in which he kept repeating the charges that United Europe served British purposes only, and that the British boycotted the European Parliamentary Union created by him.<sup>35</sup> There was a grain of truth in this because Churchill did not attend the Congress of the organization in Venice on September 19–22, 1949, under a vain excuse. Opposition between the two politicians originated in Kalergi's fine recognition that Churchill's vision of the USA – British Commonwealth – United States of Europe did not leave space for his organization. Soviet official position regarding the movement was publicized in *Izvestiya* in several articles during 1947. According to these, the British served an obsolete pan-European vision as if it were something new, to cover up their imperialistic goals. The whole idea lacked any sense of reality anyway.<sup>36</sup> Although not in such a sharp tone, the summer of 1948 did bring conflicts with the Labour administration in the question of a United Europe. The government disagreed with Churchill mainly because they did not think that Great Britain had enough economic power to help, reorganize and unite Europe. The British Labour Party opposed Churchill for ideological reasons too, because they backed out of all potential conflicts with the Russians. Churchill never denied though that his movement stood closely related Conservative Party politics:

“...appealing both to the imperial pride of a Conservative gathering and the feeling that we as a party have our own conception of foreign policy, not contrary but an improvement of that of the Government...I am sure the Party is much more in the mood of responding to a vision and positive policy, whether in foreign affairs or otherwise...”<sup>37</sup>

Attlee did not support the plan of a united European parliament. He would rather trust the initiative with the respective national governments

---

35 Churchill sources contain several dozens of letters by Kalergi (Churchill Papers 2/25), which highlight that Kalergi had more need for Churchill than vice versa. Documents sometimes reveal comic polemics; Kalergi charged Churchill that the European logo proposed by him – capital E – indeed referred to England, while in a letter of March 1951, to reach his goal, he even sent a photo of his deceased wife hoping that the British politician would be touched.

36 Sidney Bailey, *United Europe – a Short History of the Idea*. Churchill Papers 2/18. Publ. by *National News-Letter*. London, 1947. 34.

37 Churchill's letter to Duncan Sandys. Churchill Papers 2/18. *United Europe* (undated).



than Churchill's movement. The Labour Prime Minister saved time when he declared in a letter to Churchill that the whole concept of the United States of Europe had to be discussed with the prime ministers of the British Commonwealth, because it was a fundamental issue for all of their concerns.<sup>38</sup> The Labour government had always been suspicious of such hyperactive policymaking of the conservative leader concerning the issue of United Europe. Not without reason, they supposed that Churchill formed the Europe movement to his own image as supplementary action so as not to waste time in opposition, which also gave the ex-PM a task grand enough to fulfill his ambitions. Their opinion as regards the Council of Europe was not any more favorable, as summed up succinctly in a telegram by the British Ambassador to the United States (G. Jebb) to Prime Minister Attlee. In it, Mr. Jebb stated that Mr. Churchill, Mr. Reynaud and Mr. Spaak used the Council of Europe as a pulpit from which to attack the policies of their respective governments.<sup>39</sup>

Labour predictions seemed to come true when, following a minimal conservative victory, in October 1951 Churchill took the seat of prime minister for the second time.<sup>40</sup> He was nearly 77: ill, hard of hearing, and easily tired. He suffered from aortic stenosis, which often resulted in bad temper and partial amnesia. He became more selfish and introverted, but he could achieve what he had done many times in the past: to get in an adequately high position where his extraordinary skills could solve international problems of the greatest impact. No longer did the United Europe Movement satisfy his ambitions, nor did he have time left for it.

---

38 C. Attlee's letter to Churchill of August 21, 1948. Quoted in the *Times*. Churchill Papers 2/22.

39 FCO Documents, Ser. II. Vol. I. 309. Paul-Henri Spaak (1898-1972), Belgian lawyer and politician, foreign minister (1939-49, 1954-57, 1961-66) and prime minister (1938-39, 1947-49). Between 1950-1955 he was chairman of the International Council of the European Movement. From May 1957 to March 1961 he was general secretary of NATO. Paul Reynaud (1878-1966), French lawyer and politician, prime minister in 1940, deputy prime minister in 1953. From 1949 he was member of the Council of Europe, from 1952 he was chairman of the Economic Committee of Council of Europe.

40 In the British general elections of October 25, 1951, the Conservative Party took 48% of the vote and 321 seats in Parliament. Together with the Liberals (14.9% – 6 parliamentary seats) they gained a tiny governing majority as opposed to the Labour Party, which gained only 295 seats with its 49.2% result, for a curious feature of the election system. See also *British Political Facts 1900–1975*. Eds. David Butler –Anna Sloman. London. 1975. 184.

SUMMARY

Winston S. Churchill, a character of limitless self-confidence, was deeply convinced that his extraordinary talent predestined him for solving great tasks, and he always believed that he could control world events.<sup>41</sup> In relation to post-1945 foreign policy, this resulted in insisting on his obsessions often in spite of realities. In the last year of the war, it was undoubtedly him who called attention to the Soviet menace, the division of Europe and the responsibility of Western democracies to address it. He repeated this in Fulton; however, we know today that his famous address did not have much to do with launching the cold war.

The idea of the United States of Europe in his Zurich address was partly naïve – because it really did not address the continent’s division. Yet, it founded a Western European movement for unity and helped secure the Marshall Plan. His United Europe Movement organized in Great Britain imagined unity with London in the centre, which Churchill may have been the only one to support. Nonetheless, he could not deny that the British Empire was still at the centre of his political consciousness. The policies he followed during his second premiership followed classic 19<sup>th</sup>-century traditions of British diplomacy (pragmatism, a sense of compromise, national interests emphasized).<sup>42</sup> He radically opposed a policy of appeasement if rooted in weakness, but he was also convinced that the West must negotiate with Moscow from a position of power.

He was an anticommunist to the bone, but he would not convert the cold war into an election campaign. Although he always denied doing it, in fact he wished to act as mediator between world powers. He accepted the division of Europe (and Germany) as a temporary condition, but he would render a Finland-type solution (independence, with friendship with the Soviet Union) for Eastern European Soviet satellite states. Because he believed in Western democratic values, he considered that the kind of government the Soviet Union had was part of their domestic affairs. Yet he condemned dictatorship and tyranny. His aim was to stem the spread of communism – even if on his own, so for him the policy of easement was more a form of containment than its opposite. He wanted to maintain a strong Western alliance system even when cold war tensions would

---

41 At the launch of his political career at the beginning of the century, he claimed with Lloyd George, “We are here for the fame!” He followed this motto all his life. See Charmley, *Churchill. The End of Glory*, 48–60.

42 Young, *W. S. Churchill’s*, 323.

release.<sup>43</sup> He may have been the first leader in the West to realize that rigid anticommunist propaganda and an unreasonably strong opposition against the Soviet Union would only solidify it as a police state. Since the Americans never formally accepted Europe's division, Churchill could not get Stalin to repeat the percentage distributions of political influence as he had in October 1944. He was a politician of too complex and controversial character to solve similarly complex and controversial questions of post-war foreign policy with usual, simplifying old methods. As one his biographers, Paul Addison, put it "From complexity...there is no escape: to simplify is to falsify."<sup>44</sup>

---

43 Young, W. S. Churchill's, 326.

44 Paul Addison, *Churchill on the Home Front*, 433. Quoted in Young, W. S. Churchill's, 341.

**Péter Debreceni**

## **Horthy's Meeting with Hitler in Kiel in August of 1938 from a Polish perspective<sup>1</sup>**

The aim of this publication to present one of the most important of the trips and talks of Miklós Horthy in the interwar era from the Polish political and journalistic side.<sup>2</sup> This meeting caused many mutations

1 The research in writing the paper is supported by the Visegrad Scholarship Fund.

2 I examined four daily newspapers for this study: the *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (I. K. C.) was one of the most popular newspapers in Poland in that period, published in Cracow with a circulation of 80 000 copies on weekdays and 120 000 copies on Sundays, but obtained 130-180 000 copies between 1929 and 1939. After May of 1926 politically associated with the government side and supported Piłsudski and his groups (before it the I.K.C. pertain to Centrum side); The I.K.C. had twelve local departments in other Polish cities, so this newspaper had one of the best information network in the country. Furthermore, the I.K.C. was the most important press for the Polish people, who lived abroad, mainly in France and Czechoslovakia. The daily, which had most probably the best technical conditions, focussed on Cracow and the “Małopolska” region, it was the most influenced press in this part of country, which supported the governments. Among its readers we could find officers, clerks, tradesmen, craftsmen and agricultural labourer, so every part of the Polish society. Its (and its concern’s) leader was Marian Dąbrowski, who was member of the Polish Parliament of the Second Polish Republic. The *Kurier Poznański* published in Poznań with a circulation of about 35 000 copies, ideologically very close to the National – Democratic (“endecja”) side and became the most important dailies of this political circle which was printed out of Warsaw. The *Kurier Poznański* was printed two times per day (except Monday) morning on 4, evening on 16 pages, especially detailing the economical situation. The newspaper was addressed to intellectuals of Poznań’s area, who agreed with the anti-Germans views. They employed many famous and prominent publicists and redactors, so the *Kurier Poznański* had one of the best journalist guards in this era. The reason that this kind of press became popular was the economical crisis in ’30s and the younger generation started to follow the authoritarian right-side (sometimes fascist elements) political trends and parallel with this rejected the liberal and left side element.

The Daily sought independence from the Warsaw’s left cabinets and through determinedly followed the opinion of the right-wing political circles, which meant strong criticism to “sanation” system in the end of 20s.

Their main aims were: create a new elite, hierarchy and discipline policy, which could be based on strong national organization(s). Strongly rejected communist ideology and wanted to defend the Christian moral. Protection of Polishness was based on the movement and they surmise the Jewish groups to be dangerous. The *Czas* (this newspaper had the longest tradition in Poland in this period, published in Cracow from 1848) after its fusion with the *Dzień Polski* published in Warsaw from 1935 with a circulation of about 4000 – 6000 copies, in terms of its political orientation the *Czas* was principally Conservative. The daily was addressed

in the Hungarian policy and had some (and shortly) effects to Central European situation. Many Hungarian publications care about these days and trying to discover what happened, for example during Béla Imrédy's talks, whose behaviour and political mind definitely changed after them. In this paper we try to show the opinion of Polish policy and journals about this meeting and review the topics of talks between Horthy and Józef Lipski, furthermore between Hermann Göring and the Polish Ambassador. Firstly, we would like to represent widely the events of this meeting from Polish side and focusing the less well-known facts, for example Lipski's talks and its topics with the Hungarian statesmen, which is an absolutely new information in Hungarian history.

---

to the intellectuals and small aristocrats and landowner layers (who started to lose their existentialism after the economical crisis) and they felt sympathy with Piłsudski in the first half of the '30s. The daily had a kind of „quality” elitist character. Their publicists (who were known personalities for example in Cracow aged university professors) and ideologists agreed in a monarchist view, or in an authoritarian system and they believed in a more centralized system, which could solve the economical and social problems. The Conservatives were pushed opposition side after Piłsudski's death, same as the other important Conservative daily, the *Słowo* (redacted by Cat-Mackiewicz in Vilnius). The two newspapers often had polemic, but mainly neither agreed with Beck's foreign policy. The *Gazeta Polska* (conservative daily), which was published in the capital of Poland with a circulation of about 30 000 copies in the end of the '30s. Started to publish in 1929 redacted by Adam Koc until 1931, after Bogusław Miedziński and Ignacy Matuszewski). Became the central organ of BBWR (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem Józefa Piłsudskiego – Non-party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government) and mainly represented the „Piłsudski's colonels” group (for example Adam Koc, Józef Beck, Bogusław Miedziński, etc.) During the years *Gazeta Polska* was one of the best distributed political newspapers and half of its copies were sold outside of Warsaw. It was one of the most stable and most richly informative editorial newspapers, which had a great literary section (here published Tuwim, or Iwaszkiewicz for example). Slowly became the leader organ of the government groups, from December of 1937 became the main daily of OZN (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego – Camp of National Unity) and mentioned as a trumpet of the Polish government. Brzoza-Sowa: *Historia Polski 1918-1945* [History of Poland 1918-1945], Kraków, 2006; Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny 1910-1939. Ed: Grażyna Wrona- Piotr Borowiec-Krzysztof Woźniakowski, Kraków-Katowice, 2010.; Leczyk, Marian: *Druga Rzeczpospolita 1918-1939* [The Second Polish Republic 1918-1939], Warszawa, 2006; Paczkowski, A.: *Prasa polska 1918-1939* [The Polish press 1918-1939] Warszawa, 1980.; *Prasa Narodowej Demokracji 1886-1939* [Press of National Democratic side 1886-1939]. Ed.: Aneta Dawidowicz-Ewa Maj, Lublin, 2010.; Rudnicki–Władysław: *Prasa konserwatywna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej – zarys problematyki i przegląd tytułów*. [Conservative press of the Second Polish Republic – schema and review of titles] RHCzP, 1975, z. 4, 409-465.; Toczek, A.: *Stosunki „Czasu” z prasą krakowską i konserwatywną w latach 1920-1934*. [Relations of „Czas” with the press of Cracow and the conservative press in years 1920-1934] RHPP, 2007, z. 2, 95-121.;

The political situation in Hungary in the years before the Second World War was definitely tense. The three members of the Little Entente encircled Hungary and from spring 1938, the Third Reich was becoming the small country's direct neighbour.

In the interwar period the revisionist efforts (which represented the most important foreign policy goals of Hungarian politics) were inefficient but the negotiations with the Little Entente promised some results in 1937 and 1938. From among the Little Entente members, Hungary had the most strained relationships with Czechoslovakia while Prague had tense contacts with Poland.

During Gyula Gömbös' premiership Germany became the most important partner of Hungary mainly in economic line<sup>3</sup> but the Central-European country has not signed any political or military agreement with Hitler's Reich. Unlike Poland who signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany in January 1934, which – temporary – fixed its situation and stabilized its relations with its western neighbours. This political calm did not force to look for a new partnership in the Danube's Territory and they did not want to put its good contacts with Romania and Yugoslavia at risk between 1934 and 1938.

At the time, the common Hungarian-Polish border was also a recurring topic of political news (*mutatis mutandis*, to the detriment of Czechoslovakia), without any concrete basis in day-to-day politics. The Polish-Hungarian relationship was mostly neutral. The atmosphere became warm during the premierships of Gyula Gömbös, who visited Warsaw at the end of 1934 and Marian Zyndram Kościłkowski, the Polish Prime Minister who paid a return visit to Budapest in April 1936. The two countries established many contacts including economic, legal and educational ones, but remained neutral in political and military topics.

No doubt that the most important meeting was the visit of Miklós Horthy and Kálmán Kánya to Poland in February 1938, only half a year before Horthy's meeting with Hitler in Germany. The occasion was very ceremonial, with the Hungarian and Polish press making many references to the traditional Polish-Hungarian friendship and writing in positive terms about Regent Horthy. However, no new treaty was signed at that time.

As far as internal policy is concerned, Hungarian radicals caused the most problems for the country's government in the second half of 1930. Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi could not find any solution to this situation which led to his government's slow but inevitable fall.

---

3 Gömbös was the first European statesman who met Hitler in June 1933.

After the Anschluss, the Czechoslovakian-question was one of the most important issues in the Central-European policy. Poland – similar to Hungary – was also interested in this topic because both countries had notable minorities and they had territorial claims to Czechoslovakia which in case of its termination actually could open a free way to Hungarian-Polish border. The Polish politicians had much information about the Germans aim in this question and they seriously followed the events in the German-Czechoslovakian relations and the activities of Heinlein and the SdP party. Göring has already mentioned during his talk with Beck in January 1938 that existence of Czechoslovakia in this form is impossible.<sup>4</sup> It means that the action against the south neighbour of Poland would not be a surprise but the Polish minister Beck told that they did not have any aim to destroy or attack Czechoslovakia and he realised that Great Britain and France would not defend their alliance, furthermore the British political circles would even sacrifice them to Hitler for the universal peace.<sup>5</sup> (Göring also mentioned to Lipski in August 1938 that England could only be ready for a military action at the end of 1939.<sup>6</sup>) Beck clearly saw that the Czech army would not fight and the western powers were not prepared to enter any kind of war and the Soviet Union could not move either<sup>7</sup> and they knew that Rumania would not give any kind of permission to the Soviet army to cross its territory.<sup>8</sup> They were absolutely right because the statesmen of these countries declared in May 1938 that their main aim was to steer clear of military conflict.<sup>9</sup>

Beck was definitely sure that the destiny of Czechoslovakia was going to be decided in 1938 and he enhanced that Poland would not participate in any actions or attack against his neighbour and would not fight together with Germans.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, he had different interest in Czechoslovakia as Hungary did who wanted a bigger territorial part and Poland did not want to fight together with Hitler, they could imagine

4 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne* [Polish Diplomatic Documents] 1938. Ed. Marek Konrad. Warszawa, 2007. 22–26.

5 Anna Cienciąła, *Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1926-1932* [Polish foreign policy between 1926 and 1932]. Paris, 1990. 214–217.

6 Niepublikowany Dokumenty – rozmowy Göring-Lipski z 24 sierpnia 1938 r. [Unpublished documents – Göring talks to Lipski on 24th of August in 1938]. = *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* [International issues], 1958. 3. no. 80–87.

7 Ibid.

8 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 411–416.

9 Ibid. 240–244.

10 Ibid. 213., 219.

just an economical cooperation<sup>11</sup>. Hungary was mainly afraid of the Yugoslavian and Rumanian attack, this was the main reason why they wanted to keep its abstention in the military questions but they did not resign about the territorial revision and irredentism which were the basic things of Hungarian foreign policy. The Polish foreign minister did not want to risk the good relations with the other members of Little Entente.

The Prussian prime minister has confirmed his earlier opinion to Lipski about the existence of Czechoslovakia in March<sup>12</sup> and the German policy did not rule out the cooperation among the Reich, Hungary and Poland in this question.<sup>13</sup>

The Polish politicians also had a lot of information about the Hungarian attitude. Wettstein who was the Hungarian Ambassador in Prague these years, privately informed his Polish colleague that Hungary can unleash a war just could be able to take advantage of the confusion and confirmed the information about the relationship between the Hungarian minority and Slovakian minority.<sup>14</sup> It was the major topic in the Polish foreign policy because if Hungary gets back some territories (and population, mainly Hungarians of course) eventually it would be a pattern for Poland too but Beck mentioned that the Hungarian policy in the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian question is unfair.<sup>15</sup> (This matter and the Polish interest about a Czechoslovakian territory was not a topic neither in the Polish press nor in the diplomatic correspondence in these months.) According to Beck the main question was about the Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovakian-Soviet Union relationship.<sup>16</sup> They also had some information about the German plans towards Hungary. Szembek said that Germany wanted Slovakia to be annexed by Hungary and in this case Hungarian policy has to guarantee wide cultural and administrative laws for the remaining Slovakian minorities<sup>17</sup> and they also had information about the Hungarians-Heinlein contact.

---

11 Niepublikowany Dokumenty, 80–87.

12 Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne, 138–139.

13 Ibid. 220–221.

14 Ibid. 236.

15 Ibid. 22–26.

16 Polska polityka zagraniczna w świetle archiwów Wilhelmstrasse (1937-1938) [Polish Foreign Policy in light of the Wilhelmstrasse archives (1937-1938)]. = *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 1958. 4. no. 80–93.

17 Niepublikowany Dokumenty, 80–87.



In the Polish diplomatic correspondence the Czechoslovakian crisis was the main topic at the end of May because the Polish policy thought that its strategic position would become worse in case Germans dominated above all Czechoslovakia and wrote many times about the tense relations with their southern neighbour. The press in this month seriously dealt with the Hungarian government crisis<sup>18</sup> beside the Central-European issues and in the diplomatic correspondences wrote many times about the Czechoslovakian communist actions against Poland<sup>19</sup> and the Polish press wrote in negative tone about them.

In this study we would like to review some important and interesting questions from the Polish side.

Firstly, we have to check if this meeting could modify anything in the Polish-Hungarian relationships? Hungary had had a new prime minister since May, did he show a new way in the Hungarian foreign policy in Hungarian-Polish and German-Hungarian relations?

Furthermore: How did the dailies value the German-Hungarian meeting? Did it cause any change in the Hungarian-Polish relations?

Was it basically an important topic in the Polish press and diplomacy correspondence, or they disregarded it?

What they thought about the Bled's agreement and about the Hungarian policy towards national minorities? What was the German and Polish opinion about it?

What the Polish thought about an eventual military conflict and the Hungarians' role in it? Did they have any information about the situation of the Hungarian Army?

Did they write about the Hungarian-Polish common board or did they calculate with a military conflict from Hungarian side? It should have been an important topic because a strong and friendly neighbour was very important for Poland. Furthermore, the question of the Slovakian minority should have been interesting for the Polish political circles.

In the issue of May 16, the *I. K. C.* discussed the programme of the new prime minister whom they called "Hungarian Schacht". The title of the article was „The foreign and domestic policy programme of the new

---

18 In the Polish daily press published lots of articles about the crisis of the Darányi government. They mentioned Imrédy and Bárdossy as possible successors to take the vacant positions. After this crisis the Hungarian Regent had entrusted Béla Imrédy with forming the new Hungarian government.

19 For example: *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 383–387.

Hungarian government.”<sup>20</sup> In his speech before the Parliament, Imrédy tried to define the main aims and directions of the Hungarian foreign policy. He spoke about further strengthening of the Hungarian-Italian relations and the unchanged and evolving friendship between Hungary and Germany.

As regards the Hungarian-Polish relations, he said that there was a deep and sincere friendship between Hungary and Poland, a comment which received thunderous applause by the audience and was pleased in his speech that England was demonstrating growing interest in the problems of Central Europe.

At the end of his address on Hungarian foreign policy, Imrédy spoke about the „negotiations with Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia started in the last few years” with a view to harmonize the relationship among the countries. Furthermore, he referred to the situation of the Hungarian population in these countries, emphasizing that „the Hungarian government did not lose its hope to succeed in creating conditions in the Danube Basin which would make it possible to ensure the normal development and allow the creation of friendly relations necessary for them.”<sup>21</sup>

Referring to the topic of the domestic politics, Imrédy mentioned the continuation of the ongoing projects and emphasized the armaments which he identified as the main target and the elimination of harmful political activities from the far right. „Finally, the Prime Minister gave his full support to the previous government’s legislation which is to be introduced next.”<sup>22</sup>

The *Gazeta Polska* in its issue of May 15 emphasized other key details from the speech by the new prime minister. According to the article, Imrédy explained that “in recent times there have not been any changes in the Hungarian policy. We could characterize this policy as an active policy of peace which tried to strengthen the good relations with our friends as well as trying to improve our contacts with countries that we may not have had friendly relations with.”<sup>23</sup>

The new government, the new prime minister and his policy also became interesting for Poland. They tried to calculate effect of the

---

20 Zagraniczny i wewnętrzny program nowego rządu węgierskiego [Foreign and internal program of the new Hungarian government]. *I. K. C.*, no. 124, May 16, 1938.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Polityka pokojowa Węgier – bez zmian [Peace Politics of Hungary – without changes]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 132, May 15, 1938.

changing in Hungarian foreign policy which could affect the whole Danube Basin political situation and could cause change between the Hungarian-Little Entente, Hungarian-German and somehow the Hungarian-Polish relationship.

The Polish policy in those weeks was waiting for the solution of the Czechoslovakian question; they were interested in the behaviour of Hungarian statesmen. They knew about the cooperation between Hungarians and Heinlein's group and Beck had a critical opinion about the Hungarians' minority-policy.<sup>24</sup>

In the next two months in the Polish press we also can find some short articles about Hungary, for example concerning the resignation of Bálint Hóman and some serious reports about the visit to Italy between 18 and 20 July 1938. On these days, Imrédy, accompanied by Kálmán Kánya, arrived in Rome and met Mussolini and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ciano.<sup>25</sup> The *Gazeta Polska* expected that three topics would be discussed during this meeting, namely: the futures of the Rome Protocols<sup>26</sup> after Austria had been occupied by Third Reich, the relationships between Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy, as well as the possibility of convergence of these three states.<sup>27</sup>

During the negotiations the issue of Yugoslavia also came up,<sup>28</sup> and they tried to predict the reaction of the Yugoslav government in case of a possible Hungarian attack against Czechoslovakia.<sup>29</sup> In connection with this analysis the daily speculated about the prospect of Yugoslavia leaving the Little Entente.

Before this meeting the dailies mentioned in the first footnote published short articles, usually a few sentences, informing their readers about Horthy's visit to Germany in August of 1938. From the reviewed newspapers the biggest interest was shown in the *I. K. C.* which reported about this event on 14 June (while Wilhelm Keitel was staying in Hungary).

---

24 Cienciała, *Polska polityka*, 219.

25 György Réti, *Budapest – Róma Berlin árnyékában. Magyar-olasz diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1932-1940* [Budapest – Rome in the shade of Berlin. Italian – Hungarian diplomatic relationships between 1932 and 1940]. Budapest, 1998. 117–129.

26 The Rome Protocols: an international agreement which was signed in 1934 in Rome by Austria, Hungary and Italy. This protocol dealt with economic development.

27 Przed węgierską wizytą w Rzymie [Before the Hungarian visit in Rome]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 193, July 16, 1938.

28 Wizyta Mussoliniego w Budapeszcie [Mussolini's visit in Budapest]. *I. K. C.*, no. 200, July 22, 1938.

29 Réti, *Budapest – Róma*, 117–129.

During the first half of May, i.e. when the Hungarian government crisis was already in progress, the *Gazeta Polska* informed about a Hungarian-German meeting (without concrete date), during which Admiral Raeder delivered the invitation from Adolf Hitler to Miklós Horthy<sup>30</sup> (other presented dailies reported about the invitation, too). The Polish Embassy in Budapest also sent a report about this fact<sup>31</sup> and noted that the official political circles tried to keep quiet about the meeting.<sup>32</sup>

The Polish press published numerous articles about the meeting in the first half of August of 1938. These included extensive information about the reasons of the visit with speculations that the Hungarian and German politicians would sign a new agreement (a political or only economic treaty or both). In the end, though, the dailies dismissed these possibilities.<sup>33</sup>

The relationship between Hungary and the Little Entente was also of great interest during these days. The most important aspect of this situation was the question of Hungary's armament.<sup>34</sup> The *I.K.C.*'s reporter sent a short article from Berlin saying that the English and French political circles were ready to accept the equality of armaments for Hungary.<sup>35</sup> (They could have perhaps accepted such a proposal already in 1936 if Hungary had pushed it through in the League of Nations.<sup>36</sup>) This topic was one of the most important questions in the Hungarian foreign policy and became even more important as the Little Entente gradually weakened.

Simultaneously, Czechoslovakia began to be isolated inside the Little Entente, too.<sup>37</sup> The agreement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia from January 27, 1937 showed definitely that this cooperation would slowly disintegrate.<sup>38</sup>

---

30 Regent Horthy zaproszony do Niemiec na manewry floty [Regent Horthy invited to Germany for fleet maneuvers]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 129, May 12, 1938.

31 Archiwum Akt Nowych [hereinafter AAN], Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323. documents of Józef Lipski, 15. no. 52/4/W/34.

32 Ibid.

33 Prem.[sic!] Horthy nie podpisze w Berlinie nowych umów z Rzeszą [Prem. Horthy will not sign a new contract with the Reich in Berlin]. *I. K. C.*, no. 219, August 10, 1938.

34 Węgry uzyskają wkrótce równouprawienie w dziedzinie zbrojeń [Hungary will soon gain equality in the field of armaments]. *I. K. C.*, no. 220, August 11, 1938.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Magda Ádám, *Magyarország és a kisantant a harmincas években* [Hungary and the Little Entente during the 1930s]. Budapest, 1968, 130.

38 Ádám, *Magyarország*, 138. and 144.

The situation of Czechoslovakia in that year was very complicated because it had bad relations with each and every neighbour. The biggest problems were with the Czechoslovakian-German relationship and with the Sudetes Germans who enjoyed Hitler's support and made many anti-Czech activities. The situation was very complicated because the 3 million minorities became a well organised movement with a strong Party (SdP) which firstly wanted autonomy, later wanted "Anschluss" and to join to Hitler's Empire.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the Polish-Czechoslovakian contact was not de-energized. One of the most important sources of the tension was the Polish minority in this country. Many times during the talks with other statesmen its situation was the main topic and the Polish diplomacy and policy emphasized that they wanted the same right as the Sudetes could get.<sup>40</sup> The other thing was the communist agitation which caused a continuous problem for the Polish side. They had complained about it many times. These problems and the other conflicts between the two countries did not cause any military solution.

The main aim of the Hungarian foreign policy was the border revision. They knew that it was possible to modify the borderline mainly against Czechoslovakia and it depended only on the support given by Germany. The Polish Ambassador in Budapest sent his report to Warsaw and in it he mentioned that Hungary did not want to inaugurate any conflicts. Furthermore, the Hungarian policy should be sure, in case of a Hungarian attack neither Yugoslavia nor Romania would turn against Hungary.<sup>41</sup> The Polish diplomatic circles well realized that Hitler's policy did not support a Hungarian-Polish common border and for the Germans it was not necessary to occupy the whole Czechoslovakian territory.<sup>42</sup>

The Polish Foreign Affairs documents also dealt with the talks between Hungary and Yugoslavia which took place a week before the meeting in Kiel. Accordingly, the Hungarian government drafted a bilateral (Yugoslavian-Hungarian) agreement.<sup>43</sup> Kánya was almost certain that Belgrade's attitude would be positive but had not received any proposal for approval.<sup>44</sup>

---

39 <http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/historia/02-08/ch03.html> – January 22, 2015.

40 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 328–330.

41 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 320–322. He reported, that if Yugoslavia will not mobilize, then Roumania also stay in peace.

42 *Ibid.*

43 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 418–419.

44 *Ibid.*

In any case, the document proves that the Hungarian foreign policy (regardless of the meeting in Germany) strongly emphasized the need to improve relations with the Little Entente (at least with Yugoslavia). The position of Little Entente started to change in the mid 30's. Germany built more closely relationship (firstly economically) with Romania and Yugoslavia, which caused slow political closing of both countries to Reich. The first signs of decay obviously appeared around 1936-1937 and Czechoslovakia started to lose his power inside the organization. Yugoslavia signed an agreement with Italy in March 1937 and they did not ask the two other members about it which should have been necessary.<sup>45</sup> Benes looked for a new solution and started to approach Hungary because he had seen the chance to sign a secret agreement with them. The other thing was that the situation with the Sudetes became very tense and the Czechoslovakian political circles wanted to find solution with Hungary and the Hungarian minorities who lived there.

The first step was the invitation of Bárdossy to the conference in Sinaia, where the Hungarian politician talked about these topics which became facts a year later in Bled. From the end of 1937 it became increasingly clear that the organization would fall apart and the Czechoslovakian efforts were in vain. Most probably this was the reason why the politicians of Czechoslovakia tried to regulate the political relations with Hungary and offered the equality of armaments in Sinaia<sup>46</sup> on August 30, 1937.<sup>47</sup> The negotiations in Sinaia ended without any results but it was a positive development for the Hungarian diplomacy because it demonstrated that it could demand more political rights in the next months than Hungary could expect under the equality of armament arrangement. (The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Kálmán Kánya wanted to regulate the situation of the Hungarian minorities among the member countries of the Little Entente.)

The visit of the Hungarian statesmen was a frequent topic in the diplomatic correspondence in August 1938. The Polish ambassador sent back the concrete date of the visit to the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and wrote about the significance of the meeting: „[...] Horthy's trip is going to occur on the 21<sup>st</sup> of this month. Prime Minister, Imrédy,

---

45 In this agreement the these two countries mutually recognized by the other existing boundaries on March 25, 1937.

46 Sinaia is a small town In Romania, where the prime and foreign ministers from Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia met at the end of August 1937.

47 Ádám, Magyarország, 159–161.

who had still not visited Germany, Kánya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Rátz, the Minister of Defence, would be travelling in the company of the Regent. [...] I received information (from official circles) that the invitation of Rátz happened due to German pressure, considering the colossal parade of German army – of about 120 000 people were expected to take part – during the visit of the Regent.”<sup>48</sup> The ambassador noted that this would be the biggest show which was ever held in Germany.<sup>49</sup>

“As expected, during the eight days the Regent should visit Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel and Nuremberg. The Hungarian State Department was aware of the commentaries and the echoes, which were caused by the participation of Minister of Defence Rátz and the long period of this visit. I also heard that the Hungarian prime minister was not delighted about the fact that Rátz accepted the invitation. Even so, the local political circles were comforting themselves with the hope that the echo of this meeting would not last long and that it would not result in any concrete political agreement.”<sup>50</sup>

The *I. K. C.* confirmed it in a very short article on 10th August which declared that “Horthy will not sign any new agreement with the German Reich.”<sup>51</sup> According to the daily there would be some talks about political and economic topics between the two statesmen but they „*will not sign any new documents, [...] the relations between the two countries do not require any changes* [Italics in the original text – P. D.]”<sup>52</sup>

The dailies already started to take up the topic of the arrangements on August 14. The national democratic *Kurier Poznański* from the opposite side published that Germany would welcome Hungarian Regent with the same pomp as they welcomed Mussolini.<sup>53</sup>

Expectations were heightened by the German press too, with the Hungarian – German relationship and Horthy making the headlines of German newspapers. A number of dailies declared that Horthy would

48 AAN, M. S. Z. Poselstwo RP w Budapeszcie, 6751, Orłowski's report, 52/4/W/39, August 12, 1938.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Prem.[sic!] Horthy nie podpisze w Berlinie nowych umów z Rzeszą [Prem. Horthy will not sign a new contract with the Reich in Berlin]. *I. K. C.*, no. 219, August 10, 1938.

52 Ibid.

53 Przed wizytą Horthy'ego w Niemczech – Regent Węgier będzie przyjęty tak świetnie jak niedawno Duce [Before Horthy's visit in Germany – Regent of Hungary will be welcomed as well as the Duce]. *Kurier Poznański*, no. 368, August 14, 1938.

be the first head of state to visit the German Reich.<sup>54</sup>

Every newspaper reported about the arrangements<sup>55</sup> and the *Gazeta Polska* drew attention (by referring to the article of the *Berliner Zeitung am Mittag*) to the fact that „the Czech – Slovakian question was of common interest to Hungary and Germany. The newspaper reminded that 700 000 Hungarians lived in Czechoslovakia.”<sup>56</sup>

The *I. K. C.* also published a series of short articles saying that no one believed in concrete results from the meeting in England.<sup>57</sup> The interest was definitely more serious in Paris because French politicians were sure that the Czech-Slovak problem and the German propaganda in Hungary would be important topics.<sup>58</sup>

Horthy and his escort left Budapest on Saturday evening, August 20.<sup>59</sup> (Horthy wrote in his memoirs that they set off on Sunday, August 21,<sup>60</sup> but Pál Pritz in his study also mentioned the date of August 20<sup>61</sup>, which was confirmed by the Polish press and diplomatic correspondence).

On August 21 Horthy arrived on a special train in Vienna,<sup>62</sup> where the newly installed Nazi chancellor Seyss-Inquart welcomed him in the company of top officials.<sup>63</sup> The next station was Regensburg where

---

54 Horthy had already been in Berchtesgaden, where he met with Hitler in 1936, but this meeting was informal. Miklós Horthy, *Emlékirataim* [Memoirs]. Budapest, 1990. 188–191.

55 For example: Dla Horthy’ego przystroi się Berlin tak samo jak dla Mussoliniego [For Horthy Berlin as well preparing as for Mussolini]. *I. K. C.*, no. 224, August 15, 1938.

56 Ibid. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 220, August 13, 1938.

57 Angliacy o wizycie Horthy’ego [Britons about the visit of Horthy]. *I. K. C.*, no. 232, August 22, 1938.

58 Powitanie regenta Węgier w Wiedniu; and Problem czechosłowacki na pierwszym miejscu [Welcome to the Regent of Hungary in Vienna; the Czechoslovakian problem in the first place]. *I. K. C.*, no. 233, August 23, 1938.

59 Regent Horthy wyjechał do Niemiec [Regent Horthy travelled to Germany]. *I. K. C.*, no. 232, August 22, 1938; furthermore *Gazeta Polska* no. 228, August 21, 1938. 4. and Wyjazd regenta Węgier do Niemiec [Travel of the Hungarian Regent to Germany], 16.

60 Horthy, *Emlékirataim*, 209.

61 Pál Pritz, *Magyar diplomácia a két világháború között* [The Hungarian diplomacy between the Two World Wars]. Budapest, 1995. 297.

62 Wizyta regenta Horthy’ego w Rzeszy [Visit of Regent Horthy in the Reich]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 239, August 22, 1938.

63 Ibid. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 239, August 22, 1938.; furthermore Regent Horthy na ziemi niemieckiej – [Regent Horthy on German territory – great welcome in Vienna], *Czas*, no. 229, August 22, 1938.



arrived on Sunday evening.<sup>64</sup>

The Polish press tried to publish some background information about the meeting and analyzed the German – Hungarian relations of the previous few years. The *I. K. C.* wrote about Hungary's economic dependence on the German Reich.<sup>65</sup> The journalist included some very detailed statistics and concluded that Hungary's economy was lop-sided and dependant on Hitler's Germany.<sup>66</sup> This could also cause the loss of political independence.<sup>67</sup> Hungary tried to search for new goals, mainly in Italy and in England and, the country would like to open towards the Balkans (mainly Romania).<sup>68</sup> The analyst argued that Hungary could not be included in the sphere of influence of Germany without any resistance because of Hungary's leading papist faith, national traditions and strong monarchist sentiment.<sup>69</sup> It was a fact that Hitler tried to co-opt Hungary to the Rome – Berlin axis because he thought it would be easier to get to the Balkans through Hungary.<sup>70</sup> The author warned this cooperation was very similar to the one that existed a few years earlier, i.e. during the First World War.<sup>71</sup> In the closing lines the journalist emphasized that “*the Hungarian nation has been able to defend its independence in the course of ten centuries*” [Italics in the original text – P. D.].<sup>72</sup>

The Hungarian Regent arrived in Cologne on 22nd August. At the railway station, which was richly decorated, he was welcomed by Hitler and a huge crowd.<sup>73</sup> The two leaders travelled to the harbour where the new German cruiser was named: *Prinz Eugen* to honour the wife of the Hungarian Regent.<sup>74</sup> After the parade and the christening Horthy in the

---

64 Ibid.

65 Czy Węgry poddadzą się wpływowi Berlina? Za kulisami podróży Regenta Horthy'ego do Niemiec [Is Hungary surrender to the influence of Berlin? Behind the scenes, Regent Horthy's trip to Germany]. *I. K. C.*, no. 232, August 22, 1938.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Spotkanie regenta Horthy'ego z kanclerzem Hitlerem w Kolonji [Regent Horthy's meeting Chancellor Hitler in the Colonies]. *I. K. C.*, no. 233, August 24, 1938.

74 Spuszczenie na wodę nowego krążownika [Celebration of the new cruiser]. *I. K. C.*, no. 233, August 24, 1938. Furthermore, Horthy, *Emlékirataim*, 209. and Pritz, *Magyar diplomácia*, 297.

company of Hitler travelled to Hamburg on board of the “Grill” ship.<sup>75</sup> The German press published a number of articles about the salute of Hungarian statesmen, Hungary and the person of Horthy.<sup>76</sup>

Apart from this topic, the politics of the Little Entente and their conference in Bled<sup>77</sup> also became important issues in the German press. Before the Hungarian statesmen set off on their journey, the *Czas* published a full-page analysis with the title “Armament issue of Hungary”.<sup>78</sup> The journalist analysed the agreement from Saloniki<sup>79</sup> (when Bulgaria recovered the equality of armaments) and declared that only Hungary did not have this right,<sup>80</sup> although the country fought for it without any results [*Czas* published this analysis in a report from Budapest dated August 20, 1938 – P. D.].<sup>81</sup>

After these analyses the conference of Bled became one of the most important topics in the examined dailies. The *Gazeta Polska* activated its reporters in Bucharest and Belgrade, who informed that the statesmen from Romania and Yugoslavia travelled to a serious conference where they were going to discuss some important economic and political questions.<sup>82</sup> This was the aftermath of the Anschluss and of the relations with Hungary (at the same time, the papers emphasized that the talks with Budapest<sup>83</sup> had not been broken off since the conference of Sinaia).<sup>84</sup> The newspaper issued the next day wrote about expecting three bilateral agreements which would be modelled on the agreement from Thessaloniki.<sup>85</sup>

---

75 Ibid. *I. K. C.*, no. 233, August 24, 1938.

76 Powitalne artykuły prasy niemieckiej [Welcoming articles of German press]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 239, August 22, 1938.

77 Bled is a small town in Yugoslavia (today in Slovenia) where met the Hungarian and Little Entente’s politics in August 1938.

78 Sprawa dozbrojenia Węgier [Military situation of Hungary]. *Czas*, no. 227, August 20, 1938.

79 They signed this agreement on July 31, 1938.

80 Ibid. *Czas*, no. 227, August 20, 1938.

81 Ibid.

82 Przed konferencją państw Małej Ententy [Before the conference of Little Entente]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 228, 21 August 1938.

83 Conference in Sinaia: conference of Little Entente on August 30, 1937. The Little Entente invited the Hungarian ambassador, László Bárdossy also as a partner.

84 Ibid. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 228, August 21, 1938.

85 Propozycje M. Ententy pod adresem Węgier [Proposal of Little Entente to Hungary]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 230, August 23, 1938. In Thessaloniki the Little Entente and Bulgaria signed an agreement about the equality of armaments.

The official statement became the most important news in the dailies on 24th August and received even more coverage on the second day of the meeting between the Hungarian and German statesmen. The *Gazeta Polska* published it on the title page,<sup>86</sup> the *I. K. C.* wrote a full-page about it and emphasized that this agreement “*had not been accepted yet in its final version*”<sup>87</sup> [Italics in the original text – P. D.].

The reporter from Belgrade informed that an obstacle to the final agreement was the situation of Hungarian minorities in the countries of Little Entente. They could find the solution only “*through personal negotiations*” [Italics in the original text – P. D.].<sup>88</sup> This news met with great satisfaction in Prague because they thought that Hungary had opened up routes to the West.<sup>89</sup>

This agreement received big echoes in the Hungarian and the German press, too. The *Czas* informed that the Hungarian political circles were delighted with the results of Bled but they did not treat it as an event of particular importance.<sup>90</sup> The German *Nationale Zeitung* believed the Little Entente lost its actual purpose as a result of this agreement.<sup>91</sup>

The visit gave rise to many significant reports. The newspapers principally wrote about the pomp and other formal circumstances, for example the biggest naval show since the First World War.<sup>92</sup> The reason for this ceremonial pomp was that Germany wanted to demonstrate its friendship with Hungary and stress the common political interests informed by the *Gazeta Polska*.<sup>93</sup> Unfortunately, we did not find any concrete information what was meant by “common political interests”, and the papers just repeated that Hungary would not sign any new agreement.<sup>94</sup>

---

86 Równouprawienie Węgier w dziedzinie zbrojeń uznały Państwa Małej Ententy [Recognize the equality of Hungary in the field of armaments by Little Entente]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 231, 24 August 1938.

87 Ibid. *I. K. C.*, no. 234, August 25, 1938. The issued official statement touched upon the situation between Little Entente and League of Nations, too.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Mała Ententa przyznała Węgrom równouprawienie zbrojeń [Little Entente granted equality of arms to Hungary]. *Czas*, no. 232, August 25, 1938.

91 Ibid.

92 Manifestacyjne przyjęcie regenta Węgier w Niemczech [Celebrating reception of Horthy in Germany]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 231, August 24, 1938.

93 Ibid.

94 Celem wizyty – ściślejsza współpraca Węgier z Rzeszą twierdzi Berlin [The aim of the visit – closer cooperation between Hungary and Reich says Berlin]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 231, August 24, 1938.

Regent Horthy arrived in Berlin on August 25. His welcome ceremony was the most important news in the *Gazeta Polska*, which reported it on the front page.<sup>95</sup> Chancellor Hitler, Göring, Ribbentrop and other political leaders welcomed Horthy at the decorated station.<sup>96</sup> It was also here where Hitler held his speech. Hitler emphasized the friendship between Germany and Hungary which had existed since the reign of St. Stephen.<sup>97</sup> Horthy accentuated that he did not feel himself on foreign territory since he crossed the German border, and furthermore talked about the common friendship (Hungarian and German) with Italy.<sup>98</sup> The reporter from Berlin also informed that the background situation was very friendly, no one created uncomfortable atmosphere around the agreement of Bled<sup>99</sup> (we found other opinions in the Hungarian and Polish documents<sup>100</sup>) moreover the German political circles did not want any solutions between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.<sup>101</sup>

The Polish press was buzzing on August 26, when the papers wrote about the presentation of the German Army (which lasted at least two hours).<sup>102</sup> The statesmen continued their programme at the Opera in Berlin.<sup>103</sup>

---

95 Powitanie regenta Węgier w Berlinie [Welcome to the Regent of Hungary in Berlin]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 232, August 25, 1938.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid. and Przemówienie kanclerza Hitlera i regenta Horthy'ego [Speech by Chancellor Hitler and regent Horthy]. no. 232, August 25, 1938. furthermore Regent Węgier w Berlinie [Regent of Hungary in Berlin]. *Kurier Poznański*, no. 386, August 26, 1938, Wymiana toastów w Berlinie między regentem Horthym a kancl. Hitlerem [Toasts in Berlin between the regent of Hungary and chancellor Hitler's]. *I. K. C.*, no. 235, August 26, 1938.

98 Ibid.

99 Zastrzeżenia Węgier wobec uchwał M. Ententy – Czy zostanie zawarty węgiersko-czeski pakt nieagresji [Accepting Hungary's demands by Little Entente – Will the Hungarian-Czech non-aggression pact be alive?]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 232, August 25, 1938.

100 for example: Pál Pritz, A kieli találkozó [The meeting in Kiel]. = *Századok*, 1974. 3. no. 646–679.

101 Zastrzeżenia Węgier wobec uchwał M. Ententy – Czy zostanie zawarty węgiersko-czeski pakt nieagresji [Accepting Hungary's demands by Little Entente – Will the Hungarian-Czech non-aggression pact be alive?]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 232, August 25, 1938.

102 Regent Horthy w stolicy Niemiec [Horthy regent in the capital of Germany]. *Kurier Poznański*, no. 387, August 26, 1938.

103 Wielka rewia wojskowa w Berlinie przed regentem Węgier [Great military parade in Berlin for the Regent of Hungary]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 233, August 26, 1938.

The examined dailies started to publish some political information, too, besides the description of the programme and the protocol of the visit on the next day. The *Gazeta Polska* collected the results of the meeting in five points and published them on the front page.<sup>104</sup>

- eliminating the negative intentions after the Anschluss;
- no negative opinions about Romania and Yugoslavia in the welcoming speeches;
- military parades as demonstration of the Third Reich's return to military force;
- Horthy's declaration that Hungary would not participate in any cooperation against Germany;
- the visit and the official statement meant as Hungary's demonstration of an independent foreign policy.<sup>105</sup>

Horthy with his wife travelled on to Potsdam where they visited the Sanssouci Palace and laid wreaths on the tomb of Frederick the Great on the last day of their visit.<sup>106</sup> Finally, they met Göring and his wife.<sup>107</sup> The dailies reported about the visit to Nuremberg on the last day, 28th August, when Rudolf Hess welcomed Horthy.<sup>108</sup> In a special article, the *Gazeta Polska* analysed the Hungarian public mood during these days and mentioned the Hungarians were satisfied with the visit,<sup>109</sup> which, however, did not cause any changes.<sup>110</sup>

The *I. K. C.* analysed the echoes in the German press which emphasized that "there would not be peace in the Danube-basin" until

---

104 Polityczny wynik wizyty regenta Węgier w Niemczech [The political result of the Hungarian regent's visit in Germany]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 234, August 27, 1938.

105 Ibid. Furthermore Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [hereinafter MNL OL] K. 66. Press and Culture Affairs, 1938. I–5.

106 Ostatni dzień pobytu w Berlinie [Last day in Berlin]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 234, August 27, 1938.

107 Ibid.

108 Regent Horthy w Norymberdze [Regent Horthy in Nuremberg]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 235, August 28, 1938.

109 Nastroje na Węgrzech w związku z wizytą regenta Horthy'ego w Niemczech [The mood of Hungary in connection with the visit of Regent Horthy in Germany]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 235, August 28, 1938.

110 Ibid.

the situation of the Hungarian minority is not solved.<sup>111</sup> The newspaper underscored that “*Hungary negotiated solely bilaterally and would like to enter into an agreement on a bilateral basis*”<sup>112</sup> [Italics in the original text – P. D.].

The question of the Hungarian minority was a barrier to establishing contacts and the “*negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia would be continued when the question of Sudeten is solved because Hungary would like to get the same right for its minority as for Sudeten Germans got in Czechoslovakia*”<sup>113</sup> [Italics in the original text – P. D.]. The newspaper informed (citing Hungarian sources) that the decision of the Little Entente “*did not cause any advantages for Hungary [...]*”<sup>114</sup> [Italics in the original text – P. D.]

The Hungarian – Little Entente situation was in the focus of other newspapers, too. The *Czas* published an article about a series of important activities (Horthy’s meeting with Hitler, conference in Bled, arrests in Hungary targeting the extreme right) and the political situation in the Danube-basin.<sup>115</sup> The analyst concluded that „the Little Entente was late”<sup>116</sup>, it was definitely not ready to head off the Anschluss,<sup>117</sup> and Italy was the power which forced the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente.<sup>118</sup>

The *Gazeta Polska* declared with respect to the situation between Hungary and the Little Entente “significant progress but no solution” was reached.<sup>119</sup> The solution would be the settlement of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.<sup>120</sup> They also informed about

---

111 Węgrzy żądają dla siebie tych praw, jakie otrzymują Niemcy w Sudetach [Hungarians claim the same rights for themselves as the Sudeten Germans receive]. *I. K. C.*, no. 237, August 28, 1938.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Decydujące dni basenu naddunajskiego [Decision day in Danube Basin]. *Czas*, no. 234, August 27, 1938.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Węgry a Mała Ententa [Hungary and the Little Entente]. *Gazeta Polska*, no. 235, August 28, 1938, Title-page. Furthermore: Nowa era w basenie naddunajskim [New era in Danube Basin]. *I. K. C.*, no. 238, 29 August 1938.

120 Ibid. and *Gazeta Polska*, no. 235, August 28, 1938.

the return of Horthy. The Regent left from Linz to Budapest by ship on Sunday.<sup>121</sup>

The topic did not fade in the Polish press after the end of their visit. The papers published different analyses (often on their front pages) about the (political) results of the meeting. They declared the biggest result for Hungary was that the statesmen refused to be involved under German influence<sup>122</sup> and showed the independence of Hungarian foreign policy with the official statement of Bled.<sup>123</sup>

The Polish press dealt with this meeting in September 1938, too. The *I. K. C.* published a very interesting essay titled "Hungary refused the military and political demands of Germany."<sup>124</sup> The journalist emphasized the most important thing was that Hungary kept its freedom to make its own decisions.<sup>125</sup> The most important demand of Germany was the customs union,<sup>126</sup> as well as cooperation between the German and Hungarian armies during a military conflict with Czechoslovakia.<sup>127</sup> At the meeting the other German aims were to convince Hungary to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and leave the League of Nations.<sup>128</sup> During the visit the Germans could secure only one concrete result: emphasize the German-Hungarian friendship,<sup>129</sup> which was definitely an unsatisfactory outcome for Germany.<sup>130</sup>

The issue that Hungary should join Anti-Comintern Pact was not a topic in the diplomatic correspondence,<sup>131</sup> which focused on the Hungarian reaction to the conflict with Czechoslovakia,<sup>132</sup> as well as the reaction of England and Poland to this crisis.<sup>133</sup> The Hungarian political

---

121 Regent Horthy z Linzu odpłynął Dunajem do Węgier [Regent Horthy from Linz sailed to Hungary on Danube]. *I. K. C.*, no. 239, August 30, 1938.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Węgry odrzuciły polityczne i wojskowe żądania Niemiec [Hungary rejected the political and military demands of Germany]. *I. K. C.*, no. 243, September 3, 1938.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

atmosphere was very tense during these weeks because the extreme right was very active in Hungary and caused serious problems in the Hungarian domestic politics.<sup>134</sup>

SUMMARY

“The visit of Horthy and the members of the Hungarian government to Germany aroused big interest”<sup>135</sup> in contemporary Polish press. It’s proved by dailies which gave primary importance to the meeting on their front pages and informed about all possible things (for example, the *Gazeta Polska* published over ten articles and reports only in one issue on August 24). They have already informed their readers about it from May to mid of September. We come to realize that the Polish diplomacy would not have been satisfied if the German-Hungarian relationship had become stronger and closer and they did not mention it straight but we could feel that the confidence of the Polish politicians in the Hungarian policy had decreased. The meeting was also an important topic in the diplomatic correspondence with ambassadors informing the public about all the details.<sup>136</sup> (The Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck himself gave orders to inform the public about the smallest details.)<sup>137</sup>

In terms of political topics it was often strongly emphasized that Horthy was the first head of state who officially visited the German Reich. As no new agreements or contracts between the two countries were signed (the diplomatic documents declared the same), this caused general satisfaction for Polish diplomacy and politicians. The meeting only served to show the traditional friendship and gave Hungarian statesmen an opportunity to admire the military force of Germany.<sup>138</sup> The press did not write directly that Hungary was not a satellite state and would try to keep its independence. In these weeks this was an important part in the Polish newspapers because they hoped that the situation of Hungary (especially its foreign policy) would not change during Imrédy’s premiership (who received positive comments in the dailies) and did

---

134 Ibid.

135 MNL OL K. 63. (1938-17/7. Polish-Hungarian relationships) 1938. 227/pol. Attitudes of Polish press about the visit of Regent Horthy to Germany and of conference in Bled.

136 AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323.

137 AAN, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 6571, P. III.1./W-N/9. 203.

138 AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323.



not write about any Hungarian military actions and effects or about the situation of the Hungarian army.

The newspapers showed bigger interest in the negotiations in Bled, the Polish press informed about this event in parallel to the meeting but then in the diplomatic correspondence the issue was not mentioned. The press also was neutral and did not write about any Polish (emphatic) opinions about the agreement but they made feel doubt of German politicians. As regards this topic, we can definitely get more concrete political news about the meeting between Horthy and Hitler.

The importance of this topic is obvious and it is confirmed by many articles about the background information and news, for example Stojadinović (who supported the establishment of Hungarian schools in Yugoslavia<sup>139</sup>) backed the agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente and Italy was the power who urged the parties to conduct the negotiations. The situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia was mentioned a lot of times in the press. The diplomatic circles had information from June that Kánya will not sign any minorities' agreement with Czechoslovakia and Esterházy said to Göring that the Germans blocked the completion of the agreement between Hungary and Little Entente.<sup>140</sup>

The dailies also activated their correspondence network all over Europe and collected a lot of reports, interviews and gossips. The most active places were Bucharest and Belgrade, while Prague barely figured at all.

It is an interesting fact that none of the examined Polish papers published voices of Polish public opinion and expectations about the meeting and political talks. In addition, the analyzed dailies did not publish any information about the territorial changes. Reports, statements and summaries about the actual political situation between Hungary and the Little Entente as well as Hungary and the Third Reich were very neutral and did not include any speculations. This confirms they did not expect any new agreements or contracts. They also did not publish that the meeting would cause any changes in the Polish-Hungarian relationships. Most probably – as we mentioned – the Polish trust decreased in the Hungarian policy but the Polish policy had a lot of bigger problems than the question of the friendship with Hungary in these years. The

---

139 Mała Ententa i Węgry [Hungary and the Little Entente]. *Kurier Poznański*, no. 398, 2 September 1938.

140 *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, 343–344.

common boarder also was not a topic in these weeks (later many articles wrote about it.) Its reason was that they did not want to risk their good relationship with Rumania and Yugoslavia.<sup>141</sup> So Poland needed a strong south neighbour<sup>142</sup> (for example Hungary who was a “neutral friend” but Hungary was not strong enough in any spheres) but if they had had it, they would have lost their actual friends. They absolutely did not trust either in Hitler’s policy or the 25-year-elongation of the 1934 Polish-German agreement offered by Göring.

We know that the Polish ambassador in Berlin, Lipski met Göring and Miklós Horthy three times.<sup>143</sup> During the talks with Göring they mentioned the agreement of Bled and the German politician described the position of Hungary as “a little slack” (in German “flau”).<sup>144</sup>

Furthermore they talked about the German-Polish relations, the question of Czechoslovakia, the situation of powers in Western Europe and the negotiations between France, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.<sup>145</sup> We were informed that Göring also calculated with the role of Poland. This meant that Warsaw could have some influence in Bucharest (as Berlin in Yugoslavia) and they would not have moved against Hungary in case if the Hungarians had not taken any military actions.<sup>146</sup> The Prussian prime minister emphasized that Hungary had to give the same autonomy to Slovakians that the Slovakian minority were not given by the Czech.<sup>147</sup>

It means the Polish diplomatic circles knew about the danger of armed conflicts. It was confirmed by the Polish ambassador from Rome, such as Ciano said, Yugoslavia would not move (against Hungary of course) if Germany was the provocateur but if Hungary moved first, there was no guarantee that Yugoslavia would stay passive.<sup>148</sup>

This information showed they had thought about the Hungarian behaviour in the case of military conflict. If Hungary joined any military attacks, they would get some territory from Germany. The risk was huge because they did not have any guarantee that during this time, when they were fighting in Czechoslovakia, no enemy armies would attack them.

---

141 Ibid. 387–390.

142 Ibid. 172–173.

143 AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323.

144 Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne, 427–432.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid. 427–432.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid. 356–358.

Lipski also took a particular note on his conversations with Horthy on August 24. Firstly, they talked about the visit of Polish president to Hungary and the Polish ambassador referred to the cordial English-Polish relations, stressing the importance of „the current difficult political times.”<sup>149</sup> After this Horthy analyzed the internal political situation of Hungary and mentioned that Hungary would not follow Germany's example in the Jewish question.<sup>150</sup> Touching on the topic of the visit, Horthy also referred to oddities and difficulties, saying that for him the biggest surprise was the welcome of the Rumanian and Czechoslovakian ambassadors on the railway station.<sup>151</sup> About the agreement in Bled he observed (talking to Lipski) that it seemed Hungary made a step against Germany. But in reality the Italian and the German governments wanted to force the Hungarian political circles to repair Hungarian-Yugoslavian and Hungarian-Rumanian relationships.<sup>152</sup> This was the reason for the negotiations which was an “action of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs.”<sup>153</sup>

At the end of these talks Lipski mentioned the common policy of Poland and Romania related to the Soviet Union, Horthy referred to Far East countries and the Japanese-Chinese relationship.<sup>154</sup> We might conclude Horthy quietly noted to Lipski that he was missing Blomberg and only one person had influence on German policy. It could be very difficult and negative in German policy.<sup>155</sup>

The reports and the articles we used showed „abstention of assessments”.<sup>156</sup> We can think that Poland was not disappointed with the official statements from Bled (many times they emphasized that it could be the first step in the détente of the Danube-basin and the beginning of a new era). They were not disappointed in fact that the publication about the agreement of Bled took place at the same time when the Hungarian statesmen were staying in Germany. They thought that it showed the

---

149 Ibid. 433–434.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibidem 434.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid. 433–434.

156 MNLOL, K. 63. 1938. 227/pol. Attitudes of Polish press about the visit of Regent Horthy to Germany and about the conference in Bled.

independence of the Hungarian foreign policy.<sup>157</sup> Lipski's information also supported this: Hungary would not sign anything.

Furthermore, he had a secret source, which informed him about what Imrédy said: "Hungary will not participate in a German-Czech military conflict." It was a positive thing for the actual Polish policy because they counted with a Hungarian territorial growing and a separation of Slovakia from the Czech Republic.<sup>158</sup>

The lack of a final agreement with the Little Entente was due to the political stubbornness of Czechoslovakia.<sup>159</sup> We could hardly find any reference to the military question or any news about the preparations against Czechoslovakia but the press published negative comments about the fact that the Hungarian Minister of Defence joined the talks.<sup>160</sup>

We did not find any information about tension between the statesmen during the visit in the examined dailies - for example when Hitler wanted to cancel their common programme in the Opera<sup>161</sup> - therefore we do not know the opinion of Polish press or diplomats about this meeting.<sup>162</sup> This is very interesting because the Hungarian historians wrote that Hitler wanted to encourage Hungarians to attack Czechoslovakia: he wanted a military attack from Hungary.

About this fact the Poles most probably did not have any information. The Hungarian politicians turned down the German offer – so the Polish opinion that Hungary would not be the satellite of the German Reich (in the near future) was correct.

The Polish diplomatic circles also wrote about this topic in mid-September, when Göring shared many secret information with Józef Lipski, for example about the autonomy question of the Slovaks and the Hungarian and Polish territorial claim which was not important for the German policy. It meant that in fact, Hitler did not support it (and the Hungarian-Polish common border neither) because Germany did not want an actual Hungarian or Polish recruitment.

---

157 AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, 323.

158 Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne, 434–436.

159 Ibid.

160 AAN, M. S. Z. Poselstwo RP w Budapeszcie, 6751, 52/4/W/39, August 12, 1938.

161 Pritz, Magyar diplomácia, 315.


162 Supposedly Keitel talked about the participation of Poles. Pritz, Magyar diplomácia, 324 and 326.



Erzsébet Molnár D.

**Transcarpathia and the *Malenkiy Robot*<sup>1</sup>**

During the World War II (from 1939 till 1944) Transcarpathia belonged to Hungary. The population of the region amounted to 853 949 in 1941. More than half of the population declared themselves Ukrainians (Rusyns, Ruthenians), the number of them was 500 418 people accounting for 58,1% of the population. The second most populous nationality was Hungarian. It made up 27,3% of the population which meant 233 875 people. It should be mentioned that according to the Hungarian statistical methodology language use inquiry was held and not ethnicity was studied at that time. Thus, numerous Jews and Gypsies were listed as inhabitants whose mother tongue was Hungarian. The number of Jews was 78 699 (9,2%), Romanians 15 599 (1,8%), Germans 13 222 (1,5%) and Gypsies 1 193 (0,1%). (Figure 1.)



*Figure 1. Ethnic map of the present-day territory of Transcarpathia in 1941*  
 Edited by Erzsébet Molnár D. – István Molnár D.

<sup>1</sup> This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4.A/2-11-1-2012-0001

Source: Kárpátalja településeinek nemzetiségi (anyanyelvi) adatai (1880 – 1941) [National (Mother tongue) data of Settlements of Transcarpathia (1880 - 1941)]. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1996.

At the end of 1944, by defiling the front line and calming down weapons brought the Transcarpathian Hungarians and Germans not the era of peace and calmness but a period when they had to face up further hardships. According to the created Doctrine of Collective Guilt – which declared the collective guilt of Germans and Hungarians – the consequences of the lost World War for ten thousands of people belonging to these ethnics there were deportations, forced labour and *malenkiy robot*.

Intentions of Stalin and the Soviet leadership concerning the punishment of Hungarian nation were already obvious in 1943, when Molotov, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs wrote the following lines to A. C. Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow: "The Soviet government thinks that for the armed help which Hungary rendered to Germany ... not only the Hungarian government has to take responsibility but more or less Hungarian population too."<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet will to punish the Hungarian nation was obvious in the case of Transcarpathian Hungarians too, as Stalin decided to attach this territory to the Soviet Union. According to professional opinions the biggest and most revealed ethnical clean up in the territory of that time Hungary took place in Transcarpathia in order to annex the area to the Soviet Union smoothly.<sup>3</sup> Systematic, ruthless imposing of the Soviet regime began in Transcarpathia in October 1944, when the soldiers of the Soviet Army, exactly the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Front appeared in the region. Soldiers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Front got across the Tatar Pass on 27<sup>th</sup> September 1944 and they captured Uzhgorod – the centre of the region – on 27<sup>th</sup> October 1944. Thus, by the end of October the whole region got under the Soviet military occupation with the exception of the town Chop

---

2 A letter by V. Molotov, the Soviet people's commissar of foreign affairs written to the British ambassador in Moscow. Moscow, June 7, 1943. Zalán Bognár, Malenkey robot, or the deportation of the civilian population in large numbers from Hungary to forced labour in the Soviet Union in 1944/45, with special regard to those deported as Germans. In: Zalán Bognár (ed.), „Egyetlen bönünk a származásunk volt...” Német és magyar polgári lakosok deportálása „malenkiy robot”-ra a sztálini légerekbe 1944/45–1955. [Our Only Guilt Was Our Origin...] The Deportation of German and Hungarian Civil Residents for “Malenkiy robot” to the Camps of Stalin from 1944/45 till 1955] Pécs, 2009. 401. [hereinafter Bognár, Malenkey,]

3 Bognár, Malenkey, 415.

in which the troops of Hungarian Army were able to hold their positions for the longest time, until the end of November.

Among the numerous features of the sovietization of Transcarpathia – establishing the soviet (council) system, organizing collective farms, violent gathering of crops, forcible nationalization, and struggle against the historical Churches – the most tragic measure of the Soviet power in Transcarpathia was the *malenkiy robot*.

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of November 1944 the Military Council of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Front gave the notorious top secret command No.0036:

(Top secret) Command No. 0036 of the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which occupied Transcarpathia<sup>4</sup>

“1. The military governments of cities, towns and bigger rural settlements are obliged to register the soldiers and officers who were in service in the German and Hungarian armed forces *irrespective of their nationality, from* November 14 up to November 16.

2. We have to compile a list of all German and Hungarian men between the ages of 18 and 50 liable to military service who currently live on the territory of the liberated Transcarpathian Ukraine, as well as the officials and clerks of the Hungarian police and gendarmerie who reside on the territory of the liberated Transcarpathian Ukraine. ... The military commanders have to inform the persons in question about their obligation to appear again on November 18. ... The persons in question who live on the territory of the liberated Transcarpathian Ukraine have to be guided into POW transit places in separate groups according to the prepared lists under convoy.

Major general Fadeyev, commander of the NKVD-quads, responsible for the control of the hinterland, has to direct his corps to intensify efforts in order to find and arrest the listed persons.”

Next day appeared the Command No. 2 of the Town government was declared and called upon the male population aged 18-50 years of Hungarian and German nationality to register themselves.

#### ORDER 2 of the Town Command

November 13, 1944

1. Those soldiers and officers who belonged to the Hungarian and German armies and remained on the territory of the liberated Transcarpathia are obliged to register at the nearest town command

---

4 A “*malenykij robot*” *dokumentumokban* [“Malenkiy Robot” in Documents]. Ed. György Dupka – Alekszej Korszun. Ungvár – Budapest, 1993. 72–73.



within three days beginning November 14th of this year.

All German and Hungarian men between the ages of 18 and 50 who are subject to military service shall report at the town command.

2. Those who were in service of the police or the gendarmerie in Transcarpathia during the Hungarian occupation are obliged to report within the same time.

3. Persons can register at the town commands only from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. every day.

The last day for reporting is November 16, 1944.

4. Those who fail to register, will be arrested and court-martialled.

Town Command

As it can be seen the warning pointed out the 16<sup>th</sup> of November as the last day of registration and it also informed the population that all those who did not register would be arrested and court-martialled. Besides the placards announcing the command, in the settlements they also proclaimed the registering obligation. It was announced several times every day and in some places it was also emphasized that if the obliged person did not report, all of his family would be put to the sword: “It was announced by drumbeat that all men between the ages of 18 and 50 were obliged to register for a three-day work having a three-day supply of food and blankets with them as they would be taken for three-day work... Not only once was it announced by drumbeat, but every hour from morning till evening, and it was also proclaimed that if a person refused to register, all members of his family would be killed.”<sup>5</sup>

Different pretexts were issued by the representatives of the new regime: in some settlements people were gathered for the reason of taking over such a certificate which authorized them to move freely in the area “liberated” by the Red Army; in other settlements – and in the most villages – the explanation was the only 3 day long reparation and restoring work, the “little work” or the “*malenkiy robot*” which concept has become a terminology and it has come into general use also in Hungarian language thus hallmarking the Soviet measures concerning the deportation of Hungarian and German civilians. People believing the propaganda to be true went to the assigned places on 18 November, but there they did not receive any certificates but soldiers with submachine-guns went through their pockets and took away all usable things from

---

5 Citation from András Nagy’s reminiscence. The interview was taken in 2005 and it belongs to the proper of Tivadar Lehoczky Institute.

them, what is more, even the better footwear.<sup>6</sup>

Sorting people out according to their nationalities in different gathering places may be concluded that the main reason of deportation was the ethnic cleansing, to which the doctrine of collective guilt gave suitable ideological principle for the Stalin regime. Those who declared themselves Rusyns, Ukrainians or Slovaks – since nationality was determined by themselves – or could say at least the Lord's Prayer or the Anthem in Rusyn or Slovakian language they were given a certificate and were allowed to go home: "The process of registration took place in the present-day Lajos Kossuth Secondary School No. 4. We walked to the school where the NKVD [Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del / People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] was waiting for us. We took Hungarian certificates with us. The certificates of the Hungarians were not stamped by the NKVD, so we were to proceed along the corridor and we were directed into a large school yard. To those who did not consider themselves Hungarian but belonging to any other nationality, triangular stamps were put in their certificates and they were directed into another yard, a front yard, and then they were released from there."<sup>7</sup>

The first marching columns of gathered Transcarpathian male population were sent off on 18<sup>th</sup> November 1944 towards the relocation centre and transit camp in Svaliava. The transit camp in Svaliava was built by the Soviet authorities from the former barrack of Hungarian Army and it was the part of the Starij Sambor-centred camp-system. For the prisoners who were driven by strict armed escort it was forbidden to step out the line or to leave their place. (Figure 2)

---

6 Bognár, Malenkey, 416.

7 Citation from survivor Sándor Huszti's reminiscence. The interview was taken in 2005 and it belongs to the proper of Tivadar Lehoczky Institute.




Figure 2. Route of the deportations

Edited by Erzsébet Molnár D. – István Molnár D.

As they spent nights in different unheated buildings or in the open-air on their way to the camp in cold November, most of them had got cold by the time they arrived in Svaliava. The situation became more serious when the Soviet soldiers took their shoes and coats away. “Buildings, brick houses were taken by the officers of the headquarters of the commander and the staff... Prisoners were taken into stinking stables where even air hardly was.”<sup>8</sup>

According to the remembrance of survivors, in the “death camp” in Svaliava, as it was named at that time, 100-120 men were buried in mass graves without signs next to the camp every day:<sup>9</sup> “... the sight of the camp was deterrent even from outside. Our astonishment increased as the gate was opened: first a big lorry came out that was loaded up with dead bodies and we could go in after that. The sight was even more terrifying from inside. Typhus raged inside the wire fences. 2-3 lorries of dead bodies were transported away every day.”<sup>10</sup>

In Svaliava a large number of deportees died because of the inhuman conditions, starvation, epidemic and cold. According to some opinions

8 Jenő Nagy, *Megaláztatásban* [In Humiliation]. Ungvár – Budapest, 1992. 12.

9 Bognár, Malenkey, 416.

10 László Nagy, *Deportálásom – fogságom története* [„History of My Deportation – Captivity”]. = *Szabolcs-Szatmári Szemle*, 1990. 379.

most of the Transcarpathian Hungarians died in Svaliava.<sup>11</sup> Here the internees already were forced to do different jobs: building bridges, carrying woods which were typical during all the time of the deportation. The deportees were intended to be used as free labour force in order to rebuild the Soviet Empire being in ruins after war.

Those starved, frozen to the bone and humiliated in their human dignity prisoners who survived the initial tribulations in Svaliava were made to march through the *Uzhok Pass to Stariy or Noviy Sambor. Here they were put on trains leaving for different camps in the Soviet Union from where most of them never came back.*

“We set off for Velika Berezna in awful weather conditions and bad footwear. Having arrived in Malomret [Zhornava], we were bundled into a wooden house. In the morning we got two-three spoons of soup and glop. Thus we proceeded in the direction of Uzhok. We spent the night on foot, having no opportunity to fall into a swoon because we were cramped for room. . .

In the morning we set out for Sambor. In the evening we got a handful of dried peas and two pieces of bread there. Neither saw we any drinking water. Our place of residence was a crumbling building, but at least we could lie down: some men slept on dry places while others in the mud or by the windows. In the morning we moved forward and arrived in Novij Sambor in the evening. Here we were placed in a stable, because all buildings were engaged. As several thousand people did not have room, they walked up and down. A few days later we were guided into railway carriages. We were directed into goods wagon in different ways and transported to all regions of the country. On December 16, our company was directed into a carriage. 100 anguished Hungarian captives were bundled into a goods wagon. I reached the age of 20 in the camp here.

Perhaps we got food three times in 14 days, parboiled beans with much salt, and once we got some bread and fish, without any water, and they did not give us a sip. The hoary heads of iron screws being in the side of the wagon refreshed us only. Sometimes frost nipped at our tongues. When we waited for a long time at an abandoned station, they counted us in a brusque manner by means of rifle butt. I spent Christmas like that. 26. 12. 1944.”<sup>12</sup>

---

11 József Botlik – György Dupka, *Ez hát a hon...* [So This is Homeland...] Budapest –Szeged, 1991. 55.

12 According to the notes of Endre Baráth (*malenkiy robot* survivor). Chorny Potik, 1989.

The news about inhuman circumstances in the camps was coming to Hungary even at the end of 1944. On December 26, 1944, right after the Provisional National Government was formed, it made a complaint against the deportations of the civilian population to the Soviet government. On January 7, 1945 Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Miklós Dálnoki wrote a letter to the Soviet government aiming at releasing the deported civilians in which he referred respectively to the people carried forcibly away from Transcarpathia: “From Bereg county Hungarian men were taken off to labour service nearly two months ago. From town Beregszász [Berehove] and the neighbouring villages, which belong to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the Trianon contract, the Hungarian population between 18-50 years was taken off on the 19th of November. On the 21st of November, men between 18-50 years were also taken off from the Trianon area of Bereg County, from the villages east of the highway of Beregszász-Vásárosnamény. Out of these people priests, Rusyns, Gipsies, Jewish or Greek Catholic religious people were sent back to their families from Beregszász [Berehove]. [...] According to the complaints received, the accommodation and nutrition of the Hungarians being at forced labour is very poor. A lot of them became ill as they are without any warm clothes. [...] The release of the Hungarian men who have been at forced labour for a long time became necessary and that is why I ask you to order the release of these people.”<sup>13</sup>

Persons deported with reference to *malenkiy robot* were taken in so-called GUPVI (Glavnoe Upravlenie Voyennoplennikh i Internirovannikh / General Management of POW's and Internees) camps which were under the control and supervision of the NKVD as well as the GULAG camps. But there were significant differences between the two camp systems. The GUPVI camps were set up for POWs and internees who were dragged away in large numbers ignoring their personal identification. The Soviet authorities focused merely on meeting the plan figures as well as on the isolation of a given nationality just like in the case of the Transcarpathian Hungarians. On the other hand, in the case of people who were taken off to GULAG (Glavnoe Upravlenie ispravitelno-trudovykh Lagerei / Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps) camps the prisoner's personal identity was very important. The representatives of the

---

13 Dálnoki Miklós Béla kormányának (*Ideiglenes Nemzeti Kormány*) minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvei 1944. december 23. – 1945. november 15. [Protocols of Councils of Ministers of Béla Dálnoki Miklós Government, December 23, 1944 – November 15, 1945]. Ed. László Szűcs. Budapest, 1997. 149.

occupying Soviet authority presumed that they could hinder the process of establishing the regime. Therefore they became inmates by show trials organized against them and directed to GULAG forced labour camps. One more important difference should be mentioned between GUPVI and GULAG camp system: while most of the GUPVI camps were situated in the European part of the Soviet Union – mainly on the Eastern part of Ukraine, in the Donets Basin and also in the Ural – the GULAG camps were located in the Trans-Uralian area, on the Asian part of the empire.<sup>14</sup>

We can get information about the life circumstances in the camps by the survivors' notes, diaries and reminiscence: "We ate twice a day in the barrack: at dawn and at noon. At around 4–5 a. m. pearl barley soup was spilled into petrol barrels in the dark barrack. We got a half litre of it. At noon we had the same portion. In addition, we got bread. (1 loaf of bread for four men – 1 loaf of bread for 12 men. It depends on the available supply of bread in stock.) And once they give a spoonful of sugar to us with a fillet of salted fish. The menu was not varied, but it was just enough for me ... I witnessed unimaginable scenes because of the limited supply of food. Swears, quarrels, taking skins of potatoes from rubbish, etc."<sup>15</sup>

"January 1, 1945 – we arrived in Orel, in a camp that was surrounded by barbed wire. It was a barn which had been used for military purposes before. There were no doors or attic in the building. Only uncomfortable wooden beds could be found in it. Five of us sat on the place of one. In this way, we stayed up for several weeks. After two months spent in miserable conditions, only one third of us remained alive. Afterwards, we had enough space. A considerable number of captives lay in hospital while most of them were buried in mass graves with nothing on, because all clothes were pulled off from them."<sup>16</sup>

"There were no mornings without 6–10 dead men. ... It was troublesome... until an amount of a sledge of dead bodies were gathered on it ... Even their clothes were taken off, people looked like a piece of wood. They were frozen, put onto the sledge and covered up by a blanket in order that civilians not see who were carried away. We were in very bad conditions."<sup>17</sup>

---

14 Bognár, Malenkey, 442.

15 According to the notes of György Deák (*malenkiy robot* survivor). Bobruisk, 1945.

16 According to the notes of Endre Baráth (*malenkiy robot* survivor). Chorny Potik, 1989.

17 An extract from Sándor Tar's reminiscence. The interview was taken in 2005 and it belongs to the property of Tivadar Lehoczky Institute.

This was not the only wave of deportations from Transcarpathia. As Stalin intended to use “German workforce” in reparations communal labour in the Soviet Union because “human resources were nearly exhausted by the end of the war; and the use of the enemy labour force appeared to be simply a matter of fact reasonable and appropriate”<sup>18</sup> for the Soviet leadership. On the base of the order No. 7161 of the Soviet State Defense Committee Stalin ordered:

“1.) All German men of 17-45 years and women 18-30 years who are able to work and are staying in the area of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia liberated by the Red Army have to be mobilized and interned for the purpose of directing them to work in the Soviet Union.

It has to be made clear that the mobilization applies both for Germans of German and Hungarian citizenship and Germans of Romanian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian citizenship.

2.) The mobilization shall be controlled by the People’s Commissariat of the Interior of the Soviet Union (comrade Beria).

The people’s Commissariat of the Interior of the Soviet Union shall be charged with organization of the transit places, reception of the internees, assembling and starting of the trains and guarding of the trains on the way.

The trains shall be started to the Soviet Union according to the pace of the arrival of the German internees at the transit places.

3.) Comrades Malinovsky and Vinogradov shall be obliged to implement the following in relation to Romania and comrades Tolbukhin and Biryuzov in relation to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia:

A) to implement the mobilization and internment of the Germans mentioned in article 1) through the government offices of the country concerned

B) to ensure together with comrades Apollonov and Gorbatyuk, deputies of the Soviet People’s Commissariat of the Interior that the responsible military and civilian authorities take the necessary measures in order to make the Germans in question appear in the transit places.

In case of Hungary comrades Malinovsky and Tolbukhin, in case of Czechoslovakia comrade Petrov shall be ordered to announce through the town commanders on behalf of the front government the provisions necessary for the internment of the Germans according to article 1) of this order, as well as to ensure together with the deputies of the Soviet People’s Commissariat of the Interior that the measures necessary for the

---

18 Pavel Polian, *Against Their Will. The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR*. Budapest – New York, 2004. 244.

appearance of the Germans to be mobilized at the transit places are taken.

4.) It shall be permitted the Germans to be transported to take with them warm clothes, reserve underclothes, bed-clothes, household utensils for personal use and food, in total up to 200 kg per head.

5.) Comrade Khrulyov, the military supply chief of the Red Army and comrade Kovalyov shall be commissioned to provide the trains and cars for the transportation of the internees, as well as their food supply on the way.

6.) All Germans shall be directed to the renovation work of the coal mining industry of the Donets coal basin and of the iron smelting industry of the South. Worker battalions of 1000 persons shall be formed out of the Germans who arrive at the workplaces.

The People's Commissariat of Defense (comrade Golikov) shall ensure 12 officers for every battalion out of the officers restrictedly fit for service in the Red Army.

7.) The organization of the reception of the internees at the workplaces, their accommodation, their nutrition, as well as the provision of all other conditions of existence for the Germans who arrive and the organization of their jobs shall be carried out by the People's Commissariat of Coal Mining and the People's Commissariat of Iron Smelting.

(...)

10.) The collection and internment of the Germans shall be implemented in December 1944 and in January 1945, and the transportation to the workplaces shall be finished until the February 15, 1945.

President of the State Defence Committee, J. Stalin<sup>19</sup>

The order applied also to the Transcarpathian Germans and in December 2014 Command No. 0060 was issued which concerned all German men between the ages of 17 and 45 and women between the ages of 18 and 30 able to work. Only those few women who have a child under the age of 1 year could escape. Most of them were deported in the Donets Basin in Horlivka.<sup>20</sup> (Figure 3)

---

19 The text of the order is quoted by Bognár, Malenkey, 420–421.

20 Roman Ofitsinskiy, *Etnikai tisztogatások [Ethnic Cleansing]*, In: Csilla Fedinec – Mikola Vehes (eds.), *Kárpátalja 1919-2009, történelem, politika, kultúra [Transcarpathia 1919-2009, History, Politics, Culture]*. Budapest, 2010. 246.






Figure 3. Labour camps in the Donets Basin

Edited by Erzsébet Molnár D. – István Molnár D.

Men of military age deported in the course of *malenkiy robot*, in some documents are listed as prisoners of war (POWs), while in other cases they are marked as internees. Mentioning together civilians interned from Transcarpathia and prisoners of war in different documents and being treated in the same way it may be concluded that Soviet leadership considered deported civilians – even who had never held weapons in their hands - as potential prisoners of war. About those who were considered to be prisoners of war by the Soviet leadership we can get information from the decision approved in 1941 by the Council of People's Commissars of USSR: „All those qualify prisoners of war who belong to armed forces of states being at war with the Soviet Union, who fell into captivity during military operations as, as well as the civilian people of these countries who were internee to the territory of the Soviet Union.”<sup>21</sup>

People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine in summer of 1945 issued a circular letter in each settlement about making a list of prisoners

21 Command of Peoples' Commissars Council of USSR No.1798-800. T. (Secret!). July 1, 1941. In. *Magyar hadifoglyok a Szovjetunióban. Dokumentumok (1941-1953)* [Hungarian POWs in the Soviet Union. Documents (1941-1953)]. Ed. Éva Mária Varga. Moszkva – Budapest, 2006. 55.

of war and civilians being in different camps in the USSR. Since the register applied to all the men, who at that time were in any camp of the Soviet lager system, civilians who were deported in course of *malenkiy robot* as well got to the list as prisoners of war who got in captivity as the consequence of moving the front line. According to this list, in summer of 1945 almost 27 thousand inhabitants of Transcarpathia were kept in prison in POWs camps and labour camps,<sup>22</sup> and a great part of them never returned to their homeland. We can state that not only men of 18-50 years were deported as the official version sounded but also youth of 15-16 years and men above 50 years.<sup>23</sup>

Many of those who could return died within a short time of different illnesses caught in the camp, but *malenkiy robot* also left a permanent trauma in survivors' souls who were tortured physically, humiliated and forced to lose their human dignity. "The victims of GUPVI and the survivors, who are also victims, were exposed to serious traumatic effects during the forced labour, and their traumas were created by mistrust and suppression."<sup>24</sup>

This high rate of deportations besides the personal tragedies has meant a communal trauma and tragedy for the Transcarpathian Hungarians since the consequences of the largest deportation has influenced the number of community in a negative way. The deportees' rehabilitation – who received even greater punishment because of their origin than common criminals – has not been done till nowadays.

On 26 November 1944, just after extensive and organized actions that led to the decimation of the population of ethnic Hungarians and Germans, the 1st Congress of the People's Committees of Transcarpathia was held in Mukachevo. The representation was neither equal nor proportional. In addition a large number of settlements did not send a delegate there. Representatives of the NKVD, internal security services and soldiers attended the congress where the frightened and politically one-sidedly influenced participants unilaterally adopted the Manifesto on the unification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The preamble of the proclamation written in Moscow stated that Hungarians and Germans were eternal enemies of the Ukrainian nation. The Mukachevo Manifesto decided to "reunite" the

---

22 Transcarpathian State Archive [hereinafter TSA], P-14, op. 1., od. zb. 216–232.

23 TSA, P-14, op. 1., od. zb.216., 1-32.

24 Zsuzsa Singer, GUPVI camps from a psychological aspect. In. Bognár, Our only guilt, 401.

Transcarpathian Ukraine with its great mother, the Soviet Ukraine and leave the framework of Czechoslovakia. It also asked for entry into the Soviet Union and announced the election of a national council, which alone had the power to represent “the will of the people.”<sup>25</sup> During building up the soviet regime in Transcarpathia the situation in which Hungarian people got was particularly disadvantageous. These people also were declared fascists in several documents that were created during the Soviet era.<sup>26</sup>

In the decades of existence the Soviet Union it was forbidden to remember, or even to talk publicly about what happened in 1944 and the history of deportations was on the first places on the list of taboo topics. Appearance of the first writings and the first public commemoration which meant the breakthrough of the wall of silence might happen only at the end of 1980s or at the beginning of 1990s.<sup>27</sup> Thanks to memoirs and narration of survivors, through memorials, publications and conferences analyzing the events, *malenkiy robot* became the defining element of the collective memory of Transcarpathian Hungarians.

---

25 Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948*. Cambridge, Massachusetts – London, 1978. 253–254.

26 TSA, P-14, op. 1., od.zb. 6.

27 See: *Koncepciók perek magyar elíteltjei. A sztálinizmus áldozatainak emlékkönyve 1944-1957* [Hungarian Convicts of Show Trials. Album of the Victims of Stalinism 1944-1957]. Ed. György Dupka. Ungvár – Budapest, 1993., *Élő történelem. Válogatás a meghurcolt magyarok visszaemlékezéseiből 1944-1992* [Living History. Selection From the Remembrance of the Deported Hungarians 1944-1992]. Ed. György Dupka. Ungvár – Budapest, 1993.; József Botlik – György Dupka, *Magyarlakta települések ezredéve Kárpátalján* [Hungarian-inhabited Settlements For a Thousand Years in Transcarpathia]. Ungvár – Budapest, 1993.

**Natália Váradi**

## **Documents Related to the Revolution of 1956 from Transcarpathian Archives<sup>1</sup>**

The mournful and tragic days of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence convinced that despite of the numerous vicissitudes and artificially drawn borders the Hungarian unity and cooperation exists. It is also proved that there is a common homeland in people's hearts, for which those who consider themselves real Hungarians join forces within and beyond borders even if they know that the political powers may take revenge on them.

Numerous works have been written about the history of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 both in Hungary and beyond its borders in the last years but the archival documents of Ukraine and the former Soviet Union still need to be explored. For incomprehensible reasons, the investigation of the Modern Era faces several difficulties in Transcarpathia even today. The documents of the local archives cannot be accessed easily, only few researchers have the opportunity to gain an insight into the documents. Even if the research is permitted, some of the documents are still encrypted. Therefore, only a small part of the Transcarpathian archival documents related to the 20<sup>th</sup> century history have been processed up to the present time. Documents that have never been seen by historians still need to be explored concerning the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the retaliation after it. The Transcarpathian aspect of this significant historical event has been investigated only for last few years, thus, the Transcarpathian implications of the revolution are almost completely missing.

A large number of the Transcarpathian documents from 1956 can be found in the Regional State Archives of Transcarpathia (henceforth RSAT) in Ungvár [Uzhgorod]<sup>2</sup> and in the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (henceforth SASSU) also in Ungvár [Uzhgorod].<sup>3</sup>

1 This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 ,National Excellence Program?

2 The documents in the Regional State Archives of Transcarpathia in Ungvár [Uzhgorod] are kept in the following system: Fond, opis, odinica zberihanya No, year. I mark the references of documents with the following abbreviation: RSAT, F. o. od. zb. year.

3 I mark the references of documents found in the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in the following way: Fond, opis, porjadok dyelo no., tom and year

The RSAT only keeps the materials of those Transcarpathians who were accused of “less significant” crimes, for instance, of singing the Hungarian anthem in the centre of the town or of discussing the events of the revolution. The documents of the cases connected to deportations and of those labelled by serious judgments are kept in the SASSU. These are the KGB documents.<sup>4</sup>

The documents of the former KGB concerning the Revolution of 1956, which consist of 30 volumes and contain thousands of pages, are disordered; most of them are handwritten (often with lead-pencil) and hardly readable. The majority of the documents are written in Russian but Ukrainian, Hungarian and German ones also can be found.

The documents can be grouped as follows:

- roster of the Hungarian revolutionists who were deported to the Soviet Union and also the register of the soldiers and drivers who were accompanying them,
- interrogation protocols of the imprisoned persons,
- records, notes, certificates about the deportees,
- Russian translations of the Hungarian documents found at the detainees,
- lists of properties found at the revolutionists,
- documents containing the observations of the KGB detectives and jail commanders of the prison No 1. in Ungvár [Uzhgorod],
- official correspondences between the different organs of the authorities,
- minute-books containing the interrogation of the arrested co-workers of the German Red Cross,
- confiscated personal items, documents, photos,
- leaflets prepared by the arrested persons.

The majority of the documents are minutes of the interrogation of prisoners and register of the revolutionists who were deported to Ungvár [Uzhgorod] in November 1956. The aggregated rosters are mainly typed, although with many mistakes; the personal names and names of places are often illegible, unrecognisable. The majority of the names and places were written down incorrectly since they were not written out from the identity documents but were recorded by hearing, mainly by non-

---

with the following abbreviation: SASSU, KGB, F. o. p. no. t. year.

4 Committee for State Security

Hungarian speakers, what makes the identification more complicated. There were some other things that caused problems: the Hungarian accented vowels and the letter combinations, “cz”, “th”, “ch”, “sch” etc. and the letters *w*, *y*, *ly* for example cannot be converted into the Cyrillic alphabet. The recorders did not always perceive the difference between the short and long vowels and consonants, as well as the stressed and unstressed syllables. For instance, the sound marked by the Cyrillic letter *o* can be *o*, *ó*, *a*, and *á*, and perhaps *ö*, *ő* in Hungarian. The recognition of the differences between the letters *g* and *h* was a usual problem since these letters were often used reversed in the documents.

Two significant works provide detailed information about the revolutionaries' deportation in 1956: *The “Yeltsin-dossier”*<sup>5</sup> and the *“Missing Pages from the History of 1956”*<sup>6</sup>. Besides these two works, I tried to provide a broader insight into the deportations to the Soviet Union, relying on the documents kept in the Transcarpathian archives and on the interviews I made asking the local eyewitnesses.

Numerous data prove that the actions aiming to crush the War of Independence in 1956 were directly governed from Transcarpathia. Archival data and the reminiscences of the Transcarpathian Hungarians confirmed that a Soviet military and political centre was set up in Ungvár [Uzhgorod]<sup>7</sup>, from where the breakdown of the Hungarian Revolution was directed. Moreover, a military telephone centre was being operated in the Commercial Technical Institute of Munkács [Mukachevo], for the purpose of direct communication with Moscow.<sup>8</sup> KGB-leaders and high-ranked soldiers were delegated from Moscow to Transcarpathia in order to inform the Central Committee and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the events in Hungary.<sup>9</sup> The Transcarpathian high-ranked, Communist-loyal cadres actively participated in their work. The KGB intelligence worked at full strength, the Military Zone of

5 Éva Gál – András Hegedűs B. – György Litván – János Rainer M. (Eds.), *Jelcin-dosszié. Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ról*. Budapest, [Yeltsin-dossier, Soviet Documents about 1956] [hereinafter Yeltsin-dossier]

6 Viacheslav Sereda – Alexandr Stikalin (eds.), *Hiányzó lapok 1956 történetéből. Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB levéltárából*. Budapest, 1993. [Missing Pages from the History of 1956, Documents from the Archive of the Central Committee of the Former Soviet Communist Party]. [hereinafter Sereda – Stikalin, Hiányzó lapok]

7 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 12. no. 1. t. 12. 1956.

8 Interview with Sándor Suba, reminiscence. The interview was made in Mezővári [Vary] on 16 June 2002.

9 “Yeltsin-dossier”, 1993. 62-132.

Transcarpathia merged its troops and prepared them for attack along the Soviet-Hungarian border. From the reminiscences of the Soviet soldiers we know that on October 24 the first military corps crossed the border with the purpose of crushing the revolution.<sup>10</sup>

The “Hungarian Government” – led by János Kádár, came into existence in Moscow, that is why it was not really legal – in the first days of November made everything for “restoring the order” with the help of many loyal cadres. One of the first measures of the Government was the organisation of deportations to the Soviet Union. General Serov, the Chief of the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union who stayed in Budapest on those days wrote the following: *“I explained to comrade Kádár that a special division was set up, which received the command to arrest all the organisers of the rebellion who had shown armed resistance towards the units of the Soviet army, as well as to arrest those citizens who instigated and sparked off the hatred of the people against the Communists and co-workers of the state security organs, and as a result of it some of them were shot, hanged and burnt.”*<sup>11</sup>

The documents reveal that the Hungarian Communist regime did everything to keep their illegally obtained power. Moreover, they asked for help from the Soviet Union against their own nation, and deported hundreds of people to Soviet prisons.

1	2	3	4	5
73.	МАТЕШ Микша	1927 г., с. Героя, обл. Тиса	г. Будапешт, ул. Березина, 20, рабочий ученик кузнец	Будапешт 9/11-56 г.
74.	МАТКОВИЧ Унор	1928 г., г. Будапешт	г. Будапешт, студент 1 курса Университета	Будапешт 12/11-56 г.
75.	МОЛНАР Карой	1927 г., г. Худневарагонь	Будапешт 9, ул. Бачи 116, починка в строительстве 8.	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
76.	ПАЛЬ Йожеф	1927, с. Сил, обл. Пешт	Будапешт, Ракоши 129, кладовщик на заводе им. Ракоши	Будапешт 3/11-56 г.
76.	ВОРОСЕЛ Марти /г. Грославиц, Хорватия./	1927 г., н. Раковедишониц /Грославиц/	Будапешт 9, ул. Джи 81, рабочий завода "Ильич"	Будапешт 9/11-56 г.
77.	ШЕТЕВ Иштван	1919 г., г. Папа, обл. Тольна	г. Папа, обл. Тольна, офицер авиационной части 1 которой 8 25.	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
78.	ГОН Каро	1928 г., с. Дьеркен, обл. Тольна	с. Дьеркен, обл. Тольна, член кооператива	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
79.	БИЧАР Янош	1928 г., с. Дунафелдвар обл. Тольна	с. Дунафелдвар, обл. Тольна, офицер авиационной части 1 которой 8 25 в гор. Папа	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
80.	БАРОЦИ Йожеф	1921 г., с. Цема, обл. мезок.	с. Дьеркен, обл. Тольна, бригадир с/х кооператива	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
81.	МУЦ Янош	1928 г., г. Пекш, обл. Тольна	г. Папа, обл. Тольна, рабочий с/х кооператива в г. Папа.	Будапешт 6/11-56 г.
82.	СРЪАН Янош-Тимор	1928 г., г. Иштван, обл. Героя	г. Будапешт 9, ул. Березина 20, завод на строительстве 8-го завода	Будапешт 3/11-56 г.
83.	САК Карой	1928 г., гор. Ньиредьхаз	г. Будапешт, шоссе "Березина" 2-й этаж	Будапешт 10/11-56 г.

10 Interview with András Sztorozsuk, reminiscence. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on 10 August 2002.

11 Viacheslav Sereda – Alexandr Stikalín – István Vida, *Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ból.* = Rubicon, 1994. no. 8. 3. [Soviet documents from 1956].

2	3	4	5	6	7
КОЧИШ Гейза Гейзович	1930	член ВПТ	Служащий, ассистент кафедры историко-географической химии Веспремского университета.	Командир взвода национальной охраны. Университете, в вооруженной борьбе не участвовал.	
КОЧИШ Кароль Дьердьевич	1932	б/п	Инженер з-да с/х машин в г. Сомбатей.	Данных об его участии не имеется.	
КУБИК Гейза	1934	б/п	Солдат в/ч 1286/2, из рабочих.	—	
КУН Оттило Яношевич	1928	б/п	Рабочий, работник каменщиком в с.Бодислов.	Находился в национальной гвардии, задержан с оружием без сопротивления.	
ЛОКОИ Янош Яношевич	1934	член ДС	Крестьянин, единоличник, солдат в/ч 1672.	Участвовал в подразделении митжаников, вооружен митжаниками.	
ЛОСЛИЦКИЙ Тибор Яношевич	1933	член ДС	Рабочий, грузчик кирпичного завода.	Участвовал в отряде самообороны.	
ЛЮБИ Матвея Матвеичевич	1938	член ДС	Рабочий -монтажник на мотоциклетном з-де в Будапеште.	Задержан с оружием. Данных об его участии не имеется.	
ЛУГОИ Алоба	1925	б/п	Рабочий, рабочий на текстильной фабрике в Будапеште.	Данных об-его участии не имеется.	
МАЛЕНКО Михаил Иосифович	1938	член ДС	Крестьянин-средняк, работал в своем х-зе.	Служил в народной охране, оружия не имел.	

Among the documents there is an aggregated nominal roll about the deported persons which contain 848 names, and also there are some rosters which contain the deportees names from or to different Hungarian towns, e.g. from Veszprém, Debrecen, Nyíregyháza, Szombathely etc. These lists inform us about the number of persons who were transported to the Soviet Union from a particular Hungarian town or how many of them were returned to Hungary. This certainly does not mean that the revolutionists were deported to the Soviet Union only from these towns, as these towns were just so called collecting stations.

The data concerning the number of deported persons are very different. On July 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007 a list of names was given to the Hungarian President László Sólyom by Viktor Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine which included approximately three thousand names.<sup>12</sup> On the basis of the researches having been conducted in the Transcarpathian archives so far, it can be stated that more than one thousand Hungarian revolutionists were deported to Soviet prisons.

On November 11, 1956, General Serov wrote to Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that they had arrested 3773 persons until November 10. More than 700 persons of the arrested ones were directed to station Csap [Chop] with military escort.<sup>13</sup> On November 13 the General reported to Khrushchev again that 83 persons were arrested on 10 and 11 November, while altogether 4056

12 Kárpáti Igaz Szó [public newspaper] July 14, 2007. 2.

13 Sereda – Stikalin, Hiányzó lapok, 145–158.



persons had been arrested from the first day of the military operation and 767 persons of them were directed to Csap [Chop]; an investigation material was also made about them.<sup>14</sup> Serov also highlighted that no concessions should be made yet the arrests and deportations should be continued, although he did not mention to which towns of the Soviet Union. *“Yesterday comrade Münnich raised the question of finishing the arrests carried out in the counties because the workers are on strike... In my opinion, there should not be made any concession in this case, since even the smallest concession made towards the reactionaries results more demands and threats”*.<sup>15</sup>

On November 14, 1956, Serov and Andropov,<sup>16</sup> reported to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on K-line<sup>17</sup> that they would tell Ferenc Münnich that the arresting and locating a small group near the Soviet-Hungarian border was due to the lack of properly developed and equipped prisons in Hungary that would be proper for the reception of the prisoners and for the continuation of the objective investigation. After it Serov and Andropov commanded to transport the arrested ones in closed lorries and wagons in reinforced convoys.

In the middle of November 1956 Holodkov, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs arrived to Transcarpathia to deal with the reception and placement of the participants of the Hungarian “counter-revolution” who were deported to Transcarpathia by the units of the Soviet army. On November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1956, Holodkov reported the following to Dudorov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union: *“I hereby report you that on November 6, as you have commanded, I arrived to Munkács [Mukachevo] with a group of co-workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and with Colonel Berezin, the representative of the Ministry of Defence of the Soviet Union. Here I contacted comrade Colonel Komarov, the representative of the Soviet troops’ headquarters... We have decided that the units of the Soviet army will transport all the arrested to the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod]*.<sup>18</sup>

The Hungarians who were transported in closed wagons to Soviet prisons, were singing the anthem when the train stopped at or passed the stations and threw out notes through the ventilation gratings with

14 Sereda – Stikalin, Hiányzó lapok, 149.

15 Sereda – Stikalin, Hiányzó lapok, 151.

16 The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Hungary.

17 Direct communication telephone line for Soviet authorities.

18 Sereda – Stikalin, Hiányzó lapok, 154-155.

their own names, addresses and their relatives' addresses on it, asking the honest finders to inform them. The railway employees, passengers and people living near the railway stations found many of these notes in Nyíregyháza. The same happened in Szolnok. This news was even announced through the Hungarian Telegraph Office. Since there was a strike on November 14, the news had not been censored and edited, so, accidentally, the report appeared in the news at 4 p.m. with the title: "*Bald young people are transported to the Soviet Union through Szolnok...*"<sup>19</sup> It was also announced a few minutes later in London.

The documents about the deported people reveal that the deportations were carried out, in close cooperation, by the Hungarian authorities and the Transcarpathian KGB workers.

The KGB documents show that in most cases, the minute-books about the arrested ones were made on the basis of a previously defined script. The interrogation protocols often constructed different stories about the suspected, observed persons.

The interrogation was usually conducted in Russian. The interpreters were mostly Transcarpathian Hungarians, because they spoke both Hungarian and Russian languages. The interpreters were mostly intellectuals, teachers and also the employees of the State Archive of Beregszász [Berehove] – for instance Béla Gajdos, Dezső Foltin, Sándor Szijjártó – since the archive as an institution worked under the authority of the KGB.<sup>20</sup>

There were soldiers, policemen among the deported persons who guarded the Party Committee building in Budapest and other public buildings. Beltsenko<sup>21</sup> ordered their interrogation on December 2, 1956. He wanted to find out how they were attacked, who were killed by the rebels and who they knew of the counter-revolutionaries.<sup>22</sup> After they had justified and cleared themselves, many of them helped the interrogators' work during their stay in Ungvár [Uzhgorod]. According to one of the aggregated lists, altogether 231 soldiers were arrested from different military corps.<sup>23</sup>

---

19 Éva Orbán, *Amit '56-ról mindenkinek tudnia kell*. Budapest, 2006. 105. [What Should be Known by Everyone About '56 ].

20 Interview with György Csatári, archivist. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on 18 August 2008.

21 Major General, one of Serov's deputies

22 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 9. no. 1. t. 9. 1956.

23 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 15. no. 4. 1956.

There are no data confirming that the prisoners were beaten during the interrogation or that any of the Hungarian revolutionists died in Soviet prisons.

Serov reported to Khrushchev that: *“arrests are made only on the basis of evidence and factual information proving the hostile activities...”*<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless on December 8, 1956 General Beltsenko reported from Ungvár [Uzhgorod] to Major General Malyarov that *“...I am sending the name-list of those persons whose participation in the revolt cannot be proved by any material owned by us.”*<sup>25</sup>

Holodkov’s report to Dudorov also confirms that several people were arrested without evidences: *“There were no properly completed documents concerning a significant number of prisoners. Our materials were basically lists prepared on the basis of the reports and announcements of the local Hungarian authorities, the defence agencies of the Soviet army, the soldiers and the prisoners. The documents that were needed for the arrests, were missing, some of the arrested were not even on the lists, ...taking into consideration that there were 14-17 year-old teenagers, and even girls among the arrested persons, it is presumable that some of the arrests were not confirmed by evidences.”*<sup>26</sup>

The following diagram shows clearly that among the arrested there were teenagers as well. It is based on the aggregated list including 848 names, made by the KGB-authorities in 1956.<sup>27</sup>




Figure 1. The age structure of the arrested persons

24 Sereda – Stikalin, *Hiányzó lapok*, 151.

25 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 15. no. 4. 1956.

26 Sereda – Stikalin, *Hiányzó lapok*, 157.

27 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 16. no. 5. t. 1. 1956.

The prisoners were not only kept in the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod]. Holodkov wrote the following: “...*In agreement with the representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic], I have decided that the prisoners should be placed in the prisons of the following towns besides the one in Ungvár [Uzhgorod]: Stryi, Drohobych, Chernivtsi and Stanislav*”.<sup>28</sup> The KGB-documents also proved the fact that some of the prisoners were transported to the prisons of Stryi and Drohobych.<sup>29</sup> Holodkov continued his report as follows: “*The prisoners arrived to the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod] on November 8. On this day 22 persons came from Debrecen and Miskolc. There were 846 captives in the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod] on November 15, 1956 (among them 23 women). 463 of them were transported to the prisons of Stryi and Drohobych for further imprisonment. Later on convicts will be placed in the prisons of Stanislav, Chernivtsi and Drohobych... Most of the prisoners are transported from the area of Budapest (548 persons), Veszprém (90 persons), Kaposvár (45 persons), Szombathely (55 persons) and Miskolc (20 persons). A significant number of the arrived captives are members of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, soldiers of the Hungarian army, and there are 68 underage persons among them, who were born between 1939 and 1942, including 9 maidens...*”<sup>30</sup>

On November 21, 1956 Colonel Grichenko, commander of the Drohobych County KGB, sent a hand-written report to Colonel Pivovarets, one of the KGB-leaders in Transcarpathia County: “*During the interrogation of 147 persons on November 19, 1956, 32 arrestees admitted that they had weapon at the moment of their arrest, two of them confirmed that they had participated in the demonstrations and 113 persons considered themselves innocent. 120 persons were not interrogated yet, 76 of them were sent to Ungvár [Uzhgorod] on November 16, 1956 in accordance with the list given by the Regional Department of Internal Affairs of Transcarpathia. Moreover, a list containing 44 persons, who are not interrogated yet, is at comrade Kabanov.*”<sup>31</sup>

The revolutionists were deported to Ungvár [Uzhgorod] mainly between November 4-15. It occurred that the exact place of the prisoners was not known even by the Soviet authorities themselves. The following example can clearly confirm this uncertainty: Lieutenant-Colonel

28 Sereda – Stikalín, *Hiányzó lapok*, 155.

29 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 21. no. 9. t. 1. 1956

30 Sereda – Stikalín, *Hiányzó lapok*, 155.

31 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 21. no. 9. t. 1. 1956.

Klimenko sent a list containing 140 names to Colonel Glebov, who only knew about 16 people from the list staying there, but he had no information about the rest.<sup>32</sup>




Figure 2. Distribution of the prisoners by the date of their deportation

The aggregated list shows that the revolutionists were deported from 13 Hungarian settlements to the Soviet Union.




Figure 3. Distribution of the prisoners according to the settlements from where they were transported to the Soviet Union

32 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 12. no. 1. t. 12. 1956.

The documents proved that the transportations back to Hungary were performed gradually, not in one day.<sup>33</sup>




Figure 4. Distribution of the deported prisoners by the date of their return to Hungary

The documents also certify that some Hungarian towns' prisons received prisoners from the Soviet authorities. A few examples concerning this fact:

*"I have received the above mentioned 30 (thirty) people and their personal documents in 24 envelopes (for 24 persons). During the imprisonment they did not make any complaints about the staff accompanying and guarding them. Veszprém, December 16, 1956, 9.30 pm. Sándor Patkó, police lieutenant, commissioner of the Police-Headquarters of the County:*<sup>34</sup>

*"On this day, I have received 36 (thirty-six) detainees from the Soviet Headquarter. Lieutenant Horváth, Kaposvár, December 10, 1956"*<sup>35</sup>.

*"I have received 50 (fifty) persons without checking their names, Budapest, December 19, 1956, Mátyás Csúcs, lieutenant, State Prison of Budapest."*<sup>36</sup>



33 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 17. no. 5. t. 2. 1956.

34 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 1. no. 1. t. 1. 1956.

35 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 11. no. 1. t. 11. 1956.

36 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 2. no. 1. t. 2. 1956.





Based on their correspondences, the military organs did not only arrest the prisoners but also interrogated them and made several notes, reports and accounts. Consequently, the Hungarian authorities and the Transcarpathian KGB executed the deportations in close cooperation.

It turns out from the documents that there were three German citizens among the arrested and imprisoned persons, Horst Wragge, Ottó Franke and Inge Harfe, who were co-workers of the Red Cross. Their interrogation took place in Hungary and after a short stay in Ungvár [Uzhgorod] they were transported back too. Horst Wragge's Red Cross certificate, identity card, photo, letters etc. are still kept among the archival documents. The place of Horst Wragge's interrogation protocol is Budapest, its date is November 8, 1956. The language of interrogation is German, the interpreter's name is not indicated in the minute-book. The title of Ottó Franke's interrogation protocol is: "*Report about the Aid Convoy of the German Red Cross in Hungary*"; Budapest, November 9, 1956. Inge Harfe's name is mentioned too, although her interrogation protocol has not been found yet.<sup>37</sup> They were suspected of being the western controllers of the "counter-revolution".

37 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. l. p. 21. no. 9. t. 1. 1956.



DOCUMENTS OF 1956 FROM TRANSCARPATHIAN ARCHIVES




Another significant part of the KGB documents kept in Ungvár [Uzhgorod] is connected with the negotiating delegation from Tököl.<sup>38</sup> In the afternoon, on October 31, Imre Nagy announced that negotiations started about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and also about Hungary's secession from the Warsaw Pact.

On November 2 the Government appointed the members of the delegation who were sent to discuss the details of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The leaders of the Hungarian delegation were Ferenc Erdei, Pál Maléter, István Kovács and Miklós Szücs.

On November 3, 1956 the negotiations about the withdrawal of the Soviet units started in the House of Parliament and continued at the military airport of Tököl, at the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Force at 10 p.m. However, in the second round of the meeting the Hungarian negotiators were arrested according to Serov's command.

The negotiating delegation arrested at the airport, was in captivity in Tököl from 3 to 9 November, then they were transported to the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod] by plane under the leadership of Colonel Smirnov, where they were interrogated several times.

The Hungarian State Security Police took an active role in the arrests and interrogations. Although their names do not appear in the documents, several prisoners' interrogation protocols reveal, that they were arrested and given over to the Soviets by the Hungarians, who were wearing



38 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. l. p. 1. no. 1. t. 1. 1956.; F. 43. o. l. p. 2. no. 1. t. 2. 1956.; F. 43. o. l. p. 14. no. 3. t. 1. 1956.; F. 43. o. l. p. 15. no. 4. 1956.; F. 43. o. l. p. 21. no. 9. t. 1. 1956.

civilian clothes. Probably it explains the appearance of the mother's names instead of the father's names among the registered data in the roster, because in the other documents the father's names are written according to the Soviet rules.<sup>39</sup>

The revolutionary movements of 1956 beyond the Hungarian borders are excellent examples of the solidarity among the separated Hungarian nation.

In spite of the fact that the Hungarian population of Transcarpathia did not have exact information about the revolution and its procession, they observed the Hungarian events with sympathy, as a symbol of national inhesion. There are archival documents containing various information about the ways the Transcarpathian Hungarian inhabitants expressed their sympathy towards the Revolution and War of Independence. The documents also provide details about the atmosphere that prevailed in Transcarpathia and the punishments concerning the Transcarpathian groups engaged in politics, after they had become victims of the local, well-functioning espionage.

Since travelling became impossible due to the strictly closed borders after the Second World War, people living in the Soviet Union could not keep in touch with Hungary. The occurrent postal connections were severely controlled. The majority of the population was informed about the local and foreign world and events mainly by the Soviet press, which was the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Getting a relatively realistic picture about the outside world was possible only through foreign radio broadcasting. The Hungarian people mainly listened to *Radio Kossuth*, a few of them could also listen to western broadcasting such as the *Radio Free Europe*. These sources of news were available during the revolution too.<sup>40</sup>

The revolution of 1956 had a great influence on the Transcarpathian Hungarians. Different “political” groups – as they were called by the Soviet authorities – expressed their sympathy towards the Hungarian Revolution in Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv], Mezőkaszony [Koson’], Gálóc [Haloch] and Ungvár [Uzhgorod].

The group of youth in Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv] consisted of secondary school pupils distributed leaflets from autumn 1956 until July 1957 and as a result, they were accused of organising secret meetings.

39 SASSU, KGB, F. 43. o. 1. p. 1. no. 1. t. 1. 1956.

40 György Csanádi, *Sorsfordító évek sodrásában*. Ungvár, 2004. 224–227. [Twisting in Lot-Changing Events].

Their leaflets contained the following notes: “*Transcarpathia is a Hungarian territory and the Russians should go home*”, and “*the Russian army should be withdrawn from Hungary*.”<sup>41</sup> These young people were sentenced from 3 to 6 years of imprisonment. The detectives of the KGB had been dealing with their case for months. The lawyers rather accused than defended them.<sup>42</sup>

Many Transcarpathians spent the whole penalty or a part of it in the Gulag-camps of the Mordvinian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. They had suffered a lot during the years spent in prison but their humiliation continued even after their release. They were constantly observed.<sup>43</sup>

In Mezőkaszony [Koson’], the members of the Ormos family, István and Mária, their cousin, Sándor Szécsi and their friends distributed leaflets.<sup>44</sup> When the revolution broke out in Budapest, they decided to help their Hungarian compatriots after hearing the news in the radio. On their first handwritten poster they quoted the well-known line of Sándor Petőfi’s “*National song*”: “*On your feet now, Hungary calls you*”.<sup>45</sup> Their neighbour, who was a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature informed the authorities about it. The local authorities quickly removed the posters and reported it to the KGB office of the Beregszász [Berehove] district. They were arrested on November 2, 1957 and were accused of being the members of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Revolutionary Association. This accusation was based on the fact that the name of this organisation appeared on one of the leaflets that started with the call: “*To your homeland be faithful....*”. They were sentenced from 4 to 6 years of imprisonment on January 2, 1958 after a series of interrogations that have lasted over a year.

The group in Gállocs [Haloch] was formed at the end of 1956. The three young men, Tibor Perduk, István Pasztellák, and the barely 13 years old László Molnár were accused of distributing leaflets and collecting weapons, ammunition and explosives left from the Second World War.

---

41 Interview with János Varga, reminiscence. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on May 10, 2001.

42 György Dupka – Sándor Horváth, *’56 Kárpátalján*. Ungvár–Budapest, 1993. 73–85. [’56 in Transcarpathia]. [hereinafter Dupka – Horváth, *’56 Kárpátalján*].

43 Interview with Sándor Milován, reminiscence. The interview was made in Nagyszőlős [Vinohradiv] on 7 July 2001.

44 Dupka – Horváth, *’56 Kárpátalján*, 52.

45 SASSU, KGB, F. 2558. o. 1. p. 1248. no. 3395. 1957-1958.

According to them, they just found the rusty, unusable weapons in a dried well. The text of one of their leaflets started as follows: “*The bloody handed Soviet dictators drowned the Hungarian Revolution in blood.*”<sup>46</sup> The group was arrested in 1958. The authorities considered Calvinist minister Endre Gecse to be the leader of the group, whom the boys visited with the purpose of reading at the library of the parish.<sup>47</sup> After arresting him, he was transported to the prison of the KGB in Ungvár [Uzhgorod], where he was beaten to death during the interrogation since he did not want to admit that he “had been involved in the anti-Soviet propaganda and encouraged the youth for armed revolt” between 1956-1958 in Gállocs [Haloch].<sup>48</sup>

There was a small group operating in Ungvár [Uzhgorod], too. Its leader was János Szobránci and the members were Nándor Benyák, Vince Orlovsky and János Tibor Kulcsár. They also distributed leaflets.<sup>49</sup>

Hungarian and numerous non-Hungarian students of the University of Ungvár [Uzhgorod] expressed solidarity with the claims of the revolution by attending the university in black and white clothes during the revolution.<sup>50</sup>

Besides these, there were other brave persons in several settlements who expressed their solidarity with the revolutionists. Some of them assembled secretly in the evenings and talked about the Hungarian events or sang the Hungarian anthem in the centre of certain villages. In these cases, the police arrived within a few minutes and they were arrested with the charge of instigating revolt. Some of them refused to fight against the Hungarian revolutionists, deserted and tried to help the local population in Hungary, for what they were taken to prison.<sup>51</sup>

---

46 György Dupka, *'56 és Kárpátalja*. Ungvár–Budapest, 32. [’56 and Transcarpathia] [hereinafter Dupka, ’56].

47 Interview with László Molnár, reminiscence. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on 23 October 2002.

48 Erzsébet Gortvay (Ed.), *Jó Pásztor volt. Gecse Endre kárpátaljai mártír tiszteletes emlékezete*. Ungvár – Budapest, 2003. [He was a Good Minister. In Memory of Endre Gecse Transcarpathian Martyr Minister]

49 Dupka, ’56, 14–18.

50 Interview with Iván Koroly, historian. The interview was made in Ungvár [Uzhgorod] on December 9, 2002.


51 Interview with Mária Paládi, reminiscence. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on October 8, 2002.



Tanks pass through the Macsola [Machola] street of Beregszász [Berehove]<sup>52</sup>

Since the authorities were afraid of a possible Hungarian mass movement in Transcarpathia, they cruelly punished those who sympathized with the revolution in public.<sup>53</sup>

According to the KGB documents, the authorities proceeded against 18 persons for anti-Soviet behaviour.



52 The photo was taken by László Balázs in 1956. It is still in his possession.

53 Interview with György Csanádi, reminiscence. The interview was made in Beregszász [Berehove] on July 20, 2002.

Table 1. List of convicted Transcarpathians on the basis of the KGB documents

<b>№</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Place of arrest</b>	<b>Penalty imposed</b>	<b>Length of imprisonment</b>	<b>Accusation</b>	<b>Place of imprisonment</b>
1.	István Dudás	Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv]	3 years	26 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia
2.	József Illés	Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv]	6 years	6 years	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia
3.	Zoltán Kovács	Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv]	4 years	21 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia
4.	Sándor Milován	Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv]	4 years	1,5 years	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Rivne
5.	János Varga	Nagyszőlős [Vynohradiv]	5 years	23 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia
6.	István Ormos	Mezőkaszony [Koson']	4 years	3 years	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia

## DOCUMENTS OF 1956 FROM TRANSCARPATHIAN ARCHIVES

№	Name	Place of arrest	Penalty imposed	Length of imprisonment	Accusation	Place of imprisonment
7.	Mária Ormos	Mezőkaszony [Koson']	4 years	23 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Kammerovo
8.	Sándor Szécsi	Mezőkaszony [Koson']	6 years	1,5 years	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Mordvinia
9.	Endre Gecse (Calvinist minister)	Gálocs [Haloch]	Beaten to death during the interrogation	-	Anti-Soviet behaviour, instigation	
10.	László Molnár	Gálocs [Haloch]	1 year shadowing	1 year shadowing	Anti-Soviet behaviour, hiding weapons	Charges were dropped since he just turned 13 years old
11.	István Pasztellák	Gálocs [Haloch]	6 years	6 year	Anti-Soviet behaviour, hiding weapons	Ungvár [Uzhgorod]
12.	Tibor Perduk	Gálocs [Haloch]	2 years	10 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, hiding weapons	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Dubno (boarding school)
13.	Ilona Balla	Eszeny [Esen']	3 months	3 months	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], prison of KGB

<b>№</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Place of arrest</b>	<b>Penalty imposed</b>	<b>Length of imprisonment</b>	<b>Accusation</b>	<b>Place of imprisonment</b>
14.	János Dóri	Ungvár [Uzhgorod]	6 years	No data	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Vorkuta, Mordvinia
15.	Jenő Melnik	Ungvár [Uzhgorod]	6 years	No data	Anti-Soviet behaviour, distribution of leaflets	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Siberia
16.	Mátyás Lukács	Békéscsaba (inhabitant of Munkács [Mukachevo])	4 years	1 (one year and one month)	Deserted from the Soviet Army, refused to fight the Hungarians	Ungvár [Uzhgorod], Siberia
17.	József Bucsellá	Hungary (Inhabitant of Fancsika)	15 years	No data	Deserted from the Soviet Army, refused to fight the Hungarians	Mordvinia, ASSR, camp №7
18.	Elek Zihur	Oroszi [Orosijevo]	3 years	1 year	Anti-Soviet behaviour	Ungvár [Uzhgorod]
Total			78 years and 3 months of imprisonment	23 years and 11 months of imprisonment		



It must be emphasised that insignificant attempts were exaggerated very often in order to imprison innocent persons to deter people living in their surroundings.

In the local movements the main participants were pupils and students, so the authorities concluded that attention should be devoted mainly to the tutorial and educational work among the Hungarian population and the propaganda activity should also be increased among them.<sup>54</sup> For this reason, supervisors visited the Hungarian schools and attended mainly History lessons, controlling the teachers and students. After the Revolution of 1956, the Communist Party functionaries of the district were obligated to do harder work, concerning propaganda activities. It was proved by the majority of the documents related to the revolution, kept in the archive in Beregszász [Berehove].<sup>55</sup> E.g. *“Ideological works should be improved, especially in the district of Beregszász [Berehove], as this is a gentilitial district. Resistance should be expressed against the “bourgeois nationalism”, which mainly appeared in the period of the Hungarian events of 1956”* – demanded Yevdokimov, the Deputy of the KGB at the 12<sup>th</sup> Party Conference of Beregszász [Berehove] district in 1958.<sup>56</sup>

Six lecturers were directed to the district from the regional centre in order to strengthen the tutorial work among the population of Beregszász [Berehove] district by giving lectures to the people. The lecturers and the members of the party committee of the district gave 26 lectures and made 72 reports in Beregszász [Berehove] district at the end of October and in the beginning of November.<sup>57</sup>

On October 22, 2006 a memorial plaque was unveiled by the Hungarian Consulate. The memorial plaque was placed on the wall of the prison of Ungvár [Uzhgorod] in the memory of those, who sacrificed their own freedom for the next generation’s liberty.<sup>58</sup>

---

54 RSAT, F. 1. o. 1. od. zb. 2816. 1956.

55 RSAT, F. 15. o. 7. od. zb. 36. 1958.

56 RSAT, F. 15. o. 5. od. zb. 28. 1958.

57 RSAT, F. 15. o. 15. od. zb. 13. 1956.

58 Kárpátalja [weekly newspaper], № 43. October 27, 2006.

Дмитрий Дьяков

### Враждебная территория

*Воронежский поход 2-й венгерской армии*

Начну вот с какой истории. Несколько лет назад судьба свела меня с одним ветераном Второй мировой войны. Звали его Виктор Егорович Шумилов. Он жил в Воронеже и ему было уже много лет. В годы войны он был фотографом 1-й советской танковой армии, а после войны (в начале 1960-х годов) – фотокорреспондентом той самой группы советских войск, которая была здесь, в Венгрии. И вот этот человек рассказывал мне о том, как он проходил собеседование в КГБ перед отправкой в Венгрию. И ему было строго-настрого запрещено говорить, что он из Воронежа. „Этот город у венгров вызывает исключительно отрицательные эмоции, – сказали ему. – Поэтому забудьте, откуда вы родом – не будем пугать венгров.” После этого он стал говорить всем, что приехал из Москвы.

Позже, уже после падения Берлинской стены, в России был переведен культурологический словарь Иштвана Барта „Русским о венграх”, где я прочёл: „для венгров старшего поколения название русского города Воронеж звучит зловеще: здесь, в излучине Дона, в январскую ледяную стужу 1943 г. Красная армия прорвала фронт, что означало катастрофу для II Венгерской армии – 200 тысяч солдат погибли под огнем, погибли от мороза, были захвачены в плен”. [Барт 2005: 195–196.]

Это, как говорят у нас, одна сторона медали. А вот – другая.

В российском городе Воронеже к венграм – тоже сложное отношение. В наших краях из поколения в поколение передаются рассказы о „зверствах” солдат 2-й венгерской армии на воронежской земле, многие мои земляки уверены, что подчас венгры вели себя гораздо жестче немцев. Когда 12 лет назад у села Рудкино на берегу Дона, в местах, где в 1942–43 годах разыгрывалась кровавая двух наших народов драма, начали возводить воинское кладбище-мемориал по погибшим солдатам 2-й венгерской армии, – в Воронежской области поднялась огромная волна протеста. Разные политики, особенно националистического и коммунистического толка, заполнили местные издания криками о зверствах венгров. Раздавались даже призывы – снести воздвигаемый мемориал бульдозером.

В тот период я был редактором областной демократической газеты „Воронежский курьер”. Это было единственное в Воронеже издание, которое пыталось противостоять всеобщей истерике. Вот что я писал в те дни:

„На любой реальный ход событий в конечном итоге влияют люди. И те, кто оказались на ключевых постах, и, увы, те, чья кровь лилась с обеих сторон. Но, кроме этой исторической закономерности, есть еще и совесть отдельного конкретного человека, который волен оплакивать страдальцев – с той и с этой стороны.

Кто бывал на Бородинском поле, возможно, знает: неподалеку от Шевардинского редута, на том самом месте, где находился командный пункт Наполеона, стоит памятник французам – солдатам, офицерам и генералам, погибшим в этом сражении. На туристических картах и схемах-указателях он значится под номером 16 – рядом с памятником 12-й батарее роте, что в центре Шевардина... Огромный гранитный постамент с бронзовым орлом наверху. На пьедестале, в переводе с французского, надпись: „Мёртвым Великой армии”.

Так поступали с могилами врагов наши предки в XIX веке.

Безумное двадцатое столетие учило другим манерам. Безумие века, словно клеймом мечено межнациональными разломами. Советская Россия много воевала, выстраивая в сознании своих граждан список претензий к иным государствам. Оттого мы даже сегодня по инерции продолжаем выхватывать из того советского списка – то русско-германский счет, то русско-польский, то русско-афганский, то русско-еврейский... В Воронеже вот неожиданно оказался востребованным счет русско-венгерский.

Что можно сказать по этому поводу? Увы, дьявольские веса истории уравнивают любые взаимные претензии, выводя кровавый итог. К исходу XX века на территории Воронежской области, оказалось, более 60 тысяч безымянных венгерских захоронений. В Венгрии же покоятся тела 112 625 советских воинов, из которых известны лишь фамилии 20 598 человек. Как правило, останки и тех, и других покоятся в полях, где остались лишь груда осколков, смешанных с землей да призраки душ, ушедших в небо много лет назад.” [Дьяков 2002]

Так мою точку зрения поддержали разные люди. Мемориал павшим венгерским солдатам на воронежской земле появился. Сегодня он свидетельствует о том, что воронежцы (пожалуй, более чем жители других российских регионов) и венгры самой историей

ДМИТРИЙ ДЬЯКОВ

связаны навечно. Вы, здесь, на берегу Дуная, охраняете сон русских солдат, мы там, в излучине Дона, следим за покоем павших венгерских воинов. А поэтому мы с вами всегда будем приезжать друг к другу, просто потому, что забывать могилы предков – нельзя. Так принято и у вас, в Венгрии, и у нас, в русском городе Воронеже.

\*\*\*

Ну а теперь о том, что же произошло на воронежской земле в те давние уже 1942-й и 1943-й годы. Как случилось, что война пришла на нашу землю и почему венгерские солдаты оказались в эпицентре сражения, произошедшего от их родины за 1842 км (именно такое расстояние от Будапешта до Воронежа).

Рассказ свой я начну с события, которое произошло не в Венгрии и не в Советском Союзе, а совсем в другой стране. В гитлеровской Германии.

Шел январь 1942 года. После битвы под Москвой, похоронившей блицкриг, Гитлер не переставал говорить о необходимости увеличения количества жертв, которые необходимо в самое ближайшее время положить на алтарь немецкой победы: „Настоящее мировое господство может быть основано только на собственной крови, – внушал своим генералам Гитлер. – Как только представишь себе, что Фридрих Великий противостоял 12-кратно превосходящему его врагу, сразу чувствуешь себя настоящим подонком!.. Если эта война будет стоить нам четверти миллиона убитых и 100 тысяч калек, эти потери будут восполнены нами ростом рождаемости, которого немецкий народ может достигнуть после того, как мы станем хозяевами на Востоке. Эти люди во множестве возродятся у нас в тех поселениях, которые я создам для германской крови на Востоке.” [Тревор-Ропер 2004: 261.]

Всю зиму 1942 года фюрера обуревала жажда реванша. Успокоился он только тогда, когда его мозг произвел на свет план небывалой по своему масштабу операции. Теперь пусть Сталин продолжает сидеть в своем белокаменном логове, ожидая очередного нашествия доблестных войск вермахта. Не дожидется! Фюрер повернет всю мощь своих армий на юг, где располагаются главные энергетические ресурсы Страны Советов. Железными ударами он последовательно парализует основные железнодорожные линии между Москвой и промышленными областями этой страны, быстрым

и внезапным поворотом своей армии вдоль Дона захватит жизненно важные угольные бассейны, а затем столь же победоносно и дерзко овладеет нефтяными районами Кавказа и намертво преградит путь сотням танкеров по Волге.

А для того, чтобы русские до поры до времени не разгадали этот гениальный (как и всё, что он делал) стратегический план, фюрер введет их в заблуждение. Он симитирует второе нашествие на Москву, для чего нанесет невиданный по мощности удар где-нибудь посредине расстояния от Кавказа до русской столицы... Проведя нужную линию по карте, Гитлер ткнул карандашом в кружок с надписью „WORONESCH”...

Впрочем, задерживаться надолго в этом городе фюрер не собирался. Его, как уже говорилось, манили и притягивали более южные окраины советской империи. Немецкая армия была сильна и мощна. Однако не настолько, чтобы обеспечить своим присутствием все населенные пункты громадного советского пространства. Поэтому впервые за годы войны Гитлер решил сделать серьезную ставку на армии союзных с Германией государств. Речь, прежде всего, шла об Италии, Венгрии, Румынии и Словакии. Гражданам этих стран, которых в ставке фюрера именовали не иначе, как „вспомогательные народы” (русский народ Гитлер вообще считал «недочеловеками»), надлежало прикрыть растянутый на сотни километров северный фланг германских войск вдоль всей водной преграды Дона...

История, как известно, сослагательного наклонения. Но шанс сорвать планы Гитлера, не допустить его поход на Воронеж, и, нанеся предупреждающий удар, добиться отступления неприятеля еще до прихода роковой 40-градусной зимы, у Советского Союза был. И шанс этот, по иронии судьбы, Сталину подарил... венгр.

Шандор Радо,<sup>1</sup> едва ли не самый знаменитый разведчик Второй мировой войны, еще 10 апреля 1942 года передал в Москву полный текст секретной директивы Гитлера о том, что войска вермахта планируют начать летнюю наступательную кампанию с удара на Воронеж.

---

<sup>1</sup> Радо Шандор (Radó Sándor; 1899–1981), венгерский картограф и географ, доктор географических и экономических наук. В годы Второй мировой войны (1939–1945) был руководителем одной из групп антифашистского Сопротивления, руководя разведывательной группой „Дора” (перестановка слогов фамилии Радо) в Швейцарии (о своём участии в антигитлеровской борьбе вспоминал в книге „Dóra jelenti...”, впервые изданной в Будапеште в 1971 году).

Но по иронии судьбы, в тот же самый день – 10 апреля 1942 года – советский маршал Тимошенко<sup>2</sup> в Воронеже утвердил свой план действия войск на этом направлении в весенне-летний период. По плану Тимошенко Красная армия должна была, напротив, оголить воронежское направление и посредством мощной кавалерийской атаки, ударить по врагу, измотать и уничтожить его под Харьковом. Сталин, оценив план Тимошенко и донесение разведчика, доверился своему маршалу. Так был упущен шанс избежать массовой, не виданной в истории, гибели солдат армий нескольких стран на воронежской земле.

На подготовку операции у Гитлера ушло еще три месяца. И вот 28 июня ровно в 10 часов утра укомплектованные и оснащенные немецкие, итальянские, венгерские, румынские войска пересекли границы Воронежской области и бодро двинулись на битву, финал которой, по замыслу Гитлера, обязан был решить судьбу войны.

\*\*\*

Поначалу для венгров все складывалось чудесным образом. Русские явно не ожидали столь мощного удара войск неприятеля с юга. 3 июля 2-я венгерская армия генерала Яни, поддержанная 40-м немецким танковым корпусом генерала фон Швеппенбурга, окружила крупные силы Красной армии у Старого Оскола и захватила почти 40 тысяч пленных. Затем, развивая наступление, венгры достигли западного берега Дона и заняли линию фронта протяженностью 210 км от Воронежа до Павловска. Столь масштабного наступления венгерские войска еще не знали. „В то время, – вспоминал начальник штаба Воронежского фронта генерал-майор Михаил Казаков,<sup>3</sup> – мы склонны были оценивать венгерские дивизии даже выше, чем немецкие. Ведь по опыту первой мировой войны мы знали, что

---

2 *Тимошенко Семен Константинович* (1895–1970), советский военачальник, Маршал Советского Союза (1940), дважды Герой Советского Союза, народный комиссар обороны СССР (1940–1941). В апреле 1942 г. – главнокомандующий войсками Юго-Западного направления и одновременно командующий войсками Юго-Западного фронта. С ноября 1941 г. по май 1942 г. штаб Юго-Западного направления и фронта находился в Воронеже. В мае 1942 г. его фронт потерпел сокрушительное поражение под Харьковом, где советские войска потеряли 230 тысяч человек, 775 танков, более 5000 орудий. Прах Тимошенко погребен в Кремлевской стене.

3 *Казаков Михаил Ильич* (1901–1979), советский военачальник, генерал армии, Герой Советского Союза. Начальник штаба Воронежского фронта (июль 1942 – февраль 1943). Участвовал в разработке планов боевых действий под Воронежем.

мадьярская кавалерия являлась наиболее боеспособной частью объединенной австро-венгерской армии.” [Казаков 1971: 128.]

Однако очень скоро победоносное продвижение 2-й венгерской армии было приостановлено из-за отчаянного сопротивления Красной армии. Советские войска, отойдя за Дон, построили свою тактику на постоянных контратаках. Результаты внезапных ударов производили на венгров гнетущее впечатление. Так, в боях с частями Красной армии под Коротояком и Сторожевым четыре дивизии венгров лишились около половины своего состава. Один только танковый полк в ходе 10-дневных боев в этих местах потерял под огнем советской артиллерии 138 танков из 160.

В найденном на правом берегу Дона в районе Сторожевого дневнике ефрейтора 3-го батальона 1-й мотобригады Иштвана Балого есть следующая запись от 16 августа 1942 г.: „Грустное воскресенье. Многие венгерские товарищи поливают своей кровью русскую землю. Убитые покрывают землю. Не успеваем отвозить раненых.” Этот дневник, начатый еще в Будапеште, является уникальным документом. В нем весьма ярко отражено изменение настроений у венгерских солдат по мере ведения боевых действий на территории Советской России. Первая запись в дневнике утверждала: „Уезжаем с грустью, но с уверенностью в грядущей победе”. Потом оптимизм рассеивался. „1 июля. Везде видны основы разбитых немецких машин. Не покидает ли немцев военное счастье? Верим Богу, что оно останется и с ними и с нами, несмотря на отдельные поражения. ...19 августа. Не дождемся улучшения положения. Хорошо бьют русские снайперы. Стоит только показаться, как они тебя продырявят. Обычно смертельно... 20 августа. Был бой, в котором земля содрогалась от разрывов бомб и снарядов. Не покидай меня, святая Богородица!. ...21 августа. Подсчитываем потери роты: 20 убитых, 94 раненых, трое пропали без вести. Настроение подавленное. Все друзья ранены... ...1 сентября. Вижу нашу судьбу: мало шансов на возвращение домой. Поскорее бы окончилась война, иначе мы все погибнем. Половина уже погибла...” [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 57: 71–72.]. Эта запись – последняя. Из следующего боя ефрейтор Балог не вернулся.

А вот строки из письма старшины пулеметной роты 1-го батальона 35-го пехотного полка Дюлы Ронаи своей жене в г. Асод: „... Каждый ломает голову над тем, когда же нас сменят? Особенное разочарование вызвало у солдат заявление генерала Яни, что солдаты

ДМИТРИЙ ДЬЯКОВ

могут вернуться домой не раньше сентября будущего года.” [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 83: 262.]

8 августа в результате очередной контратаки 25-я гвардейская стрелковая дивизия полковника Павла Шафаренко отбила у венгров под Сторожевым плацдарм в 13 километров по фронту и 8 километров в глубину. „Паника охватила 9-ю пехотную дивизию хортистов, – вспоминал комдив Шафаренко.<sup>4</sup> – Бросая артиллерию, оружие и имущество, ее подразделения бежали далеко в тыл. Там их встречали, наскоро приводили в порядок и опять бросали в бой.” [Шафаренко 1978: 77.] Поражение венгров на этом плацдарме имело небывалые последствия.

Венгры неоднократно пытались вернуть Сторожевое, но все эти попытки были отражены дивизией Шафаренко. Плацдарм был сохранен и впоследствии сыграл важную роль в окончательном разгроме армии генерала Яни.

\*\*\*

Начав бои под Воронежем, Гитлер обманул не только советское командование, но и венгерское правительство. Немецкие эшелоны с продовольствием и вооружением оказались просто физически не в состоянии обеспечить ресурсами столь растянутую линию фронта. Тем более что Гитлер объявил на этом участке сразу два стратегических центра наступления – Воронеж и Сталинград. „Если резкое изменение Гитлером планов ведения операций уже само по себе было отрицательным явлением, то на снабжение оно оказывало самое пагубное влияние, – писал в своих воспоминаниях начальник штаба 17-го немецкого корпуса генерал-майор Ганс Дёрр. – Начальники тылов при внезапном перенесении направления главного удара не в состоянии были планировать и организовывать снабжение как путем подвоза из тыловых районов, так и непосредственно из Германии. Из положения выходили, прибегая к рокадным перевозкам в прифронтовой полосе и к заимствованию из запасов соседей. При этом почти всегда страдал какой-нибудь участок фронта, который нуждался в заимствованном у него имуществе так же настоятельно,

---

4 Шафаренко Павел Менделеевич (1908–1988), советский военачальник, генерал-лейтенант. В начале войны – командир воздушно-десантной бригады. С августа 1942 г. по июль 1943 г. командовал 25-й стрелковой дивизии – главной ударной силы советской армии в боях со 2-й венгерской армией.



как и тот, кто его получал.” [Дёрр 2000: 441.] В этих условиях гитлеровское командование стало поставлять продовольствие только немецким частям. Союзники же вермахта по всей линии фронта имели устаревшее вооружение, страдали от плохого питания и отсутствия зимней одежды. Зимняя одежда для венгерской армии была вывезена на фронт, но доставить ее в части помешали в основном трудности, связанные с транспортом, находившимся в руках немецкого командования. В результате все эшелоны с вещами, поступающие из Венгрии на фронт, были реквизированы и перенаправлены в части вермахта.

Но едва ли не самой серьезной проблемой для венгерской армии оказалось продовольственное обеспечение. Как рассказывал сдавшийся в советский плен солдат 10-го батальона Янош Молнар, „офицеры нам обещали, что после войны мы получим много земли на Украине, но мы думаем сейчас не о земле, а о том, как бы покушать”. [Пушкаш 1966: 293.]. Оснований для подобных заявлений было немало. Венгерские гонведы повсеместно стали устраивать „голодные бунты”, жестоко подавляемые командованием. В одном из приказов по 46-му пехотному полку говорилось: „За выражение недовольства питанием виновные будут наказаны. Все вы должны знать, что больше 120 г мяса и 150 г хлеба все равно никто не получит”. [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 83: 259.]

К осени ситуация резко ухудшилась. Проблема недоедания стала возникать и в немецких частях. Голодные солдаты вермахта начали открыто отбирать у венгерских гонведов пищу. Вот некоторые свидетельства очевидцев, которые мне удалось найти в воронежских архивах. „Немцы жрали все, что могли награть у населения, а венгры питались тем, что не пожирали немцы.” [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 1, д. 34: 28.] – писал после освобождения Воронежской области в своем докладе в обком партии секретарь по пропаганде одного из сельских районов области Михаил Булавин. Крестьянин Иван Савинков вспоминал, как на его глазах „немецкий солдат избивал мадьярского телефониста за то, что тот стал не в указанные часы кушать свой паек”. [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 1, д. 34: 22.] Подобные случаи приобрели настолько массовый характер, что, в конце концов, послужили поводом для экстренного совещания в Будапеште. Начальник венгерского генштаба генерал Сомбатхей печально докладывал регенту о том, что „на Восточном фронте часто имеют место сильные столкновения с немецкими военнослужащими, что

не способствует добрым отношениям между союзниками”. [Пушкаш 1966: 296.] Эти же выводы подтверждает и довольно любопытное свидетельство, сохранившееся в воронежских архивах. У одной из жительниц Репьевского района квартировал венгерский офицер, который каждый вечер перед сном вешал свою грязную одежду на портрет Гитлера. Однажды хозяйка дома сказала ему: „Пан, не добре! Мы на портрет Сталина одежду не вешаем”. На что постоялец ответил: „Этой собаке сколько не дашь – все мало. Поэтому я отдаю ему каждый день свои грязные кальсоны...” [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 1, д. 34: 24.]

Оккупанты во все времена остаются оккупантами. Оказавшись в ситуации полуголодного существования, венгерские солдаты занялись обыкновенным мародерством. Вслед за немцами они начали грабить воронежских крестьян. Очень скоро масштабы грабежа достигли таких размеров, что в Ольховатском районе один из венгерских комендантов был вынужден даже издать приказ о том, чтобы местное население „уводило весь скот подальше, так как солдаты будут его беспощадно забирать и резать. ...В случае, если скот все же будет насильно взят, следует немедленно заявить об этом коменданту” [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 1, д. 34: 21.] – говорилось в приказе. Впрочем, остановить мародерство голодных оккупантов подобными распоряжениями было трудно. Отчаяние и паника неуклонно овладевали солдатами венгерской армии. „Наши немецкие „союзники” обращались с нашими солдатами подло и беспощадно, – писал в своих воспоминаниях венгерский политический деятель 1940-х годов Иштван Доби. – Мы никогда не узнаем, сколько десятков тысяч несчастных венгерских гонимых разгромленной на Дону армии погибло в результате равнодушия, лютой ненависти или прямой расправы немецких офицеров, которые, отняв у них одежду, вооружение и продовольствие, бросили их на произвол судьбы в метель и сорокаградусную зимнюю стужу.” [Пушкаш 1966: 302.]

\*\*\*

29 октября 1942 года в дивизию полковника Павла Шафаренко, продолжавшую удерживать плацдарм на Сторожевом, прибыли самые влиятельные венгры, из находившихся в то время в СССР, – лидер коммунистической эмиграции Матьяш Ракоши и писатель Бела Иллеш. Их разместили на командном пункте дивизии в

блиндажах, отрытых в меловых горах на правом берегу Дона. „После первых приветствий Ракоши сказал, что они специально приехали к нам посмотреть и поговорить с гвардейцами, которые в тяжелых боях разбили гитлеровцев и хортистов.” [Шафаренко 1978: 94.] – вспоминал позже комдив Шафаренко. Трусоватый Ракоши напрочь отказался выехать на передовую. Он проводил политбеседы с молодыми солдатами из только что прибывшего пополнения, рассказывая им о венгерской революции 1919 года. Писатель Иллеш оказался намного смелее. Он вызвался вести радиопередачи для солдат 2-й венгерской армии прямо с переднего края. Бойцы Красной Армии соорудили передающее устройство, и Бела Иллеш начал программу своего вещания. „Венгерский солдат! – призывал он. – Дома тебя ждут жена, дети, родина. Кончай войну! Сдавайся в плен! Только так ты сохранишь жизнь для себя, своей семьи, своей родины. Сталин своим приказом № 55 гарантирует жизнь всем военнопленным. Сдавайся в плен! Кончай войну!” [Шафаренко 1978: 95.]

Этой же теме были посвящены и листовки, которые привезли в дивизию Шафаренко знатные венгерские гости. Одна из них имела заголовок „Умирать за Гитлера или жить для Венгрии?”. В ней четыре пленного офицера писали своим товарищам из 12-й пехотной дивизии: „Друзья-командиры! Прекращайте бессмысленную и бесперспективную войну. Венгерский народ будет благодарить вас за каждую каплю сохраненной крови, за каждую спасенную жизнь венгра.” [Шафаренко 1978: 95.] Прокламации были разбросаны над мадьярской армией с самолетов. Призывы, содержащиеся в них, находили отклики в войсках. Сохранились свидетельства о том, что, к примеру, командир взвода минной роты 52-го пехотного полка прапорщик Кехалми „всегда прочитывал солдатам советские листовки, разбираал их, ругал немцев и говорил, что русские правы. ... Несмотря на запрет, листовки читались и хранились, – вспоминал позже врач этого же полка старший лейтенант Фейер Байор. – Борьба с этим была бесполезна”. [Пушкаш 1966: 297., 298.]

Столь массивная пропаганда достигла своей цели: венгерских гонимых постепенно охватывали пораженческие настроения. Попытки командования поднять моральный дух войск были безуспешны. На имя генерала Яни шли донесения от командиров, где приводились неутешительные факты. Так подполковник Ласло Пулис писал, что во время боя его артиллеристы

сами спрятали снаряды от орудий. Комдив генерал Йозеф Хеслени докладывал, что солдаты его дивизии „бросают оружие или продают его вместе с боеприпасами русским за продовольствие, чтобы, не имея оружия, не воевать”. [A 2. magyar hadsereg megsemmisülése a Donnál, 1959: 122., 197.]

Дальше – больше. В ноябре в расположение 25-й дивизии Шафаренко в полном составе с белым флагом прибыл 16-й отдельный взвод 12-й венгерской дивизии. Взвод добровольно сдался в плен по предложению ефрейтора Ференца Боштяна, который заявил командованию советской дивизии: „Зачем нам стрелять в русских? Они нам ничего не сделали. Мой дядя Антон Боштян 6 лет пробыл в плену у русских и жил там хорошо...”. [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 57: 72., 95.] „На основе допроса пленных венгров можно было сделать вывод о том, что настроение у мадьярских солдат и офицеров плохое, – писал в своих воспоминаниях комдив Шафаренко. – Они не получили зимнего обмундирования. Кормили их хуже, чем немцев, и те считали их солдатами второго сорта. Они были потрясены большими потерями в ходе захвата нами Сторожевского плацдарма. Кроме того, уже теперь, в условиях обороны, они несли большие потери от огня наших снайперов, которые буквально не дают им поднять головы.” [Шафаренко 1978: 101.]

Ситуация, возникающая во 2-й венгерской армии, стала серьезно тревожить гитлеровское руководство. Командующий армейской группировкой „Б” генерал-полковник барон Максимилиан фон Вейхс решил жестко пресечь пораженческие настроения в войсках союзников. С этой целью в конце декабря 1942 года он включил в состав 2-й венгерской армии немецкий резервный корпус, состоящий из двух пехотных дивизий и танковой группы. Командовать корпусом было поручено известному своей жестокостью генералу Крамеру. Согласно специальному разъяснению для венгерского командования, корпус генерала Крамера напрямую подчинялся только приказам фон Вейхса. О том, какими методами действовал резервный корпус, известно из рассказа сдавшегося в советский плен полковника штаба венгерской армии Золтана Фаркаша: „Немцы обращались с нами как с врагами. Нашим войскам было запрещено пользоваться дорогами, им не давали мест для расквартирования, а то и вообще не пускали в населенные пункты. Солдаты и офицеры, поодиночке или группами, подвергались нападениям со стороны немцев. Последние срывали пистолеты с пояса венгерских гонимых,

насильственно отымали у них лошадей и средства передвижения, не переставая ругать венгерскую нацию и ее армию. Венгерских солдат немцы сталкивали с саней. Доходили даже до того, что снимали с наших раненых повязки и забинтовывали ими своих. Командование вермахта относилось к нашим войскам как к военнопленным.” [Пушкаш 1966: 297., 302.]

В этих условиях командующий 2-й венгерской армией генерал Яни решил ужесточить дисциплину. Он приказал каждой комендатуре гарнизона в кратчайшие сроки сформировать отряд полевой жандармерии из „наиболее твердых людей”. Этому отряду вменялось в обязанность „строго следить за порядком и беспрекословным исполнением приказов”. [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 57: 199.]

\*\*\*

Операция по окончательному разгрому 2-й венгерской армии разрабатывалась и корректировалась в оперативном отделе советского генштаба. Она была составной частью массированного наступления Красной армии на южном участке фронта. Согласно общей задаче, поставленной перед командованием Воронежского фронта, 40-й армии генерал-лейтенанта Москаленко надлежало атаковать венгерские войска в направлении Репьевка–Алексеевка, где им следовало соединиться с 3-й танковой армией генерал-лейтенанта Рыбалко. Наступление должно было начаться 14 января 1943 года. Его план держался в строжайшем секрете. Советские войска соблюдали все средства маскировки, поэтому венгерская разведка докладывала, что ничего особенного на передовой не происходит.

12 января 25-я гвардейская дивизия теперь уже генерал-майора Шафаренко со своего плацдарма на Сторожевом начала проводить обычную разведку боем. Поначалу ничто не предвещало сюрпризов, но вдруг события стали разворачиваться по совершенно неожиданному сценарию. Артиллеристы и минометчики дивизии „переусердствовали” с нанесением ударов в районе роци Ореховая до такой степени, что 7-я венгерская дивизия пустилась в бегство. Батальон капитана Никифорова начал преследовать убегающего противника. Упускать такую возможность для атаки было грешно. Комдив Шафаренко доложил обстановку в штаб армии, там

проконсультировались со штабом фронта, откуда пришло разрешение на ввод в бой главных сил первого эшелона. Наступление 25-й гвардейской поддержали 141-я дивизия полковника Рассадникова и 340-я дивизия генерал-майора Мартиросяна. Им фактически с ходу удалось продвинуться в глубину обороны венгров сразу на семь километров. Столь мощная атака стала полной неожиданностью для мадьярского командования. Связь между их дивизиями и полками была прервана. Офицеры бросали свои подразделения, а оставшиеся без начальников солдаты бежали куда глаза глядят или сдавались в плен.

Очевидцы рассказывают страшные истории о том наступлении. Взвод советских солдат начинает атаку с вершины холма, а внизу, в ложине, образовав круг, стоят венгры. „Красная армия с криками „ура!“ быстро приближается к расположившимся внизу. Те не двигаются, продолжают стоять, плечом к плечу. И только когда советские солдаты подбежали вплотную, они увидели жуткую картину: круг солдат-венгров стоял у потухшего костра, и все солдаты были мертвыми. Костер прогорел, и они замерзли, продолжая стоять, прижавшись друг к другу... Кто-то из наступающих дотронулся прикладом автомата до замерзшего воина, и весь строй мертвецов повалился друг на друга в ледяной снег...” [Дьяков 2014]

\*\*\*

13 января генерал Яни, получивший в эти дни известие о том, что Гитлер представил его к главной награде вермахта – Рыцарскому кресту, постарался остановить надвигающуюся катастрофу. Он предпринял попытку контрнаступления в районе Довгалевки и хутора Веселый. Однако успеха венграм это не принесло. В течение трехдневного боя наступающие войска полностью разгромили три мадьярские дивизии (7-ю, 20-ю и 12-ю) и поддерживающую их 700-ю немецкую бронетанковую группу. Оборона венгерской армии была прорвана почти на 100 км по фронту и около 20 км в глубину.

Любопытный случай произошел при освобождении Репьевки, которая рассматривалась сражающимися войсками как важный узел шоссе и грунтовых дорог. Так вот, получив приказ о наступлении на Репьевку, войска 25-й гвардейской дивизии, встав на лыжи, отправились в бой. Комдив генерал Шафаренко решил следовать за ними, но не по снежному полю, а по шоссе. Расположившись вместе

с адъютантом и радистом в кабине трофейной машины „Плимут”, комдив выехал в Репьевку, куда очень быстро и добрался. Однако, как оказалось, советские войска отстали где-то по пути. „В центре села мы вдруг совершенно неожиданно увидели вражеских солдат, шагавших по улице, – рассказывал позже об этом случае генерал Шафаренко. – Кое-где у хат стояли кухни, машины с орудиями. Гарнизон явно не знал обстановки на фронте и, ничего не подозревая, жил тыловой жизнью. На наш „Плимут” никто внимания не обратил. Наверное, марка машины сама за себя говорила: противнику она принадлежать не может. Но момент пренеприятнейший. Что делать? Каждая секунда промедления грозила нам смертью или пленом.

Я приметил, что хорошо расчищена от снега только главная улица, и сказал водителю:

– Поезжай вперед и развернись.

Мы развернулись и на средней скорости, как и полагается в населенном пункте, миновали центр села и благополучно выбрались из него...

Части мы догнали на подходе к Репьевке, которая была взята с ходу.” [Шафаренко 1978: 119.]

А в это время генерал Яни все еще пытался организовать сопротивление. В ночь на 16 января он приказал своим войскам „держаться до последнего человека”. Правда, уже на следующий день дал новое указание „отступать в направлении Буденновки”. Однако вместо „организованного отступления” продолжалось паническое бегство и массовая сдача в плен. Так, например, поступили 2-я маршевая рота 23-го полка 20-й пехотной дивизии в составе 180 человек во главе с прапорщиком Косашем, 3-й взвод 1-й роты 14-го полка вместе с фельдфебелем Боя, 1-й взвод 7-й роты 22-го полка со своим командиром прапорщиком Лучко и целый ряд других подразделений. Перешли на сторону Красной Армии два минометных взвода 47-го полка под командованием Габора Чомоша и Габора Баги. 18 января 1943 года двое военнопленных венгров, отправившись в свою часть, привели с собой 250 солдат. Под Острогжском младший сержант Хомяков из 340-й стрелковой дивизии Красной армии вместе с тремя солдатами сумел взять в плен 212 венгерских гонведов. Было это так. Четверо советских воинов залегли на небольшой высотке. Увидев, что из леса вышла большая группа мадьярских солдат с двумя офицерами, Хомяков дал по ним длинную пулеметную очередь, что вызвало среди

противника панику. Солдаты что-то выкрикивали, размахивали руками и спорили. Офицер, угрожая рядовым, пытался навести порядок и организовать удар по нашим воинам. Он выстрелил в одного солдата и стал наносить рукояткой пистолета удары другим. Тогда гонведы повалили офицера на землю и начали топтать его ногами, а потом застрелили. Другой офицер застрелился сам. После этого солдаты подняли руки вверх и закричали: „Рус, сдаемся!“... Как свидетельствуют документы, уже к 19 января 27 500 офицеров и солдат венгерской армии были пленены и направлены во временный лагерь в Давыдовке. [ЦАМО РФ, ф. 203, оп. 2847, д. 121: 22–23.]

„Пленные доставляли нам немало хлопот, – вспоминал начальник штаба Воронежского фронта генерал Казаков. – Для препровождения их в лагерь требовались конвоиры. А войска ведь продолжали наступление, и в подразделениях был дорог каждый солдат. Некоторые командиры частей стали вооружать женщин-колхозниц, и те добросовестно препровождали непрошенных гостей по назначению. В других случаях пленным просто выдавалась сопроводительная записка с указанием лагеря, и они сами следовали туда. Доходили все до единого. Бежать было некуда. Фронт отодвигался все дальше и дальше на запад, а вокруг только заснеженная степь да лютая пурга...” [Казаков 1971: 151–152.]

Свою роль в разгроме венгров под Воронежем сыграли и гитлеровские „союзники”. Вот только несколько примеров очередного предательства немцев по отношению к мадьярским солдатам. Под селом Борщово немецкие заградительные отряды задерживали венгерских солдат из разбитых частей 9-й дивизии и гнали их на передовую. В деревне Ивановка при отступлении немецкая часть выгнала всех венгров на мороз и заняла избы и сараи. Когда в селе Верхнее Турово застряли немецкие машины, гитлеровцы отобрали лошадей из венгерского обоза, бросив сопровождающих его солдат на произвол судьбы. Командир корпусной группы вермахта генерал Зиберт отводил свои части под живым прикрытием остатков венгерских войск. Последние использовались и на других участках фронта в качестве арьергарда при отступлении германских войск. В частности, остатки 1-й венгерской танковой дивизии по приказу Крамера прикрывали отход его корпуса.

Немцы оттесняли венгров с хороших дорог, не давали им места для расквартирования или вообще не впускали в населенные пункты. Средства передвижения, коней, теплые одеяла отнимали...



Сбрасывали раненых венгров с автомашин.

28 января в районе Касторного были разгромлены остатки венгерской армии. Через день после этого из штаба венгерской армии поступил приказ всем оставшимся солдатам армии „мелкими группами пробираться на запад”. Это был последний приказ штаба. 2-я венгерская армия перестала существовать.

\*\*\*

Есть еще одна тема, которую я не могу обойти молчанием – поведение венгерских солдат в захваченных селах Воронежской области. Об этом по-прежнему у нас много говорят, пишут книги, публикуют свидетельства очевидцев. Тема эта очень больная, и в массовом сознании она имеет резко негативное восприятие. В свое время я попытался разобраться в причинах столь отрицательного отношения к солдатам венгерской армии в наших краях. Просмотрел множество документов в архивах, беседовал с ветеранами – очевидцами тех трагических событий. И вот несколько соображений по этому поводу.

Начну с того, что, аккурат к моменту окончания боев в излучине Дона, в Москве было окончательно решено создать новую идеологическую структуру – Чрезвычайную государственную комиссию по расследованию преступлений, совершенных германской армией на территории временно захваченных советских районов. Организация эта была создана по инициативе Управления пропаганды и агитации ЦК ВКП(б) и должна была, прежде всего, „произвести учет зверств, насилий и грабежей оккупационных армий и нанесенного ими материального ущерба Советскому государству и советским гражданам”. [РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 125., д. 79: 9.]

16 марта 1943 года такая комиссия была создана и на территории Воронежской области. Письмо, содержащее предписание о немедленном создании подобной комиссии и подробные инструкции по ее деятельности, поступило из Москвы под грифом „секретно”. Подписано это письмо было секретарем ЦК ВКП(б) Маленковым.<sup>5</sup> [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 1, д. 4951: 2.] Естественно, что после этого в Воронеже такая комиссия была создана. В ее состав

<sup>5</sup> Тищенко Владимир Иосифович (1905–1973), партийный деятель СССР. В 1941–1949 гг. – первый секретарь Воронежского обкома ВКП(б), член Военного совета Воронежского фронта, председатель Воронежского городского комитета обороны.

вошли: Тищенко,<sup>6</sup> первый секретарь обкома ВКП(б), Васильев,<sup>7</sup> председатель Областного исполнительного комитета и Прошаков,<sup>8</sup> начальник Воронежского управления НКВД. Письма от их имени были разосланы по всем районам области, которые находились в зоне оккупации. В этих письмах содержался перечень вопросов, на которые на местах должны были ответить, а также были установлены четкие сроки для сбора информации и отправки ее в Воронеж. В архивах я видел подлинники этих ответов. Они сами по себе – уникальные документы. Написанные на обороте трофейных немецких карт, на газетах поверх печатных строк (бумаги не было), они содержат информацию, собранную, буквально, по горячим следам. Общий тон этих ответов довольно точно передает письмо из Синелипяговского райкома партии: „Взаимоотношения между венгерскими и румынскими солдатами были враждебны. Венгры и румыны производили между собой частые драки... Немецкие офицеры и солдаты часто избивали розгами и палками венгерских и румынских солдат. Магьярские солдаты обзывали немецких командиров и солдат – „собаками” и „свиньями”... Характеризует взаимоотношение между немцами и мадярами и такое объявление, которое было вывешено в селе Синие Липяги, и в котором было написано, что за одного убитого немецкого солдата будет расстреляно 100 мирных советских граждан, а за одного убитого мадярского солдата – 50 человек.” [ГАОПИ ВО, ф. 3, оп. 3, д. 34: 23.]

Когда подобные сведения поступили из всех районов области, собранный материал был передан в местное управление НКВД – для обработки и включения в него оперативной информации. Фактически с этого момента областная Комиссия по расследованию преступлений и злодеяний полностью перешла под контроль органов государственной безопасности. После чего вся ее деятельность свелась фактически к одной цели – пропагандистской.

---

6 Тищенко Владимир Иосифович (1905–1973), партийный деятель СССР. В 1941–1949 гг. – первый секретарь Воронежского обкома ВКП(б), член Военного совета Воронежского фронта, председатель Воронежского городского комитета обороны.

7 Васильев Иван Васильевич (1905–?), государственный деятель СССР. В 1939–1948 гг. – председатель исполкома Воронежского областного Совета депутатов трудящихся. В 1948 г. снят с поста и исключен из партии за „антигосударственный поступок и обман”.

8 Прошаков Иустин Григорьевич (1903–1970), полковник госбезопасности. Начальник управления НКВД Воронежской области в 1943–1946 гг. В 1945 г. награжден знаком „Заслуженный работник НКВД”.

Теперь для освящения итогов работы Комиссии отбирались наиболее тяжёлые для восприятия человеком примеры преступлений, совершённых на временно оккупированной территории Воронежской области, а также приводились высокие показатели причиненного ущерба. Всё это должно было разжечь у граждан ненависть к противнику, и в то же время сплотить для достижения одной единственной и главной цели – победы в войне. Естественно, органы государственной безопасности понимали всё значение данной агитационно-пропагандистской деятельности и держали её под строгим контролем.

Начиная с 1942 г., органами пропаганды ВКП(б) начинают выпускаться специальные листовки и брошюры о преступлениях противника для агитаторов, которые могли применяться как в армии, так и среди мирного населения. Брошюры издавались как общесоюзные, так и по отдельным регионам Советского союза, освобождённым от противника. Так, в 1943 году в Москве в Госполитиздате вышла брошюра лектора Воронежского обкома партии Аброськина<sup>9</sup> „Зверства фашистов в Воронежской области”. Маленького формата, удобная для чтения в окопах на передовой эта книжица подчеркнута эмоционально описывала преступления и ужасы, совершенные немцами и венграми на оккупированной территории Воронежской области, чтобы внушить читателю одну мысль. Она звучала в призыве, которым заканчивалась брошюра: „Бойцы Красной армии! Мстите фашистским захватчикам, принесшим столько горя и слёз нашему народу. Бейте врага без пощады! Бейте фашистов, как взбесившихся собак! Смерть за смерть! Кровь за кровь!” [Аброськин 1943: 48.]

Подобный пропагандистский максимализм, вполне уместный в экстремальной ситуации перед штыковой атакой, вряд ли может претендовать на историческую правду.

Значит ли это, что все разговоры о жестокостях венгров в воронежских сёлах являются пропагандистской выдумкой местных органов НКВД? Увы, нет. Были и расстрелы мирного населения, и издевательства над крестьянами, и надругательства над женщинами. Но были и факты, о которых долгие годы говорить было непринято.

<sup>9</sup> Аброськин Сергей Васильевич (1908–?), коммунистический пропагандист и агитатор. В 1942–1950 гг. лектор Воронежского обкома ВКП(б), в дальнейшем – зам. зав. отделом пропаганды и агитации Воронежского обкома партии, зам. директора Высшей партийной школы (Воронеж), зав. кафедрой истории КПСС Воронежского инженерно-строительного института.

В прошлом году в Воронеже вышел сборник „Суровое детство”, в котором собраны воспоминания тех, кто пережил оккупацию ребенком. Там много говорится и о жестокостях войны, но я хочу процитировать из этого сборника совсем другие строки.

„Трое немцев пришли в землянку села Перерывное, где жила молодая женщина с 14-летней дочкой и такого же возраста племянницей. Высокий немец с большим белым чубом поставил на стол две бутылки водки и заставил женщину жарить колбасу, а двое других стали пихать в рот девочкам конфеты. Мать показала глазами девочкам: удирайте! Сначала одна, а затем и другая, под видом болей в животе, сбежали к соседям. Немцы, угрожая орудием, потребовали девочек в землянку. Мать разводила руками и пожимала плечами, но немцы не отступались. Одевшись, побежала якобы привести девочек и тут же бросилась к патрулю венгров. Венгерский патруль пришел и арестовал наглецов.” [Суровое детство 2013: 190.]

„Непонятно, были ли венгры все такие добрые или оказывал влияние на них красавец-комендант на белом жеребце, но они не совершили ни одного насилия в Ивановке, где жителей весьма прибавилось за счет эвакуированных из соседнего села.” [Суровое детство 2013: 189.]

Вот, пожалуй, и всё. Но прежде чем закончить свое выступление, мне хотелось бы сказать еще несколько слов.

Долгие годы мы с вами жили в рамках не нами придуманных условностей, где русский город Воронеж для венгров был синонимом гиблого места, а для воронежцев венгерский солдат олицетворял оккупанта-мучителя.

Сегодня воронежцы и венгры, несмотря на корневую далёкость языков, начинают заново приглядываться друг к другу. За кровавым изнеможением Второй мировой войны, в которой обе стороны понесли самые страшные в своей истории потери, выстраивается новая цепь отношений. Они должны основываться на том, чтобы ни в чем не оправдываться в прошлом и ничего не навязывать настоящему...

## Литература

ГАОПИ ВО: Государственный общественно-политический архив Воронежской области, Воронеж.

РГАСПИ: Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории, Москва.

ЦАМО РФ: Центральный архив Министерства обороны Российской Федерации, Московская область, Подольск.

Аброськин 1943: Аброськин С. Зверства фашистов в Воронежской области. ОГИЗ-Госполитиздат, Москва, 1943.

Барт 2005: Барт Иштван. Русским о венграх: Культурологический словарь / Перевод с венгерского Т. Воронкиной. «Радуга», Москва, 2005.

Дёрр 2000: Дёрр Ганс. Поход на Сталинград / Перевод с немецкого // Роковые решения. Поход на Сталинград. «Полигон», Москва, 2000.

Дьяков 2002: Дьяков Д. Русско-венгерский счет, Воронежский курьер, 6 июля 2002 г.

Дьяков 2014: Дьяков Д. Рукописный архив автора.

Казаков 1971: Казаков М.И. Над картой былых сражений. Воениздат, Москва, 1971.

Пушкаш 1966: Пушкаш А.И. Венгрия в годы второй мировой войны. «Наука», Москва, 1966.

Суровое детство 2013: Суровое детство: Сост. М. Волков, А. Захаров, Центр духовного возрождения Черноземного края, Воронеж, 2013.

Тревор-Ропер 2004: Тревор-Ропер Хью. Застольные беседы Гитлера. 1941-1944 / Перевод с английского, «Центрполиграф», Москва, 2004.

Шафаренко 1978: Шафаренко П.М. На разных фронтах: Записки командира дивизии. Воениздат, Москва, 1978.

A 2. magyar hadsereg megsemmisülése a Donnál. In: A 2. magyar hadsereg megsemmisülése a Donnál. A Hadtörténelmi Intézet Levéltárának anyagából összeállította és a bevezető tanulmányt írta: Dr. Horváth Miklós, Zrínyi Kiadó, Bp., 1959.

## LIST OF AUTHORS

Róbert Barta

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Attila Bárány

Institute of History, University of Debrecen – Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen, “Lendület” Research Group ‘Hungary in Medieval Europe’

Péter Debreceni

Doctoral School, Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Dmitriy Dyakov

Faculty of History, Voronezh State University

Attila Györkös

Institute of History, University of Debrecen – Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen, “Lendület” Research Group ‘Hungary in Medieval Europe’

János Mazsu

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Erzsébet Molnár D.

Doctoral School, Institute of History, University of Debrecen

György Miru

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Adám Novák

Doctoral School, Institute of History, University of Debrecen – Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen, “Lendület” Research Group ‘Hungary in Medieval Europe’

István Petrovics

Institute of History, University of Szeged

László Pószán

Institute of History, University of Debrecen – Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen, “Lendület” Research Group ‘Hungary in Medieval Europe’

Katalin Schrek

Doctoral School, Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos

Doctoral School, Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Zsolt Szilágyi

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Orsolya Tóth

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Natália Váradi

Department of History and Social Sciences, Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, Beregszász/Berehove, Ukraine

Ferenc Velkey

Institute of History, University of Debrecen

Balázs Venkovits

Institute of English and American Studies, University of Debrecen

István Vida

Institute of English and American Studies, University of Debrecen

## SZERKESZTŐI ÚTMUTATÓ

### LÁBJEGYZET

#### a) *Önálló kötetnél:*

Egyforma betűmérettel, folyamatosan: – a szerző neve – kettőspont – a kötet címe – pont – a kiadás helye – vessző – éve – pont – a kötet terjedelme (oldalszám) – pont. A kötet címét kérjük dőlt betűvel szedni.

Pl. Engel Pál: *Királyi hatalom és arisztokrácia viszonya a Zsigmond-korban*. Bp., 2005. 149.

#### b) *Gyűjteményes kötetben lévő tanulmányoknál:*

Egyforma betűmérettel, folyamatosan: – a szerző neve – kettőspont – a tanulmány címe – pont – In – pont – a kötet címe – pont – a szerkesztő(k) neve – vessző – a kiadás helye – vessző – éve – pont – oldalszám (től-ig, a két szám között nagyköötjel) – pont. A gyűjteményes kötet címét kérjük dőlt betűvel szedni.

Pl. Nagy István: Urbáriumok. In. *A Nyírség parasztsága*. Szerk. Kiss József, Nyíregyháza, 2003. 15–48.

#### c) *Folyóiratban megjelent írásoknál:*

Egyforma betűmérettel, folyamatosan: – a szerző neve – kettőspont – a tanulmány címe – pont – egyenlőségjel – a folyóirat címe – vessző – év – pont – folyóiratsorszám – pont – a szám szó rövidítése (sz.) – oldalszám (től-ig, a két szám között nagyköötjel) – pont

Pl. Nagy Sámuel: A Tisza vízrajza. = *Földrajzi Lapok*, 1999. 3. sz. 15–48.

#### d) *Levéltári hivatkozásnál:*

A levéltár nevét első előfordulásakor kérjük pontosan közölni, majd zárójelben továbbiakban – rövidített levéltári jelzet – legkisebb őrzési egység (doboz = d.; kötet = k.; kútfőnél és iktatószámánál csak: szám/év – pont).

Pl. Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Levéltár (továbbiakban HBML) IV. A 1/B. 5. k.





